

The Strange Case of Europe's Decline & Self-Harm

Prof. Michael Hudson, a world-renowned classical economist, discusses the strange case of Europe's decline. Please support Michael Hudson's important work on: patreon.com/michaelhudson Follow Prof. Glenn Diesen: Substack: <https://glennDiesen.substack.com/> X/Twitter: https://x.com/Glenn_Diesen Patreon: <https://www.patreon.com/glenndiesen> Support the research by Prof. Glenn Diesen: PayPal: <https://www.paypal.com/paypalme/glenndiesen> Buy me a Coffee: [buymeacoffee.com/gdieseng](https://www.buymeacoffee.com/gdieseng) Go Fund Me: <https://gofund.me/09ea012f> Books by Prof. Glenn Diesen: <https://www.amazon.com/stores/author/B09FPQ4MDL>

#Glenn

Welcome back to the program. We're joined today by Professor Michael Hudson to discuss the very strange case of Europe's economic decline, as well as some of its latest acts of self-harm and questionable decisions. Thank you very much for coming back on.

#Michael Hudson

I'm glad you invited me, Glenn.

#Glenn

So, I wanted to get into the Europeans joining in on America's tech war—or economic war—against China. But first, I wanted to ask a bit about this seizure the Europeans are engaging in. As we know, they've frozen Russian assets, those sovereign funds, and there's now growing pressure to seize them.

That is, as various newspapers write, they're looking for something to make it seem legal to essentially steal the Russian assets—sovereign funds—something that's never been done before. What makes this unique is that the Americans do not want to participate, because of course they'd become financial pariahs. Japan doesn't want to either. But for some reason, the Europeans seem quite determined that this is something they should do. What do you make of this decision? It's quite interesting—they want to take the Russian assets and use them as collateral for a loan that can't be paid back. So either way, the Russians are not going to get their money back, more or less.

#Michael Hudson

Well, the question is, who are the Europeans we're talking about? I'm not sure it's the European population, which seems to be against the war with Russia and Ukraine and wants simply to have an industrial recovery. The Europeans are led by the EU Commission—Ursula von der Leyen and her Estonian aide—and by Friedrich Merz of Germany. The neocons and the NATO group, including Mark Rutte, have all decided they want to extend the war from Ukraine and Russia into a war between Europe and Russia, or at least to frighten Europe and make it think there's going to be an imminent war, in order to basically create a kind of military Keynesianism.

Let me begin, I think, where we left off, or what we discussed earlier, about the \$300 billion in Russian deposits with Euroclear—the clearing organization based in Brussels that handled Russia's foreign exchange in euros and dollars. Nobody knows where Euroclear has actually put this \$300 billion, or euros in assets. It seems to have spread them across many countries and many investments. There have been many attempts by journalists and politicians to find out where it is, but nobody knows. The Belgian prime minister says, well, since Euroclear is in our country, we only have \$10 to \$20 billion of this money at stake, but we're against Europe seizing Euroclear.

So the Germans, the French, and the other pro-war advocates in Europe have tried to get around this by mobilizing public opinion—by scaring people into thinking there's an imminent threat. Ultimately, what they're conjuring up is, "Is Russia going to invade Europe?" And that's absurd. No developed country with an elected government is going to invade another country. Land invasions are over. Any fight with Russia would be fought with missiles—and only missiles. It could be air-launched, from submarines, or naval missiles, but it's going to be a missile-type conflict.

The main missiles people have talked about so far are the drones. I think the aim—what Merz and the Europeans who are trying to set up European interests against those of Russia are doing—is to achieve a kind of military Keynesianism, based on the supposed need to fight Russia or defend themselves against Russia. It's really an extension of the bombing of Ukraine, and that's where the conflict is clearly heading. Now, the plan of Merz and Germany is to give money to Ukraine from Euroclear, which will be earmarked in a Ukrainian account to buy weapons to fight Russia. Nobody trusts the Ukrainian kleptocracy enough to simply hand over the \$300 billion directly to Ukraine.

It would end up in the pockets of the kleptocrats. But they'll create an account for Ukrainians to spend on European armaments. Good news for the European military-industrial complex, whose stocks have been going up, while other industrial stocks haven't followed suit because of the slowdown caused by the end of trade in Russian oil and gas. Well, the news that came out in the last few days is that Merz apparently staged alleged Russian drone appearances at airports in Germany to whip up propaganda against Russia, as if it really had some intention of attacking Germany in one way or another. I mean, that's what the drones are doing in Ukraine.

And the fact that drones are such a new form of warfare over the last three years shows how this was the right button to push for the German and European public. You've already had the NATO

head, Mark Rutte, calling on NATO to be prepared for a long-term confrontation with Russia. Well, a confrontation means, at some point, a war—that's what NATO is all about. He claims the alliance has turned the tide on ammunition and says NATO is currently winning. And if you read the European press—the popular press, the mass media—they all say that Ukraine has a chance of beating Russia; it's just fighting to a stalemate.

This is completely different from the guests you've had on your programs, who are, like me, reading what the Chinese are saying, what the Russians are saying, what reporters throughout the rest of the world are saying—that the Ukrainian war is basically over. It's totally lost. And the problem for Europe's industrial economies, according to Marx and to Merz, is: well, if the war in Ukraine has been lost, then what are we going to use all our weapons for? Who's going to buy them? Not the United States—the U.S. is asking Europe to buy American weapons for NATO. NATO needs the threat of war in order to maintain the military-industrial production and employment that it seems willing to base the economy on.

And four days ago, Germany's *Stern* magazine published insider leaks showing that the whole idea of Russian drones being used against German airports—to test them out, as if this were preparation for Russian bombing of airports in Germany and Europe, just as it was bombing air transport in Ukraine—was made up by Merz and orchestrated as a scheme to amplify public fear and fast-track a lucrative military contract for domestic firms. It turns out he has a personal background as a corporate lawyer with deep connections to Germany's arms sector.

And from the very beginning, as the Christian Democratic leader in Germany, he's been advocating more defense spending, saying this is what will lead the German recovery—if German industry can even recover, given the break in relations with Russia and now the imminent break with China as well. So if these leaks turn out to hold water—and Sahra Wagenknecht in Germany has been very outspoken about getting to the bottom of this and insisting on a public investigation—then it's going to be obvious that Europe has its own deep state of NATO and anti-Russian neocons, just as serious as the U.S. deep state in pushing for confrontation and ultimately war with Russia.

If you read what Merz has said, it's as if this really isn't about national security at all. It's about securing gains for industrial investors and for a minority that has hijacked European defense and industrial policy. And I think the question is, why are they doing it now? Now that the war is ending, it looks like there's going to be, at some point—and it may take until spring—a Ukrainian surrender. The Russians are going to take over and appoint a non-Nazi government, replace the whole government in Ukraine. And that's going to essentially block Ukraine.

The intention of Russia is to block any attempt by Europe to send more missiles or arms attacking Russia itself. Russia's aim is simply to isolate itself as much as possible from Europe, because it no longer sees Western Europe as offering any opportunity for mutual gain. It only sees Europe as a threat. And if it could build an iron wall—basically saying, "You leave us alone, we'll leave you alone, but don't get involved"—that's what it would do. I think, given that when the war ends, Russia is

going to have to spend an enormous amount of money rebuilding the Russian-speaking parts of Ukraine, the former Ukraine that is now part of Russia, that's where its focus will be.

Donetsk, Luhansk, and Crimea have already voted—had a referendum—to rejoin Russia, and Russia is going to need a lot of money. The opportunity of ending the war in Ukraine offered Russia the chance to say, well, you are demanding reparations from Russia for the war in Ukraine that you, NATO, started with the U.S.–British coup d'état of 2016 by the Nazis that overthrew the elected government. It was NATO in Europe that backed the Ukrainians in an ethnic war against the Russian-speaking eastern provinces. So we're the victims, not the attackers. If there's anyone who owes reparations, it's Europe owing reparations to Russia.

Of course, that would take years and years to settle through the courts. But what Russia, I think, would be willing to agree on is, "Well, we're going to use that \$300 billion to spend largely in Europe to start the reconstruction and rebuilding of the real estate, the industry, the economies of Luhansk, Donbass, and other parts of the former Ukraine that are now part of Russia." And I think what Merz and the anti-Russian cabal in the European leadership are trying to do is prevent this opportunity. They don't want Russia to spend its money in Europe to rebuild the Russian-speaking former provinces of Ukraine. They want the money to be spent specifically on Europe's military-industrial complex. That's what the whole problem is about.

#Glenn

I think a key problem for Europe is that the war now—well, the war going on—is more or less a condition for the survival of the political West, and indeed Europe itself. Because, well, the U.S. has already made its intentions clear: it wants to reduce its presence not just in Ukraine, but in Europe. The Americans have now taken a clear position that they want to make a profit from the weapons, so the Europeans have to pay for the weapons they send. What was interesting was that, at the end of August, Reuters reported that the U.S. told the Europeans it would begin to pull back a bit from the Baltic states. And that's when you suddenly saw all this reporting on the drones.

So suddenly everyone, you know, thinks they saw a drone—but it hasn't been confirmed. Or actual drones were seen, but none of them were tied to Russia. Many turned out to be people flying drones as a hobby—Germans in Germany, for example—but the narrative remains. There isn't one piece of evidence, but if you add zero plus zero plus zero, suddenly you have at least a one in European math. We also see now that the U.S. is gradually pulling some of its troops from Poland and Romania, and this is creating some panic. The only thing that could make the U.S. perhaps change its mind is if there's an actual conflict brewing, some real threats toward Europe.

But otherwise, yes, I wanted to say as well that Europe itself risks fragmenting, because the EU's main strength was its collective bargaining power—the ability to stand together. This transfer of sovereignty toward Brussels used to allow the EU to deliver some tangible economic benefits for its member states. The EU doesn't really do well economically anymore. So at the moment, unity to a

large extent depends on the war. Once the war is over, it's very likely that the EU will begin to fragment. I think a lot of this helps explain why the political leadership in Europe seems so frightened, or desperate, to keep the war going.

#Michael Hudson

But Glenn, the war is creating disunity. Look at what's happening with Hungary and Czechoslovakia. The European Union is now saying, well, under the rules we've had all along, Hungary has the ability to block our military spending in support of Ukraine. Well, of course, Hungary has actually been attacked by Ukraine. Article 5 of NATO is dead. A NATO member, Hungary, has been attacked by a foreign power—Ukraine—to destroy its oil supplies that it was getting via Kazakhstan and via Russia. And both Hungary and Czechoslovakia, and now there's pressure in other countries too, are saying, we cannot afford the war with Russia. You Germans are willing to end your industrial growth and deindustrialize and impoverish your economy for your ideological hatred of Russia, but we cannot afford your war.

We're going to block it. And so the European Union wants to change the rules—to no longer permit member countries to have the right to block. So what is Hungary supposed to do? Join the Shanghai Cooperation Organization? It's being left out. The war, I think, is not only dividing European countries against each other; it's dividing the European right-wing NATO leadership from the rest of Europe. The voters—the population as a whole—want economic recovery. They don't want war, because war is going to impoverish them. War will enrich the military firms represented by Merz and the other pro-war leaders, but it's not going to help the economy at all. So I think it's deeply divisive.

#Glenn

No, I think you're absolutely right. In the long term, the war is just deepening the divisions within Europe. But in the short term, it's seen as something that holds it together. And again, that's part of the problem now. I think there's no strategic thinking about where we're actually going with this. But toward this end, the need to maintain constant tension with Russia and keep the war going in Ukraine is becoming more difficult, now that Ukraine is turning out to be in much worse shape than many European leaders would like to admit. How do you see this moving forward?

Do you think the Europeans have to step in? Because there's a lot of talk now in Europe. You have the former NATO Secretary General arguing that the Europeans or NATO should start intercepting Russian missiles and drones from NATO territory. There's more push now for doing long-range strikes into Russia. We keep saying we're helping Ukraine, but at the end of the day, these will be our weapons, buttons pushed by our contractors. It will be our targeting. It will be our satellites. So it's a NATO attack on Russia, and I think, more or less, that shouldn't be controversial to say anymore.

#Michael Hudson

It's not controversial in Russia. Both President Putin and Foreign Minister Lavrov have said that if a missile hits Russia from a NATO country—even if it's launched from Ukraine, but the missile itself is from a NATO country or steered electronically from Wiesbaden or any other European guidance center—Russia will retaliate against the countries that produced or guided the missile. That means it's going to do to Germany what it's done to Ukraine. How far will it go? Will it just start hitting military companies, army bases, power utilities, or will it go further? Russia's response will be: you send a missile against us, we'll send missiles against you. You Europeans have no defense against our new hypersonic missiles.

They're not going to be atomic. They don't have to be. But they're enough to disable your industry—certainly your military industry—to disable your ability to send missiles. We can disable not only your arms makers, but your electronic and electrical facilities, your transportation systems, your railroads, your airports, your ports. They've been as clear as they can be in saying this, to the point that, given the feelings among Russian voters themselves—saying you can't just ignore one red line after another and let Europe escalate—you've got to respond. We're dealing with a step function here. Russia has tried to warn Europe again and again: here's what's going to happen if you really do that. And Europe has decided that it wants that.

Apparently, Merz and Rutte of NATO believe that Europe needs to be attacked by Russia in order to rebuild its industry. But the attack by Russia is going to prevent it from rebuilding its industry. That's what we call an internal contradiction. And how do you explain this? It's a tunnel-visioned ideology—literally sharing the long-term British hatred of Russia. It has nothing to do with communism, because Russia's not the Soviet Union anymore. It's a geopolitical confrontation that leads Europe to share the U.S. neocon view that, well, if only we could divide Russia into four or five small countries, then it wouldn't have the power to threaten us or to play any positive role in the world at all.

And that'll enable us to play a positive role in the world as America's leading puppets, administering the rest of the world on America's behalf. I mean, that's pretty pitiful—but that's where it's all moving toward. And, you know, I have other things I want to talk about on your show. What the European Union has done is say it's not enough to fight Russia. As Rutte has said, this is not only a fight against Russia; it's a fight against Russia's allies—China, Iran, North Korea. This is a war against us, against Russia, and what almost seems to be the global majority. And the first arena in this war has been against China, led by the Dutch, who seem to be, even more than Germany, the extremists.

They confiscated the Nexteria battery company that Chinese firms had bought and developed in Germany and in Holland, to provide a basic stage in transforming silicon wafers into batteries. This is not, in itself, a national security issue. In fact, because it's not a national security issue—it's such a common, mundane technology—automobiles, Mercedes, Volkswagen, all the big German car companies, and industry in general, need all of these batteries. Batteries are fairly simple, but the technology requires, I'd say, a couple of years to develop. So when Donald Trump and the

Americans pressed the Dutch government, they said, "You have to seize any company that China owns 50% or more of, or that Chinese investors own 50% or more of. You have to confiscate it as part of our war against China, because we Americans are not going to join your fight against Russia, but we are going to end up fighting against China as our existential enemy," as the Americans like to put it.

So the Dutch seized Nexperia on the grounds that, number one, the United States told them to seize it—by designating hundreds of Chinese companies that are 50% or more Chinese-owned as fair game for Europeans to grab. And the Dutch grabbed it. They said they were worried that Nexperia, given the growing antagonism of the West toward China, might move some of its operations to China, and that China might do something they didn't like or that could interfere with their control of the regional battery trade. So they decided to take over the company and confiscate it, just like European countries have confiscated Lukoil's affiliates in Romania and elsewhere. Naturally, China denounced it.

The anger in China is very clear. They said, "How can you do this? Europe's manufacturing sector depends on Nexperia's batteries—millions of their products are sold throughout Europe. They're not very expensive, but they're key inputs for automobiles and other basic machinery. And now all of this is going to be blocked." China said, "Well, obviously we're not going to keep producing all this output for companies that have been seized by the Dutch government in violation of international law, simply because the Americans told them to." The Dutch responded by saying that Donald Trump has indeed said he's no longer imposing the 50% rule against China's designated companies.

But that's not why we grabbed China. We were going to do it anyway, because we don't want the Chinese controlling a company that so many of our other firms in Holland and across Europe depend on. So they've stopped investing and producing. And the Chinese have said, well, you know, we're not going to give you stuff for free. From now on, all trade with Holland and other European industries will be in our own currency, the RMB, not in euros. We can't keep our savings or bill our products in euros, because you might do to us what you just did to Russia. It's obvious we're on the same trajectory.

And Rutte has said, we're just as bad as Russia because we're importing Russian oil, and that's supposed to help Russia defeat Ukraine—and the whole fantasy of interconnections that the Europeans have drawn. So the Nexperia incident has, to China, become a kind of barometer of Europe's institutional credibility, as the Chinese spokesmen have said. And China has unilaterally halted the wafer supplies to Nexperia, citing its own national security for all of this. So I don't see any chance of a resolution yet. The Dutch keep saying, "We think the Chinese are going to be reasonable and surrender to us." Well, China's not going to surrender. In fact, it's blocking key exports—not only rare earths, but other raw materials.

There are so many key materials that China supplies to the West that, even if there are alternative sources for Europe, those alternatives are, first of all, going to be more expensive. And secondly, it's

going to take quite a while to put them in place. China has said, well, we're able, of course, to replicate at home what Nexperia was producing in Holland. It has affiliates all over Europe. Of course, we can do it, but it's going to take a while. And certainly, just to begin exporting these batteries again is going to take three or four months.

Well, the European industries that have been using these imports have all followed just-in-time accounting. They've minimized their inventories so they can operate with lower business expenses. So Europe doesn't have stocks of these batteries. And it's going to have to—companies all throughout Europe, within two months, have announced—Mercedes and others—that they're going to have to close down their plants, because you can't make a car without these simple, basic batteries that raise and lower windows, you know, the automatic internal control systems of cars. And they're going to have to lay off their labor force.

So once again, this idea of Europe somehow regaining control of its economy by declaring a trade, investment, and financial currency war—extending this war from Russia to China and other countries—is going to be just as serious, on a smaller scale, as Europe's decision to stop importing Russian oil and gas. Europe is cutting itself off from all the basic imports—from raw materials to semi-manufactured goods to other manufactured products—that it's become dependent on. And there's no way an economy can function without these products. You can be sure China is quite aware of this. And when it says it's going to take a while, it's really Holland's fault for doing this.

Well, what it's saying is, "Let the European countries fight among themselves to see what the resolution is." And of course, when there's a resolution, there's going to have to be reparations. China will protect its own national security from future seizure by saying the European leaders are really just like Donald Trump—they're changing the rules at will for China. So, in their military confrontation, in order for us to avoid our own interruption of processing and manufacturing, we're going to have to keep control of our own production. Europe can, of course, do the same thing. Well, maybe in ten years—let's say seven or eight years—Europe can do its own thing. Its population will fall in half.

Mass poverty—the governments will be voted out of office. It'll be a disaster. That is the clearly outlined plan that Merz and von der Leyen, the European Union, the European Commission, NATO, the German government, the English government, and the French government are pushing for. It's unanimous that the future is one of European collapse and deindustrialization, and it's going to result in a breakup of the European Union. And probably this kind of breakup is what leads to actual military confrontation and war. And that's where things seem to be heading. It seems crazy, but I don't see—when you read what other governments are saying, this is what they're warning Europe about. And the Europeans said, well, that's what we want.

#Glenn

It's really crazy that we ended up in this situation. The thing is, the Russian market was actually quite good for Europe. It was a very important part of the whole development model—not just all the cheap energy being supplied by Russia, but also what the Russians were doing with all that money. They were, to a large extent, buying European goods, manufactured products. And if they were involved in special energy projects, like work in the Arctic, it was often under the hope of developing this “greater Europe” based on Gorbachev’s idea of a common European home. Europe was often favored as a partner, along with the United States, under the assumption that economic connectivity would somehow lead to Russia’s gradual integration. It’s just crazy going down this path, because it was the Americans who were pushing very hard for NATO expansion—to re-divide the continent and re-militarize it.

It was the Europeans who, for all these years, worried that we would recreate the Cold War logic—that we would impose these zero-sum, civilizational choices on the countries between NATO and Russia. Those choices could manifest in civil wars and then proxy wars. Yet here we are, and the Europeans are now really doubling down. I just... it's very hard to have anyone actually explain where the national interest comes in here—how this is good for anyone, including Ukraine, for that matter. But no, the Chinese and others are definitely watching, because if there were some push tomorrow for Taiwan to secede and China took any action, why wouldn’t the Europeans also seize Chinese funds? Why wouldn’t they seize Chinese companies? I mean, even the fact that they’re discussing this is, I think, a horrible mistake.

#Michael Hudson

There’s a discussion about national interest, and Merz, Rutte, and von der Leyen have said our national interest is in deindustrializing Europe. Our national interest is anti-labor. Our national interest is war. That’s their idea of national interest. So it’s not what you mean by national interest. When you and I talk about national interest, we use it the way it used to be used fifty years ago—it’s the interest of the entire economy. If you’re asking what is good for the economy in terms of its material welfare and well-being for the population, the increase in output, and the more equal distribution of that output, that’s how you and I—and I think most of your listeners—define national interest.

But the national interest, as defined by the European leadership, is, “No, our interest is the same as America’s—the top 1%, mainly the top 10%.” Our interest is in the military-industrial complex. Our interest is the money in our personal pockets that we get from the bribery coming from the U.S., from NATO, from the companies we represent—against the interests of labor and the voters. So you have a divergence of national interest from what used to be called the materialist approach to history—the idea that countries would act in their own economic, social, and political self-interest in a democratic way that represents what’s good for the population as a whole. That’s no longer the meaning of “national interest” in today’s Western economies, from the United States to Europe.

#Glenn

Well, it's not as if—sorry, this will be my last question. It's not as if there weren't some structural problems before this conflict. If we look at the European economy twenty years ago, it was close to parity with the United States—the EU and the U.S. But since then, the divisions between Americans and Europeans have only increased. I was wondering, how do you see the reasoning behind this? Is it about energy costs, technological sovereignty, financialization, or is it just about subordinating European interests to economic interests—primarily to U.S. geopolitical interests?

Or how do you make sense of how that parity disappeared? Because that was quite important for the Europeans—the way they had envisioned the post-Cold War era. It was supposed to be a collective hegemony, with the U.S. and the EU as equal partners. And if you fast-forward to today, as you said, the main objective of the Europeans seems to be to hope that America will accept Europe as a junior partner, if we subordinate ourselves enough—which is a far cry from where we were twenty years ago.

#Michael Hudson

Well, Glenn, you know I'm primarily a financial economist, so it's hardly a surprise. I trace the whole decline of Europe to its disastrous adoption of the euro. It's the German-backed rules that say European governments—including the European Union's central bank—should not create their own money. They basically have to borrow it, and they can't run a budget deficit of more than 5% of GDP. Europe, from the start, said that under these rules it would never be able to apply the same Keynesian policies for economic recovery that the United States, China, and every successful industrial country have used. They decided to tie the hands of Europe's banking and financial system, preventing governments from providing enough credit to enable the economy to grow, while more and more of national income is spent on finance and rent-seeking activities.

The design came from the University of Chicago—extremists of the hard-money, Milton Friedman school. And the United States knew exactly what it was doing: by imposing these self-destructive, tunnel-visioned rules on Europe, Europe couldn't use the kind of modern monetary policy that the U. S. uses for right-wing purposes, but not for the purposes that modern monetary theory was developed for—to help the economy as a whole grow. So Europe tied its hands from the beginning by not allowing the government to play a role. The United States backed politicians who said, "Although Europe is joining now, it will be a Europe of corporations. We want the country to be led by Meloni in Italy. We want exactly the corporatism that Mussolini advocated for Italy. We failed before in World War II; we're not going to fail again." And that's the craziness of it.

Of course, every industrial economy—including Italy, Europe, and Germany in particular—developed its industry in the 19th century as a mixed economy, with the government taking the lead in public infrastructure and supporting a central bank that supplied credit to the economy. It relied on government banking and government rules to steer finance into production, productive capital

formation, and tangible investment—building factories and employing labor. That's not what Europe is advocating anymore. And in fact, I don't think Europeans spend much time looking at what made industrial Germany in the 19th century so productive and enabled it to take the lead, and what made French industry also so productive.

Why did it have such a great takeoff in the 19th century—to become the economic center of the world—and now it's shrinking to the periphery? If you compare the difference, it's largely the role of the government in what was becoming industrial socialism. It was called social democracy, which really meant socialism in Germany and the other leading industrial countries of Europe. And now it's turned into finance capitalism, where most European wealth is made financially, not industrially. The financial sector realizes it's easier to make corporate and personal fortunes in a shrinking economy than in a growing one, because in a shrinking economy you have deflation, insolvency, bankruptcies.

You have an enormous concentration of wealth ownership, and you're going to see that in Europe just as you're seeing it in the United States. That polarization ends up impoverishing the economy as a whole and also leads to a suspension of democratic freedom—of expression, of voting. It neuters the role of voters in electing national officials through this overpowering EU control system, which has been taken over by a unity of the neocons and the financial oligarchy, basing itself more and more in the military-industrial complex and its links to the United States. It acts as a kind of subsidy for these personal companies and personalities—the Tony Blairs of continental Europe and the Merkels who have been able to take control.

#Glenn

It's fascinating that the European project, which began after World War II under the coal and steel agreement, was intended to promote transparency, avoid militarization, and serve as an anti-war project. Now the EU more and more defines itself, in its own words, as a "geopolitical Europe," in which economic development will be driven by military Keynesianism. So... well, thank you, as always. I really appreciate you taking the time. Thank you.

#Michael Hudson

Well, I guess it's not too optimistic—unless you see the prospect of a revolution as something optimistic.