

What Really Happened In Yugoslavia | Douglas Macgregor & David Gibbs

The Yugoslavia Wars were not about humanitarian intervention. Here is the testimony of a man who was closely involved in the NATO operations and a historian who studied that era closely. Professor David Gibbs and Colonel Douglas Macgregor compare their views on the Yugoslav wars, NATO's role in Bosnia and Kosovo, and the thinking behind the 1999 bombing campaign. Macgregor recalls his work in NATO command, while Gibbs connects the Balkan interventions to NATO expansion, Europe's military dependence, Russia, and later conflicts. Links: Neutrality Studies substack: <https://pascallottaz.substack.com> Merch: <https://neutralitystudies.com/shop> Donation: <https://neutralitystudies.com/donate> Timestamps: 00:00:00 Introduction and Balkan war context 00:02:53 Russia's role in Bosnia and Kosovo 00:08:02 Early warnings about Kosovo 00:15:09 Intervention goals and the KLA 00:22:28 Russia, NATO, and the air war 00:33:00 Rambouillet and the Kosovo settlement 00:42:53 Europe's NATO dependence and war narrative 00:55:24 The Balkans as a Russia rehearsal 01:05:39 Intervention, neutrality, and closing thoughts

#Pascal

Welcome back, everybody, to a very special episode of Neutrality Studies, because today we're going to do a little bit of live oral history. We have with us Professor David Gibbs, a professor of history at the University of Arizona, and we have Colonel Douglas MacGregor. The two men have in common that they both have a keen interest in what happened in the Balkans in the 1990s and early 2000s: Colonel Douglas MacGregor because he was serving there, and Professor Gibbs because he studies that area and that period quite closely. And they've been reacting to each other's videos on this and other channels for a couple of weeks, and now we want to bring them together. David, may I ask you to start us off maybe with where you think this most interesting part of the Balkan Wars is that, you know, Douglas MacGregor has already reacted to you?

#David Gibbs

Let me just give a little bit of background, I guess, just historical background and also a little bit of background about both of us beyond what you said, is that Yugoslavia broke up as a state in 1991, resulting in a series of—a complex series of wars and civil wars, most notably Bosnia-Herzegovina, which was settled with NATO military intervention in 1995, and then a NATO—or I should say U.S.-brokered agreement—and then Kosovo in 1998, 1999, also involving NATO military intervention, followed by a U.S.-brokered agreement. Now, Colonel MacGregor was involved as an insider, and

we'll be discussing his experiences as a military aide to the U.S. participants in both those events. I myself have written a book on this topic in 2009, *First Do No Harm: Humanitarian Intervention and the Destruction of Yugoslavia*.

And I did a podcast on this topic about a year ago. Colonel MacGregor watched the podcast, and that is what brought us together. I do want to note, just parenthetically, that the importance of Yugoslavia, as far as I can tell, was to give a tremendous justification for NATO and a new *raison d'être* for NATO, and also to give a whole justification for military intervention as a humanitarian act, and build a whole new constituency politically in both the United States and Europe for military intervention. I would say particularly on the political left, where it became almost an idealistic act to use military force. But in any case, Colonel MacGregor obviously has a great deal of information on this going beyond what I just presented.

Let me start off by dealing with perhaps the most interesting aspect, which, of course, is the current NATO-Russia war taking place in the arena of Ukraine. Now, when I wrote my book in 2009, one flaw in the book—and I'll be frank, I'll do some self-criticism here—I did not really deal very much with the issue of Russia. When I wrote the book, I viewed Russia, I think incorrectly, as a tangential issue owing to Russia's extraordinary weakness in the 1990s. And I thought that nobody really paid much attention to Russia on that account. In retrospect, I think that was an inadequate treatment of it. And I'd like to ask you, Colonel, what's your opinion on the role Russia played, both in terms of direct involvement, but more importantly, in the minds of U.S. officials and NATO officials, and how the Russia issue influenced U.S. and NATO conduct in Bosnia and in Kosovo?

#Douglas Macgregor

Well, first of all, I think your book was excellent, and I think that your presentation in the podcast was first-rate. I can also plead guilty to the charge that I did not appreciate at the time. And I was involved first in 1995 for several months before the Dayton Accords, and I went back for those. So I was all over Bosnia-Herzegovina, and I got to meet lots of interesting people. And I did not appreciate at that point some of the things that you've already mentioned: the fact that this was actually a proving ground for future use of force by the United States and its so-called allies in other places, justified by these claims of humanitarian intervention and so forth. I say claims because they weren't all accurate or true.

I did not appreciate how prominently Russia figured in the backs of people's minds until it was nearly over in Kosovo. And then I began to awaken to that. But I, too, was not completely aware, because the two are linked, but they're very different. The second round of interventions in Kosovo began on much more fragile ground, in my estimation, than what happened with Bosnia-Herzegovina. In Bosnia, you could point to something like Srebrenica, which was not necessarily the mass murder it was billed to be, but it was significant. It was obvious. It was out there. The Dutch failed miserably to protect the people. The Dutch took off, left, abandoned the local population. Large numbers of people were then unnecessarily shot.

You did have rape camps where numbers of women were held until they were finally impregnated so that they would produce children. I think the word was "little Chetniks." And this is nothing new in the Balkans. Mass rape is very common throughout history to transform populations into something they were not. And, of course, that had a lot to do with the advance of Soviet forces. It wasn't just, you know, recreation for the advancing troops. It was also purposely done to try and destroy national identity and so forth. Kosovo, though, was a little different. It was more difficult to start, let's put it that way. And when I was first approached by General Clark, whom I continue to like and think highly of personally, he said, "Look, I want you to go over and do this."

I was going to be the director of strategy or strategic planning initially, and then move on, hopefully, to be the director of joint operations, because that was a general officer position. I was a full colonel, so that was a brigadier. Of course, I was never going to get promoted, but at that point, he was still trying. And the Brit that preceded me left, and so I was able to go through the whole process. But what begins with Kosovo is something very different from what you might imagine. When I went and I met this Air Force two-star who I would be nominally working for, he had never heard of Kosovo. And one of my first points to him was, "Well, is anybody looking at Kosovo?"

You have to understand that my background is all in European studies. People say, "What did you study in graduate school, my PhD and all those kinds of things?" I say, "Germans and Russians." That's the way to put it. Those are the two that I focused on, with a sideline in some Poles and Czechs, and to a lesser extent the Hungarians. But, you know, you can't do business without taking in the Balkans to some extent. And I was very familiar with the Slovenes and the Croats because they have a thousand-year relationship with the Roman Catholic Germans who live in Austria and southern Germany. Everybody out there speaks German. And so that was another reason I was picked to go, because I could speak fluent German.

#Pascal

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#Douglas Macgregor

So when this all started, I asked, "What about Kosovo? Where's Kosovo?" Nobody had heard of it. So when I'd been there for about three months—this was in January, February, March—one of my officers, a very bright man named Cricks, he was a major in the U.S. Army. He's retired now, and he came to me as an intelligence officer. We had Canadian, British, French intelligence officers. We had German general staffers. Nineteen different nations were represented in the joint operations that are

all focused on the Balkans. And he came to me and he said, "Here's this newspaper article which had been translated from Bulgarian, which was really the language of Macedonia for all intents and purposes, had been translated into English." And I read it.

It was all about a proposal by the president of Macedonia that when all of the Albanians fled Kosovo, they were going to provide a pathway for them to come into Macedonia, go around the mountain range, and down into Albania. Because it was made very clear: we already have more Albanians than we want in Macedonia. We don't want any more. So this is a good way for them to pass down into Albania, which is, after all, where all Albanians belong. So I looked at this. I thought, this is interesting. So I cracked open the books. I started reading everything, including, believe it or not, Waffen-SS reports on the Albanians that were sent down to train. And the SS regarded them as the worst, most horrific, atrocious people they knew, and talked about how they had stopped the Albanians.

#David Gibbs

The SS regarded them that way?

#Douglas Macgregor

Yeah, yeah. They saw what they were doing to Gypsies and anyone who was Jewish or Turk. They recommended immediate cessation of any further cooperation with the Albanians. So that got my attention. I went through an awful lot of material that went all the way up to the Yugoslav period. I found out that most of the Albanians who were in Kosovo were essentially allowed to migrate in there illegally by Tito. And their numbers kept increasing and increasing and increasing until suddenly the quote-unquote illegals outnumbered the native Serbs. Sound familiar? Anyway, bottom line is, I put this short two-page paper, because anything longer than two pages, no four-star has time to read.

And I wrote it up and went by the intelligence and said, "This is correct." And I said, "We should consider contacting the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees because this is very likely to happen, and explain that if there's any major violence whatsoever, this could occur quickly." And, you know, finished it with these recommendations and sent it up to General Clark. I didn't hear anything for months—two, three, four days. It turned out he flew down to Macedonia, and he looked it all over and held personal conversations with the leadership and came back. And then I got a phone call and said, "Come up." So I went up to his office, and he said, "You know, I went to Kosovo. I went to—rather, Macedonia."

#David Gibbs

You're right. This is ready to happen.

#Douglas Macgregor

And I said, "Yes, sir, it's much more serious than people realize." "What did you think about our recommendations?" He said, "What do you mean?" I said, "Well, you know, pre-position humanitarian assistance, set up, you know, some people there that can help with these Albanians if they come out, as we expect they probably would." He said, "Well, why would I do that?" And I said, "Well, they're going to come out unless, you know, we can come to some sort of agreement over there." And I said, "By the way, one of the recommendations was that he talk to General Perisic, who was the Serb who commanded the Yugoslav Army, *Yugoslavskaja Vojska Jugoslavije*." And he was very widely respected because he had put a stop to any sort of outrages against the Albanian citizens of Yugoslavia. He made it very clear he was not going to tolerate it.

Remember, we had the special police, and then you had the army. They were not the same. And the special police, of course, would occasionally go overboard and do things that they had no business doing. And I said, you really ought to talk to him because he's expressed the view that Serbia should join NATO. Think about that. Now, how did I know that? I knew that because I had been shown by British officers communiqués coming from the British ambassador in Belgrade, whose name was Donnelly. He was a very competent man. And he was providing advice back to the Deputy SACEUR, who was a British four-star. His name was McKenzie, who, believe it or not, was a distant relative of mine. That's another story. We were all Scottish, so I had a certain rapport instantly. So I was able to read all this. I said, this is a great opportunity. You can go meet with Perisic.

So he says, "I don't want to meet with him." I said, "Why not?" He said, "I don't want to meet with the Serbs." I said, "Why not?" He said, "We're going to bomb the Serbs." Now, this is early April of 1998, and I sort of stood there a little surprised. I mean, I'm just a colonel in the Army. My last experience of anything was in command at Fort Riley, and before that I was in the desert shooting Arabs. So I had no idea that this was in anybody's mind at that point. And subsequently, I found out that General Clark had been assigned to SOUTHCOM for a year, waiting for the American military commander in SHAPE to retire.

And once he retired, General Clark was put in there because the same bunch that had intervened in Bosnia-Herzegovina wanted to intervene again in Kosovo. Well, they were convinced, first of all, that air power had been this magical instrument with which to compel acceptance. Secondly, they all wanted to get rid of Milosevic, whom they regarded as an evil dictator, an old-line communist, along with the people around him. And then ultimately Yugoslavia then could become what they had tried to do in Bosnia and Herzegovina that didn't work, was this sort of laboratory to forcibly integrate all the various groups so that they could all live in the future diversity paradise that Europe was going to have to be anyway.

And, you know, when you talk to them and said, "Well, these people just spent the last several years killing each other. A lot of blood is being spilled at this point. I don't think forcing them back together is going to work very well," you were thanked for your interest and told to shut up and get

in the corner and color. So the plan was, well, now we're going to intervene. This will be the end of Milosevic. Yugoslavia will fall into our laps, and we will have this laboratory for experimentation that we want. In other words, sort of exporting social engineering with military power. I was stunned. I just didn't completely grasp it for the same reasons as me.

#David Gibbs

You seek clarification here, so...

#Douglas Macgregor

The idea of setting it up as a laboratory, whose idea was that specifically? I think you've got to go back to several people. The key figures in Washington never included Bill Clinton. We need to understand that President Clinton was just not interested. He was never interested in anything beyond America's borders. Unfortunately, he was surrounded by people like Gore and Albright. I think Warren Christopher was lukewarm. But then you had Sandy Berger and Strobe Talbott, the Deputy Secretary of State. And, of course, General Clark was friends with all of these people. And they were all of a similar ideological mindset, that this was the beginning of something very big.

And what I was going to tell you is that in December of 1998, it was made clear to me that this was the beginning of a revolution, what they called a democratic revolution, that's going to spread from Yugoslavia all the way to Moscow. And that was the first time that I heard openly this statement: this was the beginning of something that would go all the way to Moscow. And I was stunned because, again, you know, I did know a little bit about the history of the region. And my immediate response, when I was in the War Plans Division in 1995 as a war planner, I was asked to write a position paper on what should we do or not do in the Balkans.

I said we should stay out. I said this is an area of traditional Russian influence. And if we were to involve ourselves there, it would be viewed as potentially threatening to Russian interests. And I talked about the special relationship between the Serbs and the Russians, way back to 1879 and earlier. Of course, you know, the Chief of Staff loved it. He sent it over to the White House. It died. That was 1995. Our Chief of Staff, the Chief of Staff of the Army, was Gordon Sullivan. And he said, "Yeah, this makes sense," everybody on the Army side, because the last thing we want to do is go over there.

Now, one thing I need to point out: there was one person in the Clinton administration who absolutely did not sign on for all of this. That was Secretary Perry, the Secretary of Defense. And at one point he said to General Clark—he was giving guidance on what we should or shouldn't do with the Dayton Accords if they happened—and he said, "Remember, no agreement is better than a bad agreement." That was the first thing. So if we can't get agreement, that's all right. Secondly, we don't want any Danzig corridors. In other words, we don't want any unstable, unmaintainable territorial outcomes that are going to invite future violence and so forth.

And then finally, he said, we don't want any agreement that involves a commitment of U.S. ground forces on the ground in the Balkans. Well, what did we get? Well, we got all that we didn't want. We got this long strip of land out to Srebrenica. It made no sense. And in the meantime, the Serbs continued to be demonized, violently blamed for everything. And then, when I was still not yet the director of the joint operations there, I was the Director of Strategic Planning, I was required to send a report because, remember, we had this agreement with the OSCE that they would go in and monitor what both sides were doing. And by the way, I thought the OSCE did a brilliant job. Look, there'll be no mistake about it.

And I made a habit of listening to all the German officers who would come and see me. They were coming out of Kosovo to tell me what was happening. General Rupert Smith, who had then replaced McKenzie, was a brilliant officer, did a brilliant job. He actually met with all the journalists. We shocked everyone because he said, "Well, the journalists are down there. They're visiting. They can tell me what's really happening." And they did. So we had a lot of very, very good information coming in. And one of the things that I discovered was that if you had 10 incidents of some sort of provocation that violated the agreements under the OSCE, nine were committed by the KLA. Only one was committed by the Serbs. And the Serbs actually went out of their way to enforce things, to make it work right.

Long story. And I sent these reports up, and I was called in. I said, "Look, we need to demonstrate the disproportionate use of force by the Serbs. If we can't prove disproportionate use of force by the Serbs, it's going to be that much harder for us to justify military action." And I said, "I can't find it." It was taken away from me. And by that time, we had Alastair Campbell's group that had sent some people over at the request, I guess, of General Clark to Tony Blair. "I need some help." And they came in, and I never saw any more reports going to Brussels because I was told, "No, we'll take care of it up here." But I couldn't find any. And again, I was naive. I was not part of the cabal trying to bring on operations. Let's put it that way.

#David Gibbs

General Klaus von Neumann, who was somebody I assume you interacted with there, he also said repeatedly that the Serbs actually honored the ceasefire agreement in 1998, and that it was much more the KLA, the Kosovo Liberation Army, the Albanian side, that caused the breakdown of that ceasefire, just consistent with what you're saying here.

#Douglas Macgregor

When I reported, I reported to three four-stars as the director in the Joint Operations Center. All three had to agree to my appointment. So one, obviously, was General Clark. The other was General Rupert Smith, Deputy Supreme Commander of Europe. And the other was a German four-star. His name was Strickmann. I thought he was probably one of the finest officers I've ever met, and a man of absolute integrity who was deeply troubled by all of it. And the night that we bombed Belgrade,

he was practically in tears. He thought this was a disgrace because it was the anniversary of the German air attack. Instead, we all became NATO members to prevent anything like this from ever happening again. Everyone had the view on the European side that NATO existed to ensure there would be no future wars in Europe. And now here he was, part of an alliance that was deliberately starting one.

#David Gibbs

Well, my read on that was that NATO needed a new justification after the Cold War, and a bombing campaign in Kosovo for what I call humanitarian purposes served that purpose. I mean, what you're telling me, though, is that a lot of the senior officers did not share that view. Am I hearing you correctly? Yes.

#Douglas Macgregor

Yes.

#David Gibbs

One of the things, I guess, is that the Russians, from the Russian standpoint, we know Yeltsin, who was then in power, not doing very well, obviously, but nevertheless in power officially, he viewed this as kind of a shot across the bow to Russia, that it was seen in threatening terms to Russia. That's how he viewed it, more or less publicly, I think, if I'm correct on that. And I'm wondering to what extent American officials did that intentionally, or was this just something they didn't really care about? In other words, if Russia saw this as threatening, was that something American officials were worried about, or did they just disregard it?

#Douglas Macgregor

Russia was viewed at the time as a basket case. Remember, it was being looted by people like Browder and others who came over, as Joseph Stiglitz warned against it and said, whatever you do, you don't want to put Russia through this cold turkey. You know, they've got to move from their current economic system slowly in the direction of something that's more market-oriented and effective. Right. Well, Clinton had no interest in it, turned it over to others, and the others went in there, made a terrible mess.

At one point, I was told that Yeltsin's representative to SHAPE was asking if we could assist them in recovering \$4 billion that had been looted from Russia and was probably residing in various banks, not the least of which were in Cyprus or elsewhere. So I think people sort of viewed Russia as incapable, a basket case, and was prostrate. Therefore, you can do pretty much what you want. This

is back to the whole idea of the phony rule-based liberal international order, which simply means now we can extend the Cold War structure and become the hegemon of the planet because no one is there to stop us. I mean, that was my perception ultimately.

#David Gibbs

One question I had is that the air war went on, I believe, for something like 78 days. And at first, you know, they were expecting a rapid capitulation, which did not occur. And it seemed to go on and on. The Serbs did make an effective defense, at least for a while.

#Douglas Macgregor

They never degraded the Serbian air defenses below 83%.

#David Gibbs

I see. Okay, that's good to know. There was frustration, obviously, in military circles and in Washington. And I don't remember the exact month, but Thomas Friedman had an article in The New York Times, which is very interesting, called "Stop the Music," in which he said what the United States needs to do is begin to bomb Serbia back to the Middle Ages. He said, "We can bring them back to 1389 if that's what they want." It was kind of a blood-curdling article. And what I wondered when I read the article is, was he speaking—he had a lot of official contacts, we know that about Friedman—when he wrote this article, was he just speaking for himself, or was he channeling something he'd heard in the White House or the State Department? What are your thoughts on that? In other words, was the State Department or the Clinton administration acting through Friedman to make a threat to Serbia that you better capitulate or we'll just level your cities? What are your thoughts on that, Colonel?

#Douglas Macgregor

First of all, I can't prove that anybody in the administration put him up to that. What I can say is that you've got to go back and understand that Wolfowitz and Perle and Kagan and others—I mean, Don Kagan wrote the foreword to my second book, and I thought very highly of Don Kagan. And, you know, I found out later why he liked my book so much, which kind of upset me later on. And he came and visited Clark with a group of people. And these were all the original neocons who have now reproduced and spawned new generations that are with us. They brought us into Iraq and everything else. It all flows together.

Let us say that if water is purest at its source, we were at the fountainhead back in the '90s of all of these people who are still running the show right now. In fact, if you scratch hard enough, you'll go down low enough, you'll find Tony Blinken running around, I guess, on the NSC staff or in the State Department at some lower level. So you've got to understand they're all in the same boat. They're

all acolytes of the same thing. Don Kagan came down to visit me in the Joint Operations Center, and he started talking about the terrible things that had been done by the Serbs, and don't we need to go and do this?

And I sort of sat there, and I said, "What are you talking about?" And he reiterated, and he said, "So we really need to do this, don't we?" And I sort of sat there. What am I supposed to say? No. So I said, "Well, that's very interesting. Nice to see you again. Thank you." And I think, you know, you've got to go to Vice President Gore, Sandy Berger, Madeleine Albright, Strobe Talbott, Warren Christopher. All of these people are in the same group. And they're all believers in the ideology that you so brilliantly outlined in your podcast. And it all goes back to Bosnia and the perception of success in Bosnia. Pax Americana.

#David Gibbs

Did you see any direct role of people like Wolfowitz and Perle in this, or were they completely just on the sidelines?

#Douglas Macgregor

When I was at Dayton, I opened the door, and I was surprised to see Richard Perle walking down the hall, whom I knew. And I said, "Hello, how are you? What are you doing?" He said, "Oh, I'm looking for the Bosniaks." So they were already in bed with the quote-unquote Bosniaks. That was their new laboratory, what I would call lab rats. And I think you were talking at some point about, you know, sort of projecting onto various things Holocaust-like experiences. And that was definitely done with the Bosniaks. Now, so the Bosniaks were transformed from being enthusiastic National Socialists into the victims of racism and so forth.

#David Gibbs

Yes, that was done very carefully. Everybody's a victim at some point, right?

#Douglas Macgregor

I'm sorry, say again, please. Everybody's a victim at some point.

#David Gibbs

Well, it seems to me the new thing is to be a victim. But one other person, I guess, that's of interest to me, of course, is Brzezinski. Now, Brzezinski was not officially in the chain of command in any sense of the term, but he was certainly a figure on the sidelines. I just was in his papers in the

Library of Congress, and throughout the '90s, he was still in the private sector advocating much closer U.S. involvement in Ukraine already. And I'm wondering, did he play any role that you saw as an unofficial adviser with regard to Bosnia or Kosovo? Did you see any role by him here?

#Douglas Macgregor

Not that I'm aware of. That doesn't mean there weren't phone calls made and he wasn't given the opportunity to express his views, because I know that he told Clinton in private that Ukraine was a potential catalyst for future war. And he was right. And he said Eastern Ukraine is effectively Russified. And he actually suggested that some attempt be made at a plebiscite or something else to come to terms with that reality so that you didn't get a war down the line, which I frankly said in 2014 when they had their little coup. And I made the mistake of going on RT, for which I was harassed by the Senate when I was considered for the ambassador's job in Berlin. But no, I think he said that, and he was, I think, absolutely right.

Now, when I came back from Bosnia, I had lunch with someone who was an old friend and a mentor to me. That was Bill Odom. I had lunch with him at the Army-Navy Club. And he was very much an advocate for the sort of human rights crusade that could animate military action against everybody. I was not. I never signed on for any of that. I mean, I'm strictly a realist. I would tell you that I'm an isolationist, frankly. My view is, unless they attack us, why are we attacking them? But he was very much involved with that, and we had an argument afterwards. And he said, "I think we should put three divisions on the ground in the Balkans and let them stay there until they all change." Well, things don't change very quickly in the Balkans or in most countries.

It's been my experience. And the last thing I thought we should do is make that kind of commitment. So after that, we spoke once, and I saw him about three weeks before he died, unfortunately. And we were on speaking terms, but the warmth and friendship was gone because I did not support it. So he was a Brzezinski acolyte. So I think that gives you an indication of where he stood. And I found when I came back, I had all sorts of people coming, "Great job in the Joint Operations Center. We're so proud of what you did." I was just sitting there, you know, with a... I thought it was a disaster. I didn't think we had any business doing any of it. Despite a little bit more, why do you think it was a disaster?

#David Gibbs

Flesh that out a little bit.

#Douglas Macgregor

Well, first of all, I don't think we settled anything in Bosnia because we had to leave troops there. There are still European troops there. And then the Europeans poured large quantities of money into the place. And if anybody thinks that all the wounds are healed and all is great, all they have to do is

visit Srpska. And I could never understand why people objected to simply turning over the territory occupied by Serbs to Serbia. What is the problem? If they all want to live together, by God, let them do it. And I remember getting into an argument with a Norwegian, and he was saying, "Well, they have to learn to live together," and on. I said, "Well, I think we should just abolish the border between Sweden and Norway."

Why do we need these silly flags? You all speak the same language. Oh, well, that's different. Okay, fine. Thanks very much. This kind of hypocrisy and stupidity was widespread. The further away you got from the Balkans, the dumber people were. The people closest to the Balkans—the Italians, for instance, or the Austrians, the Greeks, the Bulgars—they knew the facts. They understood what was happening. Even Tuđman, you know, he had his famous napkin solution. I'm sure you're familiar with that. That wasn't a bad solution. You were talking about Rambouillet. During Rambouillet, the Serbs and the Albanians were in separate rooms, but they both agreed to the same partition.

#David Gibbs

On Rambouillet, let me ask you: the way I saw the situation was that you almost had an agreement. The Serbs had pretty much agreed to all the political terms, or almost all of them, not quite. And then the military annex appeared, which involved basically the right of NATO troops, peacekeepers, to occupy not just Kosovo but Serbia proper, the Republic of Serbia, and this whole thing broke down. The Serbs did not accept that. They would not even consider it. I'm told that this was inserted by Wesley Clark, and a British Defense Ministry official said it was done with the intention of blowing up the peace talks and laying the basis for a bombing campaign. He said that in a parliamentary hearing. What are your thoughts on that?

#Douglas Macgregor

Well, General Clark undoubtedly saw it. He may have made some recommendations for revisions. I don't know who authored it. I certainly didn't. Okay. But that was—remember, those things were taken away from me, so I wasn't monitoring those things anymore. But I know from the Norwegian one-star who was present—his name was Lundberg—and he was a very sharp man and a wonderful man. And he was brought over there as an observer because SHAPE and Brussels said, "We want someone there as an observer." General Clark obviously was not allowed to observe directly and participate. Well, Lundberg was somebody who agreed with me 100 percent: "What are we doing? This is disastrous."

But he came and told me that the Serbs and the Albanians reached an agreement to partition the place. The Serbs would get Mitrovica and the stretch along the border. The Albanians would get the rest of it. The Germans, in private, had said they would help finance the movement of populations. That had happened under Kohl. Now, I don't know if that still existed under his successor. But

people had seen, you know, look, if we can't all live in Brčko, let's build a second Brčko in Bosnia. Yeah, we'll finance it. All of those things were crushed by the American side. And even the French foreign minister was surprised. And I think Christopher Hill played a key role in that.

And you might ask him if he'll tell you. But my impression was that he made it very clear we wouldn't accept that. And then, of course, General Clark at one point actually flew over there in his UH-60 to talk to the KLA. They came out to meet with him. What passed between them, I don't know, but I know that his view was, look, we'll bomb for you. He said that at Dayton to the Bosniaks, to Izetbegović and company. I'm sure he said something similar. The idea was they wanted to bring in the administration—not Clinton, but practically everybody else, with the exception of Perry the first time around. The second time around, I think Cohen went along with these things, wasn't really excited about it.

You know, he was not some sort of forceful advocate for it at all, but he wasn't going to stand in the way. But he did intervene ultimately during the campaign and told General Clark, "You can use whatever you like, but you cannot have any ground forces. There will be no ground forces involved in this." And that, of course, is one of the reasons that within two or three weeks of the end, Strobe Talbott, the deputy secretary of state, goes to Moscow to negotiate an end to this. And I think he went there, and I think a number of promises were made to Yeltsin. And at that point, the Russians needed help and assistance in a number of key areas.

I don't know that those promises were ever honored. I have no idea. But suddenly the air campaign ended because the Russians informed Milosevic, "We can't support you." And see, the promise for Milosevic, we knew this from inside the Serbian general staff, was that whatever happened, we will provide you with the food and the sustenance and the fuel to get through the Balkan winter. And so they were prepared to fight until hell froze over, literally. Well, they weren't going to get any support anymore from the Russians, and we had destroyed the power grid, all the coal plants that fired up heating and electricity and everything else, so that nothing was coming from Russia.

#David Gibbs

I see. I see. Since you're a German speaker, I'm wondering, did you have much dealing with Joschka Fischer? My recollection is he was—oh, you did not. I see. All right.

#Douglas Macgregor

My interaction was entirely with members of the military. I see. I met with many officers, German officers, some of whom were generals. But the one that was most important, obviously, in my life was Stöckmann, the German four-star at SHAPE. And both he and Rupert Smith together were very, very confident, very, I would say, balanced in their assessments. And both privately didn't want intervention there.

#David Gibbs

There was an incident at the very end of the Kosovo War when the quote-unquote peacekeepers were inserted. And there was a rush to get to the Pristina airport, as I recall. Pristina, yeah. And Clark basically insisted that the British commander, I think it was Rupert, General Rupert—

#Douglas Macgregor

No, no, it was the commander down of the Kosovo Force who was a three-star. Later he became Chief of Staff of the British Army. His name escapes me at the moment, but he was a good one. But he was appointed down there for all the right reasons. He was a very competent, good soldier, had good relations with all the composite units that were under his command. And he received some orders from Clark which were very confrontational vis-à-vis the Russians. Clark wanted to push them off the airfield.

#David Gibbs

Why? That was an interesting detail. And so what do you make of that incident where there was an effort basically to make sure the Russians did not get control of the airfield? And again, Russia then was supposedly on good terms with the United States and Britain and NATO. And here there seemed to be this adversarial aspect. One of the British generals, I believe, if I recall correctly, refused to take the aggressive action that was requested by Clark. He said, "I don't want to start World War III." Do I remember that correctly?

#Douglas Macgregor

No, that was the Kosovo commander. The three-star was in command down there. And he also had a pretty good working knowledge of Russian. I guess he'd been to Oxford for a while, or Cambridge, I don't know which. At any rate, he went over to personally meet with the Russian commander, and they had an amicable discussion, and they came to a resolution, and the Russians maintained part of the airfield, but they didn't have control of all of it, and we had no further difficulties with the Russians. In fact, after that, I would say cooperation with the Russians was very good.

When they put forces on the ground, they cooperated with our troops and with everybody else without any difficulty at all. You know, you're asking why was Clark so confrontational? I don't know. He never discussed it with me. But that was the undercurrent. You see, when I told you about December of 1998, when this came up about, "We're going to sweep all the way to Russia," there was always this undercurrent on the American side. There was hostility there to Russia. Russia was not democratic. Russia was all these bad things.

#David Gibbs

That's a very strange thing because, I mean, Clinton had praised Yeltsin in the White House, I believe, in 1996. And basically, what did he compare him to? Lord Washington or something like that. And he praised him as a democrat and that he was a democratic figure and so on. It was a democratic transition. He was a great hope for Russia. So why now was there talk of spreading democracy to Moscow? And supposedly Yeltsin represented democracy, at least for public purposes, in terms of what the Americans were projecting. Why this sense that we now have to evangelize the Russians and make them democratic all of a sudden? What was that about?

#Douglas Macgregor

I think the people that we've mentioned by name were all part of that movement, right? And the anti-Russian position or mentality, the hostility, which you can still see today, which is very prevalent. These sort of neocon circles are now almost indistinguishable, in my view, from the so-called Zionist lobby. They're all the same, and they're all very hostile to Russia. Now, some people—and this may be true, I don't know—but some people argue, well, these people like Madeleine Albright and others who have relatives or whoever who were driven out of Russia, okay, that's fine. You know, I don't know, but it's very strong.

It's very much there, and it was there in 1998, and it was in evidence afterwards. It's unfortunate. Now, Yeltsin... If you go and ask the Russians about Yeltsin, they see him as a drunken buffoon who was a patsy that let the Americans and the West walk all over him. Putin comes in, and he's a heroic figure because he throws all the crooks out and all the oligarchs out, or has them executed, who were trying to loot Russia and steal from Russia. So, for whatever it's worth, that's the sort of official—I don't want to say official—but the common Russian view of Yeltsin and where Putin fits in.

#David Gibbs

One other angle to my book that I took was that a key issue here was that Europe was briefly considering an independent foreign policy. This was an initiative led by, actually, France, and then France and Germany. And the idea was to use the European Community, as it was called then, as an instrument, almost as an alternative to NATO. The United States had gained too much power after the end of the Cold War, and this was to establish a new pole of independence in the world.

And the United States saw this in very threatening terms, and again, a neocon project was to undermine this independence and to reassert NATO as an alternative to this independence. And the arena was to be the Balkans, because the Europeans were trying to broker a peace agreement of their own to demonstrate their capacity to act independently, whereas the U.S., I argued, undermined the peace agreements to humiliate Europe and demonstrate that only the U.S. and NATO would have authority in these areas. What did you think of that interpretation? I'm wondering if you could comment on that.

#Douglas Macgregor

Well, at that point, I was a promotable lieutenant colonel in Sarajevo, and it became pretty clear that Holbrooke's view was that the Europeans, or referred to as the Euros, were useless and incompetent, and they should all be shoved on a plane and flown away. So when you get to Dayton, there's very little European representation. I remember sitting there talking to a British officer. He had a little Euro flag, you know, EU flag. Okay, they were irrelevant, and it was made very clear to me that they were irrelevant. They just didn't have a vote. Don't pay any attention to them.

And nothing would happen if it were not for us. We were in charge. Now, there's something else here that comes up later on. The Europeans tried to build something called the Eurocorps, and they built a Eurocorps headquarters. And that was a real bone of contention for a lot of people. Yeah, I remember that. And anything that competed with NATO was undercut. Now, when the whole thing was over, just as an aside, for the German four-star, I sat down and thought, because I was basically, you know, in my last two months, I didn't have to do anything, thank God.

#David Gibbs

I was pretty worn out.

#Douglas Macgregor

And he said, "What would you like to do?" And I talked to him, and then I said, "What would you like me to do?" He said, "Well, I want you to do what you want to do, but I want to give it a different twist." And so I spent the next two months putting together this packet on how the Europeans should build their own command and control structure and headquarters. Because I said the lesson from Kosovo, in my judgment, is you have no command and control background. There is no European C4ISR: command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance. Everything is dependent upon us. And he agreed. So I put that together, and I said, "What do you think?" And he said, "I think it's good work, but I don't think it's going to go anywhere." And it was pretty clear that the United States didn't want it to go anywhere. They wanted the Europeans to be dependent on us.

And he wanted them to behave as vassals. So it was kind of interesting to me when I listened to Donald Trump complain about NATO yesterday and then criticize the South Koreans. And I'd spent time in South Korea. I did some work for their Ministry of Defense for the same reason, saying, you know, you need to build your own capability. And then when it was over—this is back in 2010—I said, "What are you going to do with it?" They said, "We're putting it on the shelf." And I said, "What are you going to do with it then?" They said, "Well, when the Americans leave, we'll implement most of what you've said." So we are in the business of keeping everyone dependent upon this massive global command, control, communications complex with all of the satellite arrays and everything else. And if you don't have that, you can't be independent.

#David Gibbs

Sorry, go ahead, Pascal.

#Pascal

I have one thing, which is that there is a very interesting German-language documentary, and the title is "It Started with a Lie," "Es begann mit einer Lüge." And that's all about the main case, the main political case that was made in order to start the bombing of Serbia, which is that apparently, or allegedly, which was ultimately all fabricated, was the Serbs executing massive numbers of civilians on a football field somewhere in Pristina. And, you know, that was used as a parallel to what, you know, what happened in Bosnia with Srebrenica.

And that's why Srebrenica was so important, in order to re-invoke this kind of guilt that we didn't intervene then. The Dutch failed, the UN corps failed. And so now we need to do something. And this time, it's going to be the moment for NATO to shine. And even the Germans signed off on it. And actually, it turns out the German foreign minister at the time was then very proud that they managed to convince the Germans to actually go along and finally overcome this hesitation of, you know, the bad memories of years, decades past, right? What do you make of that? Were you involved in this as well?

#Douglas Macgregor

Well, when you say involved, there was a lot of action that I was in the middle of.

#David Gibbs

I wasn't necessarily involved with everything, but I was able to witness a lot.

#Douglas Macgregor

It was very clear that the MUP, which was the abbreviation for the special police that the Serbs had in Kosovo, was accused of doing a lot of things. How much of it they did and how much of it they didn't, I don't know. I have some material left over. A friend of mine who was a U.S. Army colonel, intelligence officer, he was working with me. And he had photographs, satellite imagery that had been taken of fires that were supposedly set. And his point to me was, if you look at where these are, every house that was hit was KLA. In other words, if they went into a village of Albanians, they went directly to the house that had the KLA people in it. Nobody else in the village was harmed in any way. No one else was hurt. But these kinds of photographs, for you, see, they're burning villages.

See, they're murdering people arbitrarily or deliberately. So, yeah, that argument was made. Now, what about the Germans? I think Joschka Fischer was probably making virtue out of necessity, because the Germans were treated at the time as, "Shut up. You know what you did in the past. You have to be part of this." I don't think the Germans had a whole hell of a lot of choice at that point. If I were a German at that point, I would have bailed out of NATO. I'd have said, "To hell with you." But the Germans weren't prepared for that. And I asked Sussman, I said, "When do you think the Germans are finally going to wake up?" And the consensus among the German officers was another 20 years, if we're lucky. So I think the Germans were sort of pushed along in the stream of things.

That's one thing. Now, this is very important. We sent up a lot of material to senior headquarters, to General Clark and to Brussels, made it very clear: if you bomb, you're going to get the mass exodus of Albanians out of Kosovo. Well, of course you are. Why would you leave every other Albanian with a cell phone on the ground in Kosovo to call in your location so that you could be murdered from the air? So we got to get all these agents of the enemy out of the country. So at that point, there was no longer any discrimination between those Albanians that were legitimate citizens of Yugoslavia and the Kosovo Albanians—in other words, the KLA. No more distinction. Everybody out. You got five minutes, ten minutes. Gather your stuff. You're out of here.

So they would start. They drove them exactly where the Macedonian president said they would go. They came over the border exactly where he said they would come. Well, then CNN was cooperating by interviewing these Albanians. What happened? Oh, my daughter was raped. My son was killed. My son was taken. Well, what we found out was that the Serbs weren't doing any of those things. But when they got close to the border, the KLA walked up and said, "You're a young man, you're 19, you're in the KLA now." Pull him out. They'd look at the girl and say, "How old are you? You're going to the Bravo. You're out." Oh, what have you got on you? You've got jewelry? We're taking it. And then they said, "When you go through, you tell everybody the Serbs did this to you or we'll kill you."

#David Gibbs

Christiane Amanpour didn't report that. Hashim Thaçi, of course, was a KLA leader. And we all know what happened to Hashim Thaçi. Of course, he's been, you know, essentially a criminal. I believe, if I'm not mistaken, he was convicted. Do I have that right? I don't know. I lost track at this point. That's all recalled from memory, but he certainly was not a nice man. Let's put it that way. How much of this, how much of Thaçi's background was known to NATO at this time?

#Douglas Macgregor

As far as I can tell, everybody. Everybody had knowledge. I mean, the joke in the hallways was, "Have all those boxes of knickerbockers and white wigs and tricorn caps arrived so that all these future democratic revolutionaries have the right dress?" Because, you know, people were comparing them to America's revolutionaries. Yeah, and I sort of listened to this, and my stomach was bilious. I

was nauseated. But this was part of the bigger myth. These are just like we were in 1780, fighting for our freedom. Okay, fine, thanks. It's all nonsense, but it didn't matter. And that's why I really appreciated that film, Wag the Dog. If you saw Wag the Dog, that's a perfect demonstration of what really happened. Most of it was nonsense, and it worked. Have you seen that?

#David Gibbs

I show it to my students, actually. It is funny, yes. But it's also—there's parts of it that do ring true, let's put it that way. Yeah. But I was going to ask you: one thing you did have in Germany was a remarkable change in attitude with regard to warfare, including warfare outside of Germany. And it seemed to me Joschka Fischer was instrumental in arguing for this, that he really changed completely the German political left from being anti-interventionist—especially the Green Party. Remarkable change, the Green Party, from being anti-interventionist to being one of the most pro-war parties in Europe. And Annalena Baerbock, you might say, is an intellectual descendant of him. And so he did play a key role, as far as I can tell. I mean, do you think this was all just things bullied by the Americans, or did he actually—was there something in it for him? It seemed there was a certain enthusiasm there that seemed to be authentic.

#Douglas Macgregor

A friend of mine in Germany told me many years later, he said, "Douglas, do you realize that the Germans have finally abandoned any thinking of racial superiority?" He said, "Now they are all morally superior to the rest of us." He said, "I don't know which is worse. I'm sick of them." And he's a German. So I think for a lot of Germans on the left, this became a justification for demonstrating their moral rectitude, turpitude, whatever, and superiority to others. Now, where are things today? I don't think they're there anymore. I think Baerbock's position is not very popular in Germany at all.

#David Gibbs

What do you think? I'm sorry, did you want to say something, Pascal?

#Pascal

I just wanted to ask whether we could use the last five to ten minutes that we have left to kind of bring it to this Russian angle that we had in the beginning. It's like this experimenting ground of how to then use this and go further east. I don't exactly know where the question here is, but maybe you have thoughts on that.

#Douglas Macgregor

Well, I think the professor was correct. I didn't appreciate it at the time. It just didn't leap out at me, let's put it that way. But very definitely, the whole Serbian intervention was a dress rehearsal for

what would later be tried against the Russians. And I think there was a tendency, just as people underestimated the Serbs. I mean, I know that when Bill Clinton asked the little group of advisors, "How long will this last?" he was told, "Two or three days, 10 days, two weeks at the most." And I was presented with that and asked what I thought. I said, "Well, sir, this could last six days, six months, six years." I said, "You're talking about the Serbs. You never know with the Serbs."

The Germans killed 600,000 of them. I said, "It doesn't strike me that this is going to be a pushover." And of course, you know, I was told, "You're wrong. The Serbs never, never unify. They always fight amongst each other." Well, they did. But on this particular occasion, I think the Serbs hung together very well. And the funny thing was that when Milosevic announced the Russians were pulling out on us, his generals stood around him and said, "Well, what did you expect? We told you you couldn't depend on the Russians for this. This is not the same. This is not 1914." So the Russian dimension was there for reasons that I can't entirely explain that don't strike me as being very rational.

But then a lot of this is emotional. And the American people aren't really involved. I mean, General Clark asked me in October of '98. I had gone home for a week. My family was at the time residing in Colorado Springs. I hadn't seen anybody for months. So I went there because I knew things were coming in the spring of '99. And when I came back, he said, "Well, what do the folks in Colorado Springs think?" I said, "Sir, most of them think that Kosovo is a town in Missouri hit by a tornado." And my point was nobody knew, nobody cared. Today, very few people know what's happening in the Persian Gulf, and they don't care.

#Pascal

I hate to be blunt. It's the way it is. I have one more thing, which is, if I remember it correctly, if I remember the years correctly, then Jack Matlock, last U.S. ambassador to the Soviet Union, was saying that he testified in front of Congress in 1996 or 1995 that the eastward expansion of NATO would be a big mistake. There was that debate going on within the U.S., and it was the Matlocks and this crowd that lost out. But is it far-fetched to say that 1998 rolled around and came as this convenient case to kind of build up toward making the case that, no, no, no, no, NATO, again, out of area or out of business? And, you know, eastward expansion, good idea, necessary. Let's cement that in the ground, and let's just have an example here. Is that safe?

#Douglas Macgregor

I think I should say something, but one thing to keep in mind: that was Senator Richard Lugar who made that comment of, "NATO is either out of area or out of business." And you have to understand that there is huge backing for that from the arms industry, the military complex. How do you justify what you're trying to do? And then you have the force structure issue. You know, if it promises more force structure, let's do it. This kind of nonsense has continued right up into the present, until he finally ran into somebody that couldn't be defeated, called Iran.

#David Gibbs

I think one of the things I saw from this event of the defeat of the Serbs, first in Bosnia and then in Kosovo, which gave tremendous hubris not just to the United States but to NATO, and the idea that NATO became such a prestigious instrument now, that I think this laid the political groundwork for eastern expansion. The fact that basically they had this sensational success there, the first real serious combat activity by NATO. They never really did any actual combat in the Cold War, but now they did actual combat and proved their worth, in quotes, all in quotes.

And so this basically became the justification for eastward expansion, and then conflict with Russia. I should add, just rhetorically, it's remarkable how similar the two are. The language, the anti-Serb language and the anti-Russian language, are really very similar in a lot of ways. The religious conviction, basically, that we're in the right and they're in the wrong, and the need to suppress all dissent through demonization and so on. All of these things, basically, I think the Balkans were a proving ground, basically, for what later became the conflict with Russia. That's how it looks to me, anyway.

#Douglas Macgregor

No, I think you're right. And again, I did not fully grasp that at all. That's why I was so impressed with your interview, because in retrospect, I don't see how you could argue otherwise. I would consider the following, though.

#David Gibbs

First of all, remember, the Serbs' air defenses were never degraded below 83%.

#Douglas Macgregor

We said that we didn't lose any aircraft. Large numbers of aircraft were so severely shot up and damaged that when the pilots flew back out over the Adriatic, they reported engine failure and bailed out. The engines had been, you know, badly damaged. I saw photographs of an A-10. It looked like Swiss cheese. It was lucky to get out and made an emergency landing. There was an emergency landing made by another stealth aircraft. And that's because the Serbs did put together interesting radar arrays consisting of commercial and old Soviet radar stocks.

They did track and find our stealth aircraft. Of course, pieces of that aircraft they shot down were instantly provided to the Russians and the Chinese. Of course, the Chinese were only too anxious to have that, given that we had bombed their embassy in Belgrade, sadly, unnecessarily. But that had to do with the fact that you started out with, I think, something in the neighborhood of 125 valid

military targets. After that, there were no other valid military targets in Yugoslavia. Now, why not? Well, Yugoslavia was hardly a mainstream European country. It was backward. It hadn't developed very much.

Well, then you have to sit down and start justifying the expansion of your target array to other places that have nothing to do with the military. We've done that in Iraq because ultimately the bombing answer, the Air Force answer, is we'll keep bombing and bombing more and more things. And, of course, the things they like to hit most of all are things that don't move. It's called infrastructure. We should have admitted the truth. At the end of the war, the air war, I went down to Kosovo and checked in with the British commander, who was very good to me. And he said, "Here, take this Range Rover, go see all the battle damage."

#David Gibbs

And I said, "How long will it take me?" He said, "20 minutes, maybe 30 minutes."

#Douglas Macgregor

And what I found out was that out of the claims that were made, we destroyed 11 tanks, 12 to 14 self-propelled guns, another 60, 70 different kinds of wheeled vehicles. You know, BDRMs, BMPs, things like that. So when they were going to announce the numbers, which were grossly inflated, were nowhere connected to reality. And the funny thing was, there was an Air Force colonel there from the U.S. Air Force doing the same thing I was doing. His name was McDonald. We both met and we both said, yep, there's not much to report. Well, then suddenly we report we destroyed hundreds of tanks and thousands of vehicles and so forth. Killed a very, very few soldiers, by the way.

The Serbs proved very, very expert at dispersing. And to be fair, the Air Force generals before this began warned us that once the Serbian military deployed to the field, they would be very hard to find and hit. So they wanted to hit them in their cantonments, in the barracks, before they got anywhere. Incidentally, the same argument was made to Putin by the Russians. Said, let's hit them, hit the Ukrainians while they're in their barracks. Don't let them disperse or deploy. Putin wouldn't do it because he still believed at that point, these are Orthodox Slavs like us. We don't want to kill them. Don't even want to get over that. My point is, we were wrong. We were right not to hit them in the barracks.

That would have been a disaster. But it was difficult for General Clark to get the Secretary General on board. The Secretary General at the time was a Spaniard, and he was very uncomfortable with the whole thing, but he finally signed off on it. But my point is that after it was over, we didn't do the damage we claimed. And in fact, the British commander of KFOR received a telegram, which he showed me. He said, "Look at this." And it was from the Ministry of Defense. It said, "Whatever numbers are announced today by SHAPE headquarters, you will support them without question."

Please acknowledge." Because he knew it was crap. My argument at the time was we should be truthful and show what air power cannot do.

Because we didn't have any ground forces. Unless you put a force on the ground, your enemy is not going to mass against you. It doesn't have to, and it'll survive. But nobody wanted to do that. So the myth of air power that starts in Desert Storm, by the way, just gets worse after Bosnia, is out of control after Kosovo. And then you knock over basically non-entities like the Afghans, who have no air or missile defense. You knock over the Iraqis, who've been reduced to abject poverty and have nothing. Then you make the false assumption that, well, we're the toughest. We're the best. Nobody can stand against us. We're invulnerable. We're invincible. Attack Iran. Big mistake.

#Pascal

Gentlemen, thank you very much for all of these very, very interesting explanations and reviews. Maybe just to wrap it up, David, is there one more thing that's on your mind that you would like to ask to finish it?

#David Gibbs

Well, I mean, overall, Colonel, I suppose that when you look back on this, do you see that the American victories in Bosnia and then in Kosovo—it would be fair to say that this, in retrospect, has been something of a disaster, both for the Balkans and also in setting a precedent and, shall we say, a pathway to eventual conflict with Russia. I mean, that's how I would see it. Do you see it that way as well, or do you see it differently?

#Douglas Macgregor

No, in fact, I subscribe to your view. First, do no harm. Interventions distort regional dynamics.

#David Gibbs

You create false economies.

#Douglas Macgregor

Where there was no corruption, there is shortly after the U.S. Army arrives, I can tell you that, because we always arrive with vast quantities of things that people want that can be smuggled in, turned into a black market, and make lots of money. In other words, if you don't have to go, don't go. And that's impossible right now, given the attitudes inside the United States at the highest levels. If you sat down with the average American, black or white, doesn't matter, and you said, "Well, listen, I don't think we should go, and this is why I don't think we should go. These people haven't attacked us. We don't have a real interest in this."

We wish them all well. We'll certainly send humanitarian aid and assistance. And when it ends, if we can help, we'll certainly do it. But we should not directly intervene militarily. I think most Americans would say, "Of course not." But they were never consulted. No one has ever consulted them. And a small group of people, if you're a well-organized minority, you've got a lot of money, you could do a lot in Washington. And I think everybody's learned that, whether you're in the pharmaceutical industry or you're in any other industry. The arms industry doesn't matter. We're a big country, and most people are not involved.

#Pascal

And this is where I'm going to make a little cap that will say, "Make America neutral again." That's the spirit of neutrality. We will send you humanitarian aid, but we won't get involved. It's like, it's not rocket science. Gentlemen, thank you very much for your time today. Colonel Douglas Macgregor, Professor David Gibbs, and we will talk again in the future. Thank you. Thank you very much. Thank you. Good to meet you, Colonel. Bye-bye.

#Douglas Macgregor

Good to meet you, Professor.