

Douglas Macgregor: Israel vs Turkey and Qatar: New US War Strategy?

Douglas Macgregor is a retired Colonel, combat veteran, and former senior advisor to the U.S. Secretary of Defense. Please like, subscribe & share! Follow Prof. Glenn Diesen: Substack: <https://glenndiesen.substack.com/> X/Twitter: https://x.com/Glenn_Diesen Patreon: <https://www.patreon.com/glenndiesen> Support the research by Prof. Glenn Diesen: PayPal: <https://www.paypal.com/paypalme/glenndiesen> Buy me a Coffee: buymeacoffee.com/gdieseng Go Fund Me: <https://gofund.me/09ea012f> Books by Prof. Glenn Diesen: <https://www.amazon.com/stores/author/B09FPQ4MDL>

#Glenn

Welcome back. We are joined today by Colonel Douglas Macgregor, a former advisor to the U.S. Secretary of Defense, also an author and a combat veteran. So thank you for coming back on the program.

#Douglas Macgregor

Happy to be here, Glenn.

#Glenn

So we see that the U.S. military strategy against Iran has taken on some different forms. It began with a decapitation strike. There's been focus on deterrence, some on compellence in terms of trying to open up the Strait of Hormuz. None of it seems to have been working, though. I was wondering what you see happening next, what the U.S., what the Trump administration might try to do next militarily, because they don't seem to have settled on peace yet.

#Douglas Macgregor

No, I think the rumors of any sort of agreement or deal, as the president likes to call it, are grossly exaggerated. There doesn't appear to be any real willingness to reach an agreement unless it involves the unconditional capitulation of the Iranians to whatever Washington wants. So I don't think we're going to see much change there. In fact, yesterday, I was talking to a colleague, and he's an expert on matters, particularly in Russia, and he said to me, "The interesting thing is that Washington's proxy in Ukraine has lost the war to Moscow, to Russia, but the Russians have yet to

consolidate or secure their victory." In the same sense, I think we can argue that the U.S. military, which is operating as a surrogate for the Israelis, seems to have lost the war with Iran over any number of different issues, not the least of which is control of the Persian Gulf.

But the Iranians have yet to secure their own victory. In other words, we're in a limbo at this point. And what history teaches is, if the Russians are going to be victorious in Ukraine and the Iranians are going to be victorious in the Middle East, they've got to secure their victories. They've got to take decisive action. Thus far, the Russians have seemed unwilling to do that. And it seems as though the Iranians at this stage are really willing to wait on the assumption, I think, that the pain inflicted on the global economy and also the United States by the closure of the strait is going to work to their advantage. And they probably assume that we will never come back to the bases that have been destroyed, which is not a bad assumption.

But I think they are underestimating the determination of the Israelis to drag us back into the region. So this leads to some important questions for the Iranians. What are they going to do to ensure that we don't come back in some other form? We may have largely left at this point, although I guess the drop-dead date for our departure from Iraq, complete evacuation of the country, is 30 September. I assume we'll meet that deadline. I don't know how many of us are still in Iraq. But the point nevertheless remains: what is Iran going to do? We know that what we're engaged in right now is a massive military buildup for another round of war with Iran.

Anybody watching what's happening in the United States Air Force knows that. Our forces are building up. We're committing more and more airmen and others to Great Britain and Germany, to bases in those countries, from which presumably we will fly bombers. And large numbers of bombers can be quickly flown in, prepared, loaded with weapons, and sent off to action. My question is, when does this happen? Well, it could happen before the elections, or it could happen immediately after. It sounds as though there is a readiness to wait until after the elections. Presumably, that's because we're trying to replenish a lot of stocks, missiles, precision-guided munitions, and so forth. Then we have the 40,000 2,000-pound bombs that are being shipped to Israel. And even if Israel wanted to deliver all of those, they couldn't.

So my assumption is that a lot of those are meant for U.S. use. And we will use Israel as a launch pad for the next round of attacks. So I think the best that we can say at this point is there's been no real fundamental change in the situation between ourselves and Iran. And this is probably the last hurrah for the United States military in its attempt to bring Iran to heel. Now, what does that mean? What condition other than total capitulation are we prepared to accept? I don't know. And I don't know how much destruction we can create. We certainly can create a great deal. But will it result in the disintegration of the Iranian state, which is obviously what Israel wants? I don't know what we want other than whatever Israel wants. So it's a very difficult situation right now, but I don't see much sunshine on the horizon, let's put it that way.

#Glenn

I'm glad you compared it a bit to the Ukrainian case, because in this instance as well, we have European leaders who say they want to fight Russia, but they don't explain how they're going to defeat Russia. They can't point to a military they can use, and they don't even explain what war means. Are they going to fight them in Ukraine? Are they going to launch missiles? But there's not a convincing path to victory, and I guess that's a similarity to Iran. Do you see any convincing story here in terms of how the U.S. can win this war? Because, you know, this combination of geography and the new weapons technologies puts Iran in a very favorable position. Do you think the U.S. would go in with a land force, actually take over parts of Iran or Yemen, for that matter? Or will it only be bombing campaigns?

#Douglas Macgregor

Well, the truth is we have almost no army at all by historical standards. We're under 450,000 in the so-called standing army or regular army. We don't even use those words, "regular army," much anymore. I don't know what the plan is involving reservists and National Guardsmen. I think that would probably rub up against Congress in ways that are not very popular. And I'm sure that President Trump doesn't really want to bring in large numbers of reserves and National Guardsmen. I don't see much happening on the ground. Now, that doesn't exclude some possibilities. Could we conceivably find a way using Marines and soldiers to get into the Gulf?

Other than to make President Trump and his supporters happy. And by that, I mean the Israelis who are pushing him into war. There's Chabahar on the coast of the Indian Ocean or the Arabian Sea, whatever you want to call it. I don't know that that will be well received because that's a very important port for a lot of people outside of the region. So I just don't know what you think you can accomplish with ground troops. Now, can you do things with special operations forces? Probably, but that didn't go very well the last time we tried it. And I think at that point we decided perhaps we should take another approach to deal with the supposed enriched uranium.

So right now, I think this is largely an air and missile operation. The real question is, when it becomes clear that Iran is not going to capitulate, do we turn to the use of nuclear weapons? And I don't care if somebody wants to call it a tactical nuclear weapon or otherwise. A nuclear weapon is a nuclear weapon. That ostensibly opens Pandora's box. That can lead to all sorts of terrible outcomes, rapid escalation. It could even bring in the Russians and the Chinese. We seem to have assumed that we've pacified the Chinese on the basis of this last visit. I'm not sure why we think that.

I don't think the Chinese are stupid. And it turns out that there was very little discussion, or if there was, we don't know anything about it, concerning Taiwan. And unless we're willing to stand by the Shanghai communiqué that occurred back in the 1970s, where we absolutely renounced any further interest in making Taiwan an independent state, the Chinese aren't going to take us very seriously.

Now, when it comes to the economic side of the house, our condition is very fragile. You know, we're watching the 10-year bond yield continue to rise. It's obvious to everyone that the so-called Federal Reserve is not exerting much control over anything.

So this whole economic structure in the United States could suddenly overnight go into code blue, if you will, collapse in ways that we haven't seen in a hundred years. But just because you haven't had an earthquake in a hundred years in a place like Naples doesn't mean you're not going to have an earthquake. I think the same thing is true for us financially. So we could see something really awful quickly here in the United States. That would change the complexion of the entire operation. What do we do if we can afford nothing, if we have no more money to spend? And we already have a problem with worn-out equipment and tired people.

You know, this business of abusing your standing force repeatedly month after month, year after year doesn't work very well. So I don't see us achieving anything of value. But then again, I don't know all of the plans. And maybe there's some secret sauce in all of this that I'm not aware of. I don't exclude that as a possibility. But I just don't see Iran capitulating, period. And the rest of the region is in turmoil. Everything's falling apart. Saudi Arabia, the statelets, everything. And I don't think that we can depend on the Turks to sit quietly forever. I watched their television. I watched briefings by former officers. Looks very serious and tense to me in Syria and in the Mediterranean.

#Glenn

Yeah, that's what worries me. That is usually—well, the U.S. has often had the advantage as the global hegemon to be able to control all the variables and just focus on one at a time. But if the economy goes south, if the war spreads, as we saw it did to Yemen and the Red Sea, and kind of the wild card here would be Israel, I guess, because, well, Israel is the one who initiated this war summer of last year. But when I watched Netanyahu speak, I was wondering, what else is on Israel's plans? Do you think they could go after Turkey or Qatar? I mean, and if so, what exactly does that mean?

#Douglas Macgregor

Well, let me go back to something that she said that's very important. One of the key assumptions of American military hegemony, and we've always dressed up this notion of hegemony as the quote-unquote rules-based liberal international order. Give me a break. Whose rules? Our rules. When do they apply? When we say they do. To whom do they apply? Whomever we say. So it has nothing to do with international law. We continue to hear Putin, the leadership of Iran, even President Xi, they talk about international law. There's nothing for which we have more contempt in Washington than international law. So it doesn't mean anything. The problem with hegemony, though, is that you have to be able to project decisive military power anywhere in the world on a moment's notice.

Well, I think it's perfectly obvious that that no longer can be achieved. We don't have that power anymore, and I don't see any evidence that we're going to get it back. But I think that President Trump, in the final analysis, has decided that he's going to try and reverse hegemony. In other words, he's trying to relive the unipolar moment again. It's not going to happen. It's a bad idea. The unipolar moment is over. Let it die. Let's live in the new world that involves many powers, because we are no longer the dominant power, either in economic terms or military terms and financial terms. And we're fighting this, and it's making matters much worse for us and for the rest of the world. But President Trump shows no signs of abandoning that.

Now, I think he identifies unconditional support for Israel as part of this bid to reclaim or reattain global military hegemony. That's a bad idea. But the Israelis know something: if they can't keep us engaged in the region indefinitely, if they can't drag us back in, and they cannot win against Iran, how long can they reasonably expect to survive in the region? You can't tell everyone in the region that surrounds you that they're subhuman and that the most important thing they can all do for you is to die, which is effectively what the Israelis are telling people. This is about Jewish supremacy in the worst sense of the word. It's very difficult to develop new allies in the region under those circumstances.

And the ones they have have now been exposed to the sunlight, which means if you're in the UAE or Saudi Arabia, there are millions, tens of millions of Muslim Arabs, also Muslim Turks and Iranians, who have all figured out these people are traitors. They have betrayed the interests of Islam, the interests of their people, the interests of the world that is Islamic. So it's just hard for me to imagine anything positive resulting from more warfare. On the contrary, I think it could finish off our interests in the region and make any future position for the United States impossible. But perhaps there's some secret sauce, something that we haven't heard about. Who knows? We'll have to wait and see.

#Glenn

Well, when Trump made this speech of his in the United Nations, he was making a big point that it can make Iran a very powerful, prosperous country, or it can annihilate them. Besides this show of power, it's interesting that it's all tied to the midterms. That is, even if he would want to take a deal or he wants to go all-out war, he wants to wait until after the midterms. Do we know yet what he might actually do in this case?

#Douglas Macgregor

Well, I hear people make that case. I don't see it because there's nothing he can do to improve his position for the midterms. All you have to do is look at the current polling data. He's losing airspeed and altitude at a very, very rapid pace. He's about as popular in the United States as the plague right now. There's very little interest or support for the Iran war. Now, of course, there is on the Hill,

but that has to do with money. That has to do with the fact that members are receiving money from sources that are pro-Zionist. They also are benefiting from insider trading and all sorts of special deals that the financial system in Zionist hands can provide to them. So they're going to stick with the war, at least at this point.

If it ends badly and Trump loses, they'll all say, "See, we told you so." You know, that's what Congress does. It waits until everything falls apart, then it washes its hands: "We're not responsible." I don't think the American people are quite that stupid anymore. I think the American people have figured a lot of things out. They know that Trump has gone back on every word he's ever given. He's betrayed every trust that you can imagine from his own party, from his own support base. And I think Americans are increasingly disgusted by what they see as an exercise dressed up as government, which is almost kleptocracy. So I don't know that the whole midterms plays that much of a role.

I think one of the few times when President Trump has been completely honest is when he's spoken and said, "I'm really not worried about the midterms." And I think he has to make a decision, or had to make a decision: do I bend in the direction of my supporters, my base, and others who are opposed to these policies? Or do I stick with them? And I think he's decided he's better off sticking with these policies because that's where the money is. The billionaires that support him, the billionaires that got him elected, the billionaires that are driving policy—they're his best shot at staying in office. If he betrays them at this point, which I would call Charlie Kirk-like.

In other words, goes through an epiphany and says, "Oh, I was wrong." Does he end up like Charlie Kirk? I'm not sure about that, but he certainly ends up in a lot of trouble because then the guardrails that prevent him from facing impeachment are gone. See, if most of Congress is still willing to support the Zionist war that we're in, what makes anybody think that they will suddenly not support whatever it is that Trump wants? In other words, Trump has got to be very careful. Everything he does, everything he says, everything he represents now depends on the support of the people that put him where he is, not the American people. The American people are just not prominent in this equation of power.

#Glenn

We see something similar in Europe, by the way. That is, what the elites are pushing for, it's quite obvious that the people don't want it, which is why there's all this manipulation, censorship, but also why the leaders are, at the end of the day, so unpopular. But about the relationship between the US and Israel, it seems interesting because the US backing Israel without any conditions is obviously—it enables Israel to do things it would otherwise not do. However, if the US were to pull back now, it would leave Israel much more vulnerable and unpredictable, reckless. Do you—I agree with you. What would be the future of Israel, though? Because eventually the US either has to pull back voluntarily or the economy, regional powers, Iran—it might be forced to do so. Again, it's a hypothetical, but what happens with Israel then, do you think?

#Douglas Macgregor

Well, right now, I think for the reasons you just outlined, President Trump is absolutely not going to abandon his unconditional commitment to Israel. That's going to remain in place. Now, that could change if, in fact, not only does this war fail miserably, which I think it will eventually this year, in all probability, but his own political position is destroyed by the economy. If that occurs, if we go into a tailspin, then I think we probably will. I mean, you could bring on a number of brilliant analysts, everyone from Ray Dalio to Luke Gromen to Alasdair Macleod. You take your pick, and they're all telling you the same thing.

We're headed into something not just worse than 2008, but probably something worse than the '29 crash. So if they're right, and I think they probably are, this is the last hurrah. That's why I say this is the last major military push that we can mobilize and muster. If that doesn't work, the economy crashes. Where does Trump go? He's probably finished. Even then, his dependence on the Zionist billionaires is probably not going to rescue him. But I'm talking about the perfect storm. And as far as Israel goes, I think it's very obvious that, again, as I said before, if we are suddenly disengaged from the region, if we are suddenly defeated militarily in our last attempt, we're out.

And if we're out, Israel is probably not far behind us. A lot of Israelis are moving to Cyprus. Some friends in Cyprus contacted me and told me that the place is largely being purchased by wealthy Israelis. Whether or not that money comes from Israel or it comes from the United States, I have no idea, but a lot of real estate is being bought there, to the point where the Cypriots are very, very unhappy. Greece—downtown Athens, I'm told—is largely purchased by, once again, Israelis moving there. They're moving into places in Belgrade and Serbia. You know, that does not buttress confidence in the state of Israel, does it?

#Glenn

I was going to say that might need some explanation. You say if the US pulls out of the Middle East, which looks increasingly likely, then Israel would follow. But of course, Israel is a state in the Middle East. Do you suggest they would—people, again, are fleeing—but the government would be left, the army would be left, their nuclear weapons would be left? Again, this is dangerous speculation, but how will this occur, though?

#Douglas Macgregor

Well, the real question is, could Israel become a normal state in the region? You know, the man who knows more about this than I do is Chas Freeman. So does Alistair Crooke. They have talked about this. Can Israel be a normal state in the Middle East? I think they've all concluded that's an impossibility. Was it ever possible? Yes. You know, we're about to go into October, and you'll remember the 1973 Arab-Israeli war that broke out in October, the so-called War of Atonement.

That changed things strategically on the ground in the region. When Sadat attacked with the Egyptian forces, managed to cross the Suez and defeat the Israelis on the other side and drive them away, his goal was never more than regaining the lost territory.

Sadat never had any intention, under any circumstances, of advancing further and into the heart of Israel with the goal of destroying Israel. He was not interested in that. The Egyptians have never been interested in that. Now, maybe Nasser and his wild fantasies was. I can't vouch for that. But my point is that worked out rather well in retrospect. Now, as far as Syria is concerned, that was a different animal. They failed. Had they succeeded and invaded Israel proper, which was not impossible, that would have changed things dramatically. They had a different set of goals from Sadat in Egypt. So the question is, what is now possible? I don't know that Israel could be a normal state. I just don't.

It might have to, excuse me, under great pressure, withdraw behind fortress walls. But is that a long-term solution to the problem of Israeli security? I think they know it isn't. Otherwise, they would never have embarked on the— which is supposed to solve that problem. If you'd conquered most of your surroundings and you created a giant security zone at the expense of other people's countries, then presumably you will be more safe. I think that's what the Israelis have thought for a long time. It hasn't worked. I don't think it can work. So that means, can you go back to being little Israel? I don't know. I think that's a tough one to answer. It may be easier to simply evacuate.

#Glenn

I'd always hoped that when the day came when the United States was not able to sustain collective hegemony anymore, that it would take the alliance systems and try to convert them into some regional security structures, that is, in Europe, the Middle East, and East Asia, just to have that stability. But instead of forming these inclusive security structures, we see instead a lot of the frontline states, be it the Europeans against Russia or the Gulf states against Iran. God forbid there's something similar in East Asia, but it creates a real chaos.

#Douglas Macgregor

Chaos is a good word for the Trump administration because in the midst of all of this, there are serious interests in and preparations for attacking Cuba. I find that ridiculous. I think it's insane. I don't see anything positive about going into Cuba. We invaded Cuba three times before the Second World War. People don't know this. Starting in 1898, '99. And each time that we intervened in Cuba, we wrote a constitution, we supervised elections, we tried to set up government. It all failed. I don't see that we would have any more success today in Cuba than we did in the past. But Secretary Rubio obviously represents that lobby.

And again, this goes back to the fundamental problem in American foreign policy. Most Americans, on any given day, don't pay attention to what happens overseas. They don't really care. And that

can be viewed in two ways. You can say, "Oh, well, this is horrible because they've lost control of their government." I agree. On the other hand, I always thought it was a very healthy thing. Why should we be interested in meddling in other people's countries? We have a perfectly nice country here now, but that's not been the view during the 20th century. When we had the capability to project power, we've done it. Whether or not we needed to, that's another matter for debate.

Now you're saying something that's true. We cannot do what we did in the past. That's been displayed, obviously, in the Middle East with Iran. I think we're going to see more evidence for that in the future, simply because the world has grown up. It has recovered from the Second World War. We have multiple great powers now. They all have interests. Thankfully, they don't want war, especially with us. We don't seem to care about that. We're determined, as I said before, to sort of relive the unipolar moment, whether or not it makes sense to do so. And it doesn't. So I wish I had some good news to offer you, but I just don't.

I think we're going to go forward in October. October is a strange month. A lot of strange things happen in October. We could see things blow up in any number of different places. I think what we recently saw in England with the attempted attack on an air base there that we utilized for our bombers is the tip of the iceberg. I think we're going to see more of that in the future. And eventually, I think we're going to see large numbers of people all around the world that want us out. We're no longer viewed as a guarantee against someone harming them or intervening in their country. We're now a magnet for trouble.

#Glenn

Yeah, well, also in terms of invading Cuba and, well, I guess enforcing the Monroe Doctrine of not having any foreign powers establish themselves near the U.S., it seems unnecessary, though, because from what I understand, neither the Chinese nor the Russians would, as they demonstrated in Venezuela, ever dream of actually trying to confront the U.S. in the Western Hemisphere, simply because it would be insane. So, I just think if the U.S. goes in with the heavy military weapons, it's not so much the Chinese or the Russians they have to worry about. It's more the regional pushback, so they can get themselves into a quagmire.

But on the topic of bad news, I actually am in Moscow now and had the chance to, while I saw Sergei Lavrov today give a talk, I had the chance to ask him a question. And one thing that really stuck out from what he said was how the attitude towards diplomacy with the U.S. appeared to have changed. He talked about Alaska, and he said that, you know, the Americans had put forth a deal which demanded some big compromise from the Russian side. They agreed to this compromise, and after this, you know, it was based on the idea that they would deal with the root causes, so, you know, NATO. And suddenly after this, there's no more. They never heard back from them again.

They don't talk about NATO anymore. Suddenly, Trump talks about this as if it would be a conflict between Ukraine and Russia. And with the new sanctions, weapons—in the words of Lavrov, he said

that Trump is more similar to Biden every day that passes. Every sanction has been extended and a few new ones added. How do you see the Russian-American partnership moving forward? Because one of my great hopes for the U.S. was to put an end to the whole Cold War, which has gone on for a century now. These powers don't really need to be enemies. I mean, that would stabilize Europe as well. But we see it go the other direction. Where do you see Trump going? Well, what is the strategy here? Because I don't get it.

#Douglas Macgregor

There is no strategy. Historically, we've really never had a strategy. The only clear, coherent articulation of a strategy, in my judgment, came from George Washington. And Washington essentially articulated two things. First, we're not interested in being involved in other people's wars, so we need to disengage ourselves from any possibility of being dragged into future wars overseas beyond our borders. Secondly, frankly, we English-speaking people are going to conquer the North American continent. We're going to march from the Atlantic to the Pacific. That was our strategy. That's what we did. If you go back and look at the various wars we fought, they were largely about this one country from Atlantic to the Pacific that was English-speaking, with one Constitution and one law and one people as a result.

The next time you had any sort of strategy, if you want to call it that, articulated was the strategy of containment that came from Kennan, which then was subsequently militarized and led to the tragedy in Vietnam, because Kennan at no point was arguing for any sort of armed conflict with communism in any form, anywhere, at any time. That went by the wayside, and then after 1991, when we discovered we were the last man standing, we were the preeminent power in military, economic, financial, and political terms. Instead of setting out to build a better world, as we say, one in which we would treat the rest of the world with mutual respect, respect other people's customs, way of life, laws, and so forth, we decided, no, no, no, under the guise of spreading democracy at gunpoint, we were going to make everything better for everyone, whether they liked it or not.

So I don't know what you've got going now other than an extension of what started in '91. You've got to go back to the draft of the Defense Planning Guidance of 1991, authored by Paul Wolfowitz. Normally, it's adopted, but it leaked. And it was the thing that people internally continued to point to. And that said, we're number one. We should make sure we remain number one. We should be prepared to go anywhere and challenge anybody to guarantee that we remain number one. And they treated a series of interventions as laboratory experiments to see to what extent we could establish, we said, new liberal democratic regimes. But in reality, we meant puppets that would then do our bidding, trade with us on our terms, and so forth. So you have the series of interventions there. After the failures in Somalia and Haiti, you then go to the Balkans.

And from the Balkans, you ultimately go to the Middle East, and that, of course, is triggered by 9/11. But instead of focusing on what was allegedly the problem, which was this small group of Islamists in Afghanistan, it became a region-wide crusade, in my judgment, to make the world and the region

safe for Israel. And that seems to have been the permanent strategic imperative, and has remained so. There we are. And what do we get for it? I think we looked at the trillions of dollars in the national debt that rose between 2001 and 2022, over \$28 trillion added to the national debt. We concluded that about \$8 trillion of that was due to defense spending. And we had borrowed all the money, which means we printed it. No one will buy our bonds, which means that we have to print it. The petrodollar is dead, so you've got to print it. How much longer can you print before it all falls apart? I think that about sums it up, Glenn.

#Glenn

Let me think about something a friend and former colleague of yours, Lieutenant Colonel Daniel Davis—I was with him in Istanbul a few days ago, and he was giving a speech. He was making the point that in Washington, they still live in 1992, as if it were the Wolfowitz Doctrine. And I thought we have a similar problem in Europe. That is, we have militarism without a military. They all talk about war, but don't have a military to use. So we're all living in the past, like it's at least 30 years ago. But this shows the shift, though, in world order. I guess it's just my last question. It's—we're not adjusting to it voluntarily.

I would have liked to see the politicians recognize the distribution of power and calibrate their policies accordingly, but we're not seeing it. So how do you see the—I guess a big question—but how do you see the world order we're entering now? Because if this era of dominance is over, it's not just a failure in the last 30 years. It's centuries of Western primacy, though. What is—how do you see the world shifting after this? I mean, if you add the end of the current financial system led under the U.S., it's, again, by definition, it becomes unpredictable. Well, a couple of things.

#Douglas Macgregor

If you drag out Paul Kennedy and his Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, and you look particularly at Great Britain and the British Empire, the British Empire was not militarily overwhelming in its capabilities. It had a very large and powerful navy. It was designed to protect their empire. The empire was overseas. We started out filling the shoes of the British Empire after World War II. When Eisenhower threw the British, the French, and the Israelis out of Suez in Egypt, people said, well, this was a very wise move that cultivated tremendous support in the Arab world and the Muslim world for the United States. But in reality, he was also making sure that we were the sole great power that would dispose over the oil resources in the region.

Subsequently, Nixon, who creates the petrodollar, tries to make Iran the sort of proxy force for us to maintain control. And since then, we have been building up our position in the Gulf because we wanted to be sure that no one would try to displace us. Ultimately, no one did, really. But a war has started because of Israel. And the interesting thing is that all of these attempts to maintain control of the oil resources are now at risk of complete and utter failure, and along with it, our entire economy. Not so much because of the oil dimension, but because of the spending. Remember, we

used to have taxes associated with war. When you went to war, you had to pay taxes. You had to buy war bonds, all sorts of business.

We handled the Korean conflict so well that there was practically no debt whatsoever left over from the Korean War because we taxed. But after Nixon comes in and we bankrupt ourselves in Vietnam, we go into this money-printing spiral where there's no accountability. Because if it never affects the broader population, well, then nobody notices, and you continue to print money. I think we've reached the end of that process. And Paul Kennedy describes that inevitable future for us in his 1982 work. I would encourage everybody to go back and read it. I'm sure Paul Kennedy would love to hear that. But, you know, he wrote this brilliant, brilliant piece, and it deserves more attention than it gets. So I don't see any off-ramp from disaster at this point. Now, will that be the end of us as Americans?

Of course not. But we will have to turn inward and deal with our issues forever. Fortunately, we can do that. We're an island. We're not the Roman Empire. We don't have borders with millions of barbarian armies bearing down on us. We've got barbarians, but we can reverse that. The Romans couldn't do it. We can survive the barbarian incursions because we did it to ourselves. Europe has got to do the same thing. Their problems are all internal. They're not external. There's no threat from Russia. I think the European population has realized that. I think we're part of the problem. As long as this NATO thing exists, because we continue to support it and insist upon it, as long as we have forces on the ground in Europe, the globalists will resist any positive change in European civilization.

They are only interested in themselves. They've got the same problem where you are that we do. It's perhaps not as kleptocratic, but close. And at the end of the day, the only way Europe will liberate itself is to get rid of these governments. They're going to have to rise up and liberate themselves. So I talk about the revolutions of 1848. The good news is that the states are weak, and the forces that support them are weak, so that they can have success. They can rebel. There doesn't have to be as much bloodshed as there was in 1848. They can win, and they can steer a new course. I don't know if they can do it, but I think they can. Or maybe I should say, I don't know if they will do it, but I suspect they're getting close. That's certainly true in Great Britain, from what I've seen.

#Glenn

Yeah, well, if we see the unpredictability and the coming chaos from all this, from what is awaiting us, I can understand why Trump wants to reverse the decline and restore the global primacy of the '90s. But again, it just seems like it's making matters much worse. And it's, again, refusing to see, you know, that time has already come to an end. I think there's...

#Douglas Macgregor

Yeah, there's one thing more that I would say. Americans know, but their government doesn't, that we can be prosperous, free, and independent without ruling the world.

#Glenn

Well, on that note, Colonel, thank you so much for your time. I always appreciate it.

#Douglas Macgregor

Sure. Thank you, Glenn.