

# **Pepe Escobar: Putin & Iran's BOMBSHELL Crushes Trump's War Bluff, Israel in Trouble**

Trump messed around and found out says Pepe Escobar as his seizure of Venezuelan oil tankers accelerates a century humiliation for the West says geopolitical analyst Pepe Escobar. Russia and China have stepped in to bolster the defenses of Nicholas Maduro and war is rapidly approaching. Trump's latest failures are about to change everything. Watch until the end to understand how and why. SUPPORT THE CHANNEL ON PATREON: <https://www.patreon.com/dannyhaiphong> Support the channel in other ways: <https://www.buymeacoffee.com/dannyhaiphong> Substack: [chroniclesofhaiphong.substack.com](https://chroniclesofhaiphong.substack.com) Cashapp: \$Dhaiphong Venmo: @dannyH2020 Paypal: <https://paypal.me/spiritofho> Follow me on Telegram: <https://t.me/dannyhaiphong> #trump #putin #Iran #china

## **#Danny**

During the 12-day war, you probably remember, a lot of people were saying that Iran didn't ask Russia and China for enough military assistance. So they weren't prepared enough to withstand the worst excesses of that surprise attack that Israel and the U.S. launched. Now we're in the financial and economic side, where it's said—and you outlined it well—that Iran and China could do currency swap deals. They could make it a lot easier to counter currency manipulation. So I guess I'm wondering, what's the full picture here? Because some were saying that, with the Starlink issue, Iran was able to penetrate Starlink and essentially shut it down.

That was done with either Russian or Chinese technology. The reality is that, yeah, in this iteration of the proxy war—the war the U.S. is trying to wage—they were able to counter the color revolution, the regime change operation. But it still happened, and it killed hundreds of people. It was sparked initially by, as you said, protests against financial manipulation that had real effects on the standard of living. So what's the full picture here about the Russia-China connection—how they're helping, and how they're not helping, Iran?

## **#Pepe Escobar**

Well, they're not giving the game away, right, Danny? The Russians and the Chinese are being extremely circumspect, which is predictable, because most of these issues fall into the realm of national security on all three sides, in fact. It's part of their interlocking strategic partnerships and matters of national security. And especially in the case of Russia and Iran—how deep is their military collaboration? We know it's very, very deep. We know from what we heard in Moscow, from Iranian envoys going back and forth between Iran and Moscow to discuss military integration, that all those IL-76s landing in Tehran practically full-time were bringing stuff that's quite substantial. We don't

know exactly what—could be anything: missile defense systems, cybersecurity equipment, you name it.

And, of course, what we know—and it's been confirmed diplomatically by the ministries of defense on all three sides, you can even include China—is that it's absolutely clear Russia and China cannot allow Iran to fall. Not necessarily the fall of the current government setup, but to fall in the sense of being annexed as a vassal or a colony to the empire of chaos, plunder, and permanent strikes. This is quite clear in Moscow and in Beijing. But, of course, the sensitive information—none of us have access to that. We just know it's deep. For instance, something we discovered, I'd say a few days later, was that at the beginning of the 12-day war, it was Russian know-how that enabled the Iranians to reconstitute their grid in less than 48 hours.

But you won't get the Russian Ministry of Defense saying that on the public record—forget it. Not to mention the Iranians. And, of course, for instance, when we visit Iran and meet with the IRGC, they showed us—last time, for example—only what everybody in Iran already knows about. They didn't show us their next-generation missiles or hardware or software, which they already had at the time. Some of it they used in the last few days of the 12-day war, and some of it is completely new and will be used in the next operation. So, of course, there's this element of secrecy. And at the same time, there's this element of their deeper military and scientific collaboration between Iran and Russia, which is very, very deep.

And you add to that the scientific quality you see in the best Iranian universities, which is something that would be the envy of practically everywhere in Europe and most parts of the United States. So it's immensely impressive. But conceptually, it's very clear for the Iranians, the Russians, and the Chinese: this is our Eurasian integration fight. And we all know the empire only has one shot, because the only way for them to destabilize a meaningful crossroads across Eurasia would be through Iran. Turkey—Turkey is different. Turkey is the wall of Istanbul, as we've been discussing. It's the limit between NATOstan and Eurasia. But Turkey is still over the wall, sitting on the fence—still, infinitely, right?

The Central Asian states are minor players. India and Pakistan are a different story because they're more concentrated in South Asia. Southeast Asia is different—it's an enormous commercial power, but not a big geopolitical player. So that's it. We're left with this ancestral crossroads of Eurasia, going back to the earliest Persian empires. And of course, for people in the U.S. who are still conditioned by the Mackinder, Spykman, Brzezinski interpretation of Eurasia, it's something they can never swallow: "We cannot allow Iran to be sovereign and independent. We have to go there and break it up." And at the same time, they know that if they do, Russia and China are going to react.

We still don't know how. So, you know, this is the new Great Game in action—over the past four decades, in fact, since the start of the Islamic Revolution. At the time, it's fascinating—nobody knew the revolution would go the way it did. A lot of people were expecting the Communist Party to have a place of prominence, and in the end, that was not exactly the idea of the clerical establishment.

Because in the history of Iran—and this is something we have to keep in mind—there's always this alternation between clerical power and monarchic power. And we're in one of those historical periods in Iranian history. Yeah. Of course, we'll never have the return of the monarch, especially when you have a clown posing as the monarch, right?

They tried to sell this clown to Western public opinion, and not many people bought it. Even here in Europe, very few people did. You can see right away that he doesn't even qualify as a clown—ensconced in Maryland, trying to give lessons to Iran from his... it's pathetic. So they don't have a replacement plan. The only plan they have is to blow it all up. You know, this is that famous "wish list" for Persia that everybody talks about. It's a pretty pathetic document, by the way. People keep bringing it up—blah, blah, blah—but no, it just outlines blow-up scenarios. That's it. In the sense of, "Okay, let's create the new Iraq, let's create the new Libya." Create? No, man. Let's destroy—like we destroyed Iraq, like we destroyed Libya, and like we destroyed Syria, long term.

## **#Danny**

One of the biggest concerns many people outside Iran have is, you know, some have said, "Oh, is Iran asleep at the wheel when it comes to these kinds of surprise attacks? Are they preparing?" You wrote in your article—and I want to pull it back up—you had a whole section about how Iran counters a regime-change war. Maybe you can get into more of the details here, because I think sometimes people focus a lot on one element, for example, intelligence or air defenses and things like that. But it's really about how to counter regime change. You outline it really well here. There are so many components to it.

## **#Pepe Escobar**

One of them, Danny Haiphong—which would probably require an article in itself—is that the government called the Bazaaris to have meetings, to listen to them about the cost of living, what their customers are buying or not buying, or complaining about, and so on, right at the beginning of the protests. You know how this was interpreted in the U.S. mainstream media? I read it in some of the think tank reports: "The Bazaaris have abandoned the government, so now it's over for Khamenei and the mullahs." It was exactly the opposite. The government called the Bazaaris to talk to them and say, "Look, we don't have a lot of cash, but how can we help your business?"

And what are your customers telling you about the cost of living, and so on? So the bazaar and the government were talking from the very beginning. When we had the Islamic Revolution in '78-'79, it was a completely different story, because the Bazaaris were against the Shah. The Bazaaris rebelled against the Shah. It's completely different. Only stupid people who know nothing about the history of Iran over the past 40, 45, 50 years could come up with that. So they were worried. And the argument in Tehran—okay, that includes economic management on several levels, all right, that exists—but you cannot underestimate the absolutely toxic effect of over 40 years of sanctions on everyday life all across Iran.

This is something you only understand as a foreigner if you go to Iran and travel around the country. In my case, I've been there more than ten times, and every time I come back, I'm always shocked by the degradation—especially of infrastructure. It's directly linked to the effects of these absolutely horrible sanctions: in ports, in airports, in the urban configuration, the urban landscapes—apart from parts of Iran that are being built from scratch. For instance, when you get to the Chabahar port near the Pakistani border, they're building Chabahar practically from scratch. That's a different story, because they know it's going to be a great hub for the future.

But if you go to certain neighborhoods in Tehran itself—not the north, which is upper middle class, the Tehranjali crowd, you know—if you go to southern Tehran and the outskirts of southern Tehran, which are basically working class, most of it very, very poor, the infrastructure is decaying. The infrastructure is, at best, from the mid-70s, and that's it. Then the whole thing stopped. So, you know, the fact that the government is still able to function and provide at least basic services with all these problems is, in itself, extraordinary. And don't forget that the basic necessities of an Iranian family, like gas and electricity, are subsidized by the government.

It costs practically nothing. But of course, the government has to pay for all that in the end. And obviously, there are enormous limits. There's not a lot of substantial external help, which is something I alluded to in my column. It's a very controversial question, and only the Chinese—only Beijing, I would say, maybe a few top officials in Beijing—could answer this question: why didn't they help Iran when it was obvious there was a speculative attack on the rial? This is something the Chinese could have done, you know, taking a little bit of their gigantic foreign reserves—it would have cost them peanuts. And they didn't. This is something we should ask the powers that be in Beijing.

For instance, why couldn't the NDB make a few loans to Iran, considering that the NDB is the BRICS bank and Iran is a BRICS member? We get to what? The power of the U.S. dollar. The statutes of the NDB, the BRICS bank, are in U.S. dollars. If they make a loan to Iran and it goes through the international financial system and is linked to the dollar, the NDB itself will be subjected to American sanctions. Which proves once again to all of us—and this is something my dear friend Paulo Nogueira Batista, one of the co-founders of the NDB, says—we have to start from scratch. You cannot have a development bank for the Global South using the currency of the empire. It's completely out of the question. So, you know, the constraints on Iran are tremendous.

Their staying power is—wow—it's very, very impressive. And it connects to something much more subtle beyond ideology, something metaphysical, in fact: the Shiite concept of resistance, right? The Shiite concept of martyrdom—if you become a martyr, it's for a higher cause. But especially the Shiite concept of resistance under the maximum pressure of the empire, in this case, which goes back to the very beginning of the Islamic Revolution. You know, the conceptualization of the Islamic

Revolution was to link anti-colonialism with this Shiite concept of resistance. So now we have, we could say, a variation of those ideals. The pure ideals at the beginning of the Islamic Revolution—okay, many of them were corrupted.

This is something we could argue about for eternity. But this initial flame—let's say, anti-colonialism and spiritual resistance—is what we're seeing now in Iran after this failed regime-change operation. You see a renewed sense of "Yes, we have to fight against this new colonial imperial power, and we have to go deeper into our Shiite conceptualization of the spirit of resistance." So, in the end, the empire, once again, did Iran a favor. History works in mysterious ways, usually with a measure of poetic justice. And the poetic justice we see now is that, okay, now we're going to resist even more. Which, you know, brings us back to that famous articulation by the strategic advisor...

## **#Danny**

Yep. Yeah. Yeah. And maybe just lastly, because I do want to talk about the other aspects of the Eurasia push by the United States Empire—especially Neocon Caligula and his empire of plunder. But yeah, you have, you know, of course, Netanyahu. You mentioned that think tank report, \*The Path to Persia.\* What's so interesting now, after this operation, Pepe, is when you hear Netanyahu say things like he did in this so-called parliament in Israel today. He said that if Iran attacks Israel, "we will act with strength that Iran hasn't yet known." And then he says, "Iran will never return to what it once was." But the language is not offensive—it's \*if\* Iran attacks us. There's been a bit of a shift in how this is looking.

## **#Pepe Escobar**

Because his generals are not stupid—they know what can happen. Netanyahu is not a military expert, on the contrary. But his generals saw what a few hypersonic Iranian missiles did, and that was just a few, not a thousand.

## **#Danny**

And, you know, there have been reports flying around all over social media about Iran having 2,000, even 20,000 missiles on the move. We don't really know how much of that is true, of course.

## **#Pepe Escobar**

No, 2,000 is already too much. Russia doesn't have 2,000 hypersonic missiles. So if Iran has 100, that's already—wow. Because as far as we remember, I think at the end of the 12-day war they launched fewer than 10, and that was already...

## **#Danny**

And we all saw the images—what happened there. Those went viral. And yeah, it's going to be interesting, because in the United States, even Pepe, the approval rating from the public polled in the U.S. is so low on Iran's strike. And the pretext was so interesting. Trump said it was about protecting the protesters, saving the protesters, and that was the exact opposite. What's interesting about that is it's the exact opposite kind of language he was using even in the early days of his administration. So it was a complete reversal. He just sounded like someone on the Beltway this time, and it's likely he's going to have to sound like that again in order to invoke the kind of pretext needed to strike. Because, as you said, the USS *\*Lincoln\** and fighter jets and all kinds of things are moving in that direction.

### **#Pepe Escobar**

Exactly. And he can go for probably the most plausible scenario: he goes for a pro forma strike, and then he changes the subject.

### **#Danny**

Yeah.

### **#Pepe Escobar**

Yep. As we all know, the only subject all over the planet right now is Greenland.