

# **Trump HUMILIATED – Putin, China & Venezuela CRUSH His Tanker War**

Trump messed around and found out says Pepe Escobar as his seizure of Venezuelan oil tankers accelerates a century humiliation for the West says geopolitical analyst Pepe Escobar. Russia and China have stepped in to bolster the defenses of Nicholas Maduro and war is rapidly approaching. Trump's latest failures are about to change everything. Watch until the end to understand how and why. SUPPORT THE CHANNEL ON PATREON: <https://www.patreon.com/dannyhaiphong> Support the channel in other ways: <https://www.buymeacoffee.com/dannyhaiphong> Substack: [chroniclesofhaiphong.substack.com](https://chroniclesofhaiphong.substack.com) Cashapp: \$Dhaiphong Venmo: @dannyH2020 Paypal: <https://paypal.me/spiritofho> Follow me on Telegram: <https://t.me/dannyhaiphong> #trump #putin #venezuela #china

## **#Danny**

The Trump administration, I can see it—they're trying so hard to move to this next war. They really, really—I mean, Trump really wants this, and it's getting serious. It's also pathetic, as you've called it. I'm just going to pull up the video—it's silent, so you can comment over it. There's a second tanker. So, there was a first tanker earlier in December that was captured, and now there's been a second one that had a Panamanian flag on it—not a sanctioned tanker. Trump is saying he's taking back all the oil, and there are even reports of a third tanker. Yes, this is the active pursuit—the valid one, isn't it? This is what's going on, Pepe. This is how the Trump administration is escalating with Venezuela after numerous threats about regime change. Susie Wiles, his chief of staff, is saying they're going to make Maduro beg.

## **#Pepe Escobar**

Perhaps flesh out the many manifestations of this American blockade of Venezuela. I started with the war on drugs, then went to regime change, and now it's "Pirates of the Caribbean"—essentially a kind of maritime blockade of Venezuela, which isn't moving them one inch. We haven't seen even an indirect response from Russia or China. For instance, if they blockade a ship taking oil from Venezuela to China, China will have to respond one way or another. And if that's the case with this latest interception, the Chinese are already mulling how they're going to respond. In terms of military power, the Venezuelans are sure—and they're convinced—they have enough to repel almost anything the U.S. throws at them, including a suicidal land invasion.

So what are the optics of this whole thing for Latin America and for the Global South? From the \*queremos\*—we want—national security strategy, they're affirming that Latin America is their backyard, that they can do anything they want and get away with it. From the point of view of the

Global South, it's a desperately impotent empire trying to control its backyard and failing. So this is the clash of narratives we have at the moment. We don't know where this is going, of course. But I would not bet on Venezuela folding. This is not Iraq in 2003. The Americans cannot buy all the generals they want to topple Maduro and install the Nobel Peace Prize winner—that pathetic Nobel Peace Prize winner. Popular support for an American intervention is next to zero, and the support that does exist comes from exiled Venezuelans in Florida.

This means people are betting on Marco Rubio. Internal support in Venezuela—the campesinos, the urban workers, the people who have followed the Bolivarian Revolution from the beginning—is overwhelmingly for the government in Caracas. So whatever the Americans try in terms of regimenting people inside Venezuela is already doomed. What's left are military scenarios, which are all extremely dodgy, to say the least. Are the Russians and the Chinese intimidated? Not at all. If you look at what the Russians are saying at the UN and what the Chinese are saying in their briefings at the Ministry of Foreign Relations in Beijing, they're basically saying, "We support Venezuela's sovereignty, and that will continue to be the case. We are against any foreign interference."

They're very diplomatic—"any foreign interference." But there's only one foreign interference. So what do we have? A stalemate for a few months? And then what? Because Trump has promised to eradicate the current Venezuelan government and get back all his oil—or America's oil—that was supposedly stolen by Venezuela. That's another total fallacy. So he's going to have to deliver. Can you imagine the MAGA crowd actually knocking on Trump's door and saying, "OK, what about Venezuela? Are we getting that oil back?" Not likely. So why did he promise it? Maybe he was tricked badly into this adventure by Marco Rubio. If that's the case—wow—there's going to be blowback. Not now, of course, but in the near future. So Marco better get his act together or get a one-way ticket somewhere.

## #Danny

Because I do have—since you were talking about Russia and China's response—this is one of the most interesting ones to me. It's not just a statement or a diplomatic response; it's the continuation of sending tankers to Venezuela amid all of this. DD Geopolitics, our friend, said a Russian tanker, the Hyperion, safely arrived at Amuay, Venezuela, home to the refining center there—the world's second-largest Iranian complex by capacity. So, I mean, you know, they keep going. And China, of course, as you said, has strong statements. Here's one of them: China slams the U.S. for arbitrarily seizing vessels in the Caribbean and extends support to Venezuela. Beijing opposes unilateral, illicit sanctions that have no basis in international law or authorization from the U.N. Security Council. Yeah.

## #Pepe Escobar

We see that they didn't have the guts to assault a Russian ship coming from Murmansk in the Arctic. They didn't have the guts to attack it, to seize that ship. That tells us a lot. This blockade has

already been breached, and it will be breached again by Russian and Chinese vessels. And the Iranians are already saying they're sending ships to Venezuela. Can you imagine these three BRICS countries sending their own ships, carrying their own flags, breaking the blockade? So what's the circus ringmaster going to do?

## #Danny

It's a perilous situation because you have Venezuela. I'm sure you saw the reports—they're escorting tankers. But then you have Iranian tankers, Chinese tankers, Russian tankers. There are so many elements to that that are big. I mean, this is bigger than Venezuela, as we know, but the consequences are bigger than Venezuela. When you begin to interfere with the ships of these powers, that has ricochet effects. What do you think? Why do you think the Trump administration is making these kinds of moves? It's like with that Panamanian vessel—it just seems like bullying. But with Russia, it's not happening.

## #Pepe Escobar

So it's great because all across the Global South, people are paying attention to these details. Okay, so who can escape the blockade and who cannot? And right away you see how this thing is going. It's going in a way that all this bluster and all these threats aren't affecting anything. From the point of view of the famous loss of American credibility—which has been the mantra since the end of the Second World War—wow, this is enormous. You've already lost your credibility even as you start implementing your so-called maritime strategy, a blockade. Look, what baffles me, Danny, and all of you, is how there isn't a single voice among these very, very mediocre Trump 2.0 sycophants to tell the president, in ten seconds, fifteen seconds, that this whole thing makes absolutely no sense. Nobody. Nobody. It's incredible. So they prove that this is an administration of idiots—of morons, really. There's no explanation for it.

## #Danny

Well, what's interesting is that Tucker Carlson went on our mutual friend Judge Napolitano's show and said someone in Congress had told him they were going to talk about potentially jumpstarting this war into a major escalation—air strikes or something like that. And then Trump gave the speech Tucker was referencing, and Venezuela wasn't even mentioned. Maybe there was one mention of the drug boat—"we're getting the fentanyl out of the country"—and then nothing. It was all just, "The United States is doing great under me," and that was it. I thought that said a lot.

## #Pepe Escobar

It says a lot because it fits the pattern of building a narrative—selling this narrative like crazy, domestically and globally. And when you see that the narrative doesn't stick, you change the narrative. This is the specialty of the empire of chaos, even with the Alto Pan administration before.

When the narrative doesn't work, you change it. Well, in their case, they never changed it, right? But in the case of the Trump administration, where he's a master of changing narratives, this is what he does best. So sooner or later, Venezuela will disappear as an issue. It'll just be a way to change the subject again.

## **#Danny**

Right. We won. We negotiated. It's over. No more drugs—no more drugs.

## **#Pepe Escobar**

We're going to get all the oil back.

## **#Danny**

We got it back. We got it. I wanted to ask you this because, in the National Security Strategy document, of course, the Western Hemisphere is all over it—Monroe Doctrine. But Russia and China are mentioned very specifically as players in the region. That Monroe Doctrine, I've been trying to tell people, used to be applied to Europe, when Europe was the former colonizer and the United States wanted to keep them out so the U.S. could have it all to itself. Now it's Russia and China. But what exactly are Russia and China doing in the region that's provoking a response? Because as much as some of it might be phantom threats—we just need a threat to justify—I don't think that's all of it. I do think there are relationships being built in Latin America that are concerning, and I'm wondering if you could elaborate on them. Concerning to the U.S.—the U.S. empire of chaos, I should say—not to me.

## **#Pepe Escobar**

Exactly. Okay, let's take one example: the Port of Chancay in Peru, which for all practical purposes is a key port in the South Pacific Maritime Silk Road, and extremely popular in China when it was inaugurated. Xi Jinping went there to inaugurate it himself. In China, everybody now talks about the Shanghai–Chancay connection, because everything exported from Shanghai across the South Pacific will arrive in Chancay. It's another chapter of the Maritime Silk Road. Nobody saw it coming, especially in the U.S. Nobody knew.

They knew when Xi Jinping was there inaugurating the port. And even in South America, there wasn't much information about Shanghai. Now there's more, because the Chinese went to Brazil. They've already sent a mission to Brazil to start studies to build a port—obviously by the Chinese—the famous bioceanic road linking the Atlantic coast of Brazil with the Pacific coast of Peru. That will be the integration of everything Brazil exports, being shipped from the Pacific side of South America all the way to China. This is what the Americans mean by foreign interference.

Commercial capabilities, trade capabilities, or the fact that the largest trade partner of Brazil—the number one power in South America—is China. It used to be the U.S. until about 12 or 15 years ago, if I'm not mistaken. Especially for the past 10 years, it's been China. And both are BRICS members. Brazil and China are very, very close in so many ways that the Americans can only dream of. So this is what they mean by foreign interference, because China is making inroads all over South America—Latin America as a whole. And the Russians—their soft power is increasing all across Latin America as well. Soon there will be more Russian investments throughout the region.

From the point of view of the Trump administration, this is anathema—they're invading our backyard. And from the point of view of Iran, it's essentially the Iran–Venezuela sovereign relationship. All of that is seen as infringing on our supposed right to control the whole Western Hemisphere. It's really a corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, because it's just as out of touch with reality as the Monroe Doctrine was. So this isn't going to change. They'll try to provoke hybrid warfare, focusing on different parts of Latin America, of course. They're very lucky, because Latin American countries have a tendency to fall into the lap of the empire.

It happened with Argentina a few months ago, and now it's happened with Chile. It may even happen with Bolivia, totally. But in Bolivia, there's still a lot of popular support for what remains of the Evo years, right? And for their sovereignty, of course. So they can count on ruling easily over neo-colonies, especially in South America. At the same time, they're very worried about Russia and China making inroads—commercial, trade, and diplomatic—all across Latin America. So they'll be trying to... they're pitching this clash all the time, saying, "Okay, where do we need to interfere to provoke regime change or a color revolution on one side?"

And on the other side, it's about how they can undermine the gains of the Russians and the Chinese in this or that country. So this dynamic will continue. It means they're trying to cling to controlling the whole backyard—which they can't. They can control a sizable part of it, but not some of the most important countries. In the case of the Trump administration's relationship with Brazil, this is going to get much more complicated than it already is. Because in the next elections, maybe we could have Lula again, but we could also see the return of the extreme right—and Brazil would instantly fall into the empire's lap. So this is a really high-stakes game. Very, very high stakes.

## #Danny

You know, we've heard U.S. officials literally say, "Oh, well, Colombia is coming up, Brazil is coming up with these elections." There's this very open message being sent that it's all about total control. But Pepe, one question I had was—even with, yeah, yeah, yeah—but even so, the question is: what is the U.S. going to offer after this? Because Russia and China have a lot of relationships with neocolonies; they're able to trade with anybody. Does this actually stop or solve anything? Or is it just a stopgap—an attempt to pause things, to hope it slows down a bit, this process that's already underway? Yes.

## #Pepe Escobar

You're right—hoping to slow down an inexorable process. A great deal, though not the majority unfortunately, of Latin American countries are exercising their sovereignty. And in the case of the most powerful, it's very divided. If we have Chile and Argentina falling into the empire's lap, on the other side we have Brazil that is resisting. But there are a lot of buts. If Lula continues—and Brazil is a sad case of maybe being the country of a lone man defending its sovereignty—whatever succeeds Lula will never be at the same level in terms of being a negotiator, in terms of profile, a high profile all across the Global South, in terms of understanding the motivations of the empire, etc. And it's very easy to count on fifth columns all across, especially in South America. That's the case of Argentina, and that's now the case of Chile.

From the point of view of always having their lily pads—or giant lily pads—in South America especially, the empire is not worried. Their two key focuses are Mexico and Brazil. Mexico has to be very careful to exercise its sovereignty and not be gobbled up by the empire, while at the same time not antagonizing it to the point where they'd go in and provoke regime change, for instance, or another color revolution. In the case of Brazil, which is a South Atlantic regional power and an important BRICS power, that's the real complication. The fifth column in Brazil is extremely strong and powerful, and that complicates the issue tremendously. Unfortunately—well, I was born in Brazil, so I always carry Brazil inside me a little bit everywhere—it pains me to see that the prospects are not exactly rosy.

## #Danny

As I see this, and as we both witness what's happening with Venezuela, I think people really underestimated how strong Venezuela is—and how tenuous the rest of the situation is, especially in South America. Of course, Cuba has been sanctioned for 60-plus years. They can't always persist, but there's no color revolution coming Cuba's way. They tried—what was that, a couple of years ago? It flopped. In Venezuela, you know, how many times have they tried? The sanctions are just absolutely disastrous, yet their political system remains, and it doesn't show any signs of letting up—unless the U.S. tries to wipe it all out militarily, which would be a disaster.

But the rest of the situation, yeah—if we look at the competitors, we even have, for example, Gustavo Petro and Claudia Sheinbaum, these two very important nodes in this process of multipolarity in Latin America. They've wavered a bit. They've given some room to the United States around Venezuela, similar to how Lula has had to, or has felt compelled to, give some room by not even acknowledging, for example, that Maduro is the president of Venezuela. Sheinbaum and Gustavo Petro have said very contradictory things about what should happen—no intervention, but “the people should decide.” But the people have already decided: Maduro is the leader.

## #Pepe Escobar

This dynamic shows, to you and to our audience, how it's very, very hard to navigate the humor, whims, and idiosyncrasies of the empire—especially because they're concentrated in one man. I wouldn't say he's Julius Caesar; he's Caligula. And Caligula only decides. We've had a lot of discussions about Roman emperors these past few days here in Italy, and there's a consensus that, yeah, he's essentially a reenactment of Caligula. So everything hinges on his mood swings—especially because, once again, he's no tactician, no strategist, doesn't read anything, and can't think long term.

So, obviously, it's whatever latest thing catches his attention—and then five seconds later, it's something else. His attention span is five to ten seconds, and he's incapable of retaining or processing crucial information. So you can imagine Sheinbaum, Petro, and Lula—we have to devise a strategy to counter this situation, but we can't antagonize him directly. Never. Rule number one. It's a balancing act, very, very complicated. And of course, they're not nuclear powers; they're not hypersonic powers. It's one thing when China and Russia do that—another thing entirely for Mexico, Brazil, or Colombia. Yeah.

## **#Danny**

Yeah. And, you know, we're going to close here. But when I see Maduro, for example, mocking Trump's phone call to him, versus how Sheinbaum, Petro, even Lula have had to respond to what's going on, I think, man, there's one element that's so important to all of this—which is having the armed forces, having the military, and having support. Having the whole state on your side, not just the elected party you're part of, but the state itself. That's an element that—I mean, look, Colombia and Mexico, the U.S., intel, the deep state—they're all up in there. So yes, it is very difficult to push the envelope. Very difficult.

## **#Pepe Escobar**

And there's an element, Danny—there's an element of swing there, which is a very Caribbean thing. They know how to swing. They know how to move. They know how to talk, especially, and they know the power of mockery. You can destroy a superpower by mocking it. And they understand that better. Venezuelans understand that. Colombians understand that. Cubans understand this probably better than anybody else.

## **#Danny**

Yeah. Oh, yeah. Well, their forefather, Fidel Castro, was very good at that—very good at that.