

Trump HUMILIATED as Iran's Missiles CRUSH US War Plot | Ben Norton

The truth is coming out on Trump's decision to hold off on US strikes against Iran, and it's devastating for the empire's declining global dominance says geopolitical analyst Ben Norton. In this video, we break down why Trump's war has failed, the risk for another escalation, and the untold secret behind Iran's missile and military power that has Washington in shock. SUPPORT THE CHANNEL ON PATREON: <https://www.patreon.com/dannyhaiphong> Support the channel in other ways: <https://www.buymeacoffee.com/dannyhaiphong> Substack: chroniclesofhaiphong.substack.com Cashapp: \$Dhaiphong Venmo: @dannyH2020 Paypal: <https://paypal.me/spiritofho> #iran #trump #iranprotests #irannews #israel #middleeast

#Danny

This is what came out in terms of how the United States, under the Trump administration, is going to conduct its foreign policy. Iran is such a good example of this. They're saying they want military action in Iran to be swift and decisive—no weeks or months of entanglements. It's "bomb, bomb, bomb, strike, strike, strike," and get what you want, which here, of course, is regime change, Rubio's dream. But there's a lot of popular support in Iran for the government. I mean, these are just some of the photos—massive demonstrations, massive rallies in the streets—coupled with the fact that Iran actually does have the capability to defend itself.

It does have a massive ballistic missile system, which every single regional country—and Israel—are all very afraid of. And I believe the United States was also very concerned about it. There are trade-offs to this "shock and awe" approach of getting what we want as quickly as possible. The world really isn't in that place anymore. We're talking about Iran, but we could also talk about Venezuela—another very horrific operation, but one that hasn't really borne the fruits of success. If we look into Rubio's mind, I don't think this was the ideal result. Yeah, well, I'd be a little cautious about saying that. I mean, you said it's not over, so I'm not saying you're saying this, but there are people who are saying, you know...

#Ben Norton

The window has passed, and Trump is not going to bomb Iran again. I'd be very cautious about that, because we also know that part of Trump's strategy is this kind of Nixonian "madman" approach—he wants the world to think he's a madman, which, you know, he is. It's not just an act; it's the unpredictability, the chaotic nature of it. Let's not forget—Mark Ames pointed this out on Twitter, and it's a very good point—that when Trump bombed Iran the first time... actually, let me take that back. When Israel bombed Iran last year, starting that war, and then Trump also bombed

Iran after Israel had been bombing Iran for several days—let's not forget, it was Israel that started that war. And when that happened, Trump was still technically in peace talks, or whatever you want to call them, negotiations with Iran.

So, to go back a few years—after the Obama administration imposed those very aggressive, illegal sanctions on Iran to force it to the negotiating table and sign the Iran nuclear deal, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or JCPOA—that deal was written into international law. And it wasn't just a deal between the U.S. and Iran; it was an international agreement that included the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council—China, Russia, the U.S., the U.K., and France—plus Germany, the “P5+1,” and the European Union. They all signed the agreement, and then the Obama administration allowed it to be written into international law through a U.N. Security Council resolution, which the U.S. did not veto.

So the Iran nuclear deal was written into international law. Trump came in during his first term, and in 2018 he unilaterally and illegally tore up the Iran nuclear deal and reimposed sanctions on Iran, again in violation of international law. That's caused many of the economic problems we're seeing in Iran today. Since then, the Trump administration has claimed—first and then again later—that they wanted to broker a new agreement with Iran. Last year, the Trump administration held several rounds, maybe five or six, of negotiations with Iran. And then, out of nowhere, Israel started bombing Iran with the green light from the Trump administration.

This was reported by U.S. media—that Trump personally gave Netanyahu the green light. And then, after several days of Israeli bombing, Trump also bombed Iran. So, it's very possible that what we're seeing now is part of this larger strategy where Trump says, you know, I don't doubt, like we said earlier, that Iran has established a deterrent. And part of the reason Trump didn't bomb further is this fear that Iran could retaliate. There are certainly many U.S. assets in the region that Iran could hit. I don't doubt that's a factor here, but another factor we should keep in mind is that this could be part of another strategy where the U.S. says, okay, we're not going to bomb now.

And then Iran—the U.S. thinks that Iran will lower its defenses, that it won't be as prepared as it was for this U.S. attack. And then, who knows—maybe a week, two weeks, a month, or even a year from now—Trump could suddenly bomb Iran again. So it's very hard to predict. This is part of Trump's strategy, right? This unpredictability. I do think that, again, we're right in this analysis, as others have pointed out too, that Iran in the short term has established a deterrent. But I'd still be very cautious about saying this is the end. You yourself said, this is obviously not the end.

#Danny

Oh, and just with the policy that we're describing, Ben—this idea of needing to go as quickly and as hard as possible to get what you want—it's often not going to work out like that. I mean, it's likely never going to work out like that with Iran, where you just get a couple of days. You can't do this in a day or less than a week. That's what Trump wants—to overthrow Iran in less time than the twelve-

day war. I think that's exactly what they were thinking, because in twelve days the air defenses were run dry, and Iran still had firepower. So that wasn't a good thing; it would have led to an even larger escalation. Hell, we could be talking next week, a week from now, about preparing again. There are destroyers moving into the region.

They're moving these assets. I do believe that the United States and Israel want to try this again—maybe every six months. We also had new developments, like Iran being able to jam Starlink, which was shocking to so many people. When Iran closed its airspace, the first plane to enter after they reopened it was a Chinese cargo plane. So there were a lot of signals, I think, being sent to the United States—and maybe information too. I believe from the very beginning that the U.S. was not only conducting intelligence but probably communicating through back channels with Iran. I'm sure they were talking about what was going to happen here.

#Ben Norton

I saw reports online, and I haven't been able to independently confirm them, but apparently Iran got this Starlink jamming technology from Russia. Because, of course, we know that Elon Musk's Starlink has been very active in the war in Ukraine. And, by the way, Starlink has also been active in Venezuela—so all of these countries where the U.S. is stirring chaos and war. In Ukraine, Starlink was helping the Ukrainian military, a very important asset for them in this proxy war against Russia. Starlink technology was also given to the Venezuelan coup plotters, including María Corina Machado. We know this because she herself admitted it.

I've talked about this in some of the videos I've done. Machado did an interview with Trump Jr., Trump's son, on his show on Rumble. There was an infamous clip from that interview. This was early last year, before Trump invaded Venezuela. In the interview, Machado famously said she wanted to privatize all the oil and other assets in Venezuela and sell them off to U.S. companies. She said U.S. investors would make a lot of money. But in that same interview, Machado also thanked Elon Musk personally for giving her and other coup leaders like her hundreds of Starlink devices to use in their attempt to overthrow Maduro.

And now, of course, we've seen many reports. This isn't the first time—it goes back a few years—that Musk was giving Starlink technology to these, you know, "color revolutionaries," the regime-change plotters and rioters in Iran trying to overthrow the Iranian government. What's interesting is that we saw reports saying Iran was able to block this technology using Russian systems. We know Iran has been able to block them—that's been widely reported. We don't know exactly where this came from, but I've seen reports saying it came from Russia. So this is also connected to the growing partnership between Iran and Russia, and also between Iran and China.

Iran is now a full member of BRICS. There are ten full members of BRICS now, and there are also about a dozen partner countries. Iran is also a member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization alongside China and Russia. So they're obviously coordinating more closely. They're definitely

working together on security issues and opposing these kinds of Western-backed color revolutions and regime-change efforts and such. All these issues are related. And of course, Iran and Venezuela have been very close partners, and Iran has provided a lot of support to Venezuela, especially economically and technologically, because Iran, like Venezuela, is a major oil producer.

Iran has been suffering under illegal U.S. sanctions since the revolution in 1979. Because it's been under sanctions for so long, it's obviously hurt the Iranian economy and contributed to very high rates of inflation. It's very difficult for Iran to get foreign currency, which it would need to stabilize its own currency through central bank intervention in the foreign exchange market. It's also difficult for Iran to trade, which tends to lead to current account and trade deficits with the rest of the world, because other countries fear secondary sanctions when buying products from Iran.

And Trump is now openly talking about adding more secondary sanctions, even through tariffs. He said he's going to put a 25 percent tariff on any country that trades with Iran, which is basically part of an economic blockade he's trying to impose against Iran—similar to the blockade against Cuba, where the U.S. threatens secondary sanctions against foreign governments, companies, and financial institutions that do business with Cuba. So these issues are all related, of course. But anyway, getting back to Venezuela—Venezuela has been a major oil exporter for over a hundred years.

It's been a petro-state—and this is, you know, well before Hugo Chávez was even born. Venezuela has been a petro-state. But the Venezuelan oil industry has relied, since its beginnings, on technology from U.S. companies and, to a lesser extent, European companies. Venezuela is a pretty small Global South country—about 30 million people. It doesn't have the ability to create the drilling infrastructure and other capital goods needed to actually get the oil out of the ground. Venezuela has been a major oil exporter, but it doesn't actually produce all of that technology. Very few countries do.

One country that does have its own domestic technology—because it's been under sanctions for so long and because it has over 90 million people—is Iran. Iran has been able to develop some of that technology and share it with Venezuela. So, as the U.S. has been putting sanctions on Venezuela—starting in 2015 under Obama, then in Trump's first term in 2017, and again in 2019—he imposed very aggressive sanctions on Venezuela, culminating in 2019 with the first Trump administration's coup attempt in Venezuela, when Trump recognized this little-known right-wing opposition politician, the U.S. puppet Juan Guaidó, as the so-called interim president.

And then Trump imposed an economic embargo on Venezuela in August 2019. I remember—I was there at the time. This was modeled directly after the U.S. economic embargo against Cuba. So, you know, these same tactics that the U.S. empire has been using against Cuba since the 1959 revolution, against Iran since the 1979 revolution, and against Venezuela since the 1999 Bolivarian Revolution—these are the same tactics the U.S. repeats. So it also makes sense that these countries

targeted by the U.S. empire have been closely coordinating. Iran, in addition to the support it's provided to the Palestinian liberation struggle against Israeli colonialism and to other resistance movements and anti-imperialist groups across West Asia and the Middle East...

Iran has been supporting resistance movements in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen. Similarly, Iran has provided a lot of support to revolutionary movements in Latin America. I've spent a lot of time living in Latin America, and the revolutionary left-wing movements there have a very positive view of Iran. Even though, obviously, ideologically they're very different movements, at the same time they share a lot of similarities. You can think of the Iranian Revolution as following in the footsteps of anti-colonialist Global South national liberation struggles—the Algerian Revolution, the liberation struggles in Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea-Bissau, the revolutions in Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela, and the revolutions in Vietnam and Korea.

You had all these revolutionary movements in the Global South fighting against Western colonialism. Not many of them were communists or socialists, but some were. A lot of them were, and some were also just nationalist movements. Iran is very similar to that. It's a kind of Global South anti-colonial nationalist movement. That's why it's not surprising to see that Iran has had so much solidarity with other national liberation struggles and anti-colonialist movements around the world. So when the U.S. targets Venezuela and Iran, it's part of this larger imperialist assault on the Global South and on anti-colonial national liberation struggles—just as, you know, the U.S. assassinated the founder of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the first ever democratically elected leader of the Congo.

And then the U.S. and Belgium—Belgian intelligence—dissolved his body, and all that was left were his teeth. This is Patrice Lumumba, the founding father of the DRC. And then, you know, you can go to every single Global South country that had this kind of revolutionary struggle. The U.S. and the European imperial powers just constantly waged assaults against all of these independence movements. And, you know, today Europe is very weak compared to what it used to be in the mid-20th century. And the U.S. now is, you know, following in the footsteps of the European colonial empires. So Iran has always been, you know, a thorn in the side of Western imperialism since the revolution.

#Danny

So this is what happened when the strikes didn't occur against Iran. The Trump administration said, "OK, well, let's do sanctions—not just on, you know, the very vocal people who lead Iranian national security policy, but also on, you know, shadow banking networks and essentially any trading in oil." That's what they're targeting—the oil. And, you know, they're doing this to Venezuela too. They're seizing tankers. There's still a blockade on Venezuela, despite a partial easing of sanctions in the streets of Venezuela.

Massive numbers of people, you know, are out on the streets every single day saying "Free Maduro," but also continuing the process. And a lot of people say Delcy Rodríguez is this, you know, secretive agent of the United States. But as we've been saying, the proposal from Delcy Rodríguez is to use any trade—any benefits from trade with the United States, which has increased a bit since this horrific act of war against it—to fund health care, to fund, you know, the continuation of the Bolivarian project.

#Ben Norton

Yeah, you raise some really important points there. First of all, if you follow Venezuelan social media, there have been lots of big marches in support of the Bolivarian Revolution, in support of the government, and calling to free Maduro. Another big point—and of course, you never see that in the U.S. media—is about Delcy Rodríguez, the acting president of Venezuela. Now, if you know about Delcy and the Rodríguez family, and her brother Jorge Rodríguez, who is an important Chavista politician, this is a longtime revolutionary, left-wing family. Their father was a socialist revolutionary in a militant group, and he was imprisoned, tortured, and killed by a right-wing Venezuelan regime that was allied with the U.S. So for them, this is not just about ideology.

This is also personal. They've spent their entire lives engaged in this struggle for sovereignty, fighting against U.S. imperialism. And for them, there's no way that—well, she, Delcy Rodríguez, who's the acting president now—she was the vice president under Maduro, and constitutionally she's the acting president. Her brother, Jorge Rodríguez, is also an important Chavista politician. The idea that they're just going to sell out, abandon the revolution, and let the U.S. control Venezuela is absurd. What you mentioned is true, though: you have to be pragmatic, especially when you're under sanctions and a siege. The sanctions on Venezuela actually go back to 2015 under Obama, but Trump escalated them—he literally declared an economic embargo in 2019, like the embargo on Cuba.

This is an economic blockade. And by the way, Trump has now expanded that blockade into a naval one, as we've seen. In those conditions—when you're a small country with 30 million people—you can't just say, "Screw you, we're going to fight you." I mean, it's just not possible. So yes, Delcy understands that she has to be pragmatic, but she's not selling out her country to the U.S. I explain this in a long video on my channel, but to make the message short: Venezuela has been a petro-state for a hundred years. I already talked about that—this is well before Hugo Chávez was born. It's been a petro-state, and the way the system worked was that the country exported oil. Until 1976, that oil was being exploited by U.S. corporations. In 1976, the Venezuelan government, on paper, nationalized the oil.

But most of the extraction was still being done by U.S. companies, with concessions granted to them. Technically, the oil was nationally owned by the people of Venezuela, but U.S. companies were still making most of the profits. There was a state-owned company, PDVSA, but it wasn't the

main force driving the oil sector. Then Hugo Chávez came in through democratic elections in 1998 and became president in 1999. He launched the Bolivarian Revolution, and in 2007 he fully nationalized the oil industry. He told foreign oil companies they would have to leave unless they agreed to hold only a small minority stake in projects that were majority state-owned by PDVSA, the state oil company. Some companies agreed to that, but most did not—including ExxonMobil and ConocoPhillips—so he kicked them out.

And this is why Trump is saying, you know, "This is our oil. It belongs to our companies." If you look at Venezuela's oil production—as I showed in that video I did—it was still very stable and very high under Chávez. Venezuela was also, at that time, benefiting from very high oil prices in the global market, part of a commodity supercycle. There was a big boom. But then, in 2015—so Chávez died in 2013, Maduro won the election that same year and became president—in 2015 Obama put sanctions on Venezuela. And then in 2017, Trump imposed even more aggressive, heavy sanctions. Starting with those sanctions, Venezuela's oil output began to fall significantly. Even after the nationalization under Chávez in 2007, oil output had remained very stable for seven or eight years.

So you see all this propaganda in the Western media saying, "Socialism destroyed Venezuela," blah, blah, blah. No—it was the U.S. sanctions that devastated Venezuela's economy, just like they devastated the Cuban economy and the Iranian economy. Iran doesn't have a socialist system, but it's suffered very similar consequences. So Venezuela's oil sector—its output—was devastated, especially because, as I mentioned earlier, Venezuela couldn't import the technology, the capital goods, the chemicals it needed, or the light sweet crude required to refine and process its own very heavy sour crude. The oil infrastructure in Venezuela started to deteriorate, really falling into disrepair, and it wasn't able to import much of the technology it needed to update, fix, and repair its oil infrastructure because of these illegal U.S. sanctions.

So naturally, Venezuelan oil output fell very significantly. It was around 2.5 million barrels per day, and then it dropped at the peak of the U.S. coup attempt during Trump's first term, in 2019 and 2020. That output fell to fewer than 1 million barrels per day. In the past few years, it's been slightly recovering and is now a bit over 1 million barrels per day. So, you know, you look at this situation—you're under siege. You don't have the infrastructure you need. You don't have the light crude you need to refine your oil. You're under siege. You have to make some kind of concessions to try to get some of those sanctions lifted. So basically, what Delcy has done with the Trump administration is make a deal where Venezuela will sell oil.

Trump says 30 to 50 million barrels of oil. That's like 30 to 50 days of Venezuela's oil production. But the U.S. isn't getting that for free. If you actually read—or in my video, I showed—if you look at the language of Trump's executive order and the Department of Energy's press release on this deal, and if you look at the language from PDVSA, the Venezuelan state oil company, they made it clear they're not giving this oil away. They're selling it. And yes, the U.S. government, because Venezuela is

being forced to do this deal at gunpoint, does have control over that money. But this is actually money from oil that Venezuela sold to the U.S., and in return, they admit they're basically giving sanctions relief.

Now, the Trump Energy Department did not use the term "sanctions relief," but it actually is de facto sanctions relief, because they say, what is Venezuela getting in return for that money? The U.S. is selling Venezuela oil equipment to fix and modernize its oil infrastructure, and light crude and chemicals like naphtha in order to refine its oil. So basically, what we're seeing here is that Trump does not want to publicly admit he's agreeing to sanctions relief, because that's actually what this is. So instead, he says, "We're taking Venezuela's oil." But in reality, what Delcy has agreed to is selling some of Venezuela's oil and allowing some U.S. companies to invest in Venezuela, because at this point, they have to increase oil output.

And so it's a concession they're making. But actually, Maduro also made that concession when he allowed Chevron, under the Biden administration, to come into Venezuela to increase oil output. Because Venezuela's perspective is like, look, we have around a million barrels per day, and we could potentially increase that to where it was before the sanctions—two and a half million, potentially. But we need many billions of dollars in investment and technology that we don't have because of the sanctions. We have to have these sanctions lifted in order to function effectively. So Maduro made a deal with the Biden administration that amounted to a slight lifting of sanctions. Biden still did not lift most of the sanctions, but he allowed some sanctions relief.

And that helped Venezuela increase its oil output. Then Trump came in and canceled that deal with Chevron. A few months later—this was in February—and then in July, Trump allowed Chevron to go in again. That was under Maduro. So basically, the deal made now under Delcy is very similar to the one made between Maduro and the U.S. government allowing Chevron to come in. Basically, they're doing the same thing. And Delcy is doing this in return for the U.S., with the money Venezuela is getting from selling to the U.S., because the U.S. still has sanctions on Venezuela and doesn't allow the Venezuelan government to use the U.S.-dominated financial system.

You know, the U.S. still dominates the global financial system. China and Russia are creating alternatives, and China was buying 80 percent of Venezuela's oil. But still, Venezuela is blocked from much of the international financial system. So Trump is now saying that we control that money, but in reality, that money is being used to give—well, to pay for things. And then Trump also said that Venezuela is only buying U.S. goods from us. Like, you know, Trump wants to sell to his MAGA base and all. He says that we're taking their oil, but actually what's happening is that it's trade—they just don't call it trade.

Venezuela exports its oil to the U.S. It allows U.S. companies to invest and help repair its oil infrastructure so it can export that oil. The U.S. buys the oil, and the money goes into a U.S.-administered account, but it belongs to the government of Venezuela. Then the U.S. uses that money to buy U.S. goods—equipment, light crude, and naphtha—which are then exported to

Venezuela. So what does that look like in practice? It's short-term sanctions relief. Delcy hasn't abandoned her country or the Bolivarian Revolution. She was forced to make this concession to the U.S. in order to have a more functional oil industry, which the Venezuelan government needs to fund social programs, health care, education, and public housing.

The Venezuelan government, under the Bolivarian Revolution over the last two decades, has built more than five million housing units for poor and working-class Venezuelans. The government needs oil revenue to fund all of that, and it needs to repair the oil infrastructure to get that revenue. So this is really a matter of political pragmatism. What Delcy is doing is basically what Maduro was also doing before. Trump wants to convince people that he's supposedly running Venezuela—but newsflash, he's not running Venezuela. I think the U.S. thought that when they tried to kidnap Maduro, the Venezuelan government would probably fall. And this whole idea, this narrative that Delcy is just doing what we want—that's their way of saving face, because Trump doesn't want to maintain a military occupation.

He wants that. We talked about this earlier. Trump wants to bomb a country quickly, overthrow its government, have regime change, and then just let it collapse and do whatever. Trump doesn't want to send in thousands of troops and be bogged down in these forever wars. He saw how disastrous that was in Iraq and Afghanistan. Trump's strategy is just to bomb the hell out of them, overthrow their leaders, and—you know—that's what they tried to do in Venezuela. And I think they really believed their own propaganda. They believed that Venezuela was a so-called dictatorship, and all they had to do was take out Maduro and the government would collapse. But, you know, obviously that hasn't happened. So now Trump is saying, well, you know, we're controlling Venezuela and we're controlling its oil. But that's not what's happening.