

Schuman and the Fragmentation of Europe

David H. Price is a British journalist who runs the Schuman project. Price discusses how the European project has been derailed since its inception. Follow Prof. Glenn Diesen: Substack: <https://glenndiesen.substack.com/> X/Twitter: https://x.com/Glenn_Diesen Patreon: <https://www.patreon.com/glenndiesen> Support the research by Prof. Glenn Diesen: PayPal: <https://www.paypal.com/paypalme/glenndiesen> Buy me a Coffee: buymeacoffee.com/gdieseng Go Fund Me: <https://gofund.me/09ea012f> Books by Prof. Glenn Diesen: <https://www.amazon.com/stores/author/B09FPQ4MDL>

#Glenn

Hi everyone, and welcome back. We're joined today by David Price, a British journalist who runs the Schuman Project on European Integration. Thank you very much for coming on.

#David Price

Well, thank you for all your good work in opening up a broad debate, which I really appreciate here in Brussels.

#Glenn

Well, I often make the point that I consider the war in Ukraine to be the consequence of a collapsing European security architecture. And while one can go back to the 1990s, of course, to explain that, after the Cold War we essentially had two options. We could either develop a security architecture where everyone is included, based on indivisible security and a Europe without dividing lines, or we could develop these exclusive blocs based on what's often called inter-democratic legitimacy. Now, this entails the EU and NATO. Obviously, we went with the second option, under the assumption that they are forces for good, so we wouldn't trigger a security competition.

I disagree with this, but what often strikes me is that there should be a debate around this issue—whether or not this was a good format for European security. Then we could begin to address some of the problems, but we never really get to that point at all. The entire discourse seems to leave out this whole debate. But today, I was looking forward to taking a further step back—not just looking at the post-Cold War era, but also the post-World War II era, which is your focus. That's the origin of European integration, from the Schuman Declaration to where we are today. So I thought a great place to start would be, if you can, to explain what the Schuman Declaration is and how it has shaped Europe today.

#David Price

Well, thank you very much. I'd actually like to go back a year before the Schuman Declaration, because I was struck by this American document on strategy. The line that everyone's talking about is about Europe. It says that the economic decline of Europe is eclipsed by the real and more stark prospect of civilizational erasure. Robert Schuman, who was involved in many of the institutions, used the word "suicide." Europe was actually faced with suicide in the period between the post-war years, 1945 to 1950. He said we needed to do something because we were facing suicide after the war. The Soviet Union had nuclear weapons, and it was really going to be a serious conflict if things got out of hand. And there was no unity within Western Europe.

So he actually used this phrase just a few days after he'd signed the Statute of the Council of Europe, on May 5th, 1949. People may not think much of it, but it was a key piece of the jigsaw puzzle he was putting together to create a different kind of continent from what they were experiencing. And it was extremely difficult, because the Cold War was really intense—the Communists were the largest party in the French parliament, for example, and the Red Army was poised to take over. So the first thing he established was the Council of Europe, and then he persuaded the British to create a membership charter, which was a legal system for human rights and fundamental freedoms. This would distinguish Western Europe from the Soviet Union, which didn't allow freedom of speech or freedom of religion, for example.

They were an atheist organization, so that was the first step. Then, a year later, on May 9th, 1950, he announced—or rather, the French government made—a proposal. It wasn't his personal proposal; it was the French government's proposal to the other nations of Europe to create a European community. The interesting word, which was his idea to save Europe, is "supranational," because that appears in his speech at the beginning of the signing of the Statute of the Council of Europe. It's associated with the European community system. And nobody really understands what it means nowadays, except that people think it's a bad term and assume it means globalism or something like that.

But it doesn't actually mean that. In Schuman's mind, it's about how you create another layer of democracy that's coordinated with the democracies of the nation-state. An example would be—well, I don't know much about it—but the Nordic people seem to get on quite well in their democracies. And Switzerland was one thing he mentioned, where communes got together and created a confederation. So, how do you coordinate democracies? That's the first question. But then, unlike lots of people—lots of thinkers, lots of philosophers in the past—he didn't think we could unify Europe by just getting people together around a table, where they'd all agree and create a federation.

He was against a federation. But he had an idea that changed the legal vocabulary—in fact, the constitutional vocabulary—of nation-states. The idea was that the supranational has powers that lie between federal and confederal. So it has one institution with very strong powers, because you need a coordinator between democracies. If you have democracies linked together, sooner or later

something will go wrong. One of the democracies might get a bit belligerent, or maybe defend an industry beyond what's reasonable. And you need somebody—you need a system—to coordinate. So that was part of the whole system. But I'll leave it there. Do you have any questions about what I've just said?

#Glenn

No, no, not really. I was just curious how we went from the Schuman Declaration—well, not just the Declaration, but some of the intentions for Europe—and how we got from that to where we are today, because it does look like we derailed at some point.

#David Price

Yeah, okay, so let's look at it in three different periods. Up to the Schuman Declaration—and I took a book of historical chronologies—if you take the countries of Western Europe, six countries: France, Germany, the Benelux, and Italy, and you go back two thousand years, you won't find a period longer than fifty years when there wasn't a war going on. The whole area of Western Europe was at war, more or less. They were either fighting a war, recovering from a war, or preparing for the next one. And then from 1945 to now, we've had the longest period of peace in all European history. And this is the main key to Schuman's thinking.

He wasn't so interested in unity through political means, but in stopping war. His background was that he was born in an area of coal and steel, and he knew that steel was essential for making the weapons of war. And coal was energy. In other words, today we'd call them the energy vector and the strategic materials. If you control those two things, you can control a lot in politics. So the first community was the European Community of Coal and Steel. And instead of putting all six nations under one government, he said, "Well, let's just put coal and steel under a single entity, and let's create five institutions that will guarantee we make democratic decisions."

And then, if you move from that period, there were three communities, and things changed. The American strategy document from 1990 mentions something interesting, because we moved from the European Community idea to the European Union idea, and the term "European Community" just fell out of usage. The American strategy document says that in 1990, continental Europe had 25% of global GDP, and it's fallen to about 14% today. So we're basically in an economic nosedive. We had a period of time when we had wars for two thousand years.

We then had a period called the "Thirty Glorious Years" of major growth in France and Germany—the economic miracle period. And then we've had this decline since 1990. Now we're in a sort of crisis period. The question is, what are we going to do? The Americans are saying, "You've got to shape up, because Europe is in a bad way. It doesn't have democracy, free speech—there are a lot of major problems. We need to have a stable relationship with Russia," and so on. They've put out a big menu, and actually, some of that menu relates to what Schuman was saying back in 1950.

#Glenn

Well, it's a weakness in human nature, though—the assumption that the present is permanent. That is, just because it's been like this for many years, we think it will somehow persist. But another problem is that it often feels like there have been a lot of successes in Europe. As you said, we had this long period of peace, but also prosperity. Yet in that success can also lie the source of stagnation and decline. Once you get the feeling that you've found the recipe for stability, you start to develop ideologies around it—something to perpetuate it. And as the world changes, it becomes harder to change with it. I mean, for example, I've often argued that perhaps after the Cold War we should have moved away from bloc politics and found a way to build an inclusive security architecture, given that communism was gone, the Soviet Union was gone.

But then we hear, "Well, NATO provided security throughout the Cold War—such a good institution." So the goal is simply to preserve the form rather than the function. And one often gets the feeling this is part of the challenge with the EU as well—the obsession with form, keeping the EU in its present shape. Europe in its present form prevents us from addressing the function, which is: how exactly does the world change? How is it different today? And to what extent can we actually change these institutions? It seems like we're stuck on one track, to some extent. But how do you see this dilemma between a more federal, centralized Europe versus a more intergovernmental cooperation, where the nation-state preserves some autonomy? Or maybe it doesn't have to be a dilemma at all.

#David Price

No, I understand where you're coming from in terms of the 2000 European architecture plans and so on. I was in Paris at the time, and it was a big disappointment to a lot of people. But actually, we shouldn't just speak of these two terms—federal and confederal, with confederal meaning intergovernmental. We now have this third system, which is the supranational community. And this is quite extraordinary because nobody understood it at the time. When Schuman made his proposal in 1950, he said this idea of a community is open to all European countries. And some smart-aleck journalist asked, "Is Russia a European country? In other words, can it join this invitation?" And he said, "Yes, of course, maybe." But he said Russia—he didn't say the Soviet Union.

Later I found out that he'd spoken to a number of people, and he understood the Soviet Union would collapse based on something that could be given some sort of geopolitical analysis. On what grounds did he think the Soviet Union would collapse? But certainly he understood it would, and he told a number of members of the European Parliament at the time that it would collapse before the turn of the century. And of course, it did. I spoke to one of them, and he said, "Schuman said it's going to collapse. He said it to me and to a number of other Christian Democrat parliamentarians." And we were amazed. We actually thought he was off his rocker. We thought he was crazy, because the Soviet Union was then at the height of its power. They had launched Sputnik, and no one thought the Soviet Union would just fade away.

But Schuman had made some sort of analysis suggesting it wouldn't last very long. In fact, Adenauer, who spoke with Schuman quite often, said more or less the same thing. He said the third generation would see the collapse—the world would no longer be communist. Which is basically the same idea: you can't keep people trapped in a false ideology forever. And under certain circumstances, you know, the joker in this was basically the Council of Europe, which had a big effect all the way through. Because if you have an entity where Western Europe says, "We've got freedom of speech, freedom of religion, we can criticize communism, we can criticize capitalism," and people across the border can hear about this, then it really shakes the foundations of both the communist system in the Soviet Union and the Soviet occupation of Central and Eastern Europe.

And the other thing we should bear in mind is that we shouldn't take for granted that once politicians make some decisions and later others take over, they're going to be honest. Schuman had no illusions about that—he knew politicians can play tricks on each other, and he talked about "counterfeit democracy." His five institutions at the beginning were attacked quite severely. They still survived, but, for example, the Council of Ministers, he said, should be open to public opinion. And it's never been open. The Council of Ministers has its discussions in private, behind closed doors, with the press locked out. He said it should be open like a parliament. Democracy requires public discussion, public debate.

So he's creating a European architecture for security, but using a totally different method from what you're talking about—the year 2000 architecture. And you do it by controlling certain strategic elements in society and making sure they're democratic and not run by elites or cartels. Actually, there are several unusual things about the community system. One is that it's got the first international anti-cartel system in history. And there are a number of reasons for that. I can go into one of them, which is that before the First World War there was an arms race, and some of the major defense firms were joined together, collaborating on patents, and swapping the patents between each other.

So the ministries of defense would buy a whole lot of new warships or whatever, and then they'd find that the shells coming off the manufacturing line would actually penetrate the steel. So they had to make reinforced steel to protect against the new shells. Then they went into this arms race because each level had to protect against new innovations. And this cartel covered companies like Krupp and Thyssen in Germany, Schneider in France, and the big companies—Vickers and so on—in the UK. It even included American and Japanese companies involved in this, which was basically a scam, but at a global level. So one of the first things you've got in the community system is a means to stop international cartels, which I think hasn't really been emphasized enough.

#David Price

Hello? I can't hear you.

#David Price

I can't hear you.

#Glenn

Sorry. Ah, okay. Well, how do you explain Europe since the 1990s? Because Schuman was quite critical of communism in terms of its compatibility with what Western Europe represented. That is, the European project that developed with the European Coal and Steel Community. But of course, after 1990, one would have assumed that the historical lessons would have suggested we'd put in place a similar format for unifying Europe. That is, the idea that peace, security, and prosperity would depend on finding a similar arrangement to what existed between the French and the Germans—extended then toward the Russians. Again, on the wider time spectrum, one can say that after the Napoleonic Wars, the French had a seat at the table.

Then after World War II, the Germans had a seat at the table, and this was the opposite of what happened after the First World War, when the Treaty of Versailles essentially saw peace as the managed decline of German power, or the perpetuation of its weakness. It looks as if, after the Cold War, we went back to the Treaty of Versailles—that this was almost the model for the Russians: just perpetuate their weakness, or at least avoid creating shared prosperity. Why do you think they went down this path, instead of building on what were supposed to be the key European ideas—the Coal and Steel Community?

#David Price

Well, there are two factors. One, at the beginning of the 1990s, under the presidency of Delors, and with Mrs. Thatcher in power, they created a new way of governing Europe, which had nothing to do with the original ideas of the community. That was the Single European Act. They wanted to open up the market and eventually create a currency and do various things. But the way they did it was anti-democratic because they came together, created a document, and sent it out to all the governments, saying, "You have to pass this document, which will allow us to have, in 1992, a single market working better," which is laudable in itself.

But the method was not democratic because it didn't allow people to debate the document. It was more or less a statement that everybody had to accept. Then they went on to turn the whole thing into a European Union, which is a different configuration—foreign policy, internal justice, closed-door institutions, and so on. And they basically didn't allow the elections to take place that we had envisaged in the original concept of the community. And, let's not forget, there were three communities.

So there was the Coal and Steel Community, which stopped the normal sort of war with bullets. Now we see everybody trying to get more weapons together with steel. But the second community was Euratom, and the idea behind that was to stop atomic war between member states. It's often forgotten that after the war, a lot of countries—Sweden and Switzerland, I think—wanted to have

their own atomic bomb, and that didn't happen. Euratom created institutions so you didn't have to; fissile material was under community control, which was ultimately democratic, so you didn't need nuclear weapons. When Germany became more independent, it didn't create atomic weapons. And then they moved on from those. The third community is the one everybody remembers: the Common Market, the Economic Community, which was actually meant to stop trade wars, because trade wars, even between democracies, could be very dangerous. So they created a system to—

And then they changed the whole system from communities to the European Union with a number of pillars—three pillars. They had a three-pillar architecture, which involved ministers, bureaucrats, and others meeting behind closed doors. So it was a totally different system. When we come to Russia, why didn't we get a community with Russia? They had already changed the system beforehand. Then the European Commission said, "We need to have a plan for the year 2000." Obviously, this wouldn't be of much interest to Russia. So the then president of the European Commission went to Moscow and had talks with Yeltsin at the time.

And Yeltsin said to them, "We'd like to be a member of the European system—the European Union, or whatever—by the year 2000." And the Commission president said, "2000? Not till the year 3000." The main problem was that Russia was too big in the eyes of small bureaucrats. They seemed to have forgotten that Germany was a big country too—a problem at the beginning—and yet it was absorbed. It had a real problem because it had slaughtered a lot of people on an industrial scale, and there was a lot of hate around. But they changed that system in five years into a community. Nobody could conceive of a system with Russia, at least not the small-minded bureaucrats. So they basically rejected Russia, and even though various leaders had different ideas about how to join up with the European Union as it was, none of them succeeded in getting any traction.

And then it became extremely difficult. Russia, which had joined the Council of Europe and had begun to implement the Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, then withdrew. After that, we had a major change—it lined up with China and various other things, which is probably not the natural partner for a European country. So there's a whole series of things one needs to take into account that happened. A lot of it was missed opportunities, and some of it was counterfeit democracy as well, as Schumann would call it.

#Glenn

Well, yeah, there's this quote by Tony Blair from 2013 where he basically argues that the rationale for Europe has shifted. It's no longer about peace, but about greatness. That is, we wouldn't fight each other even if the EU didn't exist, but we wouldn't be great, essentially. I guess my point was that it changed. But I want to go back to what you mentioned before—this new U.S. national security strategy—which has created some shockwaves, especially across Europe, given that it's quite pessimistic about the European economy: the relative share of global GDP dropping from 25% to 14%, the ability to reproduce the culture, declining birth rates, and mass migration.

But importantly, the security strategy also outlines authoritarianism and the anti-democratic behavior of the new political elites, suggesting that they suppress political opposition and the media. How do you see the—well, let's call it a democratic deficit, to use more neutral language—in Europe? Which I use all the time, that particular term, yeah. Yeah, well, the big joke for many years was that if the EU were a country, it wouldn't be allowed to join the EU because it's so undemocratic. I mean, how do you see these structures changing?

#David Price

This is what happened with the European Union restructuring. Take a simple example. In the very first treaty—the Treaty of Paris, the Coal and Steel Treaty—it said that we should aim to have a European Assembly, a parliament, and that it should be based on one person, one vote. But we can't do this immediately, so we will have delegations to the Parliament. And this particular article has existed in all the treaties up to the Lisbon Treaty—that we should have a community with one person, one vote. That's never happened. If you're a German living in Malta, you get the equivalent of ten or twelve votes because of the way the thing is structured. The whole thing is unbalanced from the point of view of basic democracy, because nobody wants to change it, for reasons of nationalism in the smaller countries.

But the small countries are basically represented in the Council of Ministers, where they have an equal vote to Germany. So they shouldn't be afraid of letting people vote. And people could create pan-European parties, in fact—which nobody's actually done—where they could say, well, we don't agree with the fact that, let's say, the president of the Commission should be elected in private, where a candidate hasn't been announced beforehand and she just comes out as the president. So we should have a more democratic system for the Commission presidency. And there are a lot of other things. There was an institution that actually allowed for pan-industrial policy, which would have a tripartite section of industrial associations, consumer associations, and labor associations.

And they would have power over the legislation, so the three different groups would have to come to an agreement. But the thing is, they were supposed to be elected according to the original idea, and that's never happened. So there's a mixture of people not doing what should be done and people changing what already exists. I think most people in a democracy believe there should be some sort of openness. And the term you use, "democratic deficit," emphasizes that there's a lack of openness—which maybe Scandinavian people are quite comfortable with as part of their structure—but it seems to have been lost in the South.

#Glenn

Well, what do you see as the main challenge for Europe today? Because if I look at the EU security strategy, everything seems to be going wrong there. Is it about maintaining unity? Is it about democracy? Is it the prospects for economic development or security? How do you see it? It's good to identify the problem so we can look for the remedy.

#David Price

The remedy is actually in this particular chapter of the American strategic analysis, which is very good. The first thing they say is reestablishing conditions of stability within Europe and strategic stability with Russia. And that really is a major problem, because there's no dialogue going on there. It's a major issue—how you bring Russia, which has always been part of European civilization, back into the mainstream again. And it's coming from a very hard line.

The European position doesn't even talk to Russia, so there's no dialogue, and it seems to be leading to nothing. Some people in charge are saying we should continue until we defeat Russia, but a lot of people nowadays don't think that's very realistic—that some sort of Ukrainian army will reach into Siberia. You know, or the Russians—people worry about the Russians invading Europe. Are they going to invade Portugal? I'm not sure. There's some very unrealistic geopolitics going on, and I think it comes from the previous bad American administrations, where they exploited Ukraine to a large extent.

And Europe was—I mean, if you look at the British Empire, we had colonies. And I think if you look at Europe as a colony of America, the colonies tend to take on the ideology of the mother country and hold on to it even when the mother country has moved on to something else. You know, we've now got a Trump administration that's basically saying we need to come together, we need to have peace projects all over the place. This continuation of war upon war is really devastating—it's just going to cause major world problems. And yet some parts of this area, maybe the outer parts of the American NATO flank, are still fighting a war based on a concept that should have been rejected some time ago.

#Glenn

There's an extraordinary interview—or at least a press meeting—where Viktor Orbán sits next to Trump, and they talk about the war in Ukraine. Orbán more or less says that the Europeans were initially quite cautious; they didn't really want to get into a deep conflict with the Russians. But then, you know, Trump's predecessor—Biden—got all the Europeans riled up. He worked them up about the prospect of defeating Russia and going all the way in this war. And now, of course, they're more committed to it than the United States. Trump wants to end the war. So there might be something to the idea that the colony holds on to this even after the mother country has moved on.

But how do you explain the end of—well, not the end, that's a bit strong—but the decline of diplomacy in the European Union? These days we have Kaja Kallas representing EU foreign policy, which is just extraordinary on many levels. The EU is starting to look more and more like Estonia in terms of its diplomatic engagement with Russia. But it's not just the hostility. She actually makes the

point that she doesn't want to talk to Putin because he's a war criminal, and she doesn't talk to war criminals. And if you can't achieve anything in the talks, why even try? That's a very extraordinary position to take as a diplomat. Instead, she calls for breaking up the Russian Federation.

#David Price

Exactly. That's what I was wondering—whether I should mention that. But it's totally, I mean, for one of the small countries to say we should break up the Russian Federation, which is actually quite a large landmass with lots of different ethnicities—how she's planning to do that, I don't know. I mean, it goes back maybe to American policy in the Carter–Brzezinski period, I don't know. But these Baltic countries, I can understand, had a very bad time under the Soviets. And they seem to have transferred all that hatred into modern Russia, without understanding that one should work a little bit toward reconciliation—if you could do it with post-Nazi Germany.

Maybe something can be done with Russia, and we can have—I mean, the idea is that we'd have a continent stretching all the way from Iberia to Siberia, under democratic rule, with an economy that worked together and was stable. Standards of justice and standards of industry—it would be a fantastic thing. I mean, this is what Schuman was talking about at the beginning. He talked about bringing Russia into a system based on two things: energy and strategic materials, and putting those under democratic institutions. That would act as an educating process for people who didn't have a long tradition or history of such things. And it certainly happened.

And Adenauer said more or less the same thing—that he was worried about Germany falling back into a very bad political condition. That's why he said we need to be full members of the Council of Europe, so any individual can actually take a government to court and say, "There's an abuse of power here." It's quite an extraordinary thing that happened with the Council of Europe. You can take a government before the court and say, "You're not respecting my human rights. You're stopping me from having a free press, or you're putting journalists in jail, or taking their equipment away," or something like that. This is not what we should have in the European framework.

#Glenn

Well, I guess my last question is, how do you—across the continent, not just the EU leadership—how do you explain the decline in general discourse about what creates European security? Because if you look at the whole Schuman Declaration and all the ideas of Europe that followed, it was always about economic interdependence and transparency, as the Coal and Steel Community wanted to promote. Essentially, it was about cooperation—seeking security with each other instead of security against each other. All of this was meant to mitigate security competition; that's been at the heart of it. But now, if you listen not just to politicians but to the media and the general discourse, the reason we talk about security isn't framed around competing interests or rivalry between industrial nations anymore.

It's because one side is good and the other side is evil, and security will be achieved once we've defeated the bad guys. It feels—again, maybe it's an oversimplification—but this is how security has been dumbed down. No one talks. I mean, it's not just the Russians; I always make that point. We never talk anymore about Russian, Chinese, Iranian, or any security concerns of opponents. It's always about why they're bad, essentially. We see the same now with Venezuela, by the way. No one's discussing the security concerns of the other side. It's just, you know, if we're good and they're bad, security will be achieved when the bad guy is vanquished, essentially.

#David Price

Yes, indeed. What one should do is build a strong link so you can then discuss and educate people in a democratic way, which is what happened in the European framework—either in the Council of Europe or in the community system. But that's not really working very well at the moment. Schuman said democracies need to set goals for themselves, and modern governments don't seem to have any goals. They basically just want to exist. And this American document talks about saving Western civilization. You know, it's a different sort of focus from what we hear in Brussels. Nobody's talking about that. And when they put these documents together—Europe in the Year 2000, then Europe in 2010, Europe in 2020, and so on—it was meant to be forward-looking.

But the word that was missing in these, which I remarked on, was “democracy.” They never discussed how they could deepen the democratic engagement of the people, because that would have put the European Union's processes under some sort of magnifying glass. For example, the first thing one should do is have open councils of ministers, and that would seem to me a major step forward. We have a budget that's decided in secret. Its spending is in secret. At one stage, the budget was 70% agriculture, and most of it went to France. And then Germany—you know, I mean, France wasn't the biggest country—but that shows some sort of scam was going on. We need open government so the institutions can act and hold people to account.

#Glenn

Well, this is the problem—whether that falls in the same category. The biggest problem domestically these days for a lot of these EU elites seems to be the rise of populism. But populists ascend when there's a gap between political elites and the public, when the elites have detached themselves. That's what populists do: they claim to represent the public while the elites are out of touch. But again, if one were to address the fact that the political elites themselves have become too detached, that would help explain why there's this populist uprising on both the political left and the right. Then one could start to deal with the issue.

Everything appears in a vacuum, just like our opponents do. It's as if the populists suddenly arrived, and now we have to figure out how to overcome them. So we come up with all these schemes—like

when we set up fact-checkers and started fighting disinformation. Remember when they introduced this idea of disinformation? They linked it directly to the rise of populists. In other words, how can we defeat the populists? That's more or less how the documents were written.

#David Price

Well, Schuman actually said that the unity of Europe—the unification of Europe—would not come from the European institutions. It would actually come from the people. And when you say “populist,” you’re using a word that’s quite similar to “democracy.” So, I mean, I think it happened because, at a certain stage, some people saw that NATO was coming under threat, and they wanted to label others in a derogatory way so that NATO would be preserved. It controls a lot of military-industrial spending, so a lot of money is involved in some of these decisions. The whole thing is a bit ridiculous when you talk about “populist” and “democracy” in the same sentence, so I agree with what you’re saying.

#Glenn

Well, thank you so much for taking the time. Where can people find your work?

#David Price

Well, I write on Schuman at schuman.info. That's got a lot of different articles—maybe too many—but they're scattered all over the place. It's been going since 1999. And I write on EurDemocracy, but EurDemocracy is spelled E-U-R, democracy—so it's “your democracy” spelled with the first letters of “Europe.” And that's on various websites, including Substack.

#Glenn

Well, thanks again for sharing your ideas.

#David Price

Thank you. Thanks very much.