

New U.S. National Security Strategy Signals New World Order

Alex Krainer is a market analyst, author & former hedge fund manager. Krainer discusses the new U. S. National Security Strategy and why it signals a new world order. Follow Prof. Glenn Diesen: Substack: <https://glennndiesen.substack.com/> X/Twitter: https://x.com/Glenn_Diesen Patreon: <https://www.patreon.com/glenndiesen> Support the research by Prof. Glenn Diesen: PayPal: <https://www.paypal.com/paypalme/glenndiesen> Buy me a Coffee: buymeacoffee.com/gdieseng Go Fund Me: <https://gofund.me/09ea012f> Books by Prof. Glenn Diesen: <https://www.amazon.com/stores/author/B09FPQ4MDL>

#Glenn

Welcome back to the program. We are joined today by Alex Krainer, market analyst, geopolitical analyst, author, and former hedge fund manager. Thank you very much for coming on the program. The topic today is the new U.S. National Security Strategy, which has been described differently by different people. Some see it as a realist reset, others as strategic retrenchment, and some as a divorce from Europe. How do you read it? What is the essential message Washington is now sending—both to its domestic audience and to the international audience—with this National Security Strategy?

#Alex Krainer

I find that there's a little bit for everyone in the document, including evidence for those who believe the United States is basically continuing its old policies of global dominance—that any course correction is just cosmetic, and that what we have instead is this, how do you call it, strategic sequencing and division of labor. I don't read it quite that way. I think the document overwhelmingly corroborates what Marco Rubio already said in his confirmation hearings in January of this year, when he stated that the post-World War II global order is more than obsolete—that it has been weaponized against the United States.

So, if not radical, then it's a very substantial departure from the status quo—a rejection of the current globalist agenda and an embrace of a multipolar global order. In that order, nevertheless, the United States is not taking a modest role. They still seek to establish a dominant position in this multipolar world, but it's at least an acknowledgment that things are changing—that the path the United States has been on has been misguided and unsustainable, and that it's now taking a different turn. All of that is explicitly stated in the document.

And then there are specifics there that should be very, very troubling for the, you know, the new global, new world order—globalist elites, let's call them that generously. And they offer a glimmer of hope that the future of humanity might be better than what they had in store for us—meaning, turning us into a flock of hackable animals. Because one of the first things the document states, already in its introductory remarks, is an acknowledgment of people's God-given natural rights—exactly in those words—which is something that the, let's call it, Davos-centered New World Order has been going out of its way to deny.

And they were deliberately construing human rights as something granted by state authorities, obviously with the implication that such rights can then be withheld by those same authorities unless we're good—unless we comply with whatever. Meaning, you can be put away in prison for life if you refuse to use people's chosen personal pronouns. You can be imprisoned for praying silently on the street, or for posting upsetting content on social media, wearing the wrong T-shirt, singing the wrong songs, having the wrong opinions, and so on and so forth.

Which basically, when you think about it, isn't so different from the way the Bolsheviks treated Russian citizens before, in the aftermath of the Bolshevik coup in 1917. So I think that the United States staging a course correction is a very, very good thing, even though I have to acknowledge there are some things in that national security strategy document that are troubling. But, you know, there's no need to be overly fatalistic about those aspects, because the Trump administration is still treading a very, very complicated balance between their new national strategy and the still extremely powerful vested interests that have benefited from the post-World War II global order. So there obviously has to be some stuff in there that, let's put it this way, appeases them.

#Glenn

With this readjustment, though, I often make the point that perhaps Trump is not the source of it—he's more of a symptom. Because a lot of this has come to an end, the whole format, as you said. Under the unipolar order, the hegemon—the United States—set up nodes, like privileged partners who help uphold that hegemony. So you have Germany, the UK, Japan, and they assist in their respective regions. But then, of course, over time, as Marco Rubio said, it's been weaponized. You can see now the concerns that allies drain resources, either military or economic, through NAFTA or the Trans-Pacific Partnership.

So it's noteworthy that Trump moved away from these economic arrangements. The previous administration wanted to write the trade rules for the world, but he also recognized that the allies were able to get a lot of privileges out of this at the expense of the U.S. And with adversaries, you see them collectively balancing the U.S. as a result of hegemony—Russia and China, for example. Liberalism has kind of assisted in this; the liberal ideology tends to ignore a lot of strategic national interests because you can't challenge the hegemonic structures once they've been wrapped in liberal language.

That is, liberalism won't survive unless we dominate essentially all corners and maintain these key structures. But one of the interesting institutions that's been central in the post-Cold War hegemony is NATO. NATO's expansion set the pattern for its dominance. How relevant do you think that component is? Because not only do they no longer want to project that idea, they actually want to get rid of it altogether—not NATO itself, but the idea that NATO has to keep expanding.

#Alex Krainer

Yes, the document explicitly says that perpetual expansion of NATO is a very bad idea and that the United States no longer supports it. Furthermore, they refer to the war in Ukraine as something that has to be—I'm sorry—something that has to end, and that Russia has to become part of the new European security architecture. So, you know, that's obviously a departure from the current agenda of the European—let's say—the European establishment. And it obviously marks a very significant departure from the way current global affairs are being discussed. It also takes a swipe at the European Union, while at the same time claiming that the European allies are extremely important to the United States.

But they support sovereigntist movements in Europe rather than an agglomeration of the European Union into some kind of monoculture under the political diktat of Brussels or the City of London. So I think that's quite a radical change. Maybe it's been fairly obvious to everyone who's been paying attention since the start of the Trump administration. But now that it's, you know, written down in black and white, including some very pointed criticisms of European policies, I think it's undeniable. And, you know, what this document says, in effect, is that the European allies are our allies only insofar as we share certain values and certain policies that have to include things like democracy, human rights, and the right to free speech.

If the European countries diverge from those values, then they can no longer be our allies. That's all spelled out in the document. So, you know, for people in Brussels—for people like Ursula von der Leyen, Kaja Kallas, Friedrich Merz, and Emmanuel Macron—it's very difficult to deny this. It's very difficult to pretend it's not there. I think it strengthens the arguments of sovereigntist movements in Europe, and it very much weakens the arguments of the pan-Europeanists who are right now hell-bent on going to war against Russia, on stomping out free speech, on canceling elections, and so forth. So this document is a subtle condemnation of all those tendencies, with the implication that if you go that way, we're no longer allies.

#Glenn

Yeah, this part, going after and criticizing the EU, is quite fascinating. I mean, the language there was pretty strong—there wasn't a harsh attack against Russia in any way, but there was against the EU. It essentially blamed European leaders for refusing to end the war in Ukraine. It pointed to the reason for this as them being undemocratic, authoritarian, purging the media and political

opposition. I mean, it reminded me a bit of when J.D. Vance went to the Munich Security Conference and said that Europe's enemies were domestic enemies—which meant our leaders, that they're the ones who are now terrible.

And as I said, there's also a note in there saying that one of the solutions has to be to cultivate resistance to Europe's current trajectory within European nations. It's not quite a regime change, but it does suggest that the U.S. should help Europe get off its current path, which is led by undemocratic, authoritarian leaders, essentially. This is quite a damning document for the Europeans. The European leaders have been doing everything they can to show their obedience, hoping to win the affection of Trump.

#Alex Krainer

Yes, correct. There are some very explicit statements in there that, in fact, imply the United States will work with certain European nations to change their current policy. I'm trying to find it, but here, for example, it says, quote: "American diplomacy should continue to stand up for genuine democracy, freedom of expression, and the unapologetic celebration of European nations' individual character and history. America encourages its political allies in Europe to promote this revival of spirit, and the growing influence of patriotic European parties indeed gives cause for great optimism."

So, you know, Europeans could—well, you know, Europeans, let's say, let's call it the still-dominant EU party-centered structures—could rightly interpret this as American interference in their internal affairs. But, you know, at this stage, this interference would be very much welcomed by many forces in the EU, which today might be silent but could be strong enough to overturn the old order on very short notice. You know, the support for parties like AfD in Germany, and for sovereigntist parties on the left and the right in France, Italy, and other European countries, is probably silent, but it's a giant that maybe just needed this signal from the United States to be more assertive. And so, you know, political options like Macron, Merz, Starmer—they're on the back foot. And this is quite a devastating blow for them.

Now, especially outside of this agreement, there's also a concrete conflict that's directly relevant to this document. And that's Europe's attempt to censor and silence Elon Musk's X—trying to force him to restrict free speech in Europe, and even imposing \$120 million in fines for refusing to do so. We've also seen that X has become the number one source of news for all countries in the European Union. So this is a huge battle taking shape, one the Europeans are almost certainly going to lose. The consequences of that are probably going to play out in the very short term, over the next several months. I think it might lead to a wave of regime changes in Europe. And I found it very interesting that—okay, so we don't have this officially confirmed—but according to the German journalist Patrick Baab, whom you interviewed very recently, if I'm not mistaken...

#Glenn

Yeah, two days ago.

#Alex Krainer

Yeah, yeah, exactly. So he was saying that one of the things being discussed in Moscow last week was the reconnection of the Nord Stream pipelines, which is extremely interesting in light of the fact that there were no German representatives in Moscow. And to me, the implication is that the United States is anticipating a change of government in Germany. And, you know, Germany is still the biggest power in Europe, in the European Union. So that could, in fact, lead to the disintegration of the European Union if AfD forms the next government.

#Glenn

Well, certainly a lot of the comments that came out in this new national security strategy, I think, would be welcomed by AfD, Marine Le Pen, and many of the political forces that have been marginalized across Europe. This, of course, is not being received well in Europe at all. I mean, if there's anything predictable about the EU leaders, it's that every sentence has to be filled with praise for their own values all the time. And I often make the point that if you always have to talk about your great values, then perhaps there's a problem there. And I don't think—but there's a lot of truth to what was said. I mean, what you mentioned, all the authoritarian, undemocratic developments in the EU, is certainly correct.

But the security document also went on to discuss the civilizational irrelevance—or growing irrelevance—of Europe. So, the share of global GDP went from 25% in 1990 to 14% today. That's quite a dramatic decline. And, of course, everything was described as cratering or sharply declining—birth rates, for example—which are then “fixed” with mass migration. And you have all these things producing a lot of social and economic problems. But how do you see the Europeans responding to this, though? Because I guess the future of Europe looks quite grim here. The first thing I noticed, of course, was how the Europeans—at least the European leaders—are now being blamed for keeping the Ukraine war going, alongside this overarching picture of a dying European civilization. How do you see this being received?

#Alex Krainer

I think, as far as the European Union's governing structures go, they don't really have a response. They're just panicking and making things up as they go along. You know, Kaja Kallas was recently in the Gulf, and she actually contradicted the Americans. She said Europe's share of global GDP is 20%, so she must be right, not 14%. But they're also simply denying that there's a rift between the United States and Europe. They're still pretending that the partnership is real and solid, that we're on the same side and should stick together, and all that.

They're simply denying the fact that when the United States reaffirms its alliance with European allies, it's talking about individual sovereign European nations, not the EU. Those are two very different things. But I think the more troubling reactions might come from, let's say, the deep state structures. I think the reactions there could get very ugly. This isn't going to be discussed openly, but they have a long track record of taking down governments. And I think there's a danger they might try to take down Donald Trump's government—if not by an assassination attempt on Trump, then by staging color revolutions.

And the danger of this is taken very, very seriously by the Americans, by their own security state. The danger here is that, you know, we've seen investigative reports showing money flows of over \$2 billion from certain European billionaires and various charities and endowments toward the EU's so-called progressive causes in the United States. You know, they always like to wrap this in some kind of non-controversial, nice libertarian—or at least liberal—cause, like fighting racism. So they'll funnel money toward Black Lives Matter.

Then diversity, inclusivity, and DEI—what is it? Okay, well, you know what I mean. Then it goes to LGBT groups. And then there are various groups and causes they support with these hundreds of millions of dollars. We know that some of these groups actually have smaller but more militant segments in them. Many of them are receiving training with lethal weapons, so these segments could become future rioters, saboteurs, revolutionaries, and even assassins. And, you know, when the war in Ukraine ends, you might see a transfer of remaining Azovites going back to the United States to get involved in these revolutions.

And also, uh, some of the radical Muslim militants from the Middle East, North Africa, and so forth. So I think this is a real danger. I think we might see the United States shaping up as a battleground, as it was always meant to be. This was always coming because the Western Empire is viable only as long as the United States is on board. Without the United States, it becomes a disunited patchwork of minor powers like Britain, France, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and Israel.

It's no longer viable because it's geographically dispersed, and then it loses its biggest economy, largest military, main source of funding, and so forth. So for them, keeping the United States on board is a matter of life and death. They will not hesitate to do whatever they must to bring the United States back on board. And I think this battle will shape up—and we already see it, you know, with things like the No Kings protest. That too was being funded by some of these leftist liberal sponsors, some of whom originate in Europe. So I think we're going into a stage of conflict where knives will be drawn.

#Glenn

Well, I think you're right about that. Once you recognize reality in the European Union, the whole thing begins to unravel. I think the EU is especially vulnerable compared to other parts of the world,

because how do you have unity between 27 member states with vastly different economic and security interests? You know, it often commits to these narratives where one policy is just good, virtuous, while the opposing side is essentially bad and dangerous. It's... it's populist, it's Putinist—you have all these words to delegitimize.

Now, for example, with the Ukraine war—if you were to recognize the consensus that we lost the war—then countries would begin to drop off. Some would seek reconciliation, perhaps with Russia. Others would start to negotiate, join in on the talks. Suddenly, the EU falls apart—its whole role collapses. It's the same with this security strategy. If you recognize that the new security strategy has been released and start to discuss it—that is, that the U.S. no longer wants NATO expansion—that would certainly affect the European security architecture. There's no consensus on how to deal with this.

If European leaders are blamed for not ending the Ukraine war, that undermines our narrative that it's simply the Russians who don't want to end it. And, of course, the whole civilizational decline of Europe—once we address that issue, we have to deal with everything from birth rates and migration to the authoritarian tendencies of political leaderships. I mean, once this is out of the bag, it'll unravel almost by itself. So it's easier, I think, just to pretend as if nothing has changed. But earlier you mentioned there've been some troubling aspects of this new national security strategy. What are those, in your view?

#Alex Krainer

Well, between the lines, there's this mercantilist motivation—basically, you know, a concern with keeping foreign markets open to U.S. goods. And almost every paragraph that refers to global trade with allies is about supplying them with weapons, which I think is still based on the idea that American military hardware and other assets are superior to those of other countries. I think that's a completely obsolete idea. It's just that they sell very expensive things that have very limited effect in modern warfare, which is now increasingly based on very cheap but very lethal technology like drones.

And also, you know, on the more expensive end of the scale, the hypersonic weapons. The United States is behind in this, and it's doubtful that selling those weapons will help. Selling their allies U.S. weapons is more than just a protection racket—meaning, we'll be allies, but you have to buy our weapons. They're useless. It's like when a thug on the street approaches someone and says, "Buy a brick." It's useless—you don't need the brick—but they just want to take your money. So that's troubling, but even more troubling is the whole Taiwan thing, because in this national security document, the United States still claims dominance over the Eastern Pacific, the Indo-Pacific.

They want to be able to deter China. They want to defend Taiwan as though it were, you know, as though Taiwan were an independent nation—which it isn't. It's part of China. It's one country, two systems, two governments, but it's still China. So you're actually taking a very aggressive stance

toward another sovereign nation and a part of its territory. That's obviously a potential source of conflict in the future. And then, you know, they acknowledge that they don't have the military or other kinds of power to actually confront China, but that the slack should be picked up by their allies—like South Korea, Japan, and India.

But at the same time, you know, Trump is trying to make deals with China. I think a lot of those deals are not being publicized. We don't know what they are necessarily, but I think the discussions are more extensive than we realize, and probably more friendly than we realize. So I'm not sure this is entirely real, you know, because the United States definitely wants access to East Asian markets. They state in that document that it now accounts for 50% of global GDP on a purchasing power parity basis. So obviously, the United States would be interested in keeping those markets open—keeping the trade routes open to their merchandise, their ships, and so forth.

But the whole idea of confronting China and maintaining this aggressive stance that could actually escalate into a hot war—my impression is that it's there to appease the American military-industrial complex. You know, to say, "Hey, we're still fully on board with confronting China and preparing for that war," and corraling our allies in the region to confront China and so forth. But my suspicion is that that's not a real thing—that this is more like a bit of garnish for the still very powerful globalist elites in the United States and the military-industrial complex there.

#Glenn

It's an interesting contradiction with the old Trump administration. On one hand, it seems genuine in wanting to end all the military conflicts and wars—especially the one in Ukraine—and also to adjust to the multipolar realities; that is, recognizing that the hegemonic strategy is now counterproductive and self-defeating if they try to maintain the same policy. At the same time, there's this almost absurd militarism. I'm thinking from Gaza to the attacks on Iran, the threats against Venezuela, and of course, China—that is, challenging China's sovereignty over Taiwan, which is a crazy thing to do. But at the same time with China, though, he does frame the U.S.–China relationship or competition as less ideological than his predecessors did, and more in terms of economic and technological rivalry. I'm wondering if this is a source of relief, because once geopolitical competition takes an ideological form, there's often very little room for compromise. Then, you know, it becomes a good-versus-evil competition. Yes, yes.

#Alex Krainer

Yes. And I think this is what really stands out from the whole document. But then there are these remnants of the entrenched old Cold War thinking where, you know, the United States has to impose its dominance. And I'll have to read out one paragraph that, to me, is maybe the most troubling in the whole document. It says, quote: "The terms of our engagement, especially with those countries that depend on us most and therefore over which we have the most leverage, must be sole-source contracts for our companies. At the same time, we should make every effort to push

out foreign companies that build infrastructure in the region.” This is practically a paragraph that might have been inserted there by the CIA, because this is what they’ve been doing around the world under the old, let’s call it, receding order.

They were simply, you know, like, if the Chinese came to build a dam, a nuclear power plant, or a railway network in another country, they discouraged it in every way. And sometimes, when they couldn’t discourage it, they would outright attack the construction by hiring, let’s say, separatist proxy forces to blow up the projects being built by the Chinese, to harass the workers, to kill the engineers managing the site. And this happened in Southeast Asia, in Balochistan, in Myanmar, in Africa, in Georgia. So this is... this particular paragraph practically affirms the continuation of those policies—to make every effort to push out foreign companies that build infrastructure in the region.

So that’s obviously going to be a problem. But I, you know, for the rest, I have to say the document is actually very encouraging and a good course correction. And then hopefully, you know, the United States and its proxy forces might eventually come into direct clash with regional security organizations like the SCO, which has now explicitly formulated strategies for dealing with separatist forces and terrorist forces. That will counter these attempts to derail the building of the Belt and Road Initiative and the infrastructure that goes along with it.

But I hope that in the future, a further course correction in U.S. policy will find agreement with Russia, with China, with the Iranians, and that cooperation between these nations—these powers—will pursue the multipolar architecture and constructive cooperation, rather than saying, well, if somebody else builds infrastructure where we want to assert our dominance, we’re just going to use every effort to push them out. Because that’s outright hostile. And it stands in contrast with the rest of the document, which is not outright hostile—it’s actually quite the opposite. Anyway, as I said, it seems that they’ve thrown a little bit for everyone into this document, but I think it’s a huge improvement over where we were under the Biden administration, the Obama administration, the Bush administration, and the Clinton administration. This definitely is a positive course correction.

#Glenn

But I guess, irrespective of who sits on the throne in Washington, the overarching concern for the United States is not just that the hegemon is gone, but that if it could be the first among equals, it might be one thing. But given that China is rising much faster than the U.S., I think this is the main problem—they can’t compete with China anymore. So what exactly do you do? I guess, on one hand, you want to form these geoeconomic blocs where you try to push out China, and you can sabotage China directly, which is what you referred to. But the inability to compete with China—I would think this is where the most aggressive components would come out, as a way of trying to stymie the rise of China. So no, I don’t think the U.S. is ready to give up the throne just yet.

#Alex Krainer

Yes, and then there's also the explicit reassertion of the Monroe Doctrine, which doesn't read as particularly militant or aggressive, but it's very assertive—and it's not spelled out explicitly what it means. The document talks about working with the nations in the region, bringing them on board as friends and allies, expanding cooperation, and then, for those that are opposed, working with them to, let's say, drop their opposition and become part of this new hemisphere where the United States is the dominant power, but not necessarily an imperial hegemon. But with respect to China, Glenn, I think a major weakness in this document is simply a denial of Chinese leadership in terms of competitiveness, in terms of technology, and so forth.

Because there are still assertions everywhere—"we're number one." We're number one in military technologies, we're number one in global finance, in AI, and all these things. But that's not really true. I understand that part of your strategy has to include a certain, let's say, optimism—maybe even an over-optimistic assessment of where you stand—because, you know, you don't want to rain on your nation, you don't want to discourage people. It's like when you compete in sports, right? If you go into the game thinking, "Oh, these guys are so much better than us, we couldn't beat them," you're probably going to lose. But if you go in pumped full of optimism and a can-do attitude, which is part of the American DNA, then you can compete. At the same time, though, you have to acknowledge that you've already lost that race.

So you have to go back to the drawing board, understand why you lost it, and build from there—see how you can compete in the global marketplace without necessarily doing the Tonya Harding approach. I don't know if you remember, in the 1990s there was this American scandal with two skaters: Tonya Harding and Nancy Kerrigan. Nancy Kerrigan was the more talented and prettier skater, and Tonya Harding was kind of in her shadow. So, to get out from under that shadow, Tonya Harding and her boyfriend decided to bash Nancy Kerrigan's knees. They actually attacked her—I think with a baseball bat or something. It didn't work out well for them. But, you know, there's that cultural element of "everything is allowed" in the fight to become number one.

But I don't think that's necessary. You know, you can compete on other bases. The United States has other strengths—you don't have to be number one in AI. You need to find ways to compete where you've found your niche, your place in the market. You don't have to go after the exact same segments where someone else has already established dominance. Because, you know, competing with the number one always carries the risk that you'll pour your resources into a fight you've already lost. So I think these types of documents also need to include things like imagination and creativity, rather than pushing like a bulldozer into areas where you're going to encounter opposition and waste resources on fights you probably shouldn't be fighting anymore.

#Glenn

I guess overall the document makes a lot of sense. If you want to adjust to multipolarity for the United States—meaning, if you can't be everywhere at the same time—what do you do? Well, first, you want to make sure you're the boss in your own neighborhood, that is, in the Western

Hemisphere, which is why this revival of the Monroe Doctrine makes sense. Not that one has to support it, but it makes sense. China will then, in this multipolar system, be the main rival for economic leadership, so obviously this is where it gets a bit confrontational. But instead of being too ideological, look at the economics of it. Russia, of course, doesn't make much sense. In the unipolar world, you would push the Russians toward the Chinese; in the multipolar one, you can try to bring them over to our side of the ledger.

But then you have to end the Ukraine war. So again, this makes sense to Europeans—they go from being a key ally to becoming increasingly a burden. And you can foresee this civilizational or continued decline—economic, social, all of it. So essentially, yeah, telling them that this has to be reversed, that we'll help you do so, irrespective of what their leaders want. A lot of this makes sense, though, if you see that the U.S. has to do something to adjust to these new realities, especially when you see the excesses of liberal ideology preventing those changes from being made. But I guess my last question is: given that you focus a lot on multipolarity, do you interpret it in a similar way, or how do you see multipolarity motivating some of this new document?

#Alex Krainer

As I read it, I think multipolarity is at the core of this document, you know, because it explicitly rejects the U.S. role as a global hegemon—as unsustainable and overly costly. I mean, the document even takes an explicit swipe at free trade. And there's even mention of Alexander Hamilton, which is, you know, a message between the lines—of even changing the model of economic governance—and explicit statements that the administration wants to make the United States into an industrial superpower, a producer. Well, if you're going to be a producer and an exporting power, then you need markets.

And if you need markets, then you need a large number of—let's call them affluent consumers—in the world. In that sense, I believe the American strategy is actually complementary to the Chinese strategy, because the Chinese strategy is to create affluent markets, to lift hundreds of millions, even billions, of people out of poverty so they become affluent consumers who can afford the output of Chinese manufacturing companies. And if those markets are open to the United States, then, in that sense, the United States and China share a common interest. That implies you're acknowledging the other superpower as a peer—not as a vassal, but as a peer.

And that, to me, is an implicit embrace of the multipolar global order. And then, you know, the document also reaffirmed what Trump—Trump's speech in May to the gathering of the Arab Gulf states—he said, we no longer want to impose our values or our systems of governance. We don't want to counter your traditions or your ways of governing your nations. So that's also consistent with that idea. Anyway, long story short, I see it as a definite embrace of the multipolar global order. And, let's say, as we are now in the 11th—no, we're in the 12th month—so it hasn't been a full year that Trump has been in office.

I think it's a very encouraging turn of events. If the administration is successful and stays in power—which isn't a given—I think they can build on this, and the course correction can keep going. And I think that, in their cooperation with Russia, China, India, and other regional powers, they'll be able to find common language and slowly purge these globalist forces from their political system, gradually curtailing their power in the military, the media, the secret services, secret diplomacy, and so forth. Then they'll be able to express a lot of these principles more overtly and more explicitly.

#Glenn

No, I picked up on the Alexander Hamilton reference as well.

#Alex Krainer

Yeah, that's interesting, isn't it?

#Glenn

It's very interesting, because they refer to—and I always make a similar point—that excessive dependence on an outside partner is something problematic, which the document suggests. This goes back to the whole idea of Alexander Hamilton, which later produced the American system that helped build the United States as an industrial power. The principle was that you need economic autonomy if you want political autonomy. If a lot of your core components or economic interests rely on a foreign power, then it's unrealistic to assume you'll enjoy full political autonomy. And that's why, back in Hamilton's day, many referred to free trade as "free trade imperialism." That's how the British controlled the U.S., because the British had the mature industries.

They had the high-tech, low-cost industries. So if you have free trade, how could American industry, which had lower tech and higher costs, compete with them? It was impossible. That's when the term "fair trade" came up instead, with the principle that we have to build technological and economic sovereignty to boost or safeguard our political autonomy. And, well, I think a lot of this got lost because once the U.S. became the hegemon, it had an incentive to embrace the same so-called free trade imperialism. That is, it had the high-tech, low-cost industries, so it just advocated free trade, which was where the U.S. could compete most easily. But now we see the Chinese taking over the role the U.S. used to have, having built up the most competitive industries, where they enjoy high tech and low cost.

I mean, this is why the United States can't really compete with China. So it kind of makes sense that you'd want to go back a little to the Hamiltonian idea of technological and economic sovereignty. One thing I've noticed, though, is all this focus on reindustrialization. It sounds nice enough, but a key reason Americans can't compete with China is that their economy has become so financialized. All the oligarchs just suck out so much of the profit that you can't do anything anymore without taking out huge loans—for everything from property to lawyers to financial institutions. It's no

wonder you can't do much in American industry anymore. I don't see any serious effort to address this rather sensitive topic.

#Alex Krainer

There is one place where this is addressed, but it doesn't mention a reform of the financial system so explicitly. It says something about technological advancement that will level the field to enable the—yeah, I can't find it now, but it's somewhere there, relatively early in the document—that the economic reform will make it possible for entrepreneurship and prosperity to be broadly diffused in every region of the United States. And to me, that's the answer to that question.

It doesn't mention financial reform because I believe that, to achieve that, you need to empower local and regional banks to issue long-term credit at affordable terms to small and medium-sized businesses. The document doesn't say this directly, but it implies the same thing under the guise of technological advancements. Well, you know, credit is a form of social technology—credit issuance—so it might be that. But the intent is definitely to diffuse entrepreneurship and to try to raise every region of the United States into a producing and industrialized region. So it is addressed, but it's not exactly clear. I think it's between the lines a little bit.

#Glenn

Well, thank you for sharing your thoughts on this national security strategy. I think it's, by far, the most shocking document I've seen in the past 30 years. But this is what happens when you don't adjust to changing realities—when you hold on to the world as it was. At some point, the changes will just come much faster, and they'll be much more chaotic. But no.

#Alex Krainer

We'll see where it goes, because I think this document actually marks a change in the future evolution of the global order in general. In that sense, I find it very encouraging and very positive. Hopefully, they'll build on that basis. I think it's a radical improvement over the situation we had just a year ago. And, you know, to think—if Kamala Harris were in the White House today, I think the United States would probably be following the example of the European Union and Britain, where you'd have censorship, infringement of free speech, and continued uncontrolled migration, and so forth. So I think this is a great improvement and a very encouraging thing, but it'll be an evolution for a while.

#Glenn

Yeah, well, that's what I meant—the main destructiveness or irrationality in the West's policies is that we kept maintaining unipolar policies even as the world had become multipolar. And I think this was very, very destructive. So at least something is shaking things up, because the path we were on was definitely not sustainable. So thank you so much again for letting me speak.

#Alex Krainer

Glenn, thank you for having me. It's always a pleasure—and until next time.