

Seyed M. Marandi: Iran & Yemen Unleash a New Offensive Strategy

Prof. Seyed Mohammad Marandi is a professor at Tehran University and a former advisor to Iran's nuclear negotiation team. Glenn Diesen clip channel: [https://www.youtube.com/@Prof.](https://www.youtube.com/@Prof.GlennDiesenClips)

GlennDiesenClips Follow Prof. Glenn Diesen: Substack: <https://glenndiesen.substack.com/> X/Twitter:

https://x.com/Glenn_Diesen Patreon: <https://www.patreon.com/glenndiesen> Support the research

by Prof. Glenn Diesen: PayPal: <https://www.paypal.com/paypalme/glenndiesen> Buy me a Coffee:

buymeacoffee.com/gdieseng Go Fund Me: <https://gofund.me/09ea012f> Buy merchandise:

<https://diesen-shop.fourthwall.com/en-nok> Books by Prof. Glenn Diesen: <https://www.amazon.com/stores/author/B09FPQ4MDL>

#Glenn

Welcome back. Today is August 16th, 2026, and we are joined by Seyed Mohammad Marandi. So thank you for coming back on the program.

#Marandi

Thank you for having me on your show, Glenn. It's always an honor and a pleasure.

#Glenn

Well, it seemed that Iran's strategy in this war has been, well, let's say, strategic patience. That is, it has the benefit that it can outwait the United States. And in terms of retaliation, it seems that the Iranians have been attempting to mirror whatever actions the U.S. are doing. That is, if the U.S. attacks, the Iranians respond, and with, of course, the important purpose of proving that they can go up the escalation ladder, which suggests the U.S. cannot simply escalate to force Iran to capitulate. So all of this has been, well, you can say successful. Well, successful is actually a good term, given that Iran is winning this war. But it appears to be shifting a bit. I'm not sure if it's the new IRGC leadership or simply that Iran is moving into a new phase, but it does appear that Iran is going on the offensive, and not just in terms of rhetoric, but also in action. I was wondering if you can explain what is happening in Iran.

#Marandi

Sure. I don't believe that the change in the leadership in the armed forces, or at least for the most part, the IRGC—it's not just the IRGC, it's also the regular army, but mostly the IRGC—I don't think there's any major change in that because, first of all, these commanders were in charge already.

Their names had not been declared for security reasons. I think that the fact that their names have now been declared shows a greater confidence in Iran about security. We also had, almost simultaneous with this news, other news that the president met for a seven- to eight-hour meeting, which again shows that things are moving back to normal and that the news about meetings, the highest-level meetings, are being put out there for the public, that the names of those who were leading the armed forces, who replaced the martyrs, are being declared. That, I think, is significant in itself.

What has changed is the chair of the Supreme National Security Council, with a new person being put in charge of the chairmanship of the Supreme National Security Council: Major General Mohsen Rezaei. Now, this is significant, I think, for a couple of reasons. One, I think that General Rezaei is more powerful and influential than the previous chair, who was made chair of the Supreme National Security Council after Dr. Larijani was martyred by the Trump and Netanyahu coalition. So he is a much stronger person. He has a greater background in managing key organizations. So he basically was in charge of the Guards, the Revolutionary Guards, when the war started, when Saddam Hussein invaded Iran in 1980 with the support of the West and the Soviet Union at that time.

So he led the Guards throughout those years, and when he was in charge, the Guards were a small organization with light weapons at best. So he, during those years, created effectively the IRGC into becoming what it is today. And he led it, I think, for 16 years, if I'm not mistaken. Then he also has a PhD in economics. He was a deputy to President Raisi, his economic deputy. So he knows about economic issues. He knows about political issues. He's been a high-ranking official. He's obviously a person who has a great deal of capabilities and knowledge that will be important for his position because the Supreme National Security Council is not just about war.

It's about foreign policy. It's about economics. It's about all things that are important for the security of the nation. And members of the council include key economic figures in the government, the foreign ministry, and key members of parliament for different meetings, depending on what the topic is. So he's a stronger person, he's more influential, and he has a lot more experience. That's one aspect of it. So I think that this is going to make the Supreme National Security Council a more powerful entity in the state than before, simply because of his character.

Because he, since he is so well known in political circles and he's a public figure, he can more easily coordinate the key actors in the state: the president, the speaker of parliament, the head of the judiciary, the armed forces, the state-owned foundations, and so on. In addition to that, we know that his position, his public position, towards the United States and towards the Israeli regime, and towards this coalition that has been created against Iran, is more assertive, significantly more assertive. And so I think that his view on the conflict, or on the war that's been waged against Iran, is to be more on the offensive.

In the past, as you rightly pointed out, the Iranians would retaliate as time went on. Iran's retaliation usually was more severe than the American strikes. So especially during the last episode,

the last chapter of violence after the United States tore up the MOU and restarted the war, the Iranian responses became increasingly harsh. In other words, if the Americans hit a target, the Iranians would do more. They would hit back harder. But I think that Dr. Reza's view on the situation goes further than this, and that he is going to be much more decisive.

If the United States escalates, whether through economic pressure or military pressure, I think that his response is going to be much more decisive and much more painful to the anti-Iranian coalition. So I think this is a substantial change. And also, since he is a major general, all of the commanders and all of the different parts of the armed forces, he's going to be able to easily communicate with them and understand their issues. And so he's going to be able to help the armed forces more than probably anyone else.

#Glenn

Well, I see the United States having, well, let's say, locked itself into—painted itself into a corner. That is, it doesn't have any more, or if it ever had, any convincing path to victory. So it can't win, but also it doesn't know how to put an end to the war either. It, of course, has signed documents, most importantly the Memorandum of Understanding. But for the Americans, I think it's politically impossible to actually follow through on what they have signed. That is, it was difficult to see them formally accepting Hormuz being under Iranian administration. They can't really end sanctions. They won't return Iran's assets, the reparations of 300 billion. I mean, they might sign it, but they can't actually do it, which means that they can't win, and they don't have a way out for peace either.

And meanwhile, Trump, of course, in his desperation, is digging a deeper and deeper hole in terms of his rhetoric. That is, you know, the Strait of Hormuz is now wide open. It's in U.S. control. The steel wall has been formed. And, well, after Iran has been completely defeated, the Strait of Hormuz will be U.S. territory. I mean, all this rhetoric, it seems to get more outlandish the worse the situation gets for the United States. But it kind of shows the desperation they're in, though. And when the great powers are desperate, they can do, well, not just foolish things, but very aggressive things. I was wondering, how do you see the days, if not weeks, ahead? Do you expect another round of war?

#Marandi

There is a possibility of war. The Americans have informed Iran through third parties that they are preparing for a strike, preparing for a war. The Iranians—now, it doesn't mean that will necessarily happen—but those messages have been sent. The Iranians have also seen the U.S. buildup in the region. They are prepared for war. And the Iranians are preparing for war. They're fully prepared, and they're continuing to expand their missile program, their drone program. They're developing new missiles. They are expanding their underground missile and drone bases and their factories, as well as their command and control centers, basically preparing also the country for a long-term war. The government has been shifting towards a wartime economy.

And I think the Supreme National Security Council has played an important role in that as well. So Iran is prepared both for another war, wave of attacks that could last at least a week or two. And they are also preparing for a war that would last until the end of Trump's presidency. Now, it doesn't mean that the war will last until then, and it doesn't mean that the United States will strike, but the Iranians are preparing themselves. Also, the Iranians have warned that right now the Strait of Hormuz is closed, of course, but Iran does allow some ships to go through, both through its own corridor, which is easily accessible through the internet, but also from the Omani coastline. Some ships do go through, and those are largely with Iranian coordination.

In other words, through the Iranian corridor, ships that are from countries friendly to Iran, they can pass through. Those that haven't participated in the war pass. But sometimes there may be a ship or some ships that are from countries that are friendly to Iran, but they are afraid to go from the Iranian corridor out of fear of punishment. So on some occasions, the Iranians allow them to go alongside the Omani coast. Or there are some deals going on. I mean, there are negotiations taking place, and there have always been negotiations taking place between Iran and the countries in the Persian Gulf. So sometimes Iran allows some ships to go through based on agreements that exist between, let's say, the United Arab Emirates and Iran.

So these things do exist. But if the United States escalates economic warfare, the Iranians—we've heard that the Iranians could start targeting U.S. naval ships. Iran is known to have capabilities that it has not used because it does not want to go up the escalation ladder too far, for the time being at least. But also, Iran will completely shut down the Strait of Hormuz. That will be one of its responses. And that means just complete shutdown, where nothing gets through, and probably no pipelines would be functioning either, whether in the Emirates or in Saudi Arabia. So the Iranians are prepared for all sorts of escalation, whether it's economic escalation, whether it's military escalation, but ultimately they're prepared for a very long fight. Yeah.

#Glenn

No, like I said, I think at the heart of the problem now is, I think, that the U.S.'s only off-ramp for them, which works, would be a return to the old status quo, while for obvious reasons the old status quo is completely unacceptable for Iran. I mean, can't have 47 more years of this. But given that it's likely leading up to another escalation, and Iran is now prepared to, well, act more confidently or go on the offensive, what might we see from Iran? What does that translate into in actions? Do you think the Iranians might go after some U.S. aircraft carriers? Will they go after the U.S. satellite states in the Gulf region in a tougher way? How do you see this happening? Because at the same time as we see the escalation and Iran's preparedness to take a harder line, you also see countries like the UAE apparently transferring money to Iran, again, these are the reports, to, I guess, buy its way out of this conflict. I was wondering, what is happening here? Because something is obviously brewing.

#Marandi

Well, I don't know the exact details, but something is happening between Iran and the Emirates. I don't know if Iran would call it reparations or what it would call it, but the Emirates, of course, has played a very devastating role, like all the others. They assisted the United States in targeting Iran and killing Iranian civilians and citizens and leaders, but also Iranian infrastructure, of course. And by the way, these countries in the Persian Gulf that have assisted the United States in this war, it's not just that they've given their airspace or their territory or access to their space and their territory to use against Iran. They also fund the war.

Because the U.S. bases in these countries, the expenses are paid for by the host countries. And during the war, when the expenses were going up, they gave more assistance. In fact, the Iranians have evidence that at some point during the 40-day hot war, the Qataris were having problems paying the taxes. They didn't have the cash necessary, for whatever technical reasons or whatever reasons, to fund this. So their role in this war has been quite outrageous in the eyes of Iranians. But in any case, there is something going on between the Emirates and Iran at the moment. Again, I don't know the details, but that is linked to why there is a limited number of ships that are allowed to pass through the Strait of Hormuz.

#Marandi

I think the Iranians are going to, as the Americans would like us to say, for them all options are on the table. And that would mean both targeting U.S. naval assets, but also the countries that have been hosting U.S. bases. And the United States has not left these countries. Their bases have been either destroyed or partially destroyed, or mostly destroyed—not partially destroyed. But U.S. forces are now based in hotels, in buildings that are not linked to any military bases. So they currently exist, especially in Kuwait and in Bahrain. Their governments are particularly helpful to the U.S. military.

But in Saudi Arabia and the Emirates and in... and also in Oman, they have a significant presence. I think that the Iranians are weighing all their options. It depends on the form of escalation. If the United States escalates in a particular way, they will respond in a particular way. That's what we've seen throughout this five and a half months. But the difference today is that it seems clear that Ayatollah Khamenei wanted Major General Rezaei to be the chair of the Supreme National Security Council because he wants to respond to U.S. and Israeli aggression against Iran, but also across the region, in a more decisive and proactive way.

#Glenn

Well, if in this retaliation, the Iranians obviously not only go after the United States and Israel, but go after the Gulf monarchies, how vulnerable are they now? Because they already have taken quite a hit over the past few months. But if we're talking about going up the escalation ladder again, what might we be looking at here, though?

#Marandi

Well, Glenn, if we look at Iran's military capabilities and how they've evolved from True Promise 1, when Ismail Haniyeh was martyred in Tehran right after President Pezeshkian's inaugural ceremony, Iran struck the Israeli regime, and it was called True Promise 1. If you compare True Promise 1 to True Promise 2, and then 3 and 9, at the beginning of this war, the current war, and the latest chapter in this war a few weeks ago, when Americans restarted the fighting after tearing up the MOU effectively, we see that Iran's capabilities have improved dramatically at all levels, whether it's air defense and downing U.S. drones, whether it's Iran's capabilities in striking with greater precision and greater devastation, Iran's capabilities have changed. And the very fact that also they've announced the names of the new commanders who've been in charge already for the last few months.

But it shows that the underground facilities that need to be created for warfare have been put in place, have been built. It shows that Iran's missile capabilities are improving. In other words, R&D continues as the war goes on, and of course they have enormous experience now with their missiles. So in the next chapter, I think that Iran's strikes will be far more decisive, and Iran will be capable of doing whatever they want to these monarchies in the Persian Gulf very swiftly. So, I don't—you know, I've always said, and I've said this for years, that these monarchies put themselves at risk by assisting the United States in aggression. And I've said during the past few months that these countries will collapse if Iran targets them in retaliation, if Trump actually carries out his threat to send Iran back to the Stone Age and so on. But literally every day that goes by, Iran's capabilities increase.

And so I think it becomes easier and easier for Iran to hurt them decisively and to inflict pain on them that they simply cannot tolerate. But also, Iran's capabilities in striking the Israeli regime are much greater today than even a few months ago. The precision of Iranian missiles is becoming far more devastating. And so I think that the Iranians, if the war expands, will easily be able to destroy very key and sensitive installations and assets of the Israeli regime, whether inside the 1967 borders or beyond, or whether in Lebanon or Syria. The pain that Iran can inflict on the Israeli regime now is far greater because of the precision of the missiles and because of their ability to use evasive measures, and also because of the shortages that the United States and the Israeli regime now have when it comes to air defenses. And Iran is producing new missiles and drones far faster than the Americans have the ability to build new air defense missiles.

#Glenn

Well, that is what I assume would have to be a calculation for the Americans when they do their strategic planning here or think about doing another round of war. If I was in the U.S., I would look at how the numbers continue to go in the wrong direction. Not just put the global economy aside, but we see that in the U.S. they have these growing weapons shortages. I mean, it's becoming a bit of a scandal in the U.S., how they're running out of weapons, how irresponsible it is. But at the same time, we're seeing the Iranians building up. So you would assume that some would be looking for a diplomatic off-ramp. But as I said, none is forthcoming. But there are small things happening, it seems. That is, you know, the U.S. could simply just walk away from this and pretend they won. And as Scott Bessent said, pretend, you know, the Strait of Hormuz is irrelevant.

You know, I'm hoping he said that for a reason, that they might walk away. But you also see countries like the UAE apparently handing over some money to Iran to, well, part of some deal. I haven't heard any developments now on the deal between Oman and Iran. But apparently, well, they are still discussing how to manage the Strait of Hormuz. And then you have other countries, be it this defense pact we talked about before about Turkey, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia seeking to have something in place as the U.S. presence diminishes. So things are happening on the diplomatic front as well. I was just wondering, is there anything there you see having some great potential, or are these still not, you know, worth what I'm looking for here? They're still not changing the situation on the ground.

#Marandi

A number of important changes have taken place. But first of all, the negotiations between Iran and Oman are over. The text is finalized. They're just not declaring anything because there's no reason to do so. Because there's a war going on, the United States has imposed a siege, so there's no purpose in declaring some agreement over the Strait of Hormuz. And this, I'm just speculating, perhaps Trump would use this as a means to manipulate the oil market. So there's no purpose in announcing this because it's not going to bring about any change. This will only be implemented when this strait is open. And for the time being, there's no news of that. So there is no disagreement between the two countries. They've effectively ended their negotiations with success. But they're just putting it into a file in some office building for a later date.

But with regards to the region, it's obvious that the Saudis underestimated Yemen in a very big way. And we're seeing that play itself out, both with the ease in which Yemen strikes Saudi oil installations, but also the way in which the Yemeni armed forces are destroying Saudi regime forces inside Yemen and their proxies. We're seeing them using missiles and drones to devastate Saudi assets in areas of Yemen occupied by forces loyal to the Saudi regime. And that, of course, that is why it was clear that they miscalculated when they bombed the Yemeni International Airport and started this war. And the Yemenis used this as an opportunity to begin forcing the Saudi regime to end the blockade on the Yemeni people. So they imposed a counter-blockade on Saudi Arabia. So now Saudi oil exports are affected.

Saudi installations are being targeted, and Saudi-linked forces and Saudi forces are being hammered. And that's why the Saudis and Turkey and Pakistan gathered together. It's not about... They didn't do this for Gaza. It's been ongoing for three years. They didn't do it for Syria. The occupation of Syrian territory has taken place a long time ago. Well, the second wave, the new occupation—the Golan Heights have been occupied since 1967—but the new territories that have been occupied, which are far more important and far larger than the Golan Heights, in response, Saudi Arabia and Erdogan and Pakistan didn't do anything. It's not about Lebanon, southern Lebanon being occupied. It's all about Saudi Arabia and Yemen. Now, the objectives of Pakistan are very different from Saudi Arabia.

#Glenn

The objectives of Turkey are also different.

#Marandi

And we've seen that since the signing, Yemen and Saudi Arabia are fighting, and nothing much has happened on that front. Now, they may send a few ships to the Red Sea, but it's not going to—I don't believe it's going to have any serious, major benefit for Saudi Arabia. So Yemen is now showing—it's flexing its muscles—and that is going to be important in the weeks ahead. The Iraqi resistance is prepared for war, and they have said that they have not canceled the response that they're going to give to Saudi Arabia for the bombing of the Popular Mobilization Forces, which are part of the Iraqi military.

So the U.S.-Saudi bombing, they say that file is still open. And so we see that the regional component to this war is more important today than it was before. So if you go back during the last five months—well, closing in on six months—during the past, let's say, the first five months of the war, it was mostly, it was basically Iran versus the coalition. But now the resistance front is expanding. It's at work across the region. Yemen, of course, has its own grievances, but they're still coordinated. And so the closure of the Bab al-Mandab Strait and the Strait of Hormuz together increases the pressure on the United States dramatically.

But if the United States pushes for further escalation, then obviously this side can escalate further too. And also, if the Israeli regime continues with its aggression in Lebanon and in Gaza, then based on the new policy of the Supreme National Security Council, let's say, then Iran's response may be more decisive and it may take less time for it to be carried out. In other words, Iran may show less patience than before. So the Americans don't, as Trump likes to say, the Americans are not the ones with the cards. And the more the Americans escalate, the more Iran will escalate and the more Iran's allies will escalate.

And every day that goes by, Glenn, as we've been discussing for months now, the global crisis, the global economic crisis, is getting worse. Now, the timeline may be different from what I expected

because my knowledge of global economics is limited. I didn't know that, for example, China had such enormous reserves. And also Iran has been cooperating, or they've been working with some of the countries in the region, as I said, to allow limited exports or allowing its friends to export. So the timeline that I had thought would lead to a global economic catastrophe was sort of similar to what Trump had said. When he signed the MOU, he said, "In four weeks." That's what the assessment was among many in Iran.

But it's obviously taken more than—I mean, well, the Strait was closed, open for a while, but since the war restarted, I think we passed that four-week deadline period. Let's assume that during the period when the MOU was being implemented, the energy shortages didn't grow further. But I think we are, based on Trump's own calculations, whether they are very accurate or whether he was accurately reflecting what he'd been told, I think that the crisis is getting closer and closer. And it doesn't really matter if it's tomorrow, next week, or next month. That's the direction that the world is moving in. And if this conflict continues for much longer, we're ultimately going to get to a very dark place.

#Glenn

How do you make sense of the Saudi position? Again, they were already having quite a difficult time with the strikes by Iran. And now, of course, they're escalating, taking this war to Iraq and to Yemen. And it's proving to be something they can't control. That is, the retaliation, especially from Yemen, is, as you said, beyond their control. They're striking their ships. They're striking their oil facilities. This week alone, there's been a lot of dramatic footage coming out, especially from Yemen. Do you see any efforts by the Saudis to pull out of this? I'm struggling to see the strategic thinking. If you can't win, it's escalating. Why aren't you trying to put an end to this? Walk away, do something like the Emirates. Just buy your way out.

#Marandi

Saudi Arabia is complicated, but first, a couple of things. One is, I think there are striking similarities between Saudi Arabia and the United States, and Yemen and Iran, in the way in which this is playing out. Saudi Arabia underestimated Yemen, just as the United States underestimated Iran. The United States—and this shows, Glenn, that Mossad intelligence and CIA intelligence and the intelligence of Western agencies are not very good. They know far less than we thought they knew. They underestimated Iran's missile and drone capabilities, their underground cities, which are expanding.

Iran is building new missile bases, underground bases, as we speak. They underestimated them. They underestimated the number of missiles that Iran has. They underestimated the number of factories that Iran has. They underestimated the R&D, Iran's R&D, in military technology. They underestimated everything. And not just in a, let's say, significant way; they completely misread the

situation. I think that the same is true with Yemen. Yemen was quietly building up its underground capabilities, its factories, its missile and drone factories, its underground missile bases and drone bases, and the Saudis underestimated them.

And although I heard, although I believe this to be correct as well, that the Americans encouraged the Saudis to strike Sana'a International Airport and to begin this confrontation, in the belief that Yemen would not respond, or that it did not have the capability to respond. But as we're seeing, and as you pointed out, during the last few days, we've seen very impressive strikes on Saudi targets across the board. So I think that they miscalculated, they misread the situation. The Saudis, just like the United States with regards to Iran, did. But also, I think that Mohammed bin Salman is somewhat similar to Trump. These monarchies in the Persian Gulf are led by people who are surrounded by yes-men.

And of course, I'm sure they get their intelligence briefings from CENTCOM and so on. That's where they get much of their information. And CENTCOM and the U.S. intelligence agencies tell them what they want them to know, so they mislead them as well. But in any case, they're surrounded by yes-men. And, I mean, look at Mohammed bin Salman's track record. He kidnapped the Lebanese prime minister, Hariri, when he was the prime minister, imprisoned him, beat him up—the prime minister of another country. Not very smart. He began the genocidal war in Yemen with the support of the West and the entire region except for Iran. Qatar and Turkey under Erdogan supported him as he was carrying out a genocide similar to what we see in Gaza.

Although Yemen could fight back, and it was much larger. But they tried to starve the people, and they did. It failed. So that was catastrophic. Since 2015, hundreds of billions of dollars were spent on Yemen, and hundreds of billions of dollars on these megaprojects, which got him nowhere either. Again, doesn't show great wisdom. And Saudi Arabia today doesn't have the financial cushion that it had before. And this is a big issue now because of these wars and because of these megaprojects. Then he imposed the siege on Qatar, another foolish act. And we also then saw what he did to Jamal Khashoggi in Turkey.

So he's not the most, let's say, wise of leaders. And that, I think, makes him strikingly similar to Trump, even though Trump humiliates him regularly. But there are striking similarities. So it's not as if he's very wise. His actions don't show that. So Saudi Arabia is in a very difficult situation now because, as I said, it does not have the financial reserves that it used to have at all. And this, by the way, Glenn Diesen, I'm sorry for digressing, but we have to keep an eye on Japan and the Japanese currency and the fact that this continues. But also, Trump was depending—he was counting on further milking of these Arab monarchies.

He was hoping that they'd spend \$2 trillion or more for AI, for the development of AI in the United States. They're not making money. They're losing money. They need their reserves. And Saudi Arabia is particularly vulnerable. Qatar is also not doing exceptionally well. But Saudi Arabia is particularly vulnerable because it has wasted all the money on wars and on these megaprojects and

so on, these failed megaprojects. So Saudi Arabia is not in an ideal situation. And it has reflected, it has shown itself in its dealings with Iran. Saudi Arabia is now behaving differently than before. But its conflict with Yemen continues, but its behavior towards Iran has shifted, at least for the time being.

#Glenn

My last question, though, is just how you see, I guess, the international order shifting in terms of how it's possibly benefiting Iran. Because what's happening in West Asia now, in the war against Iran, it does reflect a wider trend around the world, which is the U.S. is facing growing economic problems. Of course, they're having deeper social, political problems at home. They're being balanced abroad militarily. And, well, overall, we are seeing the rise of these new rivals. I was just wondering, how do you see the world order changing? Not just as a direct result of this war, although I would say this is a huge component of this wider trend. But how is the shift in world order impacting Iran? Or how will it impact Iran?

#Marandi

Well, first, I think in the West, things are going well for Iran. Europe, because of its own foolish policies, the war in Ukraine—the war in Ukraine has had a, I mean, has had a huge impact on this war itself. I mean, part of the reason why the United States has these shortages is because of the war in Ukraine. And part of the reason why the European proxies of the United States have not been able to do anything against Iran is because they have worn themselves out. And the reverse is true as well. The U.S. war in West Asia has weakened its position in Europe and in Ukraine in particular.

So there is a strong relationship between the war in Europe and the war in West Asia. And I'm not saying the two conflicts have melted into one another, but I think the coordination between Iran and its allies and Russia are probably much greater than we think. So Europe is much weaker today, and it is declining fast. I mean, I don't think Iranians have any ill will towards ordinary Europeans, but I'm talking about the governments and NATO and the EU and the UK as, let's say, allied entities that have centuries of colonization that have influenced our lives for all these years.

#Marandi

The United States—the changes taking place there, I think, are also very good for Iran. The very fact that Trump, this whole episode of Trump in Turkey, where he fled the plane and was hidden and changed planes twice, I think—and then it turns out it was Israeli, as expected. As soon as I heard the news, I was absolutely certain it was Israeli intelligence, and it turned out to be exactly that. All of this is undermining the Israeli regime and the Zionist lobby. As we move forward, every new foolish act of the Israeli regime, giving false intelligence to Trump to humiliate him in order to restart the war—which he did. The 13 days of fighting came after that. So all of this is coming out, and this is going to hurt the Israeli regime further.

It's going to hurt the Zionist lobby further in the United States: the declining economy and the ongoing genocide and the war against Iran and the humiliation of the U.S. president and the general behavior of the Zionist lobby in the United States trying to take away freedom of speech in the country. All of this is destroying the status of Zionism in the United States. So that is going well for Iran too. And of course, the same is true, I'm sure, in Europe in its own way. But in the United States, it's much more important for us. And then Iran's status among powerful countries like, of course, China and Russia has been enhanced significantly due to the war.

So even though Iran has been hurt, and it's been significantly hurt economically, there's no doubt that life is more difficult for Iranians today than it was six months ago. That's obvious. But Iran's global status and regional status have been enhanced. And once this war is over, whenever that may be, Iran's growth will be impacted significantly. And of course, the fact that it will hold the Strait of Hormuz will allow Iran to grow much more swiftly. And then, again, another thing that's important, Glenn, and that is that the United States—these statements made by Trump about taking the Strait of Hormuz and making it American territory—that further strengthens Iran's hand. It unites the Iranian people further.

It always reminds people what the enemy is up to, and that the enemy wants to take away your sovereignty. It wants to take away your dignity. It wants to take away your territory. It wants to break up your country. It wants to send you back. It wants to exterminate your people by obliterating the country. So every time Trump reminds the Iranian people of who he really is and what his personality is like, and what the political establishment in the United States and the Zionists are like, that further unites the country, and it creates stronger sympathy for Iran across the world, because what Trump says, wherever he may be, wherever he may say it, is heard around the world.

So, you know, it's—I think the United States, it's as if, besides the death and destruction, besides the murder of children, the slaughter and the daily slaughter in Lebanon and Gaza, and the attacks on Iran and the murders that they carry out in Yemen, all that aside, it's as if the general policies of the United States are being devised by the Iranians. It's like they're making the worst possible choices and the worst possible decisions in their dealings, in their attempts to undermine Iran and its allies.

#Glenn

Yeah, one can often assess the mistakes of the U.S. in measured economic and military terms. But if we also shift towards soft power, which has been one of the great successes of the United States, it has truly been shattered—how it's able to sell wars. I mean, for all of the past decades now, we see from the war against Serbia, Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Syria, against Russia, Iran, they always sell their wars as a humanitarian mission. And it's—yeah, now that you see this rhetoric that we're going

to annihilate Iran, it's going to stop existing as a civilization, we're going to take the Strait of Hormuz as U.S. territory, we're going to make so much money. I mean, all of this very—yeah, this rhetoric, it's really destroying whoever still believed in that nonsense.

#Marandi

And it goes alongside actions. I mean, we see the genocide—ongoing genocide in Gaza—never ends. The starvation of the people, preventing medicine from getting in. As we speak, they're starving kids. There are kids with special food needs because of their diet. They won't let that sort of food get in. They won't let medicine for those who have cancer get in so that they would die. And then, of course, they snipe people, they bomb people at the same time. It's ongoing. So people see Trump's threat and see the reality in Gaza, the bombings in Lebanon yesterday, murdered 11 Lebanese, all civilians, half of them children. They see how they're openly stealing the assets of the Venezuelan people, and no one in the United States is protesting.

So this rhetoric is backed up by genocide and theft. So when he says, "We're going to make a lot of money, we're going to take the land, we're going to destroy the country," people look around and see, well, they've done this before. That's what they're actually doing. So it's even uglier. It's not just, you know, they're not saying, "Well, he's just talking nonsense." They see it happening. So the utter destruction of U.S. soft power is, I think, something... I mean, if someone was—if a young 20-, 22-year-old person who's now highly critical of the United States was to suddenly be taken back in time 10 years ago, 7, 8 years ago, or during the Obama years, they would be stunned.

Because the U.S. soft power—I mean, look how, and I don't want to keep you for too long, but remember the U.S. war on Afghanistan and Iraq and how it damaged the U.S. image really badly across the world. Not like this war, but really badly. Then Obama became president, and they whitewashed everything. And Obama received the Nobel Peace Prize before he even got into the White House. But now the image of the United States is so devastated that if the United States brings in 10 Obamas, it's just not going to—we can't reverse it. The devastation is just so extraordinary.

#Glenn

There's a similar problem in Europe, by the way. If you take the German case, they backed the genocide in Gaza. They made the comment that Israel was doing their dirty work in attacking Iran. They continued this boycott of diplomacy against Russia and pushed for this forever war. And at home, they're crushing opposition. I mean, yeah, the list can go on and on. But they still try to lecture other countries about human rights, democracy, and good governance.

But you see that while they still believe they have this authority, you see the rest of the world now starting to reject this idea that states are divided into civilizational teachers and students, and somehow these people are the teachers who are supposed to lecture the world. It's not working

anymore. And that was a key component of the hegemonic model, of a benevolent hegemon. So a lot is being bet on these wars, and they're losing all of it. It's quite a shock to see, and they keep doubling down. Anyways, I've already held you too long for a Sunday morning, so thank you very much for taking time.

#Marandi

Thank you very much for having me. It's always a great pleasure.