# The U.S. Now Considers the EU an Enemy

Scott Ritter is a former Major, Intelligence Officer, US Marine, and UN Weapons Inspector. Ritter argues that the new US National Security Strategy confirms that the EU is now considered an enemy. Follow Prof. Glenn Diesen: Substack: https://glenndiesen.substack.com/ X/Twitter: https://x.com/Glenn\_Diesen Patreon: https://www.patreon.com/glenndiesen Support the research by Prof. Glenn Diesen: PayPal: https://www.paypal.com/paypalme/glenndiesen Buy me a Coffee: buymeacoffee.com/gdieseng Go Fund Me: https://gofund.me/09ea012f Books by Prof. Glenn Diesen: https://www.amazon.com/stores/author/B09FPQ4MDL

# #Glenn

Welcome back. We're joined today by Scott Ritter, a former U.S. Marine, intelligence analyst, and UN weapons inspector. Thank you very much for coming on. We see now that the United States has released a new national security strategy, which has taken most people by surprise, especially in Europe. However, you more or less predicted that the U.S. would go in this direction about eight months ago. How do you make sense of this new security strategy?

#### **#Scott Ritter**

Well, I mean, this is exactly what Donald Trump said he was going to do. It doesn't take rocket science to go back and listen to him—listen to him during the campaign, listen to him talk about what his priorities were. You're right, back in April I spoke about this issue and said that the number one priority for the United States would be "Fortress America," to secure the Western Hemisphere for America. I said the next most important front would be China—to shift resources that weren't going to be allocated to the security of the Western Hemisphere to the Pacific, to stand up to China there—and that the United States would de-emphasize its military engagement in both Europe and the Middle East.

You know, this wasn't me making things up out of thin air. This was simply assessing the statements made by the Trump administration. And, you know, we are now—gosh, what—ten months into the Trump presidency, and certain patterns are starting to appear. Because, you know, look, you're analytically inclined—I know you are, I follow you, I listen to you—and if you're analytically inclined, the Trump administration has to be one of the most frustrating entities to follow and evaluate. If you do short-term plotting, they're all over the map. One day they say this, the next day they say something else. They say it again, they contradict it again. It's very frustrating.

But when you examine these data points over time, you find that they inexorably point in the direction Trump says he wants to go. It's just that he's not going from A to Z directly—he's going all over the map. And it's difficult. But if you assess Trump over the long term, everything he said he

wanted to accomplish, the directions he wanted to go—that's the direction he's heading. The National Security Strategy document reflects this reality. Also keep in mind that he tasked his national security team with producing this document back in April. So the guidance given for its production remained consistent, and therefore it's no surprise that the document says what it does.

# #Glenn

Well, I'm thinking, if you recognize that the world has shifted from unipolarity to multipolarity and you have to prioritize places, it does make a lot of sense. That is, the first priority is to shore up your own hemisphere—the Western Hemisphere. Then, of course, confront the main adversary, which is in Asia, primarily China. And if you pivot to those places, you pivot away from Europe, which ends up getting the short end of the stick. So a lot of this makes sense. But there's also a lot of focus on ideology. How do you make sense of that? Or, to be more specific, they call for reducing the role of ideology.

# **#Scott Ritter**

You know, when you take a look at evaluating the Trump administration over time, go back to the last National Security Strategy document that was issued by the Biden administration. In it, they build a world vision predicated on the defense of the rules-based international order. That was the sacred mantra of everything American. And from that came the defense of democracy—American democracy imposed on other nations as the gold standard. Donald Trump gave a number of very telling speeches during his campaign in which he rejected the rules-based international order. He also rejected the notion that America has a right to dictate outcomes to other nations based on American principles, values, and so on. He said the place for American values is at home.

That's where we need to defend them—at home. You know, if we shouldn't be projecting them beyond our shores when we haven't fully defended them at home, that's a little bit hypocritical. Remember one of the answers he gave to a question about Putin being a killer? He said, "Well, we've killed a lot of people too." A very pragmatic, realistic answer. I'd say it shouldn't surprise anyone that Trump, when evaluating the world we live in, is more interested in practicalities—economic relations, who we invest our money in, why we're investing money in certain places. And, you know, there's a difference between telling people what they have to do—which Trump says is not our role—and giving people money.

Trump's like, "I'm going to give you money if you align with us—if you're on our side, if you're doing what we want, if you believe in what we believe in—then you can get money." When it comes to Europe right now, I mean, let's just look at, you know, a simplistic analogy—but we'll use it nonetheless—or a simplistic way of explaining it. NATO claims to be all about America. I mean, my God, the Secretary General of NATO just falls over himself to praise America and the role that America plays—the leadership role—especially when we tell NATO how much money they have to spend, that they must spend this money because daddy told them to. OK, that's one way. Now, then

there's the European Union, which is as anti-American as the day is long. Let's just be honest about it.

I can dig through all the European Union statements—they're anti-American. They're fundamentally anti-American. And it's not just that they're posturing as a global competitor to the United States. They don't like us. They simply don't like us. They belittle us. I read their stuff—you know this is true. Go to the webpages of any of these European parliamentarians who fly the blue flag with the gold stars and posture as the moral equivalent or superior of the United States of America. They hate the United States of America, and they despise Americans. We're only useful when we do what they want us to do. But, you know, sometimes they don't like us for a reason. I mean, America is a war power and a warmongering nation. Yep—guilty as charged.

But then don't pretend to be our friend when you put on your NATO hat, because the same people who condemn us when they wear their EU hat are the same people who embrace us when they wear their NATO hat. This is a fundamental inconsistency that the Trump administration is fed up with. And the other thing is, when we sit down with Europe and try to say, you know, who do we want to align ourselves with? We don't want to align ourselves with people who, A, denigrate us. If you don't like America, guess what? We don't like you either. So, you know, we'll go our own ways. But the other thing is, if you act in a way that's against core American values, they shouldn't expect us to embrace you either. And freedom of speech is a core American value.

And it certainly isn't being practiced in Europe today, in many places. Interference in elections—come on, you Europeans, wake up. This is Donald Trump. He believes fervently that the election was stolen from him in 2020. He knows—absolutely—that the Democrats sought to undermine his 2016 candidacy. All right, so now you're running around playing stupid games in Romania, Moldova, trying to outlaw a political party in Germany. And you want the United States, you want this president, to be silent? No. You're anti-American by definition. And this is the national security strategy of the United States—it seeks to promote American security interests. So don't be surprised that we've turned against Europe. This is a fundamental turn.

This isn't, you know, a little lovers' spat. This isn't a quarrel that can be papered over. This is something fundamental. Europe is on a pathway, according to the Trump administration, to civilizational erasure. That means you're gone—you're doing it to yourself. We've decided that we'll try to get those European nations—not the European Union, not the European community, but those European nations that are worth saving—on the right trajectory. But NATO is finished. I hope people understand that too, because the Trump administration has said there are members of NATO today who don't reflect the cultural values and realities of the nations that signed the charter. And therefore, they're incompatible with what we believe should be defended under the charter. It's over. Finished. Done. Goodbye.

# #Glenn

It's interesting, though, how not just the EU but Europeans in general often view Americans, because it's very much human nature to divide—who are we and who are they, the in-group and the out-group. And whenever we talk about "us Europeans" and then "the Americans," there's often this very derogatory language, like you said—hostile in many ways. But as soon as you introduce the Russians, then the Americans are suddenly part of "us," and they're celebrated. But when it's only the two of us, then it's very strange—yeah.

# **#Scott Ritter**

Can I just remind you, audience, who we are? We liberated you, sons of bitches. No—okay, we liberated you. Russia did too. Russia liberated the East; we liberated the West. We rebuilt your sorry asses. You wouldn't be here today if it weren't for us. We're not perfect—we never claimed to be perfect. We're Americans. But my God, we went across the ocean to save your sorry asses, and we buried a hundred thousand plus Americans doing so. And I also want to remind the Germans of a harsh reality. Familiarize yourselves with Article 53 of the United Nations Charter. Not too many people know what it is, but it's the article that speaks of enemy states, and it gives every nation in the world the right to pound your ass into the dirt if you seek to re-embrace aggressive policies that should have been erased from your DNA at the end of the Second World War.

Germany today, talking about building the largest army and preparing for war with Russia—these are aggressive policies. And I don't think the Russians have forgotten what Article 53 is. And hey, guys, J.D. Vance and company—they're looking at it too. You're the enemy of America. Literally, you are defined by the United Nations Charter as an enemy state. And when you start to push aggressive policies, don't be surprised when those who buried their fathers, uncles, and sons in the soil of Europe to save your sorry asses suddenly decide maybe it's time to bury you instead. This is fundamental, guys. Europe better wake the hell up, because America's waking up.

We're sick and tired of sending money your way, of saving your asses, only to have you sit there and spit in our face. Look, there are ways to criticize America. We deserve to be criticized. We're not perfect. We've done a lot of things wrong, and I have no problem with people holding us to account. But when you owe your very existence to the blood of Americans, you'd better bite your tongue before you start saying certain things. Or don't be surprised when we turn around and hold you to account. And that's what's happening today—you're being held to account by a generation of Americans who are tired of playing the game. We're not going to underwrite your security with a blank check anymore, and we're not going to stand by idly while you plot against us.

# #Glenn

There's an interesting comparison, though, because with the Russians, they often comment on this dishonesty too. When the Europeans go to Moscow, they talk about their security, their aspirations,

and they kind of show some understanding—"Yeah, yeah, no, we can work together." But then when they come back to Brussels, the language changes completely. It's a little bit like with Trump, I guess.

When they meet him, it's, "Oh, thank you, Daddy, for convincing us to spend more on the military." But then, of course, when they're back in Brussels, they don't hide their contempt for him. So it's very fake, the way they approach it. This is genius. Yeah, but it's an interesting aspect of this, because I think you make a great point—it should have been predictable that Trump would have, I guess, identified himself closely with the Le Pens and the AfD, and with Romania, Moldova, all the essentially sidelined opposition, given that he saw this is what happened to him. But there's a comment, though, within the national security strategy about the intention to cultivate resistance to this downward trajectory of Europe. How do you interpret that? Do you think there's going to be more effort to actively challenge the authority of people like Merz, Macron, and Starmer, and, well, the likes? I think so.

#### **#Scott Ritter**

Yeah, it's over for Merz. Again, I just want to remind the German people who follow you that Merz is the leader of an enemy state. This is a reality. You don't get to rebuild your military—not with your history. So Merz's history, he's finished. And the efforts among the Germans to suppress democratic, you know, free will in Germany are not going unnoticed either. You know, AfD—whatever you think about AfD—an increasingly large number of Germans think that's the direction they want to go. And we'll see what happens. I can't predict the future, but I'd imagine that a Germany where, if you look at the demographic division of support, AfD is very popular in the former eastern sectors of Germany. Maybe Germany doesn't deserve to be a unified state. Maybe the future of Germany is to be a divided state.

And that might be the direction the United States starts pushing. Again, Germany, beware. You're the enemy. We're not going to allow you to suppress democracy, suppress free speech, and exist as a unified whole that's trying to head back down the path of the Third Reich. It's not going to be permitted. And if you want to do this, remember, we're now looking to the Russians, according to the National Security Strategy, as partners in stability. Not friends—we're not best friends. I mean, I personally believe that we could be and we should be, but Trump's not there yet. Trump is talking. They didn't describe Russia as an adversary or an enemy; Russia was a partner in stability. And therefore, anything that seeks to undermine this strategic decision to have a stable relationship with Russia becomes the enemy.

In Germany, you're now the enemy—the official enemy of the United States. Get used to it. France, same thing. I mean, Macron is actively conspiring against the United States right now. Starmer, same thing. I mean, there's a rumor going around that they're talking about divesting themselves of American treasuries. Play the game. Really. I mean, there's the old "fool around and find out." We will crush you. We will destroy you. That will be the end of Europe. If you want to play this game,

we'll do it, because there's no love lost here. We don't like you anymore. I mean, we always thought it was fun to go to France and tour Paris. We thought it was cool to go to Germany and drink beer, you know—and back then, in Germany, we used to have American soldiers living there.

They fell in love with German women. They, you know, brought them home. We have families and children that come from American-German relationships. Same thing in England. We have a long, storied history with the British, but we also kicked the English out of America back in the day, and we don't believe in the king. We're not going to tolerate any nonsense from Europe. That's just the way it's going to be. So, yeah, I think you're going to see a very active role for the United States going forward in promoting those political elements in Europe that align with our ideals and values, and working actively against those who conspire against us. And so, yeah, if you're Starmer, if you're Macron, if you're Merz—be on notice. You're our enemy now, because you made yourself our enemy.

# #Glenn

I think back in February, at the Munich Security Conference, when J.D. Vance made that speech, many Europeans were caught a bit off guard and thought it was just J.D. Vance blowing off some steam. I don't think they saw the deeper foundations of how this rift is growing between the U.S. and Europe. But besides threatening to divest from the U.S., we now have the former EU foreign policy chief, Josep Borrell, saying, you know, why are we still pretending America's a friend? Trump is our enemy. This train has left the station, it seems. You mentioned before that NATO is done, but do you see this in the short or medium term?

Well, not short term, but medium term already, because this rhetoric is becoming quite mutually aggressive. And also, I saw this news article headline—I forget which British newspaper—that said the Europeans are walking a tightrope. They want to be friendly to Trump, but they still want to, as they say, help Ukraine, which really means prolonging the war and undermining Trump's peace agreement by convincing Zelensky not to take it. But, in other words, they want to tell daddy how great he is while at the same time trying to sabotage what he's doing. I mean, how long can this go on before Trump responds? Do you think we'll see some escalation coming this way?

# **#Scott Ritter**

Yeah, I see. You know, this can spin out of control very fast—very fast. What I see happening is that Trump is going to use the tools of divide and conquer. There are certain European nations that can't live without the United States. Poland—Poland is not going to walk away from the United States. Germany has already made a strategic decision to walk away. So, in the short term, I think you're going to see the transfer of American influence assets out of Germany into Poland, or back to the United States. I think you're going to see the United States divest itself of Germany. This is fundamental—it's the end of NATO. The United States is already—if you notice—Marco Rubio didn't attend the NATO ministerial.

It's the kiss of death. The other thing that's happening is that we're beginning to pull out of some of the foundational infrastructure of NATO—logistical planning, communications. NATO can't have a large-scale military exercise without the United States involved in it. We're not going to be involved. We're going to start withdrawing a whole bunch of critical support from NATO while still being in NATO. We're just going to tell the Europeans, "You've got to do it." Europe can't do it. Europe doesn't have the logistical infrastructure to unify Europe. They don't have a communications framework that can unify Europe. They've been relying on the United States for this forever.

And so, as Europe starts to collapse, the expense of sustaining NATO without the United States becomes prohibitive. Nations are going to opt out, especially when the United States offers them bilateral security arrangements. This is what's going to be the end of NATO—when the United States moves away from collective security. And we already have. Scott Ritter made it clear that if Russia attacks NATO, we're not going to come streaming in with troops. We'll be willing to sell you some equipment—maybe. That's it. Of course, that's all that's required under Article 5. People haven't read it very closely if they think it automatically requires us to send troops in. But we're done with that.

So we're getting to a situation where, if a European nation behaves irresponsibly and provokes Russia and Russia attacks it, there isn't going to be a collective response by NATO—because NATO can't collectively respond without the United States. And we're opting out of that. We view Europe as an irresponsible entity right now. So I think you're going to see us making individual bilateral security deals with some European states and opting out of security arrangements with others. And that's the end of collective defense, which means the end of NATO. This could happen as soon as this summer. So, yeah, I mean, again, be careful what you ask for, Europe, because you may very well get it—America walking away from you. It's already happened. It's done.

# #Glenn

Well, some good developments could come from this, though, because one of the problems often recognized—at least by many academics in the '90s—was that all these countries, the Baltic states for example, when a small country borders massive Russia, you'd normally have a systemic incentive to seek some reconciliation. However, with the US and NATO behind them, they instead could take the luxury of pursuing some historical vengeance. Well, essentially, a country like Estonia, with one and a half million people, having such a hostile policy toward Russia—it doesn't really make much sense. It's very suicidal.

And, you know, instead of calming them down, we handed them the car keys by making Kallas the EU foreign policy chief, which is an extraordinary thing to do. So, if the U.S. is more ambiguous about the extent to which it would help Europe, perhaps that could tone down some of the more radical elements, and maybe some Europeans would rediscover diplomacy. But if you were sitting in Moscow now, opening this new U.S. national security strategy document, how would you make sense of it? What would it mean for you?

# **#Scott Ritter**

If I put on a hypothetical Russian hat, the first thing I'd say is, you know, this is strategically the right direction for the U.S. to be heading—a pragmatic, realistic foreign policy that finally recognizes Russia is not the enemy. There are things in this document that would be disturbing to the Russians, of course. The whole Monroe Doctrine concept puts Russia in a difficult spot vis-à-vis Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela, and the same thing with China getting involved. But all in all, it's the right direction. Then I'd say, well, yeah, but come November, Trump's got midterm elections. Is Trump sustainable as a political force?

I mean, how much credence do we want to give a document that could be undermined, you know, in terms of policy implementation after November? If a new Democratic-controlled House were to be empowered, then Trump would find himself in a repeat of the last two years of his first presidency—impeachment, impeachment. It would be the end of the Trump presidency. And then there's no guarantee, you know, is J.D. Vance going to be able to replace Trump? That becomes problematic. So I'd be careful there. Then, you know, if the Republicans, or pro-Trump Republicans, can retain control of the House and the Senate, that's different. But even then, you have to ask, is J. D. Vance electable?

You know, is Donald Trump just a unique phenomenon, and once he's off the ballot, is J.D. Vance electable? Or are we going to get a throwback? I'd say the Russians really can't get too excited about this document until 2028—see what happens then. In the short term, though, I think it shows Russia that they're on the right path when it comes to Ukraine. Instead of their reticence about a ceasefire, etc., alienating the Trump administration, it's actually compelled the Trump administration to recognize, pragmatically, the Russian reality. And that appears to be what Trump has done. So if I were the Russians, I'd be cautiously optimistic about this document.

But you also have to remember that it was the Trump administration that lied about Russia cheating in the INF Treaty and pulled out of it. Trump lied about the JCPOA and pulled out of that agreement too. The United States can't be trusted. Even with Trump going in this new direction, I think the Russians will always hold back a little bit, because—is this the truth, or is this just a short-term act designed to assuage a certain political reality? Once those ruffled feathers have been soothed, you'll see Trump change course again. Kent, is Trump a trusted intellect? Is the United States a trusted intellect? And right now, the answer in Russia is a decisive no to both.

#### #Glenn

Yeah, I think many still remember that reset button, which meant nothing. So yeah, there's a lack of trust, of course.

#### **#Scott Ritter**

It meant more than nothing, because it wasn't just a mistake. The reset button was subterfuge—the policy was regime change. They weren't trying to reset relations with Russia; they were trying to keep Vladimir Putin out of the presidency. They wanted to empower Medvedev so that he would block Putin's return. They were seeking the demise of Vladimir Putin and the empowerment of Medvedev, hoping that Medvedev could be brought into line, à la Yeltsin. So this wasn't a reset; it was a redefinition.

This was regime change, and the Russians know that. This wasn't a simple mistake. There's a difference between people executing bad policy—I mean, everybody makes mistakes, you know—but this was deception on the part of the United States, outright deception with the most nefarious intent: to collapse Russia as it had emerged under the leadership of Vladimir Putin and to return Russia to the decade of the 1990s. And that's deeply insulting to the Russian people, who remember what the reality of the 1990s was.

# #Glenn

Yeah, I feel like for the younger audience, they should know that. Because now, when you see Dmitry Medvedev, he's very hawkish—he's the pit bull, essentially, playing the bad cop to Putin. But I remember when I lived in Russia in 2011–2012, a lot of Russians saw Medvedev as weak because, as was seen in the West as well, he was viewed as a bit soft, liberal, very pro-Western—someone you could bring on board. Which, I guess, is a testament to how the relationship has been mismanaged.

If you see the fury and the anger he carries with him now toward Europe—how does this national security strategy translate into the end of the Ukraine war? What would you do if you were Zelensky reading this document? Because it does seem as if the U.S. is now ready to completely wash its hands of Ukraine. Of course, as you said, it could be an act meant simply to apply pressure. But assuming it does reflect the genuine ideas of the Trump administration, how do you think this would impact Zelensky's government?

#### **#Scott Ritter**

Fatally. This is the end of Zelensky. He can't survive without American support. There are some critical things happening, or about to happen, in Ukraine that are tied to the budget. And, you know, if Ukraine can't find a way to access, you know, \$120 to \$150 billion in the short term, there will be a political crisis of existential proportions, which Zelensky may not survive. So right off the bat, you have this economic reality that becomes a political reality. Layer on top of that the fact that the Ukrainian army is being routed on the battlefield—every day it gets worse, and it's not going to change.

It's not going to reverse. You know, Zelensky, instead of doing the smart thing—which would be to go to Trump and say, "Forgive me, Daddy, the prodigal son has returned, and I'm here to do

whatever Daddy wants to make this war go away"—he's instead aligning himself with the Europeans, the very people Trump just declared war on through his national security strategy document. And all the Europeans are doing, by continuing to support Zelensky, is proving Trump's point: that they don't care about the things America cares about. We don't want more war with Russia; we want stable relations with Russia. And yet Europe is becoming hostile—a kind of warparty collective.

And Zelensky appears to be aligning himself fully with that, rejecting outright some of the core demands made in the peace plan that Trump has put forward. I don't believe this will endear him to Trump. I think you're going to see the United States increasingly cut its ties with Zelensky, and in doing so, empower the Russians to continue their military advance unfettered by American political or economic interference. You're also going to find that Europe can't live up to its promises—that anything they say about supporting Ukraine is empty—because ultimately, Europe can't do anything of fundamental value without the support of the United States. And we won't support European policies that continue to push for, you know, endless war with Russia.

# #Glenn

Yeah, that sounds a bit like what Zelensky's former press secretary said too. Like, why are we letting the Europeans convince us to keep going? They don't have the weapons, they don't have the intention to join in, they don't have the economy, and they don't even have the political clout. They' re not talking to the Russians. So... well, not just her—there are others in Ukraine as well—questioning why follow the Europeans on this, because it's not help if you just let them prolong the war without any prospect of success. Now, you mentioned America—that's the Monroe Doctrine, which makes sense.

If it's a multipolar world and you have the rise of China, you want to at least cement control over your own backyard. So, of course, that's going to have unfortunate consequences for countries like Venezuela. But the last country, though, is China. How are you assessing this? Because on one hand, it does seem as if Trump has a very belligerent approach toward China. On the other hand, he's not that ideological, which is often, I guess, a good sign. If you see everything as forces of light versus forces of darkness, then it's just going to be hammering each other—there's not going to be a solution, there's not going to be compromise. Or are you reading the China sections of the security strategy differently?

# **#Scott Ritter**

I think in the China section, Trump got ahead of himself. They're talking about something they call "conventional overmatch" in terms of military capabilities, and that this will serve as the ultimate deterrent against China. I mean, that's an important statement because it means the United States isn't relying on its nuclear deterrent to deter China—we're talking about conventional military power. But when I look at the number of ships America produces each year in our shipyards and compare

that to the number China produces in theirs, I just wonder how we're supposed to reach conventional military overmatch when the Chinese can expand exponentially faster than we can.

I think there will be a lot of posturing—"peace through strength" kind of posturing. But the reality is that this is a situation that will be resolved economically. You know, the state of global economic health will largely influence how Trump postures vis-à-vis China. I think there's a recognition, reading the National Security Strategy, that the American and Chinese economies are interwoven to the extent that a trade war is impractical and a real war would be suicidal. So I agree. I think there were a lot of strong words put in there. But, you know, the next document that needs to be produced in this cycle of documents is—I think it's the National Military Strategy of the United States, put out by the Department of Defense slash War, depending on how you feel about these things.

You know, that document will lay out the military priorities based on it. It'll be interesting to see how the military divides its resources and prioritizes how it employs them in the Pacific—what specifically is going to be asked of the military. And can the military bring these resources to bear in a timely fashion, or are we talking about an extended period of time? Europe—the disengagement from Europe—what resources will be allocated to the defense of the homeland, of Europe, you know, of the Western Hemisphere? This next step is to find out how this document plays out in terms of follow-on policy. And the same thing with nuclear policy—we have to see how that shapes up.

# #Glenn

My last question, though, is how you see the possible drop-offs among the European states. You mentioned that either the EU or Europe is now considered an enemy. Well, it doesn't seem—that doesn't seem like an exaggeration, really. Again, I'd encourage people to actually read this document, where the European leaders are described as authoritarian, undemocratic, essentially crushing political opposition, media, and dissent. And when you add the aspect of seeking to cultivate opposition to reverse all of this, it does come off as—yeah, that this is now not just a drifting apart but a possible confrontation. But Europe, no matter how much we talk about it as an entity, you know, the EU itself has 27 member states. And for some, like Hungary, they're under great pressure and often being punished by the EU, by the Germans.

So there are going to be some drop-offs. You mentioned Poland, of course—they have good reasons. They want to have America. Well, they'll favor America over, for example, the Germans. But how do you see this conflict between the EU and the United States? How would this affect the cohesion of Europe, do you think? Because it's not as if all European countries are going to stand up and say, "Let's, you know, divest from America. We'll stand together." You know, we seem to be able to unite around a common hatred of Russia, but even there we seem to break up a little bit, with Fico, Orbán, you know, going their own way. But to unite somehow against America, which the former EU foreign policy chief suggested, doesn't seem likely.

# **#Scott Ritter**

No, again, if Europe tries to do this, it's the end of Europe. Because, as you said, there won't be consensus. Nations will peel away. There will be different points of view. And the United States will exploit all of these. We'll exploit them to the detriment of Europe. What will happen is that Europe will fracture along a number of fault lines, and the United States will be in the business of picking friends and picking enemies. It depends on which side of the fence you decide you want to be on. But I can guarantee you this: if you choose to go against America, you do so at your own detriment.

There's not a single European nation that could confront the United States decisively and come out on top. Any government that tries simply won't survive. We're very good at regime change—that's what we do. And if you don't think we can target European countries, then you don't know much about our history in Europe. Ask the French, ask the Italians, ask the Germans—ask anybody. The history of American covert and overt interference in Europe's democratic processes is long and well-documented. And we'd be more than happy to do it again. Every one of your capital cities has an American embassy, and you've allowed the United States to build up very large CIA stations inside those embassies.

What do you think they're there to do? To hold hands and sing Kumbaya? To be your friends? No, they're there to implement the policy directives given to them by the President of the United States. And one of the main things they do is political action. They'll actively undermine any government that dares to voice opposition to Donald Trump and the government of the United States. So it's over. You picked the wrong enemy. We're not outsiders who don't know anything about you. We built you. We created you. We clothed you. We fed you. We taught you how to crawl, how to walk, how to run, how to talk.

There's not an aspect of European society that we aren't intimately familiar with and don't intimately control, either directly or indirectly. You picked the wrong enemy. You have zero ability to influence the United States, while we have maximum opportunity to influence Europe. This is not a fight you want to fight. But if you do want to fight it, the outcome is guaranteed—you will lose. And losing will not be pretty, because we will collapse you. We'll collapse you politically, and if you want to play the harder game, we'll collapse you economically. We will be the ruin of Europe if that's the game Europe wants to play.

# #Glenn

Yeah, I remember I had a talk with Richard Sakwa and some other academics on this podcast about six months ago. And, you know, it was more of a hypothetical question—whether the political West might be coming to an end. But yeah, it's very hard to read this any other way if you look at the sentiment now on both sides. I'm not sure what you foresee replacing the political West. Do we see a redefinition of the relationship, an amicable divorce?

Because we Europeans have made ourselves very dependent on U.S. technologies, industries, payment systems, banks, and security arrangements. If you're the adversary—be it China or Russia—you have an incentive to build a lot of strategic autonomy. But after 80 years of such close relations, we've made ourselves deeply dependent. So to go this strongly against the United States now seems like a mistake. You'd need at least 10 or 20 years to build some independence before trying to make such a move, I think.

#### **#Scott Ritter**

Look, the United States has made it clear that its number one priority is security in the Western Hemisphere. And Europe's not part of the Western Hemisphere. You're a number three priority, and we view you in a negative fashion in this national security strategy. You are, in many ways, the enemy. To the extent that Europe will be linked to America, again, there will be the haves and the have-nots. But the haves—those under our umbrella—I think Europe's future is to be a quasi-colonial enterprise of the United States. We will seek to divide and conquer, and we will bring certain nations under our umbrella, but it won't be a favorable relationship. You will be expected to buttress the dollar, to help keep the dollar relevant globally.

And that means we will either seek to degrade the global impact of the euro or actually destroy the euro altogether and compel nation-states to go back to national currencies. For many Europeans, this is unthinkable. All they know is the euro—all they know is the unified currency model. But, you know, that model can't exist in a fractured Europe. And we have a deeply fractured Europe right now. Once the United States starts picking nation-states off, I think that's what you're going to see. Europe is going to be a deeply divided continent, and there will be the haves and the have-nots. And, you know, the nations that stick with the United States—you will not be friends and equals. You will be colonial subjects, existing to help promote and further the American empire.

Because we are becoming an empire. We're a Western Hemisphere empire. Where do you think the Monroe Doctrine is? It's basically laying claim to an entire region as American-controlled, American-dominated—a subset of America. Whether we succeed or not, or even whether we deserve to succeed or not, that's not the point. I'm not for this. I mean, I know a lot of Europeans are probably getting mad at me for saying what I'm saying, but I'm not for this. I'm for good relations between the United States and Europe. I would love to go back to the relationship we enjoyed in the 1970s and 1980s. That was ideal. But Europe has decided to go a different way, and I'm just telling you honestly what I think the price will be for these decisions—that this isn't going to be business as usual.

This is the classic "fool around and find out" motto. And, you know, the United States will bring in those who further our interests, but we're not here to further your interests. It's a very sad state of affairs. I don't want the United States invading Venezuela. I don't want us bullying Peru. I don't want us seeking the breakup of Canada. I don't want us illegally occupying Greenland or the Panama Canal. I'm not for any of this, but I'm simply saying, as an analyst, this is the reality of America as

you see it. And it's probably going to prevail, because there's nothing in this hemisphere that can stop us. And Europe probably isn't going to survive this as it currently exists. This is going to be a bad century for Europe going forward.

# #Glenn

Yeah, I wrote a book in 2020—so five years ago—called \*Europe as the Western Peninsula of Greater Eurasia\*, where I made the point that as the world becomes multipolar, the U.S. has every incentive to focus on other parts of the world: Asia and the Americas. And the dilemma for Europe was either, you know, do everything you can to keep America here by surrendering national interests and becoming subordinate, or alternatively, diversify—that is, keep good relations with the U.S. but also integrate more into the Eurasian format.

But then, you know, you have to end the divisions in Europe, make peace with the Russians, and stop this Russophobic hostility. Otherwise, you're going to end up in a situation where you're fighting the Russians while the Americans see you as a burden and bid you farewell. I mean, it just seems like every choice we made was the worst possible one. It's quite depressing. You know, I don't like to be right—this is really depressing to see happening now. Anyway, as our countries become more hostile toward each other, I hope there will be some kind of happy ending to this. So, thank you very much for taking the time.

# **#Scott Ritter**

Well, thank you for having me.