

The USA Is DESTROYING Europe from Within | Prof. Glenn Diesen

The war-mania in Europe is heating up. People are starting to see drones everywhere, and all of them must be the product of Russian "hybrid warfare". What does this irrational psychosis mean for the future of the continent? Today I'm talking (in person) to my friend and colleague, Glenn Diesen. We examine Europe's confrontation with Russia and the dangers of uncontrolled escalation. Diesen argues that European leaders are struggling to accept a changing balance of power, while questioning Washington's willingness to end the Ukraine war. They discuss nuclear deterrence, NATO, Iran, economic dependence and America's emerging spheres of influence. The conversation also explores whether transatlantic elites serve national interests, and how liberalism, democracy and multipolarity are reshaping the international order today. Glenn's Links: Glenn Diesen on YouTube: <https://www.youtube.com/@GDiesen1> Glenn Diesen on Substack: <https://glenndiesen.substack.com> East-West Forum: <https://east-west-forum.com/> Harici: <https://harici.com.tr/en/> Neutrality Studies Links: Neutrality Studies Substack: <https://pascallottaz.substack.com> Support Neutrality Studies: <https://neutralitystudies.com/donate> Neutrality Studies shop: <https://neutralitystudies.com/shop> Time Stamps 00:00 An in-person conversation in Istanbul 02:53 Europe's leaders and American influence 07:59 Drone incidents and the rhetoric of war 12:52 Russia, nuclear risks and uncontrolled escalation 26:10 Trump, Anchorage and outsourcing the war 31:48 Why the unipolar order resists change 36:59 Spheres of influence and Europe's dependence 39:58 Transatlantic elites, liberalism and democracy

#Pascal

Well, welcome everybody to a special episode of Neutrality Studies. Today live—or not live, but in person from Istanbul, in fact. And I do hope that you are not getting bothered too much by the background noise. But with me is my friend and colleague, Glenn Diesen. Glenn, how are you? Good. It's good to see you in person.

#Glenn Diesen

Good seeing you too in person.

#Pascal

Last time we did that was in Tbilisi, Georgia. And now we're in Istanbul in order to take part in the East-West Forum. That's going to take place tomorrow, also co-organized by Harici, wonderful

people. That will also be linked below. But Glenn, this forum wants to talk about the future of the multipolar world, and we're seeing all of these huge changes right now that are taking place. How hopeful are you that we can get to a peaceful multipolar world without a large European war first?

#Glenn Diesen

It can go both ways, I would say, at this point in time, because, well, as we see, the United States, but also the Europeans, are pushing back in a very big way. I always make the point: if you're in the United States and you want to resist the multipolar world—that is, the emergence of new centers of power—and preserve your global primacy, what would you do? Well, you would probably try to break the Chinese economy through economic—well, economic war. If that doesn't work, perhaps use a proxy in military conflict. You would want to try to break Russia. You could use proxies there as well, like Ukraine. And you would try to take down Iran, which would then weaken both the Chinese and the Russians. And you're going to see all of this is happening. And so I don't think there's going to be a smooth transition. It doesn't look like it.

But again, an all-out war, I don't think we can do that usually. This is the problem in history. If you have a massive shift in the distribution of power, a change in world order, you see it usually being followed by a war because you need to readjust or recalibrate the entire world order. Usually you get those agreements after big wars. So you get a new agreement after the Napoleonic Wars, after World War I, after World War II. This is when the great powers are willing to sit down and agree to a new status quo. The problem now is that all the major powers are now armed with nuclear weapons. So we can't really do this anymore if we want to survive. So it's a unique situation, point in history, and you would think that leaders were more responsible now, but again, they, yeah, we are unfortunately not blessed with responsible leaders.

#Pascal

What is your view on the leaders in Europe? There's one school that says they're just puppets, basically, of the Americans. And then there's the others who say, no, no, no, they do have their very own agendas and so on. And you can see how the Europeans, especially the EU Brussels Centre, used the last four years to centralize power under itself, and just how the nation states in Europe are being hollowed out. Where do you fall? How much do you think are the European leaders independent of the Americans? And how tight is this network of domination from across the Atlantic?

#Glenn Diesen

Well, I do think that the Europeans have been influenced by the Americans, but they don't want to restrict their leaders of this autonomy of their own. Whenever I speak to Colonel Lawrence Wilkerson, who you also know, he always makes the point that after the Iraq War, when he was there in the White House, they figured out that they needed more obedience from the Europeans. So since then, they really put in a lot of work through their journalists, NGOs, think tanks, and

different programs to bring forth the right warmongering European leaders. So they had a great deal to do with it.

And also, even in 2022, when the Russians went in, it was the United States that had to talk the Europeans into this. That's something Viktor Orbán made a point of. Once he had a press conference with Trump and made this point that Biden had to pull in the European leaders. But now something has happened. They have taken it over completely, in full ownership of this warmongering. Even now that the U.S. is pulling back, Europeans are quite eager to continue. So what has happened to them? I think some of it's just human nature. When humans go into war, some basic impulses kick in. I mean, this is the contradiction.

In international relations, what you want to do to resolve a conflict, you want to put yourself in the shoes of the opponent and see where compromise can be made. The problem is that there's an instinct also in human nature, which is when you face an external threat, you seek internal solidarity. You divide stricter into the in-group and the out-group, and in order to make everyone march in line, they shouldn't show any empathy at all to the out-group. And you kind of see this in Europe now. We criminalize the whole idea of seeing the conflict from the side of the opponents. So they all kind of unified under this narrative that this was an unprovoked war. And again, then there's only one conclusion: it was unprovoked.

It's simply Russian expansionism. Then the logical thing would be to deter, to send weapons, elevate the cost so it's more than the benefit. But this is why it's problematic, this whole Hitler narrative that they're fighting World War II all over again, because what I argue, and many others would, is that this is not another Hitler. This is not an opportunistic war, a war of expansion. We learned over the past 30 years, and this is confirmed by leadership across the West, that Russia sees NATO expansion as a real threat. So they see this as an existential threat. And given that this is the problem, not the rise of a new Hitler, that means you have to do the exact opposite. You have to recognize that they have some security concerns. And the more weapons we push in, the more we escalate, the more they will have to respond in kind.

#Pascal

Now we could talk about all of the reasons why this isn't sinking in. I mean, just last week, I had again Ambassador Jack Matlock on my channel. He's now 96 or 97, and he was there. He was in the Soviet Union, right? And he said in the '90s, together with George Kennan and others, you know, this NATO expansion will lead to war with Russia. This is the most unwise thing we can do. But this is now already kind of a moot or past discussion, because this is what happened. NATO was enlarged, was expanded. The Russians actually did, in the end, go to war in Ukraine because they said, like, we cannot take this. Whether you argue that this is just Russian lies or not, the fact is the Russians say that this is what it is.

So their official—at least on an official level—there's no question of why they are doing this. From the Russian narrative, it's clear. But the thing I wonder now is why it is that the Europeans seem dead set at creating even more threat from, or making the Russians into an even bigger threat. This whole drone narrative that's being built up right now, and you tweeted about that quite a bit, it's like, it's insane to believe that Russia could, under any circumstance, think that just doing little pinprick attacks with drones on European—on EU, NATO soil—would do anything else but increase the resolve of the Europeans, right?

Why are the Europeans so dead set at using these drone incidents and Leipzig, the Leipzig drone incident, right? This is such a dumb narrative, but it seems to be these people are dead set on putting that out in order to somehow justify something that might be coming next. How are you interpreting that? Hey, just a very quick note. The best way to support this channel is by signing up for my free Substack. You can also help with a paid subscription there, or you can get some of our new merch on neutralitystudies.com. Links below. See you there.

#Glenn Diesen

Well, I think there's reason to be concerned why all the European leaders are suddenly repeating the same talking points as well. Not just talking points, but they're all showing up in their military fatigues. And you hear from Britain—you probably saw Jacob Rees-Mogg arguing that it's the duty of all British to go essentially die in a war, you know, to fight for Britain now. And this argument that war is coming, we shouldn't be fearful, we should be prepared, as a given that war is coming, preparing the public mentally for the war so it doesn't come as a surprise that they're all doing this now at the same time.

And of course this drone incident in Leipzig, that's quite ridiculous. But this is the kind of talk you would expect before a war. So, no, it is of great concern that they're all suddenly now saying the exact same thing. I spoke just yesterday to the former CIA director for Russian analysis, George Beebe, and he was also expressing some great concerns about this. Why are they all now saying—you know, seemingly they all got their talking points delivered, and they're now all repeating the same things. And this is... yeah, so this is dangerous.

And I don't know if they're preparing for war, or if they want to show the Russians that they are willing to go to war because they anticipate some negotiations, because something is cracking now in Ukraine. Yeah. So that means the Europeans have two options. Either you start to talk to the Russians, which they refuse to do, or you go to war. But they don't have the capabilities. They don't have a strategy. And I don't even know what victory against the world's largest nuclear power would even look like. So, yeah, they're in a bit of a bind. And I don't even think they have a clear strategy. I mean, I talk to people in the EU Parliament who say, well, people are just talking, and we have to confront them.

They speak in slogans. I mean, but they don't actually have anything concrete. There's no strategy. There's no real arguments. It's just this emotional rhetoric. And I think what makes this even worse is, if it was just a war in Ukraine, it would be one thing. But I think this is a symptom of something even larger, which is the shift in world order. That is, again, NATO expansion was about creating a collective hegemony in Europe, creating a Europe where everyone would be included except for the Russians. And, you know, this was the manifestation of the unipolar moment.

So all of this is, you know, now seen to be falling apart. And the Europeans essentially have two options. Do you, in a multipolar world, diversify your economic connectivity, that is, reach out to the Russians, Chinese, as the Americans will eventually reduce their interest and presence in Europe? Or do you double down on global primacy and make yourself into obedient, you know, frontline states for the United States? And it appears that Europeans weren't really sure what to do. They're trying to sit on both chairs. But now they're kind of doubling down on, yeah, the hegemonic order.

So again, you see it with the rhetoric they have against not just Russia, but the hostility towards Iran, China. So they're kind of betting on something going to happen in Russia. Something might crack, they might collapse, and then the goal would be effectively to try to restore the unipolar moment. Again, no one's formulating a clear strategy because it's not plausible. But I just, I think they're in a strategic vacuum. They don't know what to do. And, yeah, yeah. But if you don't know what to do, then, I mean, this kind of war rhetoric and warmongering, in my view, creating the self-fulfilling prophecy of a war with Russia.

#Pascal

When you're already in a weak spot, this just seems so suicidal. And my great fear, also from watching your podcast, by the way, because you had Professor Karaganov on, you had other Russian thinkers on who are all saying that the Russians are now basically getting ready for taking the European threat seriously. For like three or four years, they were listening and they just thought this is just grandstanding when the Europeans were talking about war with Russia. But also since Mearsheimer went to Moscow the other week and then reported back from a dinner with Mr. Lavrov, we know that the Russian leadership is now really listening to the Europeans and saying, like, yeah, we will probably have a war with them.

We probably have to fight them. They are so dead set on doing this that we are now taking them seriously. So we are now getting closer to this self-fulfilling prophecy moment when everybody will believe in the start of a war, and then the most logical thing to do is to engage first in it, right? From both sides. Is this also worrying you, especially looking at the fact that in Russia, voices like Professor Karaganov seem to be gaining currency?

#Glenn Diesen

No, and that's an important part because he's been taking quite a hawkish tone for quite a while. But as he admitted himself, he started off representing a small minority, but now he has the majority behind him that there's a need to escalate in a big way. But from the Russian government, what you hear from Lavrov, what you hear from Putin is, at least over the past two weeks, they've been saying very clearly, listen, we have no plans against NATO. I mean, they've been so cautious for the past four and a half years. They even sacrificed their deterrence to a large extent so they wouldn't have to fight NATO directly.

And they're saying, we have no interest in this. However, if we are attacked, as Lavrov said, it would be a very different war, and it would be very short. And I think that's, well, what is often pointed out is that the Russians have been pumping out a lot of armored vehicles, for example, over the past two, three years. But they're not making it to the front lines. So what are they for? And also, we know they're producing a lot of Oreshnik missiles. They're also going into storage. And we can also assume that this would be meant for a war if the Europeans attack.

So again, this is why I would like, when you hear these European leaders being so reckless, saying, "War with Russia, war with Russia," at least they should have the decency of explaining what exactly does that mean. How do you think this war is going to be fought? Because it appears that, you know, they make some casual remarks, you know, missiles into Moscow. Yes, but then very more powerful missiles will come our way. And what happens then? We fire off some missiles into Moscow, and then they cry uncle and, you know, well, we assume that they will capitulate. No, there is no way. I mean, so how do you think this is going to end? And, you know, are you going to fight them on the front lines?

You know, do they think they can simply send some drone operators and launch a few missiles into Moscow to tip the scales a little bit in favor of Ukraine? Do they think they can control that escalation ladder? Because once Europe begins to fire missiles into Russia, and they are now attacking Russia directly, not through a Ukrainian proxy, the idea that you could control the escalation ladder—that is what the Americans have been trying to do in Iran. They say, "Oh, when we start to fight, what should be the acceptable targets? When do we end? When do we pause?"

When do we restart? This kind of escalation control, they will not give this to the Europeans. Once the first missiles hit Russia, no one will control it, not even the Russians. And the idea that they can control the escalation—no, the chances of a nuclear escalation are quite large. And it probably won't even be the Russians that initiate it, because with all these Russian missiles, they probably can have that middle step between conventional weapons and nuclear weapons. They have an advantage, so they don't have to go up that escalation ladder. But think about it.

The fact you can say, "We're going to go to war with Russia"—something that we just survived the Cold War not doing—and now they're saying it without explaining at all what that means. And how are we going to survive this? Nothing. I mean, this is why, you know, this is reckless. And, you

know, to me, it points to a political leadership which is becoming more and more illegitimate. And at the end of the day, I think the main problem is so many of the politicians, they dug themselves into this position for four and a half years. And they believed—many of them did believe—that they were winning. So now that they're realizing that Ukraine is falling, they don't know what to do.

#Pascal

Do you think they're realizing that? Because, like, in the media, our propaganda environment, we are still reading that the Russians are not advancing on the battlefield. The Russians are stuck on the battlefield. Therefore, Putin is getting desperate, blah, blah, blah. As of September 2026, that's still the main narrative. Do you think that the leaders themselves, they are actually aware that this is largely BS? Because they're still saying so. I mean, Kaja Kallas and so on, they're still saying, like, the Russians are stuck, while they are advancing on the battlefield, while all of the observers are saying, no, the Russians are about to break the last defenses of Ukraine.

#Glenn Diesen

Well, what I've heard from people in the EU Parliament is that they believed this genuinely, that they were winning for four and a half years, all the way now up until the summer. You know, this whole Ukraine-is-turning-the-tide—this wasn't just a propaganda pitch. They actually believed their own propaganda. But now I'm being told something has happened. A panic has set in because they realize they're not winning, and things are falling apart very quickly. Not just the manpower issue, but especially this 40-day campaign. That was supposed to be what would turn the tide. That was the source of Ukraine's winning. And they started destroying these Russian ships in the Sea of Azov and the Black Sea.

And then the Russian retaliation came, which was immensely more powerful. And now suddenly, not only do the Ukrainians have a manpower issue, but now they also have a problem with their entire infrastructure. We see their logistics being destroyed, all of their warehouses being destroyed, gas stations, railroads. They don't even have a steel industry anymore, apparently. So the Russians are just destroying everything of critical infrastructure. And the Europeans themselves don't really have a lot of ability to keep funding Ukraine in perpetuity. There's a great concern. And the air defenses, I think, were also something that shocked the Europeans.

They see now, you know, the Russians get more and more drones and missiles, and more and more of them are getting through. At the same time, the Russians are building up their, you know, layer after layer of air defenses, which means that NATO—well, you know, they say it's Ukraine, but NATO with Ukraine has to launch like a thousand drones to start to penetrate it. So it's becoming very difficult, the whole balance of power. And again, this is what I'm being told in the EU Parliament. The panic has set in. And that's usually when you would—if they panic, what you do, then you start screaming about, "Oh, we're going to join the war."

If it's rhetorical or if it's genuine, we don't know. But if enough—again, it doesn't have to be rational—if enough people are chanting, you know, "Okay, we have to go to war, we go to war," then even if it's just rhetorical to put pressure on Russia, you know, this is human nature. They will then eventually internalize this, and they will begin to pursue it. So it's incredibly dangerous. And I don't even think—forget about escalation control—I don't even think they can control the narrative anymore. So the European leaders are now, in my opinion, the most dangerous breed of politicians on this planet.

#Pascal

The thing is, nobody has them under direct control, right? I mean, this could... Although the United States is the most important part of NATO, of this entire NATO apparatus, if the Europeans actually start doing something stupid, or start a false flag, anything that kind of gives them a pretext to start directly firing from NATO territory without the pretense of going through Ukraine, right? And if they do that, then the Russians will have to respond, right? And that will be the moment when, even if the other side, even if the Americans wouldn't be happy with it, you can basically just start an escalation, a military escalation spiral.

#Glenn Diesen

Okay. Yeah, well, that's something that could happen because, well, if you've seen through this war, how it has been defined is this incremental escalation. If you remember, in the beginning, the Germans were sending some helmets and, you know, gradually more and more powerful weapons. And I always make the point to remind people that Biden once said that F-16s mean World War III, you know, with weapons. We've gone far beyond this. Now we're doing long-range strikes into Russia with barely concealing that we're participating. But what I expect or suspect might be the next step is if the Europeans say, "Oh, we might have to enter the war in some way, put our soldiers in Ukraine, or do some kind of a no-fly zone, or even launch missiles into Russia directly."

You know, there has to be some kind of a step where you do that. That's a very difficult step to make. But if you do an attack, let's say, you know, this so-called CIA report that the Russians were going to launch drones from the Mediterranean into Europe. You know, if this is what they're going to do, put a blockade on Russian ships in the Mediterranean or the Baltic Sea, or if you're going to launch some missiles in there or send troops into Ukraine, if you have an attack on Europe, then that would kind of allow them to do this attack.

Imagine if a missile hit France or something, and then they would say, well, we can just retaliate, one missile towards Moscow, and then we have responded. And if Russia responds, then they're attacking NATO. So it could be something just to do that little extra step, because I'm thinking, many of them realize every time in this war Ukraine runs into trouble, being on its back foot, NATO

has responded by escalating. And the question is, how do you escalate further without triggering a major war? So if you need a false flag in order to take that extra step, why wouldn't they? I mean, is this really something they wouldn't do at this point?

#Pascal

I mean, we are at the point where people in Germany are arguing, seriously arguing, that this drone in Leipzig Airport was Germany's 9/11, right? That that was a hybrid war attack. So it's really only one more logical step towards saying now we need to retaliate in kind and send drones from Germany or missiles. I mean, I don't think their drones can fly that far, but we need to send drones into Russia from our territory in order to put our foot down, because that's the discourse at the moment, right?

#Glenn Diesen

And another discourse you keep—at least, which I see in the media now—is that, oh, Russia is losing and they know they're losing, and as a result, they might escalate in a reckless way. And, well, that makes no sense at all. They're winning. And the main interest for Russia is just to prevent escalation when Ukraine begins to fall apart, make sure the NATO countries don't do anything foolish. So, you know, this is like projection there. Yeah, but this is my concern. The talking points which are out there, they're all indicating that the Europeans will do something very foolish in the near future.

#Pascal

What did you connect it to, that, you know, the doing something foolish? Because at the end of the day, the big question is: how foolish a thing can you do without the okay from the Americans? And John Mearsheimer, for the longest time, has been making the argument that the Russians have an interest in keeping the Americans somewhat involved in Europe in order to prevent exactly that, from the Europeans going completely into loose-cannon territory. But at the same time, his recent trip, he said what surprised him most was to learn that the Anchorage agreement and the diplomatic negotiations on the way to that, how much Russia was actually willing to give up and then make a deal with Donald Trump.

And apparently, according to what Mearsheimer was told, Anchorage was then just the place where they would shake hands, and basically they already had everything agreed, because the Russians basically said yes to what came from Kushner and Witkoff. But that hinged upon Donald Trump then being able to basically pull it off and pacify the Europeans and his own military-industrial complex, right? And then the neocons—and apparently that he failed. So at least that's the interpretation of Mearsheimer, that the Russians now believe that Trump is basically powerless, or lied to them and just strung them along. What do you think this was? Because it is difficult for me to believe that the

U.S. president couldn't actually stop the intelligence sharing and couldn't stop the weapons flow if he actually wanted. What do you think that game was, or still is, about with the Europeans, this good cop, bad cop kind of game that seems to be going on?

#Glenn Diesen

Well... yeah, so either Trump is weak or he's deceptive. That's pretty much the two options. Again, it would be speculation, but I do think there's probably more deception in play here. I mean, I know that there's a lot of pressure from the military. I know the Europeans and Zelensky didn't agree to what he was doing in Anchorage. But I also think that the wider U.S. interest is necessarily to put an end to the war, or to outsource it. That is, if the Europeans want to fight the Russians, as Trump said, we make a lot of money selling weapons. And then they can push this a bit further down, see how it goes, if Russia is actually significantly weakened.

As you remember, when Marco Rubio was asked a few months ago, "How about talks?" "Well, maybe we have to reassess it a bit now because Russia's in a much more difficult position than it was before." This was during this 40-day campaign. So this is kind of, I think, the thinking: let the Europeans do this. They use their energy to try to weaken the Russians. If they can get a better deal, we'll take that. So I think it's a process of outsourcing the war, which is also this good cop, bad cop dynamic. Again, I could be wrong. No one from the White House is telling me what's happening there, but you see a very different Trump now than you saw during the election.

Remember that, on more than one occasion, he said that NATO expansion—what's the source of this conflict? Why is Russia sensitive to NATO? He stopped saying it. And even in February of last year, you know, in the Oval Office when they had this screaming match with Zelensky, you know, they were taking a clear position and they were saying also, listen, there won't be any NATO membership. That's off the table. But then now that's all gone. So it could be that he was genuine in the beginning, but now I think it's just being deceptive.

#Pascal

It's just so fascinating, isn't it? Because on the one hand, you know that a lot of people know what actually good policy would look like. On the other hand, you have a system that prevents that from ever happening, right? Even if the people with the good speech get elected, on the output end, you always get more warmongering and more of the same, and expansion of this military approach to international relations. We had that also with Obama, and of course with Biden, even worse. It's just whatever comes in on the other side, you have a military approach of the United States in order to deal with whatever world, global situation it sees itself confronted with.

Same with Yugoslavia, same with Iraq twice, same with Afghanistan. I mean, Afghanistan is maybe still the most kind of comprehensible war of all the wars of the last 30 years of the United States. And in this sense, also with Iran, there's just no reason to believe that the United States is capable

of making an agreement with any kind of perceived enemy power. The MOU has been dead in the water ever since day five or six. How do you see the capability of the United States to even go a diplomatic route?

#Glenn Diesen

Not well, but I think the reason why these wars are difficult to put an end to would be because they signify, as I said before, something bigger: the end of the unipolar moment. You see this with Iran. If they accept the MOU, they accept now that all of these terms—what does it mean? Well, it means that the U.S. presence and influence in the Middle East will be significantly reduced. Those U.S. bases probably won't be rebuilt. Its allies will likely not trust the American security guarantees anymore. The Iranians will have influence over the Strait of Hormuz, where they can increase the fees if they would want, in order for countries that still trade in the dollar, who host American bases, participate in any military actions against Iran.

And the same goes in Europe, where that is, if we lose the war against—not if, but when we lose the war against the Russians—then NATO is kind of done as well. So there's a lot at stake. And, you know, you'd think if people were completely rational, they would say, okay, in the '90s, there was one distribution of power. Now it's over. We have to adjust to it. That would be rational and sensible. Indeed, the guy who coined that term, "unipolar moment," Charles Krauthammer, he was kind of making this point in 1990. He said, listen, we have to have the unipolar moment now. That's the distribution of power. In the future, there's going to be a multipolar distribution of power, and then we'll adjust to it. But again, I made before the comment that this overestimates the rationality of people, because you have a political class who has to, you know, who has to make these adjustments.

And what has happened since the 1990s? Once you embrace that unipolar moment, what does that mean? When the U.S. says, well, we are the only military power, real power, military superpower in the world, and we're going to reorganize the world in our image, suddenly, not surprisingly, the neocons, they, you know, they surface to the top. They flow to the top because, you know, if military is always an option to reorganize the world in your image, then of course, why wouldn't they be in power? So you have this rise of this new militant politics. And making matters even worse, we have an ideology which suggests that it's actually virtuous. That is, you know, a liberal hegemony, that is, through our dominance, by dominating every corner of the world, we will essentially be able to create perpetual peace because we will deliver liberal democracy to the world. And you see this in Europe as well. We had like three decades now of our political class believing that they are essentially overseeing the end of history. They are, you know, they're dominating, and it's a dominance that is good for the rest of the world as well. And they will transform the world from its previous flaws to this utopian future.

And, you know, if the difference between the flawed present and the utopian future can be bridged, then people are willing to do a lot of crazy things. Yeah. So, no, I think that the militarism, the

ideology, all of this has been built in now for decades. So it's going to make it very difficult to simply sit down and recognize the distribution of power has changed, and now our policy has to change as well. The US can't be everywhere at the same time. It has to make priorities. Either it has to do it voluntarily or learn the painful way. The painful way is, you know, sending all your interceptors to Ukraine, then you're not able to fight Iran properly.

And then you have to pull in the missiles from East Asia. The South Koreans get upset. You have to pull it in, divert it from Europe. Europeans get upset. Even in the Middle East, they can't help the Arabs because they have to give most of it to Israel. So the U.S. can't be everywhere at the same time. So at some point, it has to make priorities. And that priority is not going to be Europe anymore. So, you know, this can come fast or it can come slow, but at some point they will have to learn the old world is gone. We have to adjust to the new world. And probably going to war with Russia is not the best way to start this.

#Pascal

The interesting thing is that this is more or less what Marco Rubio already said at the very beginning of his term, right? It's like, oh, we're now in a multipolar world. We need to deal with it. And now they're doing, well, Cuba and Venezuela. But to give them credit, I mean, the hegemonic approach seems to be working in Latin America. South America is falling into line. I mean, all of the governments, they are now starting to lean right, and probably the next victim is going to be Lula. It's not unlikely that he will be unseated. So, I mean, the United States still does have some successes. I mean, Venezuela is a huge success right now. Delcy Rodríguez in New York, shaking hands and basically being, even like, posturing as a buddy of Donald Trump. It's quite insane, the speed with which this went. So there is still power in the—what do they call it? There's still life in the old dog.

#Glenn Diesen

Yeah, well, no, but they still want their empire, but the course of it has changed. I mean, what is interesting for the United States, it used to be, you know, in the 19th century, they used to refer to British free trade as free trade imperialism because they realized the British were more competitive. So in a completely free market, the Americans wouldn't be able to industrialize because the British would essentially be able to dominate that market. Anyways, the whole point I'm making is that you expect the country with the dominant economy to be able to dominate through free trade. But that has come to an end for the United States. It's not able to compete anymore, especially with the Chinese.

So what does it do now that it's not that competitive anymore and the hegemonic era is over? A logical thing would be to carve out little spheres of influence, areas where the U.S. has exclusive influence or at least preferable access. You know, old imperialism. So one area would, of course, be the Western Hemisphere, and this was the rhetoric around Venezuela. Like, okay, the Chinese and

Russians are out, and all of this oil is now under our control. They made a deal now in Greenland that had an energy component too. We will have a priority in terms of processing this energy, and only NATO countries are allowed to do so. So no China, no Russia. And so this has kind of become the new recipe.

And from what I hear in the Middle East, that's what they want as well. They don't want Russia and China to have the same access as the United States. And this is also what they're doing with the Europeans: cut yourself off Russian energy. They do. Stop buying Chinese technologies. They do. And join our sanctions on Iran. And at the end of the day, well, what do they have? Well, they say you can only buy technology from us, energy from us, and the prices are going up. And then there's nothing the Europeans can do anymore. So, of course, they walked into this themselves, but now, you know, they will drift into this vassalage, and they're not going to be competitive.

They're going to be extremely weakened, but it's becoming a zone of exclusive influence for the United States. That's what the Europeans don't seem to appreciate. They thought after the Cold War, we're going to have collective hegemony, a hegemon which stands on two legs, the U.S. and the EU. But instead now, they're not going to be a pole of power. They're going to be a subordinate of the United States, a fiefdom of the U.S. And the alternative, if they adjusted to multipolarity, they diversified their economic connectivity, they ended this military division of Europe, they could have been an actual pole of power. So nothing they're doing now is in the interest of Europe.

#Pascal

No, no. Unless—and maybe that's just the last thing, or the last thought I want to throw at you. One way is, of course, to look at the Europeans now being completely dominated by the Americans. Another way to look at it is as—and I did that in one of my Substack articles—a team sport, or, you know, the people who are governing Europe, they belong to the, let's call them—let's use the Iranian term that Mr. Mohammad Marandi likes so much—the Epstein class, right? The same class of people, BlackRock, Merz, and so on, right, that are at home in the transatlantic world, right?

And they will always have millions in their bank accounts, eat very good stuff, go to New York, and mingle with all the other cool kids in all of these Munich Security Forums and whatnot. And they cooperate, of course; they're at one and the same with Israel, which is still implementing its genocide as we speak. And that wouldn't be possible without the Americans and the Europeans, the way things are going. So, on the top level, you could argue that it is actually, you know, a Euro-American team sport, what is happening right now. It's just not in the interest of the people they've got under them. But they transcend the nation-state at this point.

#Glenn Diesen

Yeah. Well, it reminds me of this article that was written in 2004 by Samuel Huntington. You probably read "Dead Souls." He was kind of making the same argument, that the main division now,

and which we'll see in the years to come, will be between essentially the globalists and the nationalists. And he argues that the whole political class is now devoted only to global institutions, while the public wants to maintain national identities. And this is kind of at the heart of the political polarization. And you're probably correct that a lot of the European elites now, they have been, by being part of this political West, been wedded into a lot of these international institutions, or managed by the United States.

So, yeah, they might not be serving the basic national interest. But again, this shouldn't be a surprise if you... This is a key problem now in Europe, though. You don't have political leaders who serve national interests, which is why they're becoming increasingly unpopular. I mean, it's not just the Germans, the French, the British... This is incredible, how horrible their approval ratings are. I feel, to some extent, we saw this in the 19th century. That is, in the beginning, during the globalization, then you saw liberalism and democracy being two sides of the same coin.

But then after 1873, when globalization began to die off, then we saw something else happen. That is, it became a contradiction. That is, people didn't vote for the liberals anymore. John Stuart Mill actually warned against this. He said, you know, democracy is great because we're getting rid of the Victorian English society based on tradition. But I also recognize in the future, if the public would start to vote for tradition instead of these liberal ideals, then democracy could be a problem. Then you might want to have liberal elites instead of ruling.

#Pascal

That's where we are today. Yeah. And it will be really interesting talking to our colleague who is also here, Thomas Fazzi, because he just wrote a book about this very topic and how liberal democracy is a contradiction in terms because liberalism actually undermines democracy. And we will have to talk to him about this and the way in which the, well... the liberal elites actually have much more allegiance to their own agenda than they have to their own countries. And we might be actually seeing the end of the nation-state the way that we knew it ever since 1648. But that's going to be another discussion for another time with Thomas Fazzi, hopefully. Everybody, if you want to listen to more of Glenn's analysis, he has his own YouTube channel and Substack. I suppose you know that. The links will be in the description box below. And I hope to talk to you again before we are leaving. Glenn, thank you so much. Sounds good. Thanks.