

Alex Krainer: U.S. Resets Global Order to Regain Advantage

Alex Krainer is a market analyst, author & former hedge fund manager. Krainer discusses how the US desperately attempts to reshuffle the global order to regain advantage. Follow Prof. Glenn Diesen: Substack: <https://glenndiesen.substack.com/> X/Twitter: https://x.com/Glenn_Diesen Patreon: <https://www.patreon.com/glenndiesen> Support the research by Prof. Glenn Diesen: PayPal: <https://www.paypal.com/paypalme/glenndiesen> Buy me a Coffee: buymeacoffee.com/gdieseng Go Fund Me: <https://gofund.me/09ea012f> Books by Prof. Glenn Diesen: <https://www.amazon.com/stores/author/B09FPQ4MDL>

#Glenn

Welcome back. We are here with Alex Krainer, a market analyst, author, and former hedge fund manager. Thank you for coming. We are living in very interesting and dangerous times, it seems. The U.S. global hegemony that defined the world order is already gone. The U.S. is acting in increasingly unpredictable ways. It can't rely on free trade anymore, and it can't compete with China. Instead, we see militarism being used to enhance its position. Former alliances no longer serve their purpose and are falling apart quickly. We see more extractive economic relationships being set up—a war on Russia, a possible war on China, likely soon a war with Iran, even talk of snatching Greenland. Of course, we had the attack on Venezuela, and Trump already listed a few more Latin American countries he'd like to go after.

International law doesn't seem to be doing very well, as the U.S. and Europeans are not just seizing ships but attacking them—with retaliation likely coming from Russia before too long, I think. And of course, the U.S. appears to be heading toward bankruptcy, or at least a major economic crisis, including one for the dollar. But instead of restoring fiscal discipline, the U.S. is acting like a drunk sailor. So why not just increase the military budget to 1.5 trillion dollars? I mean, we seem to be heading toward a major showdown. So how are you assessing the wider situation here? Because—is this economics that's driving the meltdown, or does it seem like too many dangerous things are all being done at the same time?

#Alex Krainer

Yeah, sure. As you said, these are very dangerous times—unprecedented and extremely difficult to interpret. Obviously, economics is ultimately at the foundation of everything, but I think the issues we're dealing with are complex because they strike at the whole order of alliances we've been used

to since World War II. Some of these alliances serve interests and investments that have a much, much longer timescale than what we're looking at—a shipload of oil here, a shipload of oil there, you know, a few tens or a few hundred million dollars in stolen oil, taking control of Venezuela's oil.

I think all of that is happening in the immediate cycle, whereas we seem to be shifting millennia—we seem to be shifting eras. We might even be going in a direction completely different from what we've been used to over the past 500 years. So, uh, things are extremely confusing and difficult to read. And I think nothing is quite what it seems—starting with Venezuela. You know, I'm still dumbfounded that Trump went to Venezuela with his military, kidnapped Nicolás Maduro, and brought him to New York to stand trial.

That action had such a poor risk-to-reward ratio that I can't help believing it was the result of some kind of deal. Between who and who is difficult to say, but the more I learn about the situation, the more I'm inclined to believe the deal was actually between Trump and Maduro themselves. That, uh, Nicolás Maduro was extricated there—and this is, you know, you're getting the world exclusive, because I just reached this conclusion tomorrow, and I don't know that I'm right—it's just one of the plausible explanations of what happened: that Trump was actually preempting a regime change in Venezuela. Because what did he do?

He brought Maduro out. Some former special operations and intelligence professionals I spoke with share my belief that Maduro was taken simply into protective custody. And why would that be the case? Well, we've all noticed that the regime never changed—nothing at all about the regime in Venezuela changed, other than Nicolás Maduro being taken out. Now, we have to shift attention a little to the national security strategy of the United States. It underscores the Monroe Doctrine and talks about dismantling the infrastructure of adversarial powers in the Western Hemisphere. So, at first blush, you'd think they're talking about China and Russia.

And, you know, China and Russia made important investments in Venezuela. They didn't amount to much, but, you know, they're still present. So it seems that Trump has a problem with China and Russia. But then again, taking that much of a risk over something that could have been done in a completely different way—meaning Trump could have made a deal with Nicolás Maduro—and he will, in the end, do deals with the Venezuelan government as it is. Trump could have talked about the situation with the Chinese and the Russians and come to an understanding, which they probably did anyway. So why all the fireworks?

What's the point? I find two data points here very interesting—well, three, actually. One is that, I think in 2024, the G7 issued a statement disputing the legitimacy of Maduro's government. So that was after the elections. Or was it 2022? I'm confused now—well, the last elections. They issued a statement. And let's remember, the G7 is basically the European colonial powers—Britain, France, Germany. The United States was still there, still under, how do you call it, the Biden administration, or whatever—Blinken and Sullivan's administration—so completely in the grip of the neocons. And they disputed Nicolás Maduro's government's legitimacy and rejected the results of the elections.

They issued a formal statement about this, which I thought was very interesting. It doesn't say much—it just says about that much. And then, you know, the Nobel Committee gives a Nobel Peace Prize to María Corina Machado, which is a strange thing in itself.

And that one, I was certain from the start, didn't come from Trump—meaning it wasn't the Trump administration that leaned on the Nobel Committee to give the award to María Corina Machado. So it came from elsewhere, and to my mind, it could have come only from one other side, and that is the globalist, rules-based order—however we want to label it. Is it the Davos set? Is it the City of London? Is it Great Britain and the European powers? But it's there, and it's probably very closely linked to the European banking oligarchies. And so I think there was a chance they were going to stage a similar kind of regime-change process as they just did in Iran—you know, a color revolution—because Venezuela was, and probably still is, full of CIA and MI6 assets and so forth.

And then the third data point about this is the thing called the Organization of American States, which nobody really pays much attention to. They try to stay under the radar, but it's actually a massive behemoth that has been extremely active—and increasingly active—in South America and the Caribbean, pretty much since they started implementing what you would call the global goals: the SDGs, the Sustainable Development Goals, Agenda 2030 of the United Nations, the Great Reset. There's been great involvement from big tech in the United States—Microsoft, Facebook, Jeff Bezos, the Washington Post, the New York Times, the Wall Street Journal. The idea was to implement things like internet connectivity, digitization of government, and the introduction of central bank digital currencies.

They had a massive initiative there called "Better Than Cash," which was trying to promote the adoption of digital currencies for everyone—along with electoral reforms, gender issues, climate change policies, and energy transitions. Basically, all of these initiatives that we've kind of grown used to in the West—things tied to the globalist agenda like climate change, LGBT ideology, digital IDs, central bank digital currencies, surveillance, smart cities—all of that was being increasingly pushed into South America and the Caribbean with billions of dollars behind it. And this Organization of American States is a special kind of thing because it works in conjunction with the United Nations, but it's not part of the United Nations. They work together, but the OAS is autonomous. And the Organization of American States enjoys complete legal immunity, so they're not at all liable under U.S. law or the laws of any of the nations involved.

Their headquarters are in Washington, D.C., but they enjoy a special status, meaning U.S. law enforcement can't enter their premises or seize their documents or computers. Basically, there's nothing they can do—they're completely outside the law. So, having said all that—and there's a lot to it—we go back to the U.S. national security strategy. When they talk about dismantling the infrastructure of adversarial powers, this, to me, seems like a far greater threat to the security of the United States, and particularly to the Trump administration or any administration that would want to

extricate the U.S. from the global empire, than anything Russia or China are doing. Because the Russians and the Chinese are engaged in straightforward business and security cooperation with Venezuela and other Latin American nations.

Here we basically have an incubator for all these dystopian globalist ideas that the Trump administration has rejected for the United States. And part of that whole equation is flooding the country with uncontrolled immigration. Another part is flooding the United States with drugs, which aren't coming from Venezuela in large amounts—if any. They're largely coming from Mexico, Ecuador, and Canada. But the bigger problem, a much bigger problem, is the money laundering, because without the services of money-laundering banks, the drug, weapons, and human-smuggling cartels would splinter and become easy to deal with.

But because they have money-laundering bank services, they're robust, hierarchical organizations with massive amounts of money at their disposal—money they use to buy things like heavy weaponry. They have troops of commandos, whole brigades, armored personnel carriers, helicopters, submarines—heavy weaponry. All of this is a threat. And then, with all of this in mind, we go back to statements by Donald Trump, Marco Rubio, and others, and you see they're talking about tackling the drug-smuggling networks—where Maduro isn't really anywhere near the top of the list of suspects. So the whole thing seems extremely strange.

And I don't think we have a clear explanation, but the range of plausible explanations is so broad that I think we'll just have to wait and see what happens. One plausible explanation is that the whole intervention in Venezuela was actually Trump preempting a regime-change operation. Because, you know, if these globalist forces—let's call it UN Agenda 2030, the Great Reset—if those forces took over Venezuela, then Venezuela could become a really dangerous beachhead in the region, one that might threaten to destabilize the United States. So the idea was maybe to preserve the regime but do a token action by removing Maduro.

And I also have to say, I then went and did a bit of research about Maduro, about the Organization of American States—what they do and who they're working with—because they're connected with literally hundreds of non-government organizations and, let's say, civil society groups like George Soros' Open Society and so on. And they have this deal where their legal immunities are automatically transferred to their agents and representatives. So, let's say if Alex Krainer becomes a contractor with the Organization of American States, I get their immunity. So now, if I go across the border, you cannot search my luggage, you cannot search my documents, you cannot take my phone or my computer, and you cannot sue me or take any legal action against me.

And so, you know, Microsoft, Facebook, the Wall Street Journal, the Washington Post, Open Society, George Soros' Open Society Institute—all of these NGOs and civil society organizations enjoy that immunity as they're pushing the Great Reset, the Agenda 2030 agenda practically through the whole region, through the whole Western Hemisphere, south of the United States' borders. Venezuela is the only country in that region that is no longer a member of the OAS. Which is why I thought, okay,

in that case, at least from an ideological point of view, they shouldn't be in an adversarial relationship with the Trump administration.

Because since Chávez came to power, the relationship between Venezuela and the Organization of American States started to deteriorate to the point where the OAS became kind of like the IAEA—you know, it was set up with one set of ideas, but then it got completely co-opted into these globalist agendas. They became one of the main champions disputing the legitimacy of the Maduro regime. But at the same time, ideologically, they're the greatest and maybe most dangerous enemy to the United States—plus legal immunity, plus tax exemptions, and all kinds of other privileges that the Chinese and the Russians don't have themselves.

So I think it's very, very hard to know what the Trump administration actually knows about all this. I think they know a lot, because very soon after they abducted Maduro, Trump announced that they were withdrawing from 66 of these international organizations. The OAS wasn't one of them, but they did put the OAS under review and apparently suspended some of its programs in the United States, along with U.S. funding for some of those programs. Altogether, there are about 76 of these international organizations that enjoy legal immunities, tax exemptions, and so forth.

And Trump withdrew the United States from 66 of them. So that tells me this is the infrastructure they're really targeting. It's not necessarily China, it's not necessarily Russia, it's not necessarily about the oil in Venezuela. I think it's really what George Soros called a clash between two systems of governance. And this globalist system of governance is using all these international organizations that have immunities—they get to do whatever they like. Which is why we wonder: why is Bill Gates a free man? Why is Anthony Fauci a free man? Why are they spraying our skies and nobody is held accountable?

You know, it doesn't seem that anybody is ever held accountable, and it's because they all enjoy legal immunities. The United States law enforcement can't go after them. Anyway, it's long, it's very convoluted, it's very complicated. But if you focus on some case studies—let's say trafficking of fentanyl, methamphetamines, marijuana, and other drugs from Canada to the United States—you realize it's a great source of danger to the United States. And then you realize that a lot of these organizations are immune; they're simply out of reach of U.S. law enforcement. And that's a source of great frustration for the United States.

For your viewers, there's an online publication called **The Bureau**, which in March of this year published an extensive interview with a man named David Asher. David Asher was a high-level official in the U.S. State Department and played an important role in the Trump administration's drug enforcement and financial crimes task force. He gave an interview where he explained a lot of things that neither Marco Rubio nor Trump mentioned. Well, Trump did mention, after the kidnapping of Maduro, that a lot of the drugs are coming from Canada. But then the media wasn't interested. They didn't say, like, "Oh, wait—did you say Canada?"

What do you mean exactly? Could you elaborate? Nobody asks. It's like nobody wants to know. And he didn't elaborate. But if you go back to that interview with David Asher, he explains a lot, and he makes it very clear that the United States has massive frustration with the Canadian government, which is completely uncooperative. Even when they bust these huge fentanyl labs in Canada and get proof of large-scale money laundering by Canadian banks, there are no charges, no investigations. Nothing happens. These people just keep going. They just change their phone numbers.

They change their addresses, they change their operations around a little bit, and they keep smuggling drugs into the United States. So I suspect that the action in Venezuela had to do with all this. How exactly, I'm not sure, because Venezuela doesn't seem to fit the list of suspects very well. And again, the risk-to-reward ratio from that action just doesn't make any sense at all. So it's a different kind of warfare, and it's obviously being waged covertly and through deception. Even what we know from public statements and press releases doesn't tell us the truth—it doesn't give us the full picture.

#Glenn

It does seem that the United States is now trying to change the rules of the game a bit. As its power weakens, it wants more direct control—less reliance on alliance systems. So they tell the Taiwanese, you know, the semiconductor industry should be moved to the United States immediately. Then they say Denmark and Greenland have to be under U.S. control to secure these key corridors. Latin America has to be, well, subordinated to the United States to prevent China from becoming the leading economic power in its backyard. So you see all this reshuffling. But how do you make sense of the deteriorating relationship between the United States and the Europeans?

Because it seems as if the Europeans are willing to go to great lengths—you know, even look the other way and pretend the U.S. isn't threatening to take European territory over Greenland. And they're still willing to back the U.S. on everything from Venezuela to Iran, whatever it wants to do. But the U.S. seems very dismissive, as if it's saying, "Well, that's not good enough." Essentially, it seems they'd like to push for some splits within the European Union as well. What's driving this relationship? Because the Europeans don't seem to understand why the U.S. isn't embracing them, given that they're offering their complete loyalty.

#Alex Krainer

I think the Trump administration perceives the Europeans as adversaries.

#Alex Krainer

I think that China is easy to lambast in the United States publicly, because there have been so many years of demonizing China that, in the public mind, China is the enemy. Europeans—good. Europeans—allies. Russia—bad. China—bad. So Trump doesn't want to rearrange this. He doesn't

want to go to the American public and tell them, "Hey, look, the British, the French, the Germans—they are our enemies," because people would not understand that. But I think all these great resets in global goals, and the United States providing for the security of European nations—all of that has been depleting the United States, exhausting it. I think the Trump administration perceives the European oligarchies as the parasite that has turned the United States into a globalist power, into an empire, when it was always meant to be a republic.

And, you know, if we go back to the National Security Strategy and the reassertion of the Monroe Doctrine, it doesn't necessarily mean we're going to bludgeon everybody in our neighborhood into submission. The Monroe Doctrine was meant to keep European colonial powers out of the American hemisphere because that was their chief source of threat. The British Empire, the French, and Spain were actually a security risk to the United States because they had colonial and imperial ambitions on the American continent—North America, South America. The British still controlled Canada. So I think that reasserting the Monroe Doctrine actually means kicking out European colonial interests from the hemisphere. When it comes to China, I think it's much simpler. You know, it's not a "China Doctrine." China is there to do straight-up business.

It doesn't behave like a parasite that infiltrates everywhere, looking to balkanize nations, undermine legal systems, and weaken political systems—just to turn everybody into a third-world colony for pure resource extraction. China comes in with development plans. They build nuclear power plants, dams, railroads, bridges, ports, and so on. So I think if you're going to raise the living standards of a region, if you're going to make them affluent consumers, then—well, the United States and China may be adversaries, but their agendas could still be compatible, because ultimately, if Trump wants to make the United States an industrial superpower, they're going to need markets.

And markets that are affluent are better markets than ones that are, you know, like Bantustans where people live on a dollar a day. So I think that—and I've heard this from people who've given, let's say, secondhand testimonials—that Trump, in cabinet meetings, says, quote-unquote, "our supposed enemies" and "our perceived enemies," referring to countries like Iran, China, and Russia. Which means he believes there are those supposed or perceived enemies, and then there are the real enemies. So what I would say is that Trump is now using Greenland as a pretext to extricate the United States from NATO. Because for Trump to get the United States out of NATO the legal way—it's a treaty, right?

So it would have to go to Congress. I think it would need a two-thirds majority, which Trump can't even dream about, so it would never happen that way. What Trump has to do now, if he wants to make real changes, is break the rules. He has to go like an elephant into a china shop, break a whole lot of things, and cause the Europeans to say, "Well, okay, we'll withdraw from NATO," or, "We want you out of NATO," you know—to create a conflict that ultimately leads to the dissolution of NATO. Then Trump gets his goal without having to go through Congress and the whole political process that everyone already knows will fail.

So this all makes it very difficult to—how do you call it—to interpret what Trump is doing. But I think that when you look at the whole year of what Trump has been doing, a method to the madness emerges. Which means he's not just randomly doing ugly, greedy, violent things on impulse; he's actually driving the United States down a certain road toward certain goals. Which means there's an agenda. Even if there's no published strategy of "here's what we're going to do and this is how we're going to achieve it," it seems that there is a mission.

And I believe that that mission is, as Marco Rubio announced a year ago, in January 2025, dismantling the post-World War II global order and embracing multipolar integration—in which case China and Russia are your number one and number two partners, not adversaries but partners. A lot of these organizations, like NATO and even the United Nations, have to be reorganized. The European Union, you know, has become adversarial, and then there's what the Organization of American States is doing in Latin America and the Caribbean, where Britain has a permanent observer mission. So they are very, very deeply involved. That could be the infrastructure of adversarial power that the National Security Strategy document is referring to.

#Glenn

But it seemed as if much of the United States' strategy was aimed at China, because China is really its main rival. A lot of things appeared to be organized around that idea. Even the notion of getting along better with Russia would be to make sure it doesn't lean too heavily toward China. Cutting Iran off from China could create more energy pressure there, same as with Venezuela. I'm not saying China is the only consideration, but it is peculiar that the United States now seems to focus on everywhere else except China.

As you know, the whole pivot to Asia was supposed to mean reducing the presence in the Middle East and Europe, but the US is still very much engaged in the war in Ukraine—not as much as under the Biden government, but still. And also in the Middle East, by getting disengaged with—or possibly provoking yet another war with—Iran. How do you see their approach toward China here? Because they seem to be the main piece in strengthening or restoring the US hegemonic position, if that is indeed the goal.

#Alex Krainer

I don't know that the United States can restore its hegemonic position on the Eurasian continent. It would be very complicated. If we look at Iran, for example—which is the minor of the three powers if we're talking about Iran, Russia, and China—the cost-benefit analysis of any conflict between the United States and Iran is so staggeringly lopsided in favor of cost that I don't see what the benefit would be for the United States, even if the regime in Iran were changed. Even if they achieved that, why? I have to ask myself, why on earth would they want to do this? I don't think anybody can coherently formulate any kind of benefit to the United States.

I can see the benefit to Great Britain, to France, to the European powers, in removing the one obstacle they have to full control of the Middle East. And two, because, you know, it's Europe's trade that goes through—how do you call it—the Suez Canal. Ninety percent of all merchandise that goes through the Suez Canal is going from Asia to Europe. It has hardly anything to do with the United States; I think it's maybe about 3% of American trade that goes through there. Europe is much more dependent on Middle Eastern oil than the United States is. So it's very clear why this is very, very important to the European colonial powers.

The British have been wanting to reassert themselves east of Suez to control their old colonial dependencies. And there, Iran is an obstacle. They definitely do not want the Arctic route to be developed, because the old British geopolitical setup was about controlling all the trade choke points. That would be the Suez Canal, the Red Sea, Bab el-Mandeb, the Strait of Hormuz, the Strait of Malacca, and so forth. All the trade between east and west flows through the choke points that Britain used to control. Now the Russians, together with the Indians, Iranians, and Chinese, are developing the North-South Transport Corridor, which is cheaper and faster.

It goes from India, right, across Iran and the Caspian region, all the way up to St. Petersburg, and can reach northwestern Europe. It's cheaper and faster than going through the Suez Canal. And then there's the Arctic route, which is another alternative. The Trump administration had already set the development of the Arctic as one of its strategic objectives. In the Middle East, they'll be going after Iran for the benefit of the European powers, and at a huge cost to themselves—possibly a massive, even catastrophic cost. Israel itself, you know, there's this sentimental, ideological attachment to the state of Israel in a significant segment of the U.S. population.

But regarded as an actual strategic interest of the United States, Israel is a liability rather than a benefit. So it's all downside—potential war, potential escalation, potential loss of their foothold in the region—all to defend something that's a net cost to the United States. Whereas doing business with Iran, doing business with China, doing business with Russia, doing business with Ukraine once the Ukrainian government changes—all of that carries a lot of upside and very little downside. So, you know, I have to close my ears when Trump talks about Iran, but I don't believe he actually intends to go to war with Iran.

He has to kowtow to his Zionist donors, the Zionist Jewish voters, and the Christian evangelical voters, who are still a very large, very active, very passionate bloc in U.S. elections. Less than a year before the—how do you call it?—the midterms. But as far as the actual U.S. national interest, I think they're ready to start distancing themselves from Israel. We'll know soon, because at the moment Israel is in a kind of alliance with the UAE, I suppose supporting a number of these separatist and terrorist movements in the Horn of Africa, Somalia, and southern Yemen.

And they're looking to balkanize these nations—to turn them into basically chaos, like Libya. At the same time, this has put the UAE on a collision course with Saudi Arabia, and also in Syria. Sorry—also in Syria, the UAE and Israelis are supporting, arming, and financing Druze separatists. So they

even want to balkanize Syria and turn Lebanon into chaos, and so forth. The UAE and Israel are cooperating there. On the other hand, the Saudis are now feeling very threatened by this, because if Yemen, Somalia, or Syria collapse as states, then this jeopardizes Saudi security.

So now we see that the Saudis have taken it as far as launching military action against the UAE. They didn't bomb the UAE itself, but they did bomb ships that were transporting weapons for the Yemeni Southern Transitional Council—the STC—which I think acts as an alternative government, not in Sana'a but in Aden, in the southern part of Yemen, right? And this is in direct conflict with the internationally recognized government in Aden—the Yemeni government that's actually in exile in Riyadh, right? They're also supporting military groups in Somalia. So MBS, Mohammed bin Salman, has been trying to influence Donald Trump and his administration to declare these groups as terrorist organizations.

And so now you have a conflict shaping up between the strategy being pushed by Israel together with the UAE—which is kind of typical British-style geopolitics, pitting everybody against everybody, balkanizing nations, and rendering them weak so you can control them. That's one side. The other side is nations like Saudi Arabia that want to preserve their integrity, sovereignty, and security, and they want to work with Russia, China, and Iran. They're asking the Trump administration to support them. If Trump says, "Yes, we'll support you, we'll declare these Somali militant groups as terrorists," and so forth, then that puts them at loggerheads with Israel—the United States versus Israel.

It's an extremely complicated situation for the Trump administration to navigate. But ultimately, the way Trump chooses to act will tell us where he stands. Because if he puts his weight behind the Saudis, that means he's adopting this multipolar integration strategy and taking positions compatible with those of Iran, Saudi Arabia, Russia, China, India, and so on—and turning his back on Israel. I don't think Trump will come out and declare that openly, at least not before the midterms. But he might talk a big game and then do nothing. I think the June action they took against Iran was exactly that. Trump talked a big game, launched a bunch of Tomahawks at pre-announced targets, dropped a few bombs, and gave the Iranians 48 hours' notice to prepare.

The Iranians responded in kind, pre-announcing their retaliation and basically, you know, destroying a radar station—with zero casualties on both sides. They shook hands, thanked one another, and then he said, "We obliterated the nuclear program. We don't have to go to war anymore. That's all done and dusted. Let's focus on other things." I think this is where we're going to see where Trump stands. But if I were to make a bet today, I'd say either Trump won't get involved in a war against Iran, or they'll do another fake World Wrestling Federation-type fight—something that raises a lot of dust but does nothing. And then again, he'll say, "Okay, well, we showed them. That's it, it's over, we're leaving." That's the best way I can interpret it. Go ahead.

#Glenn

When you spoke about the Suez Canal, it reminded me of J.D. Vance, because he was saying the same thing: why are we protecting the Suez Canal? This has nothing to do with us—it's all European trade. But again, it seems to me that Trump's administration is a bag of mixed nuts. There are some crazy neocons, but there are also people like J.D. Vance, who seem very genuine about this America First principle, which then leads them to question very basic things, like the Suez Canal. It has nothing to do with us. We can't do everything if we're going to put America first; otherwise, it just becomes an empty slogan. It just feels as if all these efforts to throw all the pieces in the air and reshuffle the whole global chessboard leave so much room for miscalculation—and failure in one area could spill over. Again, I hope someone there knows what they're doing, because they seem to be spinning a bit out of control.

#Alex Krainer

I suspect they do, Glenn, because I think it's inconceivable that Trump went into Caracas and kidnapped Nicolás Maduro and his wife. That's really not an irrelevant fact—and his wife—without having discussed it with the Russians, to explain what they're doing, why they're doing it, and getting the Russians' go-ahead. But then, you know, once I looked into this Organization of American States, the network of 14 offshore financial centers where they have between 50 and 75 trillion dollars sloshing around in the Caribbean...

The petrodollar market—maybe it overlaps—but about \$22 trillion circulates outside the United States, outside the control of American currency and the American government, almost completely under the control of the City of London and their 14 offshore centers in the Caribbean. Then there's the opium war, because, you know, along America's southern border, drug cartels are smuggling lethal drugs and handling the logistics and illegal border crossings for practically all South American immigrants. Millions and millions are crossing. Okay, so Trump clamped down on it, but this had been going on for a long time—probably 30 million illegal immigrants entered the United States over the last 20 years.

And the drug cartels—so, weapons, illegal immigrants, and illegal drugs from the South. Northern border, Canada—the same thing, plus money laundering through Canadian banks and through all 50 large global banks active in the Caribbean. That reeks of an opium war, something the British Empire has a very, very long tradition of—very well-developed, advanced skills at—with, you know, HSBC Bank, which got busted in 2012 for money laundering for Mexican drug cartels and terror organizations. They got off practically scot-free by the Obama administration and Eric Holder, with basically a parking ticket—I think five or ten percent of their annual profits was the fine they paid.

And then they got a deferred prosecution agreement, meaning if you don't do anything illegal in the next five years, everything's forgotten and you carry on as usual. No executives ended up in prison. And then HSBC got to police itself—that is, they appoint a person, give them money and credit and everything, and then say, "Oh yeah, HSBC is clean as a whistle." Five years are up—business as usual. So, the United States rightfully feels itself under siege, but it's not China, it's not Iran, it's not

Russia. It's this amorphous, parasitic, rules-based global order that's really headquartered in the City of London today, tied to European oligarchic families linked to the banking system.

And so this is the enemy. I think that once you look at it from this prism—and also, you ignore Trump's public statements, because that literally causes brain injury—you just ignore Trump's statements and look at the results of what his administration is doing, then it kind of begins to make sense. From that prism, we can arrive at some plausible explanations, but it's nothing—it's not about Venezuela's oil, it's not about regime change in Iran. I think it's about dismantling the entirety of the post-World War II global order. And also, when we talk about international law, we have to remember that international law is what entails these seventy-six international organizations that operate worldwide—with no transparency, no accountability to any government in the world, full tax exemptions, full legal immunities.

And then, when you look into what they do, it's climate change, it's gender ideology, it's digital currencies. It pretty much looks like an enslavement matrix that's being slowly built and developed around the world, and that's going to be sprung upon us at some point. There's not gonna be a way out of it. And if I'm right that the method in Trump's madness is actually directed at dismantling all this, then, you know, I have to say I'm encouraged by that. Whether I'm right or not, I think time will tell. But watch the conflict between Saudi Arabia and the UAE, and see what side the United States is going to stand on.

And that we may not know from public declarations. Whatever Trump says, just ignore it for your own mental health. But, you know, when you see what's actually getting done, look at Israeli officials—because they've been going quite hysterical about, you know, Tom Barrack in Syria, Trump's new envoy there. They're not very happy with him. I think we'll know from Israeli statements. I think we'll know from, you know, I've been spending a lot of time watching people—British officials who like Trump—Alastair Campbell, the former chief of staff to Tony Blair, Rory Stewart, people like David Rothkopf, John Bolton, all of these people.

CIA guy, Mike Pompeo, former CIA. Anyway, you know, I think they're talking a lot these days, and they're giving away a bit of their frustration—they're immensely frustrated with Donald Trump. And then also, you know, what are the Russians saying? What are the Chinese saying? When he kidnapped Maduro, they gave a token condemnation of the action, but it wasn't really strong. It was very, very strange. And then Putin disappears—Putin becomes invisible—because I think he doesn't want to say anything about any of this in public. He doesn't want to be asked, so he just doesn't appear anywhere. It's all very strange, but I think it's very different from what it looks like on the surface.

#Glenn

Yeah, well, they don't do much of the megaphone politics in general out of Russia. But it seems like we're sleepwalking into something, at least—that some miscalculation might be coming. But thank you for taking the time. I think we went a little over there, but thank you.

#Alex Krainer

Thank you for the invite, Glenn. Always a pleasure to talk with you. And I hope that before this year is over, we'll know what's going on.