

Seyed M. Marandi: Houthis Expanding Fast & Iran Set to Escalate Big

Prof. Seyed Mohammad Marandi is a professor at Tehran University and a former advisor to Iran's nuclear negotiation team. Marandi discusses the great advances of the Houthis (Ansar Allah) and why Iran is set to escalate. Glenn Diesen clip channel: [https://www.youtube.com/@Prof.](https://www.youtube.com/@Prof.GlennDiesenClips)

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#Glenn

Welcome back. Today is September 12, 2026, and we are joined by Professor Seyed Mohammad Marandi, a professor at Tehran University and also a former advisor to Iran's nuclear negotiation team. Thank you for coming back on. There's a lot of things happening out there to discuss.

#Seyed M. Marandi

Indeed. Every day, there's something new happening.

#Glenn

So, well, we know that the U.S. war against Iran is intensifying. Iran is also shifting its position. It appears so, at least. But the war isn't just intensifying; it's also widening quite fast. So I do have a lot of questions about Iran. But first, I wanted to ask about the developments in Yemen, which are, well, let's say, quite incredible. I was wondering if you can flesh out what is actually happening there now and what is the, I guess, wider significance?

#Seyed M. Marandi

Well, thank you for inviting me, Glenn. It's always a great pleasure. It's very confusing, obviously, because so many things are happening simultaneously, and everything is more or less linked to everything else. So whenever something changes, you have to sort of think about how it changes the situation on other battlefields. And that includes Ukraine. That includes the trade wars. Everything nowadays seems to be shifting, and some things are just shifting more than others. In Yemen, it began, of course, with a genocidal war by the Saudis and the Emiratis on Yemen, which

was supported by the entire region except for Iran and the West. When I mean the region, I mean the governments, not ordinary people on the streets. And the media supported the war, whether it was Al Jazeera or Al Arabiya.

They were all supporting that genocidal war. I think many of them expected, as usual, that the resistance would collapse and that the Ansarullah movement would be swept away. But that didn't happen. And over the years, they became more powerful. Iran, of course, assisted them. Hezbollah assisted them with training, and Iran, obviously, with technology. Yemen has a lot of bright young men and women. So they were able to, with Iranian assistance, create their own military infrastructure, their own military-industrial infrastructure, which we're seeing being effectively used, very effectively used today. And gradually they became stronger until they tilted the balance of power and forced a ceasefire upon the Saudis and the Emiratis.

So we had a ceasefire for a while. Then more recently, as you covered in your excellent show, we saw the Saudis and the Emiratis split away from each other. And then after the war that Trump and Netanyahu began against Iran, more recently, we saw the Saudis restart or reignite the war. They preserved the siege on Yemen, sort of like Gaza, preventing ships from getting in, keeping people in a very difficult situation. Obviously, under sanctions, people die, just like with Iran. I mean... these are all hypothetical. I mean, these are just examples. I don't know... This is an example of how things could play out. Let's say you're a father in Iran. You have a couple of children.

And then one of them gets cancer. And then you have this very expensive medical treatment. But you're a working-class person. You borrow money from friends, or your friends just give money as aid, or your relatives, and you buy some of the medicine. Then you need more to continue the process to have your child survive. And then that runs out. And then you go to the government. Government agencies give some assistance, but they only have limited money. That runs out. And then ultimately you reach a point where you don't have anything to sell. You don't have a car. You don't have anything. And so your child dies. And this is just, like, one way in which Americans kill people. In Yemen, it's far worse, obviously. There's no comparison. So the siege on Yemen kills a lot of people as a result.

And so when Ayatollah Khamenei was... after he was martyred, when things were safe and they decided to hold a funeral ceremony, Iran sent a plane to Yemen, to Sana'a, to bring a delegation to Iran. Plus some injured people or sick people who couldn't find medication in Yemen, they also came on the plane. This, according to the Saudis, was a violation of their siege on the Yemeni people, which, of course, Iran ignored. When the plane went back to return the delegation to Sana'a, to Yemen, the Saudis bombed the airport, the international airport, which, of course, outraged Iran, because it was a civilian airliner with men and women working on it, on the plane. But it was a violation. It was an act of war against Yemen. So Yemen began to strike back. But this time around, it became clear that Yemen was far stronger than the Yemen that the Saudis were fighting before.

And it's sort of like, it makes... It reminds me of Trump, Mohammed bin Salman, doing the sort of things that you would imagine any rational person would refrain from doing. Just like how Trump began the war with Iran, how Trump continued the war with Iran. Mohammed bin Salman, for whatever reason, launched this war, and it backfired catastrophically. But the bigger picture is that this is happening simultaneously with the events in the Persian Gulf. So the catastrophe becomes much bigger for Saudi Arabia, and of course for Trump, for the anti-Iranian alliance, for the Israeli regime. Because while the war against Iran has imposed a lot of suffering on the global economy, as well as the regional economy, and as well as for Iranians too, this added to that makes things much worse.

So the Saudis, for example, which have had a lot of difficulty and are facing a lot of economic problems, to say the least, because of what's going on in the Strait of Hormuz and because of the damage that was done to their economy during the war, since they were assisting the United States, this added to that brings about a very dangerous situation. And then we have the attacks on Saudi oil installations and oil facilities added to the defeats on the ground and to what's going on in the Strait of Hormuz.

But as I was saying before on your show, in my opinion, while Trump will continue to try to strangle the Iranian people—and I gave the example of the little boy—to strangle the Iranian people, to bring them to their knees, what he's also doing effectively through this policy and the policy of his administration, his regional allies like Mohammed bin Salman, is that he is strangling the economies of Saudi Arabia, the Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain, and Kuwait. And that could lead to instability, and it could undermine these regimes altogether. During the war, you recall I would say that if Iran's critical infrastructure is attacked by Trump or Netanyahu, Iran will destroy the critical infrastructure of these regimes, and that would bring about their collapse.

And I said that on multiple occasions, every time it seemed like Trump may be going in that direction. Well, this policy ultimately can lead to the same result, perhaps in a slower way. But often these crises, they grow slowly, and then suddenly things explode. So I don't believe Iran will fall at all. But I do believe that there's a good chance that the countries in the Persian Gulf will begin to grow unstable, depending on how long this lasts and how bad things get, because they're completely dependent on oil and gas, and none of them have, as far as I can tell, they don't have any public legitimacy. They're family dictatorships. And so if things grow bad, it's unclear how many people will stay loyal to the ruling class.

So, and if that happens, then we have an even much bigger crisis, because then there will be no oil and gas that will be coming from these regimes, whether their assets are completely destroyed or not, because there will be instability in the countries. So... we are living in very, very dangerous times. Anything can happen. And usually, when you have escalation, the chances for even further escalation grow because the tensions are high. People become more desperate. Governments are humiliated. They feel defeated, so they feel they have to do something. They have to react. And

then they do something foolish. So, for example, Bessent will probably intensify the sanctions on Iran in the coming days as revenge.

And then what will Iran do? It will do the same thing in return. It will tighten the screw on the Strait of Hormuz. And then it could go further. They could start striking U.S. bases in the Persian Gulf region. It could bomb U.S. business assets in the Persian Gulf region, or assets that are affiliated to the United States, oil and gas. Because Iran can't sanction the Americans, they don't have the ability to do so, they'll take their revenge by military means. And then the Americans would feel that they have to respond, even though they're the ones who started this whole cycle. So I think that it's most probable—it's probable that things will increasingly get worse for the time being.

#Glenn

It's interesting what you said about all these wars being interconnected, though, because, well, I guess, take a step back. The war against both Russia and Iran obviously has the intention of restoring the global primacy of the United States. But also on a more micro scale, when you see the Gulf states now struggling and being weakened, you have the possibility of Israel re-engaging in the war against Iran. And I think this is probably one of the reasons why Iran is softening up the targets in Jordan in case a bigger war breaks out between Israel and Iran again. But when you see Iran targeting Jordan in this way, the whole sky was just lit up with all these interceptor missiles. And all of these missiles are essentially what Zelensky is begging for, so he can continue the war with Russia.

I mean, you can't really make it up how they're all joined at the hip here. But regarding the recent developments of Ansar Allah, or the Houthis as we call them in the West, only the past few days, they had some pretty significant successes. That is the East-West Pipeline in Saudi Arabia. I mean, this carries a significant portion of the world's oil, and this had to be shut down after it was set on fire by an attack by the Houthis then. And also, you see this territorial conquest moving south along the Red Sea and also seizing this island, Perim Island, or the Arabs call it Mayyun Island. And this allows them to choke off very efficiently, I think—well, we haven't seen it in action yet—but choke off the strait there going into the Red Sea. So what is the wider significance?

I mean, because you would think if this really has a real prospect of strangling the Saudi economy, not only would Saudi Arabia go in, but the U.S. would also go in. I thought, you know, if the U.S. can't invade Iran, then perhaps they could use ground forces against Yemen. But the Saudis asked the U.S. to help them strike Yemen, strike Houthis, to slow down or stop their advances. And indeed, over the past two or three days, they've attacked them, I think, like 130, 150 airstrikes against Yemen from the Saudi side. But Trump reportedly declined, if he's not just delaying. But what cards do you see the Houthis having to play here, and how could the Saudis and the U.S. respond? That's a very large, big question, but I guess you can go at it as you see fit.

#Seyed M. Marandi

I was listening to this American analyst speaking about Trump's objectives in Iran, and he was saying Trump is looking—he said, well, he was saying that Trump from the beginning knew that these economic problems would be created, and he doesn't care about the mid-elections, and he's working to overthrow Iran during the last few years of his presidency. And he was saying that what the objective is, is to starve Iran, to bring the Iranian people to their knees. People will revolt and then bring about a normal government.

And I was thinking to myself that this person, and he's basically saying that he and Trump, because he seemed to be supporting this, he and Trump and the Trump regime, they are the ones who are abnormal, who would even pretend that to bring about normality, you'd have to strangle people to death. But again, that just shows the mentality of a significant segment of American society and the overwhelming majority of the elites in the United States. But the problem is, regardless of the morality or immorality of all this, is that what has happened in Yemen has created an enormous potential to do the same thing, or it has enhanced the potential to do the same thing to the U.S. economy and Western economies.

Yemen, the Yemeni armed forces and Ansarullah, they've made huge gains in the south, stunning gains. About 5,400 square kilometers were liberated in, I guess, less than 48 hours, if I'm not mistaken. And the Saudi forces collapsed, which people should be asking themselves: how could this happen when the Saudis, when their troops are much better funded, when they have much higher salaries, when they have much better equipment, when they have air support, when they have everything, and Ansarullah and the Yemeni armed forces, they have very low wages? They don't have that sort of weapon systems. The reason is that Ansarullah is seen as legitimate in the eyes of the people of Yemen, especially after the support that the Yemeni armed forces led by Ansarullah and the Yemeni government gave to Gaza, where they blocked the Red Sea to the Israeli regime in order to stop the genocide, in order to put pressure on the regime to end the genocide in Gaza.

And that made them heroes across the Arab world. For years, Al Jazeera and Al Arabi and all the media outlets owned by these despots were telling people how awful Ansarullah is. And a lot of people probably believed the propaganda. But then when it turned out that all of these regimes, and they're all doing business as usual, transporting oil, importing gas, sending goods, having secret meetings and all that, all these regimes were on the side of—and of course they were allowing the Israelis to continue genocide—and Ansarullah was standing up for the Palestinians despite all the hardship that they had gone through. And they actually made an impact, and it brought the Americans to the region to destroy them and cause a war.

And the Qataris, the Emiratis, the Saudis all helped the Americans. Their bases in these countries were used to bomb Yemen, just like Iran. So they became heroes across the region all of a sudden. And so in Yemen, you can imagine those forces that are being paid by the Saudis, they're saying to themselves, "I am fighting for despots who are with Trump against people who are for Palestine." That does not help with morale, right? And that doesn't create an incentive to fight.

And so despite all their equipment, they just collapse because people don't want to be seen as fighting against those who've sacrificed for the Palestinian people. So with this sudden collapse, now the Yemeni armed forces have control over the entire Red Sea. Now they're also moving towards Taiz and moving inwards and moving to control literally everything that needs to be controlled. But the Red Sea now is going to be much more problematic for the United States, because from the Bab al-Mandab itself, which is easier to control than the Strait of Hormuz, significantly easier to control, all the way up to where they were before is all under the control of Ansarullah. So getting ships through safely without their consent becomes almost impossible, or very difficult, or highly unlikely.

And then you also have to take into account that there's some striking similarities between Yemen and Iran, not just the strait itself, but the Yemeni side is mountainous. And that makes it much easier for Yemen to have assets, the Yemeni armed forces have assets put in place to strike ships or to strike the enemy and to be protected at the same time. These mountains do help the Yemeni armed forces a great deal when it comes to dealing with Americans or any other adversary. So now you have the Bab al-Mandab and you have the Strait of Hormuz both controlled by allies, and then you have the oil assets being attacked every day by Yemen in retaliation to the airstrikes being carried out against Yemen. So one day the pipeline, the East-West pipeline, is badly damaged.

Right now it's not functioning. Oil is not passing through that pipeline. During the last few months, between three to four and a half million barrels a day would go through that pipeline, which is very important under these circumstances. So that's not happening. And then they also bomb refineries, other oil facilities across Saudi Arabia. So the damage that's being done to the Saudis every day is enormous and is coming at a time when the Saudis are already in deep trouble because of the war that they joined with the Americans and Israelis against Iran. So while they want to strangle Iran and the hope is to crush Iran, now Iran and its allies have a much better hold over the neck of the economies of its adversaries.

#Glenn

Well, I'm just thinking what possibly the Houthis might do. Like I said, it's very hard to... Well, once you escalate, it's easier to further escalate as the situation destabilizes. And obviously, along the Red Sea, we see now the ability to put a blockade on the Saudis. I assume that will remain in place until the Saudis lift their blockade on Yemen. And so, again, it is significant, though, that, as you said, how everything fell so quickly because people assumed that after more than a decade of this, you know, strikes and attacks and blockade and, well, a genocidal war against Yemen, that they would be ready to fall apart.

But the way you see the Houthis now just, you know, plowing over all these territories with very little resistance, something is also due to escalate now, because we can assume the desperation, especially in Saudi Arabia, but also in Washington, as the entire strategic situation is now falling apart. But I guess my question was, we know they can put a blockade on Saudi Arabia. They can bring immense pain to the U.S. by shutting down the Red Sea. But what are the possibilities in terms

of a land war, though? Because if you ignore the big foreign population in Saudi Arabia, Yemen has twice the population. So how—yeah, and as you said, the terrain is also favoring them. Do you see intensification of drone strikes against energy facilities? Or do you think actual fighters moving physically into Saudi territory? I mean, what are possible steps up that escalation ladder?

#Seyed M. Marandi

I can't say, obviously, for certain, but I think that what they will continue to do is liberate different areas in Yemen. They already control, even before this latest chapter, they already—like 70 to 80 percent of the people of Yemen lived in territories that were under the authority of Ansarullah and the Yemeni government. And so, I mean, when people say that, when they look at the map and see that before this liberation, the recent liberation, when they look and see that Ansarullah only holds like a segment of Yemen, or they say that it's controlling like, I don't know, 30 percent or whatever of Yemen, that's very misleading. Because much of Yemen is desert to the east, and there's no one there.

Very few people live there, and there are areas where no one lives. And the most important part of Yemen are those areas that they control, and of course Sana'a, the capital, is in that territory. So, and that area is mountainous. So after the operations that we've seen and their expansion into the remaining territories, they're going to have, let's say, control over almost all of the population, except for some parts in the south. And I don't think they're, again, I'm guessing, I don't think they're going to assault Aden. I think they're going to do political deals with the south. The south is very fragmented. And the Saudis and the Emiratis fought over the south, even though they were allies. So I think what Ansarullah and the Yemeni army and the government will do is that they will liberate the rest of the territories and then do political deals with the south.

After that, I don't think they're going to enter Saudi Arabia. I don't think that's their objective. They have what they need to put pressure on Saudi Arabia right now, and that is the capability to bomb their oil and gas installations. And they've said that they have two demands of Saudi Arabia. One is to end the siege, which is directed at ordinary people, and it's a crime against humanity. And the second is to stop interfering in Yemen. And so, as long as this continues, then the situation is going to remain difficult for Saudi Arabia. And in my opinion, it's not sustainable forever because Saudi Arabia is very dependent on oil, just like the other countries, the Arab countries, family-controlled countries in the Persian Gulf. And without oil, or without enough oil, they cannot survive forever.

They are probably going to have to start selling — I'm sure they already have — selling many assets that they have in the West, stocks and bonds, and withdraw money from their accounts and sell assets. But I'm not sure if they'll be allowed to do that anymore, because that will be very dangerous for the U.S. economy under these circumstances. We all know the concerns that exist over the Japanese yen and the fact that the Japanese government is selling, or thinking about selling, a large quantity of their assets in the bond market. So these Arab countries are no longer sending money to the United States, their excess money. They'll have to sell assets and bring them home. I don't know

if the Americans will let them do that for long. So Saudi Arabia is going to remain in a very difficult position until it listens.

And if it continues to bomb Yemen, as it is doing right now, then Yemen is just going to fire more missiles and drones into their military bases, but also they'll destroy their economic infrastructure. And since their economic infrastructure is basically founded upon oil, that's what they're going to strike. And again, just as we all know this, and I'm being repetitive, but it's important, the situation in the Strait of Hormuz is not good for Saudi Arabia. But this is their only option. And it's a large country, and their expenditures are high. And they've already wasted hundreds of billions of dollars, hundreds of billions of dollars, on the genocidal war in Yemen over the past few years. And they've spent a lot of money on megaprojects. And all of those have reached a dead end, like The Line and the others. So it's not as if the Saudis have infinite money. And it's not clear if the Americans will allow the Saudis to withdraw that money.

#Glenn

About the deceptive ways, though, that Yemen is portrayed. You know, we often have, at least in the Western media, the competition within Yemen is between the Houthis, or Ansar Allah, on one side and the government on the other. But, you know, the capital is controlled by the Houthis, and the majority of the population, I think 65 or 75 percent of the population, live under Houthi-controlled territories. So when would you... I know you're in international recognition and all of this, but nonetheless, at some point, it doesn't paint a clear picture of what exactly is happening within that country, as it is controlled mostly now by the Houthis. Sorry, it looked like you wanted to say something.

#Seyed M. Marandi

No, no, I was just laughing because they always say the Houthi rebels, as if they're, like, in the mountains somewhere hiding, or they're in some jungle or in the forest, and that the central government is doing business as usual and they have to do counterinsurgency operations. That's how Western media says it, because Western media is completely, you know, it's a part of the state. It's not independent. It's, you know, over the last few years, it's become more openly so. It's becoming increasingly like Soviet media back in the day. So you would think that when Western media says "the government," they're talking about the government in the capital. It's like, you know, the government in Oslo, or like any other major city. You think that that's being controlled by them, the people who the West says is the government.

But the reality is that that so-called internationally recognized government is not the government. It's based in Riyadh. It's based in Saudi Arabia. The only reason why it's called the internationally recognized government is because the Saudis and the Emiratis and the Kuwaitis and the Qataris and all the wealthy regimes, they backed the genocidal war in 2015, and because of their economic clout, they were able to get a UN resolution and basically force this narrative that this government,

which is not in control of the country, is the legitimate government. That's why the discussions over Yemen are often confusing, because when I say the government, some people are thinking about those who are being backed by the Saudis.

But for me, the government is the entity that controls the capital and controls, let's say, well, I think by now it's probably closer to 80% of the population, and most of the territory that is livable, which has water resources and so on. Again, the desert is not all that important unless it's for pipelines or for roads or other things. So this myth that they've created about these Houthi rebels—and it's not even the Houthis either. The Houthis, if you look at Ansar Allah, it is far larger than the Houthis. It has enormous popular support, and that's why they win wars. That's why they win the war against a far more powerful entity which has complete support from the West. You have thousands of British military advisors helping the Saudi government bomb schools.

I mean, they've been carrying out the genocide for many years, but with the full help of British nationals, American nationals, Australians, Canadians, and so on. And of course, the other countries in the Persian Gulf were with them. Despite all that, they failed. So that shows that not only do they have popular legitimacy, but they hold the territory, the territory that's of most value, and most of the population is there. So, you know, what is it they say? When it looks like a duck, it walks like a duck, it sounds like a duck, it is a duck. If it looks like a government, if it sounds like a government, well, that's the government. But again, Western media will continue with this narrative that they're the Houthi rebels. And again, the image that comes to mind is that this ragtag group hidden in some mountain, in the caves of some mountains, they're carrying out a fight.

#Glenn

Well, yeah, that's how language is used in political propaganda. That is, political language is supposed to either legitimize or delegitimize, which is why we never use the same language for us versus them, the opponent. That is, we have governments; you have regimes. We do military interventions; you do full-scale wars of aggression. And we promote democracy in other countries, while they do hybrid wars inside our countries. We support resistance. Our opponents support insurgencies. We have allies. You have proxies. We represent the international community. You are pariah states. I mean, this is how, you know, once you build this into the language and you make people actually adopt it, then there's no—there's no way words anymore can legitimize opponents anymore. Everything is already built into the language that this is essentially a fight of good versus evil. That's usually how one would structure political language, and it does get quite intense at times.

#Seyed M. Marandi

And then it deeply affects policy because when they are just proxies, then you say, well, I can overthrow them. I don't have to use all my resources. I'll just give it a push and they'll fall if they're a regime, again. So everything for me, my calculations are based upon that narrative, right? And so then I hit a brick wall because I miscalculate because, well, it's just—these are just proxies, this is

just a regime, these are just rebels, and so on. And then all the excellent examples that you gave. And then so my calculations should work, and they should be undermined, and everything will live happily ever after, and then that doesn't happen.

But even afterwards, we don't understand why it failed. We say, well, let's try it again, and again, and again, which is, they say, the definition of insanity. But it's based upon, to a degree, the narrative itself. This narrative that becomes a part of your unconscious. It's there. So no matter what atrocities one carries out, they're the bad guys, we're the good guys. No matter how stiff the resistance is, they are about to fall because they have no popular support, no legitimacy, they're unstable, and so on. So it helps contribute to further war, further aggression, further death and destruction, but also further failure.

#Glenn

Well, we kind of saw this in the war with Ukraine as well. That is, in 2014, when the West backed this coup, it had to be referred to as a democratic revolution. No one had to unpack it, going, well, they removed the democratically elected president. It went against the majority will of Ukrainians. It was not supported by the Constitution, all of these things. But still, it has to be a democratic revolution. And we supported those people resisting the regime of Yanukovych. But once it was toppled, you had all these people in the east, primarily Donbas, who resisted this post-coup government because it was also extremely ethno-nationalist.

And, well, the first steps were essentially banning the Russian language to a large extent. And so when they started to resist, you know, that can't give them legitimacy. So they were all Russian proxies, and they were, you know, terrorists. And suddenly the whole resistance, which had been hailed and supported in the west of Ukraine, when that appeared in the east in response to the coup, it was just criminalized and stripped of all autonomy. It's all Russia behind it. I mean, you know, this is how you build the case for war, effectively. Yeah. But, yeah, I wanted to ask Iran.

We're seeing some big developments there as well. Again, just a big package would be, you know, we see Iran now coming with—announcing that they will have this restricted zone, push the U.S. ships out. We see Iran seemingly willing to at least soon begin to strike U.S. warships, already striking U.S.-linked tankers, suggesting that they might go more defensive. And some indications that Iran no longer sees any need for negotiations, or maybe call it renegotiations. How do you see, as all of this is happening in the Gulf states, what is shifting in Iran?

#Seyed M. Marandi

The Iranians have been moving towards an offensive military posture ever since the new chair of the Supreme National Security Council was appointed. And we've been seeing that. The U.S. strikes were countered with much heavier strikes. And sometimes the Iranians would continue striking a couple of days after the Americans had stopped striking. So, or when the Americans struck Iranian

tankers, and I think this morning they struck another tanker, the Iranians would retaliate by hitting larger numbers of tankers. So the Iranians have put aside this tit-for-tat, and they are now pursuing a policy where their strikes have become disproportionate. They'll hit the Americans much harder, or U.S. assets, or U.S.-linked assets, much harder.

And of course, the whole Persian Gulf region, the Iranians consider these countries as proxies of the United States. So in the broader sense, the Iranians could say that everything there is fair game because they're all U.S.-linked assets. So whether it's AI data centers, or whether it's oil installations, or U.S. banks, or ships in the Persian Gulf, or tankers, Iran could strike at any of them in retaliation for the U.S. sanctions. So now, with the situation in Yemen becoming more difficult for the United States, because it's weakening Saudi Arabia, the Iranians have more leverage. So any pressure, any added pressure to oil exports in the Persian Gulf will have even a greater effect than before. The Iranians are becoming more strict about ships leaving the Persian Gulf and oil leaving.

They do still allow some ships to go through. There are, let's say, five ways in which ships can go. One is through the Iranian corridor, and they just pass through and go, like Chinese ships or Iraqi ships, because they didn't fight against Iran. But for the countries that fought against Iran, or countries that are taking oil or other resources from countries that are fighting against Iran, like Kuwait, the Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Bahrain, there are two ways to go. One is through the American corridor. In the American corridor, some of those ships go through with American consent, with Iranian consent. And some of them actually carry Iranian oil. So it's very complicated. So the Iranians can hit some of those ships, and they don't hit other ships.

But they can start hitting more ships, which they're doing. So that's lessening the American corridor, let's say. The amount of oil that gets through is decreasing there. Then there's this other means by which boats, small ships, they take oil from tankers, they cling alongside the Omani coast, and these small ships go outside of the Strait of Hormuz, and then they transport the oil to other tankers. This is very expensive and time-consuming. But because of oil prices, it's still worth, you know, it's still worth pursuing for these people. Iranian oil also goes through that corridor, but in a very complicated process.

But the Iranians also strike some of the ships. Sometimes they don't strike ships because they have deals with the Saudis or with the Emiratis or with others. Certain ships get through. The Iranians can decrease those too, which they're also doing. So the Iranians are turning the screw on the U.S. in the Strait of Hormuz. They're tightening the noose in the Strait of Hormuz. And it has a much greater impact, as I said, now after what's happened in Yemen, because the oil shortages are going to grow. And we always have to remember that there are all sorts of other shortages that are growing too: helium, sulfur, that have huge consequences, and fertilizer and LNG and all that.

And then there's the refined fuel as well, not just petrochemicals. But if I'm not mistaken, I think 3 million barrels of fuel that used to go out on a daily basis from the Persian Gulf no longer go. And they can't get those ships through. So if you want to have gasoline or other fuels exit the Strait of

Hormuz, that's very dangerous, because if that ship is hit, it'll explode. It's not like crude oil. So diesel, which is produced in the Persian Gulf, you can't just get it through the Strait of Hormuz now because that's highly inflammable.

So the Iranians now, any added pressure that they build becomes far more consequential as a result of the events going on, not just in the Red Sea, but also internationally. The strikes on Saudi oil installations by Yemen—the Saudis, of course, say that the Iraqis are also involved. The Iraqis deny that. But in any case, I would assume—I mean, I would assume Yemen is doing it. I mean, Yemen is definitely doing it for the most part. Now, whether the Iraqis are involved or not, I don't know. But in any case, the Saudis are being devastated. So the Red Sea, the Arabian Peninsula, the Persian Gulf—when you put that all together, it gives Iran and its allies many more tools to use in the face of the Treasury Secretary's attempts to strangle Iran.

#Glenn

But as this is happening, the Iranians are tightening the noose on the U.S. Meanwhile, in Yemen, they're creating huge problems for the Saudis and also, well, you can say, tightening the noose on the Red Sea.

#Seyed M. Marandi

Wow.

#Glenn

What are the options here? I mean, either the U.S. can escalate in a big way to, again, the usual tactic to try to use overwhelming force to make the—well, I choose my words correctly—well, make the Iranians more compliant, let's say. Otherwise, the alternative is to go back to a diplomatic path, either to put an end to this thing or to give some breathing space, to buy some time, get some oil through, reshuffle the forces, whatever they need to do. But do you see an indication either way, either honest or dishonest diplomacy or towards escalation?

#Seyed M. Marandi

Well, politically, at the global level, things are not going well for the United States. We saw the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit, where the statements were pro-Iran. And now in BRICS, we're seeing statements in support of Iran, where countries, including countries that have been traditionally close to the United States, have been putting out favorable statements. India has also signed on to a statement basically condemning what's going on in Gaza and in Lebanon. So this is not good for the United States. And in the Western media, you don't see anything about BRICS or the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.

But these two summits, these two meetings of leaders, both within two, three weeks, these are important events. What the United States plans to do and what the United States will do, I think, it's impossible to say because it's Trump, and Trump is just—you can't predict him. But there are different ways in which this can play out. I mean, if Bessent escalates, then Iran will definitely escalate and things will get worse. And then that will itself create more potential for escalation and military strikes. So we could be moving towards a hot war again. Or, for example, Netanyahu, who seems to be losing the election, may carry out some act of desperation in Lebanon or against Iran.

And that would start a hot war again. And the region, as I said at the beginning, is very fragile now. It's been over six months, and these countries are becoming increasingly fragile. They think that Iran will fall, but I think that they should be very worried about Kuwait and Qatar and the Emirates and Saudi Arabia and Bahrain and their other proxies in the region. So if the war expands, I don't think these countries can take it. And they're not as wealthy as they seem. And as I said before, these countries have been sending all their excess money to the U.S., to the West, but mostly the U.S., for bonds and stocks and buying assets.

And so if the princes and all those who've been taking their cut, their portion of the country's wealth, they would take it to the West too, alongside all the weapons that they've been buying and that they don't know how to use, as we've seen. Well, that money is not going anywhere anymore because there is no extra money. They are not selling any oil or natural gas or anything like that. And then now they have to start selling because they spend a lot of money. These countries, they spend much more than other ordinary countries. And so they have to start selling those assets.

And as I said earlier, the Americans, I don't believe the Americans are going to let them sell those assets, those bonds and stocks, because the Americans are desperate to preserve their economy at this very dangerous juncture. I don't think the Americans can afford to allow them to have their own money back. I mean, they should do it if a country would, but that's—it's the United States. If they want to take the money or prevent them from taking their money back, they'll do that. So I think these countries are very, very vulnerable now. So if there is escalation, then I think that the chances that they collapse increase by the day. But

#Seyed M. Marandi

But I think it's fair to say, from the Iranian side, is that the Iranians are prepared for a long war. You can see the shift in the way the government is moving forward with regard to economic policy. It's now a wartime economy, and the way in which the Iranian president is dealing with leaders, the Chinese, the Russians, and others, and BRICS, and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. They're finding ways to manage the situation for a couple of years. But I think also the Iranians are going to increase the pressure on the United States until the midterm elections. And I think the Iranians would like to see Trump lose the House by a bigger margin and for his hand to be weakened in the

Senate. And if he loses the Senate, that would be excellent. Not that it would bring an end to the war, but just so that it would make life much more difficult for Trump in general, which would have an adverse impact on the way in which he carries out anti-Iranian policies.

#Glenn

Well, I'm glad you mentioned the BRICS summit. It's the last day today in India. And as you said, it just followed a meeting about the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. These two institutions, I would argue, are the two main ones that seek to find, I guess, an institutional format, political format, to transition from this unipolar world to a multipolar one. That is a lot to be organized. You have all this new technological cooperation. As you hear from the BRICS summit, they all have to talk about how to manage the AI, industrial cooperation, all this land and sea transportation corridors and new development banks, their payment systems, national currencies.

I mean, I think the reason why it doesn't get discussed properly in the Western media is because it's easier just to put a little label that, you know, some anti-Western club, and then not delve into it. But, you know, the whole world, which is supposed to be organized around, you know, NATO, G7, IMF, World Bank, the dollar system, Western NGOs, you know, to reorganize—well, to do essentially administration of the world—all of this is now falling apart. So, you know, and that's the whole hegemonic model.

So again, it goes back to language, which we discussed. I think there's a legitimacy crisis for many of the political class in the West because this is essentially, you know, what they see as their responsibility. They're supposed to govern international security, economics, politics, civil society. So the role of the media, I think, as to their efforts to do the narrative management, it prohibits them from informing the public what's actually happening in the world. Yeah. Anyways, I want to thank you, unless you have any final thoughts.

#Seyed M. Marandi

No, thank you very much, Glenn. Again, since I've been saying this for a while, I advise people to look away and ignore the Western narrative. And just by watching your show, that's basically what they're doing, to see a more objective picture. You have different analysts. I'm, of course, the least important of them all, but for people to go to alternative sources to get a better understanding of what's going on. And my advice, as I've said, I think, before on your show, is for people to read books not written by the mainstream, but by those who have alternative views. The book *Going to Tehran* by Flynt and Hillary Leverett, I think, is a must-read nowadays. And they predicted all this happening. They predicted a possible rapprochement between Iran and the United States.

And they dealt with many of the myths on Iran. And they spoke and wrote extensively about the history. And they said that, look, if you don't move towards rapprochement, it will move towards confrontation. Well, here we are. And they got punished for writing this book. And another good

book to have a better understanding of the resistance, the culture of resistance, the ideology behind it, is Alistair Crooke's book, *Resistance: The Essence of the Islamist Revolution*, something like that. These are books that people need to read so that they get a better understanding of the situation because the West is implementing policy built upon a narrative that is, in my opinion, largely a myth, based upon a myth.

#Glenn

Well, I think people are starting to pick up on it. I was just seeing in a paper in my own country, they referred to Ray McGovern because he's making some comments about the Ukraine war. Like, 27 years in the CIA, he was offering the daily—giving daily briefs to President Reagan—and they don't like what he has to say. So he was just dismissed as—he has been accused of being pro-Russian. So, accused, which means not much. Who accused him? What the hell does pro-Russian mean? I think people notice when they just do these labels all the time. Like, he's not legitimate. Here's a lot of bad words. Do not listen to him. We have the truth for you. You know, I think after a while, people start to pick up on the nonsense. And I guess in West Asia, this is how these problems and conflicts are portrayed. The case is the same. So thank you again, and have a great Sunday.

#Seyed M. Marandi

You too.

#Seyed M. Marandi

Have a great day, and I hope your audience has a great day too.