

China Shocks USA: The Fight Is Already Over | Prof. Wang Wen

While the US is in high panic about "the rise of China" and its failing warmongering in the word, Beijing is at its most relaxed yet. Turns out, China is confident that it won the race roughly 10 years ago and is now only working on expanding its lead. Professor Wang Wen, Dean of the Chongyang Institute for Financial Studies at Renmin University of China, discusses how Chinese scholars view Trump's second administration, trade pressure, China's domestic development, and US-China competition. He shares his views on Iran, Taiwan risks, BRICS, the Belt and Road Initiative, global governance, green energy, AI, and why he believes cooperation can replace conflict. Links: Chongyang Institute for Financial Studies, Renmin University of China: <https://rdcy.ruc.edu.cn> Neutrality Studies substack: <https://pascallottaz.substack.com> Merch: <https://neutralitystudies.com/shop> Donation: <https://neutralitystudies.com/donate> Timestamps: 00:00:00 Trump and China's Response 00:12:14 China's Long-Term Development Model 00:18:39 US-China Conflict Risks 00:23:17 China's Future Advantages 00:30:32 Iran War and US Power 00:36:39 BRICS and Chinese Foreign Policy 00:44:57 China, Realism and Peaceful Coexistence

#Pascal

Welcome back, everybody, to Neutrality Studies. Today, for the first time, with Professor Wang Wen, the Dean of the Chongyang Institute for Financial Studies at Renmin University of China. Professor Wang, welcome.

#Wang Wen

Thank you. Thank you for the opportunity to give me.

#Pascal

It's fantastic to have a Chinese scholar here, and you've been—actually, you are one of the very attentive people who try to analyze international relations. And that's why I would like to ask you, you know, a little bit mainly about China's relationship today with the United States. And maybe let's start with Donald Trump, because it's hard to get past him. How do you think Chinese people actually view the second Trump administration?

#Wang Wen

Yeah, well, this is a very important question. You know, Trump is so famous. Also, he's very famous in China. Every Chinese person knows him. But the problem is that gradually, you know, compared

to eight years ago or two years ago when he got to office again, I think the Chinese people now have formed many consensuses about Trump 2.0. Let me show you a few consensuses of Chinese people's viewpoints on Trump 2.0. First is that Trump 2.0 is a concentrated outbreak of inherent contradictions within the American system. The transactional America First policy is rapidly eroding American global leadership. As I said, compared to Trump 1.0, who took office in 2017, Trump 2.0 is no longer merely about impacting the Washington establishment, but a systematic transformation of U.S. governance rules, purging the federal public office system, unlimited expression of executive power. So now we can see from the Chinese people, I mean, especially Chinese scholars...

#Wang Wen

Most Chinese academics agree that all of Trump's policies are driven by short-term electoral and commercial interests, lacking any medium- or long-term global governance planning. These policies are actively undermining the global order framework built by the U.S. after World War II, objectively accelerating the multipolarization process. So I think for Chinese people, especially for Chinese scholars, nowadays President Trump is destroying American hegemony. That's, I think, a very important consensus on Trump 2.0.

#Pascal

You know, there are people in my world, in this bubble of this YouTube bubble, that try to analyze U. S. hegemony, that argue that overall Trump is not that exceptional because overall, the Trump administration continues with this hegemonic approach: the war on Iran, the proxy war on Russia, the undermining of the global order that doesn't benefit the United States anymore. So it's still kind of the continuation of U.S. expansionism, and also its ratcheting up of war rhetoric with China. And the U.S. bases are not going away, and the energy shock is rather also causing problems for the Chinese economy. What do you and Chinese scholars make of such arguments? Do you think this is, you know, just the latest version of a long-term strategy, or is this, you know, Donald Trump as a kind of a very bizarre administration that's actually harming U.S. interests more than it helps?

#Wang Wen

Yeah, I agree with you. You know, for most Chinese scholars, they think that competing with China is a longstanding strategic consensus between the two U.S. parties. But the problem is that Trump 2.0's businessman-like transactional thinking allows more controllable negotiation space in China-U. S. games. Whether it's Biden or Trump, the underlying logic of the U.S. positioning China as its primary strategic competitor remains unchanged, as you mentioned right now. However, the biggest difference from the Biden era is that Trump is not fixated on ideological confrontation. All negotiations are measured by economic gains and reciprocal exchanges. In 2025, I mean, last year, the U.S. raised the tariffs on Chinese goods to 145%.

However, many U.S. domestic businesses protested, and inflationary pressure forced the U.S. to actively seek multiple rounds of trade negotiations with China. So I think there were a lot of cases confirming our shared judgment. Trump's tough stance on China is a means to an end. The real goal is to gain economic benefits. So this leaves a window for China-U.S. relations to manage differences and engage in pragmatic cooperation in certain areas. And another point I want to share with you is that, because you mentioned containment, or Trump's so-called competitive strategy, but nowadays, from China's side, we think the comprehensive external pressure has not... So that's what makes us more and more confident. Look at the...

#Wang Wen

The changes happened in the past eight years. I'll give you an example. When Trump launched his first trade war in 2018, there was considerable anxiety in Chinese public opinion. But what was the result by 2026, I mean this year? The blockade spurred independent innovation. China is rising in semiconductors, ships, new energy vehicles, photovoltaics, robotics, large-scale models, and more. So I don't know whether you read my very interesting article written last year, which was cited by media outlets in over 20 countries, including The Economist. My article last year was that, thanks to Trump for making China great again. This article stated that extreme external pressure cannot impede Chinese-style modernization. Instead, it has allowed us to fill gaps in our industrial chain, expand our global cooperation, and achieve a qualitative leap in our strategic resilience.

#Pascal

Hey, just a very quick note. The best way to support this channel is by signing up for my free Substack. You can also help with a paid subscription there, or you can get some of our new merch on neutralitystudies.com. Links below. See you there. So, yeah, that is a very—it's a very good title for a very good article. And it actually, you know, made me wonder whether you and other Chinese scholars actually kind of think like, thank you, Trump, like, for being a teacher without wanting to be one. Is that kind of a sentiment that is currently around in China, that, okay, we can learn a lot from what's going on over there? Let's make the best out of it.

#Wang Wen

Well, yes, I agree with you. Nowadays, more and more Chinese people, when they face Trump 2.0, are becoming more and more confident. I must tell you a fact: China may be better at dealing with the US than the US is at dealing with China. China is not afraid of Trump 2.0. On the contrary, China has successfully responded to Trump's trade war, high-tech war, and other containment and suppression efforts. So I think this self-confidence is the proactive self-confidence in dealing with external games. As I said, eight years ago, when Trump 1.0 came to power, when faced with a sudden trade war, China responded more positively and took advantage of the situation.

However, after the Trump 2.0 cycle, China has learned to proactively shape U.S.-China relations. Let me give a few examples. At the economic and trade level, we have accurately implemented rare earth export controls, energy product tariff countermeasures, and unreliable entity-list reciprocity constraints, and we no longer persistently endure unilateral barriers. At the global governance level, we rely on BRICS, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, Belt and Road Initiative expansion, and cooperation in the Global South to hedge against U.S. unilateralism.

And more importantly, very interesting is that China's experience, though, is that at the communication level with the U.S., we take the initiative to conduct hierarchical dialogues, distinguish different topics such as economic, trade, climate change, humanities, and security, to set cooperation agendas, proactively manage risks, and avoid escalation of conflicts with the U.S. So now it's very obvious that, as you mentioned, in the past eight years, the mentality of Chinese people has changed very clearly. In the past, we persistently adapted to the rules set by the United States. But now we have the ability to balance the differences, proactively create opportunities for bilateral cooperation, and are no longer dictated by the lens of U.S. policy. That's one kind of Chinese self-confidence.

#Pascal

That is very interesting, because what I hear from your words is that you are actually rather optimistic about China's ability to deal with the United States. So does that influence now the planning, the future planning of the U.S.-China relationship, that China doesn't feel that they just need to deal with anything being thrown at them, but that they can also now start long-term planning of how to proactively approach the U.S. and balance things? Is that the thinking in Beijing these days?

#Wang Wen

Well, I think you mentioned why China has more and more confidence, self-confidence in dealing with the United States. I think the fundamental confidence is in China's own development path. So, because—let me explain to you—because I think many Western public opinions have fallen into a cognitive misunderstanding. They think that China-U.S. relations are a zero-sum competition, and they believe that China's development goal is to surpass and defeat the United States. I think this is precisely the biggest misunderstanding of Chinese development logic. Let me tell you that the development goal of China has never been to defeat any country, but to improve the people's livelihood, achieve common prosperity for all people, and complete national rejuvenation.

So now I think, even though it has been in a competitive environment among major powers for a long time, from Europe, from Japan, or from the U.S., China's policy focus has always been based on domestic demand. I don't know whether you know, this year is the first year of our 15th Five-Year

Plan. The 15th Five-Year Plan focuses on boosting domestic demand, technological innovation, urban-rural balance, and ecological protection, ensuring tens of millions of jobs every year, improving the pension and medical system, and continuing to revitalize the countryside.

All strategic starting points are the needs of a better life for the 1.4 billion Chinese people. But look at Trump's rule. Look at American society. There is so much polarization between rich and poor in the United States. There are so many problems that the welfare of the people at the bottom has shrunk. So I think our confidence is that our target has never been to catch up with the United States, but to continue to do our own things well. So we become more and more confident because we do very well, much better than before. So China has become much better than before. And we think that we can have more confidence to deal with the U.S.

#Pascal

This is very interesting, you know, because what you're saying is the goal of China is self-improvement and not to hurt the other one. And that's the motivating factor. But, you know, when we listen to a lot of the rhetoric that comes out of Washington, or even among the think tanks and so on, they now have a goal of disturbing or preventing China from building the One Belt, One Road initiative. And they're very proud, you know, that they picked off Venezuela. And now, you know, Colombia is going to get a right-wing government and they're going to leave the Chinese orbit. The West keeps thinking about who do we control and who does China control. But you're saying that's not the point. That's not what we are after. So in this sense, China is probably not very worried about Venezuela and Colombia because it's like they do what they do, and then China will do something different, right?

#Wang Wen

Yeah, I think in the future, the ultimate area of U.S.-China competition is not tariffs or technological barriers or coercion of other countries, but a contest of domestic governance capability. That's why we believe that time is on China's side in the long run, favoring stable and continuous development policy. So that's why in media we often report that American society is divided, American policy is volatile, and each administration overturns many of its predecessor's policies. So in contrast, over the past four decades, China has consistently implemented its medium- and long-term plans with strategies such as targeted poverty alleviation, common prosperity, new quality productivity, and green transformation, continuously taking efforts.

So I think gradually, in the long term, China's continuous, massive market, complete industrial system, and institutional advantages that coordinate development and security will continue to narrow the gap in comprehensive national strength between China and the U.S. So that's our fundamental basis for our long-term confidence. But look at the United States. The U.S. has so many

conflicts with the outside world. They will stop and prevent the U.S.'s sustainable development in the long term. So when we compare it, you can find why Chinese people have more and more confidence.

#Pascal

But does it not worry you when you see how the United States is trying to actively hurt its other powers on the world stage, like the war with Russia, NATO's war with Russia, and especially now the war with Iran? Doesn't it worry Chinese strategic thinkers like you that you think, like, okay, we might be next. They might try to transform Taiwan or the Philippines into Ukraine for China in order to drain our resources. Is this not being discussed?

#Wang Wen

I think maybe last year or in the past, we often worried about it. We worried about maybe whether China would be the next one where war would be launched by the U.S. But nowadays, I mean, especially this year, we become more confident because, I don't know whether you know, this year, this May, President Trump with China—the two leaders of the U.S. and China—we organized a new consensus. We reached—the two leaders reached—a new consensus: a constructive, strategic, and stable relationship. The core of this leadership is cooperation as a primary focus, orderly competition, manageable differences, and prospects of peace.

So this is extremely important. So I think this year is very important, which was misunderstood or ignored by a lot of public opinion in the West. This year, in my opinion, the U.S. and China are escaping the Thucydides Trap. Both countries are very rational. Maybe, as you may know, although some countries such as Japan or the Philippines, and even Europe, hope for a war between the U.S. and China, the leaders of China and the U.S. are very rational, at least at the strategic level. In my opinion, even President Trump is a very controversial person. But Trump is the most rational person in Washington political circles regarding China policy.

This year, the two leaders of China and the U.S. will have four face-to-face meetings. This is very rare. And because of the, as I said, constructive, strategic, stable relationship, this is a very important new consensus. And more important is that we are experiencing a new era of interaction between major powers in President Trump's 2.0 administration. For example, the U.S.-China-Russia relationship. Perhaps, I guess, at the APEC summit this November in Shenzhen, China, we will see a photo of President Xi Jinping, President Trump, and President Putin together. A new type of big power relationship. Of course, I don't see this as a G3-level action.

I just want to say that I see it as the beginning of a post-Cold War era led by three major powers, just as the United States, Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom led the establishment of the Yalta system after World War II. So that also demonstrates that China's response and China's countermeasures to Trump 2.0 over the past few years, and even to the U.S. containment policies

over the past 20 years or so, have been very, very successful, because the U.S. agrees with China on a new consensus: constructive strategic stability. So the era, in my opinion, the era of vicious competition between China and the U.S. is passing. So that's why, as you mentioned, I'm very, very optimistic about China-U.S. relations.

#Pascal

It's so interesting that you're saying that because, you know, to me, it seems it's going the other way. It seems to be that the United States is gearing up for more, not just competition, but actual conflict. Maybe not direct, a kinetic fight with China, but at least the trade war to try to hurt Chinese interests. But you're much more optimistic, and I just want to ask, like, what you just portrayed, is this your expectation of what will happen, or is it your assessment of what China's strategy is probably going to be, what China wants to push the relationship? Yeah.

#Wang Wen

Yes, as I said, China's strategy of development is not to conquer other countries. China just focuses on our own self and focuses on the broader global trends. So if we observe the world, as well as China and the U.S.' future, from a more crucial perspective of broader global trends, China has achieved a systematic and forward-looking strategic layout at the forefront of the global future. If we observe U.S.-China competition decades ago, that condition was characterized by the U.S. leading and China catching up. But now, in the cutting-edge emerging fields that will determine the global landscape for the next 30 years, China has already completed a forward-looking and systematic layout, achieving structural leadership and the pace of advancement in multiple core future tracks.

Let me explain to you, for example, in the track of low-carbon and green development. China is the only country in the world to have built a full-chain, large-scale, and industrialized green energy system with a pace of development far exceeding that of the U.S. You look at four cores of low-carbon industry globally: wind power, photovoltaics, lithium batteries, and new energy vehicles. China's production capacity, output, and exports account for more than half of the global total. So look at the future. It can be said that the standards, industrial chain, and implementation model for global green transformation in the future are basically defined, supplied, and led by China.

That's one future track. The second track—the second track—is about modern social governance. In the field of modern social governance, China has formed a globally unique, highly efficient governance system domestically, transforming its institutional advantage into a long-term development advantage. So if you come to China, you can see that, relying on a systematic approach to digital governance, grassroots governance, and emergency response, China has built the world's largest digital governance system, enabling precise and efficient implementation of public services, social control, and emergency response.

If you look at China's COVID pandemic prevention and control, if you look at disaster emergency response, if you look at China's rural revitalization, if you look at China's common prosperity, if you look at China's full-scale construction of smart cities, smart communities, China has achieved a stable, precise, inclusive, sustainable modern governance model. So I think this is what we call a domestic governance capability. So these domestic governance capabilities balance efficiency and fairness, balance development and security, balance short-term livelihood and long-term development.

So I think this is a very powerful domestic governance capacity. That is a core advantage that the American-style system cannot replicate. So it's also the underlying support for China's long-term stable development and continuous accumulation of momentum. And another very important, and you might be very interested in, another track, that is China now competing very seriously. That is AI and future computing power. We can compare China and the U.S. China now has achieved multi-dimensional advancement in application implementation, basic computing power, and industrial ecosystem. Yes, I agree. So U.S. advantages, I cannot deny U.S. advantages, still has a lot of advantages in fundamental areas such as underlying algorithms and high-end GPU chips.

But the problem is that China's overall layout leads in the future direction, such as total electricity, AI industrialization, scenario implementation, and space-based intelligence computing power. So what I want to say is that now China focuses on our domestic construction. We, our top leader, their 99% energy focuses on domestic construction, to make us, you know, push and promote our body healthy and healthy, stronger and stronger. As long as our body, our national body, strengthens, becomes much stronger than before, no external strength can conquer us, can occupy us, can beat us. So I think that's very, very important. That's a different strategic method. For the United States, their leaders focus on external expansion, external conflict with other countries. But for Chinese leaders, we focus on domestic development. That's a very, very big difference. So in the future, I think time belongs to China.

#Pascal

This is really very interesting because you're not conceptualizing it as China becoming number one, because that's not the point. China wants to continue to develop. Whatever the other ones do, I don't care. We just continue developing to the moon and beyond. But there is this danger that the United States or others in the West, including Europe, might start using violent means. I mean, Iran—what happened to Iran, and the war that was started by the United States by an aggressive attack, again, like a breach of the UN Charter and whatnot—isn't that a threat? Or how does this war and also, you know, the continuous, from my view, lies by the United States trying to use diplomacy as a way to pretend that everything is fine, but then strike militarily when it's convenient for them—doesn't that create kind of—isn't that a threat to China? Or how does this war impact China's assessment of U.S. capabilities?

#Wang Wen

I think, first of all, I admit that the U.S.-Iran conflict is a huge tragedy. The war now has crossed the red line of the earlier tacit understanding, and the risks are escalating now, especially since July, the resumption of the hostilities. Both sides have shifted from simply striking military targets to attacking each other's energy infrastructure, even breaking the previous consensus of not touching civilian facilities. So now I think the Middle East, the area, is sliding into a deeper vortex of confrontation. So that's a very, very dangerous condition in the Middle East. It's very obvious the U.S. now is hijacked by Israel. But in reality, you ask me, Chinese people, whether Chinese feel the threat from the U.S.?

No. I think from the Iran conflict with the U.S., it shows that the U.S. is still a paper tiger, lacking the capacity for a protracted war. Because we all know that many American scholars and analysts believe that this war, the United States has already lost. The U.S. has changed nothing. It failed to push for regime change in Iran. It failed to gain control of the Strait of Hormuz. It failed to control global oil prices. And it failed to protect the interests of Gulf states. The U.S. is a complete loser in this war. So, because of the domestic political polarization in the U.S., coupled with the approaching midterm elections, the White House is unable to bear the cost of the prolonged high-intensity war.

And now U.S. Gulf allies are also generally unwilling to be directly involved in the long-term conflict. So that's why I think, as Chairman Mao Zedong said many, many years ago, the U.S. is a paper tiger. And this war between the U.S. and Iran, the U.S. would lose this war far worse than the Vietnam War and the Afghanistan War, in my opinion. And historically, we can observe the U.S. war history with other countries. The U.S. has never been able to conquer or defeat a country with a population exceeding 30 million. And how about Iran? Iran has 80 million. It's the middle and the big power regionally. And also Vietnam. Vietnam, that time in the 1960s, 50 million, or exceeding 30 million. So I think the U.S. especially needs to respect those regional powers.

The U.S. needs to respect those countries with civilized traditions, including Iran, to be honest. For China, of course, the U.S. needs to respect us, with a long civilized tradition. Of course, China's population is much bigger. So that's why I think, for Chinese people, we observe the war between the U.S. and Iran. It could promote us more confident than before, because the U.S. cannot conquer Iran. How dare it conquer China? So, as our observation, we just sometimes feel it is a very, very big tragedy, big tragedy for those people who died in the war, especially for those Iranian people, especially for those primary school students in Iran. So that's my observation and opinion.

#Pascal

Maybe the very last kind of complex that I just would like to ask your opinion about is, like, China's cooperation with the BRICS states and these regional cooperations with Russia, Iran, but extending South Africa, Brazil, and so on, and the One Belt, One Road initiative. Should we understand China's interaction with other powers the way that you described earlier, just as part and parcel of trying to improve China and, in that context, try to improve relations and try to improve trade with others? Or

are there more geopolitical aspects behind it, like trying to build a network to resist, for instance, Western pressure when it comes to the banking network or to trade networks? How should we understand China's larger foreign policy approach?

#Wang Wen

Well, I think you launched a very important question about China's future. If I can understand it like this, now, you know, as a think tank scholar, we think for our country. Because nowadays, China's national strength has become much more powerful than before. We grew up very quickly. Our economic value has become much bigger than before. So what should we do? What do we want from the world? This is a new question to us. Every day we think about it. And also this, and then we consult for our government. And also our government, you know, gradually, China has a new strategic ambition. This ambition—what about China's foreign policy ambition? I think at least five points, if I can share with you.

First, we want to pursue a peaceful development environment shared by all countries. China hopes to maintain universal peace, oppose hegemonism, power politics, and various camp confrontations, and create a stable development environment for all humanity. So therefore, as you can see, in the past many years, China has launched a Global Security Initiative to prevent the world from falling into new turmoil and division, allowing all countries to pursue development with peace of mind. That's one ambition. The second ambition is that we want to promote common prosperity globally. China wants to break the unfair pattern of a few countries monopolizing the dividends of development so that the fruits of development can benefit people all over the world more widely and equitably.

So therefore, through the platforms, as you mentioned, the Belt and Road Initiative and the Global Development Initiative, China is helping countries in the Global South, especially in ASEAN, to address infrastructure shortcomings, cultivate independent development capability, and promote more diversified sources of global economic growth. A third strategic ambition for China's foreign policy in the future is that we want to build a more just and reasonable global governance system. So that's why I think China hopes to change the old governance rules and the old governance system dominated by the West, and promote the reform of the international order towards consultation, joint negotiations, and shared benefits.

So therefore, China advocates genuine multilateralism, supports the UN in playing a central role, and enhances the voice of developing countries in international affairs through mechanisms such as AIIB, BRICS cooperation, and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, ensuring that global affairs are handled through joint consultation among all countries. And I think the fourth foreign policy ambition of China is that we want to safeguard a diverse and inclusive ecosystem of human civilization. Because China hopes, as you know, China has a long civilizational history.

China hopes that different civilizations and different developmental paths in the world can be respected. So we disagree with the so-called clash of civilizations launched by Samuel Huntington many, many years ago. And the final strategic or foreign policy ambition, of course, is China working together to address common challenges to human survival and development. Because we all know nowadays we have so many common threats, such as climate change, digital governance, and public health. So China just hopes to encourage countries around the world to transcend differences and jointly solve common problems facing all humanity. So that's why China is promoting the world's largest low-carbon revolution. China hopes to work with all countries to safeguard our shared home, Earth.

So my conclusion is that we should, when we observe China, when we think about China's rise, we need to jump from traditional international relations theory, the realist theory of international relations. Because if you think about China in terms of the realist theory of international studies, maybe you can get a conclusion that, oh yes, China rises up, then China will become the next Nazi Germany. No. If you jump from Western international relations realist theory, you can see that what China wants has never been to dominate the world, but to work with all countries to build a community with a shared future for mankind, so that the world is free from hegemonic oppression and development gaps and achieves common progress for all mankind.

So from this point, you can explain everything China did in the past many decades. For example, we have even a neighbor conflict, neighbor differences with the Philippines. We have full military strength to maybe push the military unification of Taiwan. But we didn't. We didn't do that. We just keep patience and solve it step by step. This is resilience and patience of new big power strategy. So I think this is very interesting. So how to judge the new style of big power thriving? I think we need to push our thinking and innovation. So as a think tank scholar from China, we just try our best to explain China's rising-up logic to the foreigners.

#Pascal

That's my opinion. This is fascinating. I actually wanted to ask you exactly about that, about Western realism. And just the very last point, because, you know, I think John Mearsheimer is also a famous scholar in China, right? And one of his main points that I struggle with is that he builds the entire thinking of realism around the inevitability of security competition. And if I understand you correctly, then you would probably disagree and say, like, security competition is not what we do. We compete, but we compete for development, not for security. And hence, I would understand you as saying, like, no, on this point, Mr. Mearsheimer doesn't correctly assess what China actually wants. Is that the case?

#Wang Wen

Yeah, actually, Professor John Mearsheimer, he's my long-term friend. I invited him to deliver lectures at our university twice. I think that, yes, we have a lot of debate, but we respect each other very well. We often contact by email. That's the new style, like the new style of relationship between the U.S. and China in the future. I think we do not reject fair competition with the United States. And we continuously seek a model of mutual respect and peaceful coexistence. I think in the long run, China and the U.S. are destined to coexist, and competition will be the norm. But conflict and confrontation are by no means inevitable. Because as I said, China's original aspiration for development remains unchanged.

All its forward-looking plans, industrial upgrading, governance reforms, technological breakthroughs, have never had the ultimate goal of defeating or surpassing the United States, but rather of addressing its own development shortcomings, improving the quality of life for its people, and achieving sustainable national development. So I think compared to passively responding to the United States in the past, China's capacity rises up very quickly. In the past, China followed the rules and adapted to the existing landscape. But now, we proactively plan our own path, shape the rules, shape the new rules, and lead the new trends. Because we are increasingly convinced that time is on the side of long-termism. Time is on the side of stable development. And time is on the side of inclusive and win-win cooperation. That's our thinking and our vision, trust, and our idea.

#Pascal

Professor Wang, that makes me very happy to hear that, because quite often my discussions, in the end, they become very gloomy about the future of humanity and whatnot. But you're giving me a very positive outlook. I am very grateful for that. People who want to find your work and who would like to follow you or your institute, where should they go?

#Wang Wen

Yes. Yeah, they can click our website, the rdcy.ruc.edu.cn. So welcome any friends to contact me. We can debate, we can discuss, we can make friends. And I think that now we need more and more thinking innovation. In the past, we trusted the Western theory of international relations. But now I think only those Western international relations theories are not enough to understand the new world. For China, we wake up, we rise up. But the problem is that after we become much more powerful and stronger than before, every day we learn from U.S. successful experience. But simultaneously, we learn from the U.S. negative lessons. We always caution. We always suggest to our policymakers that, no, no, no, don't learn from U.S. those negative issues. We just, we have, our ambition is to become a much better big power, much more civilized big power, much more beautiful world. That's our long-term strategic ambition.

#Pascal

Well, and I would encourage everybody to engage and actually to join in building a cooperative framework for global development. I find that a very, very good idea. We will certainly have you back here on this channel, Professor Wang. I hope in the future also with other scholars, maybe from Russia and other places, in order to chart that out. Professor Wang Wen, thank you so much for your time today.

#Wang Wen

Thank you. Thank you.