Scott Ritter: Trump HUMILIATED, Putin's Oreshnik Missile Destroys CIA Coup

Scott Ritter unleashes on Trump for his role in attempting the coup of Vladimir Putin and explains why the Oreshnik strike on Lviv Ukraine has changed everything when no one noticed. SUPPORT THE CHANNEL ON PATREON: https://www.patreon.com/dannyhaiphong Support the channel in other ways: https://www.buymeacoffee.com/dannyhaiphong Substack: chroniclesofhaiphong.substack.com Cashapp: $Dhaiphong Venmo: @dannyH2020 Paypal: https://paypal.me/spiritofho Follow me on Telegram: https://t.me/dannyhaiphong #scottritter #putin #oreshnik #ukraine #cia

#Danny

The CIA colluded with the New York Times to publish an article about how the CIA was targeting, in the most direct—I mean, the most intimate—way possible, Russian oil infrastructure. Right. Precision strikes.

#Ray

Oil, yeah. But then, what about the residents?

#Danny

The same drones, the same guidance systems. It's the same weapon. It's a CIA-run asset—the 14th Regiment—launching the same drone, using the same chips, directed by the CIA. And the CIA had been working with the New York Times on this article for days, if not weeks, beforehand. The timing of the release of this article is not an accident. The CIA was sending a signal: we are targeting you. We are targeting you.

#Ray

The CIA.

#Scott Ritter

The chip was given to the Russians days after Trump called Putin a liar—after he said none of what the Russians were saying was true. And the CIA gave this, the Russians gave this chip. That chip does a couple of things. The chip proves that the residence was the target—there's no doubt about it. But given this drone, and the way this drone pounded here, this drone is jointly produced by the Germans and the Ukrainians. Right. The guidance system is actually a German chip, produced in

Germany. But Palantir is responsible for the targeting, not the German government. Palantir does the targeting. Palantir says they get commercially available intelligence, which they then blend with intelligence given to the Ukrainians by whomever—they didn't say NATO, just whomever.

And it's blended in. The assumption is supposed to be Germany, NATO, all that. But here's the thing: the technology being used, which is AI-driven, mirrors the Tomahawk guidance system but slowed down because it's in a drone. Basically, there's no GPS. The thing gets launched on a trajectory, and halfway through it does a course correction based on timing. It'll turn on either radar or a camera, take an image that's then matched with data stored in the drone, and align itself before continuing. But there's other data that comes in—wind speed, weather conditions, guidance to go around air defense networks. This is information that's only collected through classified means; it's not gathered from commercially available sources.

Right. And the specificity of the information can only be collected by the United States. And the way it was packaged—the way it was packaged—is a unique signature. Remember, the Russians have complete Tomahawk missiles, you know, the ones we fired into Syria that ended up in a field? So the Tomahawk guidance system isn't unfamiliar to the Russians. And those Tomahawks that were fired received their digital targeting packet from the DOD activity in Europe. They're the ones who make it up, they're the ones who send it out via classified communication channels to the various ships that then program it. Is that NATO? The Russians have a digital signature. NATO can't do this. NATO cannot do this. Only the United States can do this.

#Ray

The United States gives it to NATO.

#Scott Ritter

We don't. We don't give it to NATO.

#Ray

OK, so NATO has no way of using the kind of U.S.-specific technology you described, and no way to give that to the Ukrainians.

#Scott Ritter

NATO has SCALP missiles. NATO has Storm Shadow missiles. NATO has the German Taurus, which hasn't been provided. Right. But the specific targeting systems—there are different targeting systems that use different inputs. The digital fingerprint of this chip is a DOD digital fingerprint. And there's a reason why they gave it to the Americans. They didn't give it to the Americans to point the finger at Germany. They didn't give it to the Americans to point the finger at France or the United

Kingdom. They gave it to the Americans to point the finger at Donald Trump, who lied to them—straight up lied to them. And now they know that he tried to kill the president of Russia. That's what they know. Now, you say you'd like them to make a statement. Let me give you the following statement that the Russians have made.

When I was in Russia in November, I met with the Gorky Institute. That's a group out of St. Petersburg. Karin Kneissl, the former foreign minister of Austria, runs it, and it's in close collaboration with the Russian foreign ministry. At that time, we were trying to figure out how we could put arms control on the agenda. The Russian government made it very clear to me that they weren't going to talk about arms control. They weren't going to talk about a resumption of talks. They weren't going to talk about anything nuclear. That was all hushed up because of the supposed close communications that were to take place with the United States on this issue. Meanwhile, while they were waiting for that, Lavrov said they ain't picking up the phone.

We're waiting here. We're ready. They ain't picking up the phone. Nobody's talking to us. But we did come up with an idea—we were going to do mock negotiations. The idea of the mock negotiations was to go through the process of problem-solving on the various issues related to New START extension, INF, and ABM. And the Russian government said, "We like that idea. That's a good idea, because that's not making policy, but it gets it out there. It moves things forward in a positive way." We were going to do it in St. Petersburg, bring a similar effort in parallel in the United States, have these two things together so we could deliver packets of information to the foreign ministry and the State Department—and they were all on board.

They just pulled the plug. They said, we ain't doing arms control. It ain't happening. It's dead. Now, they haven't said that publicly, but I'm telling you right now, the foreign ministry was excited about this. They ain't excited about it anymore. The Russians—they're not interested. They fired the Avangard. That means the Avangard is now, as Dmitry Medvedev said, an integral part of their nuclear deterrence posture. And they're not giving it up to a lying sack-of-manure government that tried to kill their president. Remember, the Russians are furious about this. They're furious because this isn't a CIA accident. This is a directed activity by the CIA, directed by the President of the United States, who's covering for the CIA right now.

#Scott Ritter

That's the Russian interpretation.

#Danny

I wanted to cover the specifics and the details of the Urazhnoye strike that occurred in response to the CIA and U.S. assassination attempt on Vladimir Putin. What exactly happened? The Urazhnoye missile slammed into Lviv, right on the Polish border. What's significant about this second use of the Urazhnoye, and what exactly happened?

#Scott Ritter

Well, there's going to be an awful lot of speculation here, so just understand that, because nobody's come out and—what I'll say is this: the first Urazhnoye attack was done with a test missile. The Russians said it was an operational test. And if you look at the strike, the warheads hit in roughly the same area. They picked six different targets within a narrow geographical space in Dnipro. This second Urazhnoye strike hit six distinct, physically separated targets. I think there was an aircraft refurbishment facility that might have taken three. When I say three, I mean six—the six submunitions, three independently targeted warheads, six submunitions—boom, boom, boom.

But one of them went off and hit the strategic gas station, and I think they hit other targets too. What the Russians demonstrated this time—because people were saying, "No, it just comes in and it' s not accurate"—the Russians went, "Watch this. See, it separates. Now see what happens." The six independently targeted warheads go and hit six distinct targets. Oh, the Urazhnoye has a greater range. So the Russians gave away a very big operational detail about the Urazhnoye—that it's not just concentrated in one area. It's six separate, targetable, maneuvering warheads that strike with precision where they need to go. That's a signal the Russians sent, too, about capability.

The Russians... The Yars missile has gone into serial production. That was announced a while back, but it actually began, I think, in August, when the first serial-produced missile came off the production line in Votkinsk. Since that time, they've put together a brigade—three battalions of three launchers each. That's nine missiles, plus a tenth missile used for training purposes. So, ten missiles, serially produced, out of Votkinsk, between August and November. In December, this brigade went operational. But the Russians have said there are other brigades forming up as well. The launch didn' t come from an operational unit; the launch came from Kapustin Yar.

When Putin first announced the Yarsnik, he said it was an operational test. He said, "We have several of these assembled together, but it's a test missile. We don't have… you know, it's not gone into serial production." It is in serial production now. Those missiles are going to operational brigades. And the Belarusian military—it's actually a Russian brigade in Belarus, jointly commanded. And then other brigades are up there. This missile was a test missile as well. It's sort of funny—just a little war story here. They're looking at the debris, and somebody goes, "Look, there's a lamp in there. A lamp! An old Soviet lamp in there." This isn't sophisticated, right?

When I was a weapons inspector in Votkinsk, we used this thing called a stage measuring device. You pop the lid off the missile, and you're supposed to slide the stage measuring device down into it. Then they had optical sensors—you're measuring the gap between the stages to make sure the second stage wasn't the same as an SS-20. But it had to be illuminated, so down there they had lamps. I remember, this is a solid-propellant thing. We had to wear anti-static clothing and, you

know, ground ourselves before we got anywhere near the missile. I wasn't on this test—I wish I was; I'd have killed to be there. But I had a good friend who was, John Sartorius. So they slide it down there, and they're working, and all of a sudden that lamp down there goes—there's a surge.

The lamp blows up inside the launch canister of a solid rocket missile, and everybody just freezes. About ten seconds later, one of the Soviets goes, "Well, we're still alive." So they pull the thing out, and now there are shards of glass down there, and they're like, "Well, we need another lamp." Now, the Soviets are told—because when the Americans were looking at it, they said, "There's a lamp on this. This is a very specially made lamp, made by a factory in Moscow specifically for this." The Russians went out to a standard truck, I think it was, took off the headlight, pulled the lamp from it, came back in, soldered it on there, and said, "We can go again." And the Americans were like, "We're not doing that."

My point is, the Russians, when they do testing, have things in there that are sort of soldered in, you know, just for testing. That lamp isn't part of the operating system of the Yars. It's probably there to illuminate parts of the missile during vibration tests. You know, Kapustin Yar has an off-road area where they take the launcher and run it around, then bring it back to see if they can raise it up, check if the gyros spin up, and do all these tests so that if something breaks, they can say, "Oh, wait, we've got to fix that." Then they send it back to the Moscow Institute of Thermal Technology, they think about it, come up with fixes, it goes to Votkinsk, they put together a test missile, send it out to Kapustin Yar, and test it.

The Russians fired a test missile, which, again, means they aren't showing the full capacity of this missile. But they showed enough. This time, the warheads separated and hit six distinct targets. These weren't operational missiles, though. Those missiles are now deployed. It'll be a different game the day the Russians stop firing the Yars from Kapustin Yar, because that's still a demonstration. You fire it from an actual operational unit—that's war. But the Russians are fed up, Ray. I mean, all these guys who advise the president—the people in parliament, the close advisors—they're all coming out, and they are furious. I mean, they want to nuke Europe right now.

The head of the defense committee in the parliament—basically the equivalent of whoever runs the House Armed Services Committee—said, "Nuke them. I'm going to advise the president to nuke them now." Sergei Karaganov, a well-known political theorist close to Vladimir Putin, said, "We need to use nuclear weapons against Europe now. It's the only thing they'll understand." This is the kind of rhetoric that's happening. Now, Vladimir Putin, of course, is much more pragmatic and smart, and he carries the weight of the world on his shoulders. I don't believe he's going to do that. But we can't dismiss the fact that the Russian system is furious that the United States tried to kill their president. Yeah—blind furious.

#Ray

Yeah, no, I would say that's really important. And Karaganov, of course, has been saying this for, if not decades, at least years. So he's under some pressure to do so—that is, Putin is. And I would just add here, I think this is something that's really important. Ten years ago, when U.S. and other Western journalists were in St. Petersburg for a big economic conference, Putin invited them to a small around-the-table briefing. There were about twenty of them, okay? And what he said was, "Look, I don't know why you guys don't take this seriously, but I'm going to tell you what we've had to do because the U.S. has rejected all our initiatives."

We're not helpless. We're developing very imaginative systems that the U.S. can't defend against. Now, I don't expect you to write this in your newspapers. I don't even expect you to tell your editors about this—which, of course, Putin was right about. But I'm going to tell you what it is. We have the tape of that, okay? Now, two years later, in his State of the Union address, Putin got up and did a show-and-tell about these new, sophisticated, different technology weapons that were going to come online eventually—and now they're online, okay? You know, not only the Avangard, but the Poseidon and lots of others.

What I'm trying to say is, the important thing is that, for the first time in my life—let alone my professional career—Russia has an advantage over us, not only in conventional arms but in strategic arms. They have a deterrent that won't quit. My question is, why is it that no intelligence or armed forces intelligence outfit has acknowledged that and said to the President of the United States, "Look, we need to cry uncle here. We're not going to prevail against the Russians, much less the Russians and the Chinese"? Why is it, Scott, that people don't know the Russians have an advantage now that they never had before—and that we should stop tweaking the bear?

#Scott Ritter

Look, Ray, I'm not in the intelligence business anymore, so it's hard to know. But I take a look at the theories that come out from people who are connected, you know, because of course we don't get to read the actual classified intelligence reports put out by the various missile analysis departments in the intelligence community. But there's a theory right now that we don't need to worry about the Ereshnik, because when the Russians started mass-producing the Iskander, the Zircon, and the Kinzhal, they maxed out their aluminum perchlorate capability—aluminum powder. And there's only that one factory in Novosibirsk, and the satellite imagery doesn't show that the factory has expanded, so there's this bottleneck.

And so now they want to talk about building the Ereshnik, but that's a bigger missile that's going to consume a lot more material, and therefore they can't do it. They're bluffing. And plus, you know, we're looking at the Yars modernization program. There are all these competing factors out there for this limited quantity of material. And I look at their analysis and have to respond by saying, you don't know. I mean, I can't get into sources or methods here, but I know what they used to be able to do in terms of collection. Maybe they've gotten better, but the Russians haven't just sat there as a

static target. They change up, too. The Russian relationship with China is a completely different relationship, and so is the Russian relationship with North Korea.

And both of those nations produce the materials they say are now in short supply—the raw materials. All I know is that when I was in Russia, when I went to Novosibirsk and to Ekaterinburg, of course I didn't have access to the classified side of things. There were just a lot of cranes, a lot of cranes. The Russians are building things, building things. And there are probably facilities out there that we just don't have a clue about, what they're doing. I remember how shocked people were when Vladimir Solovyov went up to Victory Park, that complex north of Moscow where they have this giant cathedral and a wonderful museum about World War II. But adjacent to it is a facility.

And it turns out that's where they were building up the Birzbesnik drone unit. They did it there to avoid detection. But Solovyov made a mistake—he did a video, and it allowed people to geolocate it. And there it is. My point is, I think Russia's full of places doing things right now that we just don't have a clue about. I mean, the CIA is shut down; they don't have any eyes operating inside Russia, not like they used to. And, you know, satellites are only good when they're looking at something. If you're looking at a roof, you're looking at a roof. I mean, it's not that good yet—you can't see through the roof.

#Ray

Actually, you can now, with radar and infrared.

#Danny

But I can also counter that just through simple heat layering and reflectors. I mean, you know, my point is, I think the United States is flying blind on this. And I think there's also a lot of wishful thinking. We've been posturing the Russians as weak for so long that we can't accept the fact that they're actually strong—that they can produce things in quantities and quality beyond our imagination. They're getting ready. You know, we talked about how the drone revolution has made the tank obsolete. No. You know what Russia's been doing? They're building a tank with modern, advanced anti-drone technology built into it. And they're assembling armored forces now that have this technology for breakout.

Now, when and where that's going to happen, I don't know. People are saying it might come down through Chernaev, maybe through Sumy. But the point is, the Russians are getting ready to reinvent the battlefield using new, advanced technology. We're still trying to learn how to do basic drone warfare, while the Russians and Ukrainians are masters at it. But drone warfare has kind of reached the pinnacle of where it can go. Now the question is, do you just have static trench warfare, or do you come up with new tactics and new equipment like the Germans did at the end? The Russians are doing that right now, and we're just clueless. We're clueless about Russia.

#Ray

Well, I thought the Russian economy was falling apart, Scott. That's what the president said just the other day. Would the president be ill-informed on that, do you suppose?

#Danny

I think the president is as ill-informed as it gets. I also think this president doesn't care what other people tell him. He gets something in his mind—look, this is a man who basically said international law doesn't matter.

#Scott Ritter

Only my morals.

#Scott Ritter

The only thing that matters is my morality. The man who was on more airplanes with Epstein than anybody else is talking about morality. Sorry I went there. I apologize. I know. I mean, that's relevant.