

Gilbert Doctorow: Russia Retaliates, Hidden Diplomacy, & EU Chaos

Dr. Gilbert Doctorow discusses how Russia retaliates during the diplomatic efforts. While most focus is on negotiations between Russia and Ukraine, the negotiations between Russia and the US are of greater importance to end the proxy war. Gilbert Doctorow's new book "War Diaries. Volume 1: The Russia-Ukraine War, 2022-2023" is now available on Amazon: <https://www.amazon.com/War-Diaries-Russia-Ukraine-2022-2023/dp/B0F9VK1WM2> Follow Prof. Glenn Diesen: Substack: <https://glenndiesen.substack.com/> X/Twitter: https://x.com/Glenn_Diesen Patreon: <https://www.patreon.com/glenndiesen> Support the research by Prof. Glenn Diesen: PayPal: <https://www.paypal.com/paypalme/glenndiesen> Buy me a Coffee: buymeacoffee.com/gdieseng Go Fund Me: <https://gofund.me/09ea012f> Books by Prof. Glenn Diesen: <https://www.amazon.com/stores/author/B09FPQ4MDL>

#Glenn

Welcome back to the program. We're joined again by Gilbert Doktorov, historian, political affairs analyst, and author of **War Diaries: The Russia-Ukraine War.** Thank you for coming back on. We see now that these trilateral negotiations between Ukraine, Russia, and the U.S. have already begun, and the first phase has finished. I was wondering how you assess this, because whenever we speak of negotiations, it tends to be very simplified — as if it's just between Russia and Ukraine, which doesn't appear to be moving forward. However, we shouldn't neglect that the U.S.–Russia negotiations are also quite important, since this is primarily a proxy war between NATO and Russia. And we often seem to forget that part, because Trump wants to present himself as a mediator, and the Russians appear to humor him by allowing him to play that role.

But beneath the theatrics, the war between Russia and the United States still has to be resolved. It's still the U.S. that toppled the government in Ukraine. It's U.S. intelligence agencies that poured into Ukraine the day after the coup. It's the U.S. that hijacked the Ukrainian government and built up this massive proxy army. It's the U.S. that sends the military planners, the weapons, provides the intelligence, picks the targets, and at times even pulls the trigger. So, given that this is also a U.S. war—and one year into his presidency, it's also Trump's war—there must be some kind of deal between the U.S. and Russia aimed at improving bilateral ties, which would mean ending the proxy war, or at least downgrading it. Sorry for the very long question, but in this wider context, with the complexity of these negotiations and the lack of clear information coming out, how are you assessing the negotiations?

#Gilbert Doctorow

They are confusing. My colleagues who have commented on this in the past few days have raised some points I'd like to address as we get into this. There are many dimensions to the U.S.–Russian relationship, and the reestablishment of normal state-to-state conditions involves various issues — like the renewal or non-renewal of the New START treaty, which comes up in about a week, and the question of restoring normal embassy functions in both countries. So these are two issues you could put on the negative side of the balance, suggesting there's no progress in U.S.–Russian state-to-state relations. But there are contradictions here, because in other areas I see dramatic and very important positive changes.

And I'll start with that. It comes from the latest news, which, to my great surprise, virtually nobody—either in mainstream or alternative media—has written or spoken about. I'm referring to what was said on Sunday evening's news wrap-up, **The News of the Week**, hosted by the doyen of Russian television news reporting, Dmitry Kiselyov. What he had to say went far beyond the very bland, almost meaningless statements of the presidential advisor Ushakov, when he spoke to reporters about the results of the meetings in Moscow—when Kushner, Witkoff, and Jindan were present—and the follow-up meetings in Abu Dhabi. Now, what comes out of this?

I hope we'll have time to get into the question of the Russia–Ukraine war later. But let's look at U.S.–Russian relations. What came out of this, in the presence of Glenn Diesen and the meetings in Moscow, was heavily focused on the question of U.S.–Russian relations. Unlike the Chinese, who very quickly decided they wouldn't take part in the peace forum, Mr. Putin held off on making a firm comment—although a kind of hint was probably pre-coordinated with Lukashenko in Belarus, since Belarus, which also got such an invitation, instantly accepted it. And because Russia and Belarus are joined at the hip, it was a good sign that the Russians would probably join as well. Nonetheless, there was no statement until what Kiselyov revealed on Sunday night.

That Greenbaum and Putin had discussed the Russian proposal to contribute \$1 billion in order to be designated a permanent member of the board—from the frozen Russian state assets in the United States, which total about \$5 billion in equivalent value. That's remarkable. I know that Donald Trump was asked by a reporter on one of his flights whether he accepted this proposal of using frozen Russian assets, and he begged off. But you can assume that it's accepted. From the Russian side, it's outstanding, considering something else that Mr. Kiselyov quickly inserted into his comments on the meeting that same day—the same day Kushner and Witkoff were in Moscow—when he received Mahmoud Abbas, the president of the Palestinian state.

And of course, he discussed with the Palestinians the one-billion-dollar contribution and that Russia will be on the board, which of course forces Netanyahu's hand—they absurdly also have to be on the board. Although, again, either you're at the meeting table or you're on the menu. So that is of great importance. But there's still, as I said, a little additional detail, which you had to listen closely to catch: Kiselyov said that the remaining four billion dollars in frozen Russian assets in the States will be assigned to the reconstruction of Palestine. I mention this because it bears heavily on the Russia–Ukraine war. I said a year ago that the Russians could probably end the war at once if they offered

to make their two-hundred billion dollars in assets in Belgium available for reconstruction of the whole of Ukraine, including the part they occupy.

That, of course, passed without much notice. But maybe it was noticed—not because it's a brilliant insight, but because it's so obvious, and particularly in line with what we now know about how Mr. Trump conducts foreign policy: foreign policy as an extension of real estate transactions. So I believe that what we just heard, which was slipped in, as I said, by Kiselyov, gives us an inkling of what could be coming—and how Mr. Greenbaum finds 800 billion to buy off Kyiv and reach a settlement of the war as a kind of real estate transaction. If the Russians' 300 billion in assets in Europe are used, then he only has to find an additional 500. This is something tantalizing.

And it is—no, I'm mixing the two issues: the Russia-Ukraine war and American-Russian relations. But they're so totally interrelated. As for the rest of the improvements in U.S.–Russian relations, we know very little indeed. But I want to push back on what my peers have said, suggesting there's no progress. They say there's no progress on restoring full functionality of the embassies because of the opposition or interference of Marco Rubio. Well, that's possible. After all, that's his department, and he could put the brakes on there if he wished—though I'm not sure I understand why he would directly frustrate the initiatives of his boss. But that's a separate issue. Still, it's reasonable to say there's no progress there.

However, it isn't really an issue of any importance, because we know that the feedback channels—communications between Putin and Trump—are working superbly. They're effective, and perhaps that's why the State Department isn't being brought in: because there are no leaks. There are no leaks. You mentioned my book. I can say that volume two, on 2024, will be coming out in about six weeks, and volume three, on 2025, will be out in about three months. I'm doing the final editing of these now, reading through the texts again, looking for themes—threads, common threads—that run through these periods of time.

And I find—and one thing is clear—since I'm doing 2025 now, I'm looking at the period from September '25 through October '25, when Vladimir Putin, whom I had criticized rather severely, saying maybe he should step down because the gently-gently approach was doing damage to Russia's deterrence. Trump had called Russia a paper tiger, and suddenly there's a remarkable change in Putin's language. I'm supposing that happened behind closed doors, within this back channel, and I believe the back channel was extremely effective. Because in public, Putin continued his fawning behavior toward Trump, which you and I both saw at the discussion club meeting in Sochi.

But something very important happened in late September or October, which suggests that Putin was showing his teeth to Trump—and did so effectively. What do I have in mind? In these periodic flip-flops—Is Mr. Trump pro-Russian or pro-Ukraine?—there was a flip in September when Trump was siding with Zelensky, saying the Russians have to sit down at once and sign a general truce, or he'd impose enormous sanctions and start shipping Tomahawks to Kyiv. Well, we heard that for a very brief time, and then "Tomahawks to Kyiv" disappeared completely. And I firmly believe that

Vladimir Putin sent a message, through these back channels, to Donald Trump: if you do this—if you send Tomahawks to Kyiv—we will utterly destroy Ukraine at once.

That is to say, Mr. Putin shifted from the slow, cautious approach to exactly the position of his critics. There aren't really opponents as such—just critics within the upper circles of the Russian elite—and their stance was “get tough, and we will annihilate Ukraine, as we are capable of doing.” And it worked, because we never heard again about Tomahawks going to Ukraine. So here I'm suggesting that the absence of regular diplomacy isn't necessarily significant, because regular diplomacy would go through Rubio's hands, through State Department people who are neocons and would do everything possible to wreck things. So Trump is using back channels. Therefore, it's a mistake to interpret the failure to revive normal diplomatic operations as a failure to carry through on the Anchorage agreements.

So the situation is much more complicated. Oh, yes, the same thing about this failure to renew New START. I don't see this as having—I'm sorry, I'll say something that will surprise and displease a lot of people, but so be it. My view is that the New START treaty has no relevance to 2026. In the last two years, with the rollout of completely new weapon systems by Russia—the Burevestnik, for example—it's not covered by anything remotely conceived in New START. And a missile that can circle the globe three times, essentially—let's be honest about it—though it doesn't legally violate the terms of no weapon systems in space, is in fact a weapon system in space.

So, I mean, it travels at such a high level into the atmosphere that, practically speaking, it doesn't go into orbit as such, but we're talking about a weapons system that isn't covered by New START. Therefore, the simple renewal or extension of New START, I think, is an irrelevancy and a distraction, preventing us from focusing our minds on what should be the proper arms negotiations in the present situation—one of wholly new strategic offensive and defensive systems that have been implemented by Russia. And let's be open about it: the systems now being planned by Donald Trump in his \$1.5 trillion defense budget. Everyone is laughing at his “golden dome.”

What I'm talking about—and what the Russians are talking about—and I say this because my peers aren't really listening to them, is this: they rely on their favored relationships with Russian generals, as I've said. Well, I'm listening to what the Russians are actually saying. And what they're saying on public television is that the United States is preparing for a space-based missile system that will be called a defense, but is actually an offense, making a first strike possible. So there's a lot in play here that isn't being openly discussed, and it bears directly on the judgments my peers are making about the validity or importance of New START's renewal or extension.

#Glenn

Well, I also picked up on Russia escalating as well. That is, Putin has not only become a bit more aggressive rhetorically, but also in action—striking ships, ports, and bridges, and of course trying to shut off electricity across Ukraine. Well, not all of it, but turning off the lights in important areas. I

even saw it in the British media; they tried to present it as, “Oh, the Russians are trying to humiliate Trump by having these massive attacks during the negotiations.” But I think anything else would be interpreted by Trump as weakness, which they understood. If the Russians halted this, I mean, the U.S. isn’t halting its attacks on Russia either. So it’s interesting that this is intensifying, but it doesn’t really get that much coverage.

However, in the wider context, to what extent do you think a reset between Russia and the U.S. is even possible now? Because as you see, while the United States says it wants to improve relations with Russia, it’s still ramping up sanctions, still continuing the war efforts—not just indirectly, but also through direct confrontation. We also see Trump going after oil supplies, the attacks on Venezuela, and probably soon yet another attack on Iran. Yes, much of this is aimed at China, but overall the U.S. under Trump seems to be trying to assert its dominance in a new format. So it’s very hard to see how this could fit with the broader goal of finding a new, acceptable status quo with the Russians.

#Gilbert Doctorow

Well, first of all, the overarching view: the Russians blow hot and cold in their optimism and pessimism, just as you and I do. That’s official Russia. So what Mr. Kiselyov shows on his high-level talk show, or on his *News of the Week* wrap-up, ranges from optimistic to gloomy—though not necessarily following the same wave as ours, but their own. I’ll be a bit disruptive of the consensus in alternative media with what I’m about to say, and it ties into what you just mentioned a moment ago about sanctions.

It’s the consensus among my peers—those who are Putin’s cheerleaders—that the Americans can do nothing to damage Russia economically. Russia has gone through 16,000 sanctions, the economy is doing just fine, and if it’s not doing fine, it’s because of the misguided political and interest-rate policies of the central bank, not because of any harm being done to the fundamentals of the Russian economy by the sanctions or by American actions. Wrong. Again, they don’t listen to Russian news. They don’t listen to Russian authoritative or expert opinions. If they did, they’d have heard what I heard on Sunday night regarding Mr. Trump’s move on Venezuela—what it means.

There was one panelist, quite an expert in the field, who said, “Yes, this indicates that the United States is going to reach 35% control of global oil trade. The takeover of Venezuela is a contributing factor in that. With this level of control over prices and production, the United States can do a lot of damage to our economy. And it’s a strong argument for continued industrialization, reindustrialization, and diversification of our economy—which, incidentally, the same people are saying has to be guided by a dirigiste economic policy domestically. Forget about, throw out the window, all those 1990s capitalist notions.”

We need a dirigiste, state-planned investment perspective in key sectors of the economy, which is already happening de facto, with the allocation of subsidies and credit for those favored industries

and companies that cannot and should not be exposed to 20% interest rates. But they want to institutionalize this to ensure that the Russian economy becomes more directed and less free-market. And it's all because of the damage the United States is doing—and will do—to the Russian economy. Those who say the United States has no power over Russia are simply dead wrong. They're not listening to Russian experts. That's a very important point. At the same time, I can say that, officially, Russia—around Putin—is very enthusiastic about the prospects of doing a deal with Trump.

And nothing is more important in their evaluation of his sincerity—not as a friend, but de facto because of his own interests in restoring normal relations with Russia and ending the sanctions and so forth. This is a result of what they saw at Davos. They were delighted to see the Europeans utterly humiliated, taken off their perch. They were delighted, and Soloviov showed twice on his program our Belgian Prime Minister, Bart De Wever, saying that it was one thing to be happy as vassals, it's another to be miserable as slaves. They loved that. And that destruction of the EU and of NATO is understood by the Russians as essential to Trump delivering what he promised to Putin in Ankara.

#Glenn

Well, while the negotiations between Russia and the U.S. continue to be—well, let's call it unclear, or it's ambiguous which direction this is heading—I think part of it is also the way Trump tends to work. Whenever he flatters, it's sometimes to conceal the growing pressure and the damage he's trying to do. But if we shift a bit to the Russia-Ukraine aspect of the negotiations, how do you make sense of these recent statements? For example, Zelensky made a comment that Ukraine will not make any compromises or cede any territory, and then, of course, went on to demand security guarantees elsewhere—to the point that it would undermine Ukraine as a neutral country.

So, in other words, taking everything the Russians demand off the table at a time when Ukraine's manpower crisis is getting out of control—when it's suffering more on the battlefield, the economy is struggling, the infrastructure, especially the electric grid, is breaking down, and international support is waning—it's very strange to see this absolute, uncompromising tone. It seems he's shifted a bit backward, because it looked like he had the door open for some compromises, and now he seems to be going the other direction. Is this just posturing? Is it for a domestic audience, to appease the nationalists? How are you assessing this?

#Gilbert Doctorow

I think your last remark is exactly what I said. It's to buy time for himself by not letting his compatriots know what he's doing. Of course, they agreed to give up the Donbass. The Russians wouldn't be there if that hadn't been pre-agreed. They wouldn't have sent who they sent—their military experts, their head of military intelligence—to discuss security issues. Well, what are the security issues? This was clear from Mr. Soloviov: security issues are the conditions under which the Ukrainians were withdrawing all their troops from Donbass. That's what they were meeting about,

and the creation of, I think, a 60-kilometer buffer zone on either side of the new frontier between Russia and Ukraine.

Well, if there were no agreement on withdrawal, 60 kilometers would take them right back to the area from which the Ukrainians had been launching all their missiles, drones, and artillery at Donetsk. So, of course, it's not going to be that frontier. It'll probably be the frontier at the Dnieper River, where the Russians can afford to have a demilitarized zone of 60 kilometers. What's the difference? That's essentially the territory they haven't yet conquered. So there's no question—what Zelensky was saying was really addressed to his compatriots, not to the West. Although in the West, the BBC, of course, picked it up as if this meant, "Oh, he hasn't agreed to anything." Rubbish. He's agreed to everything, otherwise the Russians wouldn't be there.

The Russians were hesitant to be there because of the significant role given to Budanov as the head of it. From the Russian perspective, he's a terrorist and a killer. As the head of Ukrainian military intelligence, he was the one behind the successful execution of plots and the assassination of Russian generals. They had to bite their tongues to go into these meetings with the Ukrainians and have Budanov as their talking partner. And they did so only because they'd gotten their way on what matters to them, which is that the Ukrainians have essentially capitulated. Now, that's where we are. I'm sorry, I think I'm missing the broader question you had about relations with Ukraine. Could you maybe restate it?

#Glenn

Yeah, well, in this proxy war, you do have to solve a lot of things. Ukraine is very much at the center, but you have to restore Ukraine's neutrality, and you need the territorial concessions. But I think the Russians have left themselves some room to make compromises. Again, on neutrality, you can always have some limited security guarantees, you can have some ties there—just not Western troops or weapons in Ukraine. Same with the issue of territorial concessions: of course, Ukraine has to pull out of Donbass.

That's just written in stone for the Russians. But they might be able to make some compromises—that is, to accept that they won't get all of Kherson's separation if they get to keep what they've taken in, you know, Sumy and Kharkiv. So, you know, there's always room for maneuver. But on the basics, how close would we actually be to at least the Ukrainians and the Russians agreeing on something? Because, I mean, I think just for self-preservation, continuing this war now does seem suicidal. So I guess my wider question was simply, is there a possibility of Ukraine and Russia actually reaching some agreement? Yes.

#Gilbert Doctorow

I think there is, to my surprise. And I can say that there are people—even on the show of this General Burzynski, retired—who is very well connected, saying that, well, we would prefer a

capitulation right now. But listen to what our Supreme Commander is doing, and I will not criticize him. Well, of course, he's saying that. He is criticizing him indirectly, nonetheless. I think there are several things in play here, and we can't miss all the marbles. I think this question of a monetary offer being made for the settlement will come into play a little further down the line. Remember, the Russians' main interest is regime change.

And I think they may have an understanding with Trump about how this is to take place in a democratic manner—not by the Americans replacing Zelensky with Syrsky, Zaluzhny, or Budanov. No, I think that Trump, even though Americans are fond of calling him an autocrat, is going to behave in a very pro-democracy way with respect to the settlement and regime change in Ukraine. And if the Americans and the Russians are truly conspiring on how this is to be done, it may be done. When do they insert the question of the buyout? When do they raise the question of a referendum, which Mr. Zelensky has rightly seen as his off-ramp? He can leave with his fortune and say that he's done his duty to Ukraine if there is a proper vote by his people.

So the timing of this will be essential. We are not privy to any of it, and we have no right to be. But I can imagine that there's a way the Russians and the Americans could remove Zelensky from the scene and see that he's replaced by some Ukrainian politician who favors accepting the Russian conditions in return for a solid monetary payment that can help Ukraine rebuild and not be stolen—which is what Mr. Trump's peace board could do if it has the right people in charge. And I suppose he's picking his assistants, like Fink, the head of BlackRock and the World Economic Forum, to ensure that the reconstruction will be proper and the money won't be wasted.

#Glenn

Well, I wanted to ask about the European component, because you can, of course, say that both the Ukrainians and the Americans have to negotiate peace with the Russians. The Europeans have obviously cut themselves off from the diplomatic process. But some within Europe are now pushing to restore talks with Russia after four years of boycotting. I don't see the Europeans having any real role in resolving or engaging in the Ukraine-Russia talks, although they're trying to insert themselves with this "coalition of the willing" and other, well, non-starters. But this is also a war about the European security architecture. I mean, this war, to a large extent, was predictable.

As you know, many have said since the 1990s, when the decision was made to cancel the pan-European security architecture and instead pursue the incremental expansion of NATO. If you go through the academic literature, there were many who made the point: where exactly would NATO stop? There wouldn't be any logical stopping point before it actually reached Ukraine. And this would never work—it was widely understood that this would mean war. So even though the Europeans aren't talking to Russia and won't have any role in the Ukraine-Russia process, there still has to be some diplomatic settlement, doesn't there, between the Europeans and the Russians?

#Gilbert Doctorow

Well, the Europeans have to be brought in at a certain point. When I said that the frozen Russian assets in Europe would be handed over to the Peace Fund—well, they're controlled by the Europeans, so you can't just do it without the permission of the Belgian prime minister and everyone else. I think the Russians, as I said, were very satisfied to see the Europeans shattered at Davos. And we heard something quite remarkable coming from the very diplomatic Mr. Lavrov, the foreign minister. In the past week, he said, "We absolutely will never have talks with Kaja Kallas. Never. Never."

And I don't believe that her tenure as the deputy president of the European Commission under Ursula von der Leyen was going to last very long. The Europeans are now scratching their heads over whom to send as their emissary to reopen direct talks with Russia. Of course, Mr. Macron couldn't miss the opportunity to rush forward and present France as the intercessor. Even at Davos, he sent a secret message—a private message to Donald Trump—inviting him to come to a hastily arranged G7 meeting in Paris just after Davos closes, or, failing that, to have a private dinner with him.

And then Donald Trump did the unthinkable. He published this message, making Macron look like an utter fool—which was his intention. I understand that the Europeans are putting up Stubb, the prime minister of Finland, as a possible candidate, as an intercessor, because he supposedly has a good relationship both with Trump and some kind of relationship with Putin. That's possible. Stubb has gone this way or that way from day to day on whether the Russians should be engaged in a civilized, normal way with Europe in the future when the war ends. He's had it both ways.

So he could be useful, although his remarks about the peace treaty that Finland concluded in 1944 with the Soviet Union—ending their participation in the, uh, in the Hitler coalition and the Axis and joining the Allies, joining Russia, at the expense of significant territorial concessions—that was a peculiar thing to say, since it cut both ways. Nonetheless, Mr. Stubb is there, eligible. And since Europeans generally think that because Finland is a neighbor of Russia, every Finn necessarily knows Russian perfectly—which is a big mistake—but nonetheless, he's being put up. Someone will step forward. But what I see is regime change in Europe. If Kaja Kallas is thrown out, she will take her boss with her. I don't know if it's reached you, but here in Brussels the rumors are that she is denouncing Ursula von der Leyen as a dictator—yes, a dictator, somebody you can't work for. So I think when she goes, she'll go screaming, "Take Ursula with me." And that will happen.

#Glenn

Well, this is—yeah, that was political. They actually covered that Kallas had called von der Leyen a dictator, pointing out the fracture between them. But you also see the tensions between the Germans and the EU. You see the tension between the French and the Germans. There's a lot of that taking place. And the fact is, not just the Russians don't see any point in talking to Kallas, but the Americans aren't too excited about her either. Marco Rubio has, I think, humiliated her more

than once. But this is becoming common now. That is, Trump at Davos humiliated the Europeans, and Mark Rutte responded by celebrating him as the greatest leader there was. He had Zelensky get on stage and give a speech where he was just criticizing the Europeans as being weak and unable to do anything.

And he was met with a standing ovation—just by the Europeans—applauding him for scolding them. I mean, there's something very sad happening in Europe. And as a European, this is... yeah, you can't help but think this isn't going to last. All of this is happening, all these fracture points, and now there's a deeper rift between the public and the political leaders. I think we're seeing a legitimacy crisis brewing. These aren't just unpopular politicians; these are politicians who have overstepped their mandates. They've been lying excessively and taking their respective countries down a very dark road. So, at some point, Europeans have to change course as well. You'd think the end of this war would be an opportunity, but they seem to push back so fiercely. Do you have any final thoughts before we wrap up?

#Gilbert Doctorow

No, we have a wealth of news coming at us every day now. As I look at what I call 2025—my volume three—it's the year of Trump, no question about it. And here's the barometer of the resolution of so many global issues, some of which he himself precipitates. At the moment, the Russians—official Russians, I mean the Kremlin and its spokesman, Kiselyov—are very optimistic about the resolution and the agreements reached, both on the war in Ukraine and on the normalization of relations with the Americans. At the same time, Mr. Solovyov, on his program, is pointing out that the United States is a very dangerous competitor and is capable of, and will be, doing serious damage to the Russian economy as it was configured in the 1990s—as a major exporter of raw materials. So the argument for major economic and financial changes in Russia is being made in light of a future world dominated by Trump.

#Glenn

Well, still, I think the Russian approach to Trump is shifting. The Europeans seem convinced that if they just bow to Trump, do as they're told, they'll somehow be spared. As we saw in Davos, the Canadians seem to reject this now, saying it will only embolden Trump. It seems to me the Russian position has been shifting too—again, a bit like the Europeans, just trying to make Trump happy. At least, in the worst case, that might direct his focus toward the Europeans instead of his main objective of decoupling someone from these old security arrangements.

However, I think—yes—Putin stated recently that any restraint or trust would only be abused as a sign of weakness. So I don't think they're going to... it seems to me, at least, that some of their ties with Trump aren't going to be as, well, as European, let's call it, as they were in the past. We both

saw Putin's speech in Valdai back in—was it October or November? I think you probably won't see a similar speech from him next time around. At least that's my expectation, after, again, the Russians learning a bit about how to deal with Trump.

#Gilbert Doctorow

The destruction of Europe's self-confidence—in Ireland, I think—and their new understanding of the dangers of counting on Mr. Trump in the United States. We have to add to that the views that Borrell made in his speech to the European Parliament a day ago, in which he said that without the American umbrella and support, Europe is utterly defenseless and will be for many years to come. I think all of this pushes anyone in European leadership positions to face the reality and necessity of sitting with the Russians and devising a new security architecture that puts an end to the threat of a war breaking out. So a lot of things are going to change—not just the name of the party boss from this group or that group in a coalition government in any one of the European countries—but a basic policy change and understanding of how security can be achieved by agreeing with the Russians instead of ganging up on them.

#Glenn

That would be an advancement. And again, I wish we'd had this kind of thinking back in the '90s when we started moving toward this disaster. So thank you very much for taking the time.

#Gilbert Doctorow

My pleasure.