

Richard Wolff: End of Free Trade & Return of Empire

Prof. Richard Wolff discusses the implosion of the political and economic system organised around the US, and how the US is responding by returning to more traditional imperialism. Follow Prof. Glenn Diesen: Substack: <https://glenndiesen.substack.com/> X/Twitter: https://x.com/Glenn_Diesen Patreon: <https://www.patreon.com/glenndiesen> Support the research by Prof. Glenn Diesen: PayPal: <https://www.paypal.com/paypalme/glenndiesen> Buy me a Coffee: buymeacoffee.com/gdieseng Go Fund Me: <https://gofund.me/09ea012f> Buy Diesen merchandise: <https://diesen-shop.fourthwall.com/en-nok> Books by Prof. Glenn Diesen: <https://www.amazon.com/stores/author/B09FPQ4MDL>

#Glenn

Hi, everyone, and welcome back. We are joined today by the political economist, Professor Richard Wolff. It's good to have you back. How have you been?

#Richard Wolff

Pretty well. I'm marveling each day at the behavior of my government and then again also of you in Europe as well. But otherwise, yes, I'm fine. We are, I should mention, we are in the final month before our elections here. They will happen literally a month from now. And we are watching what appears to be the determined death spiral of our great leader. And that is a remarkable display, either of a level of corruption even we will be surprised at, or a death wish.

#Glenn

Yeah, I actually was going to get to this later, but we might as well start there. That is, I'm afraid that, you know, you see the problems of the Trump administration. You have similar developments in Europe, you know, Chancellor Merz of Germany or Macron of France. Well, you know the whole list, but it feels like it's more problematic than simply one political party doing it poorly and handing over power. There seems to be a deeper crisis here that is one of political legitimacy, one of a democratic deficit in a sense by the population that the system needs huge reforms. That is not merely an issue of this party or the opposition party, but again, the system needs a larger shock.

Again, I have an aversion to revolutions because I see more stability in incremental change. But how do you see this commonality between the United States and Europe? Because all these economic problems, the security issues, the concentration of wealth, the political corruption, this really powerful control over the media and narrative—there's something deeper, it feels.

#Richard Wolff

Well, let me offer something that you and I have discussed before as a way of understanding it. To be as blunt as possible, in the hopes of clarity, I'll try to spell it out in a minute. I believe that what we are witnessing, both in Europe and the United States—and I would add Japan, but leave it to the side for the moment—we are witnessing what was in the cards for a long time, namely the revolt of the empire. That is, you know, the European countries, 18th, 19th century, maybe longer, created a world economy. They did.

And to their credit, Marx himself said repeatedly that one of the historic achievements of modern capitalism was the creation of a world economy, a world market in which the Africans would know what the Europeans are doing and the Asians would know what's happening in Latin America and all the rest of it. They would trade with each other, invest in each other, learn from each other, etc., etc. And I agree with Marx. I think that is an achievement of modern capitalism. And we'll always give some credit to capitalism for having advanced the human experience beyond what slavery and feudalism, who have their achievements too, but creating a world economy wasn't one of them.

Okay. The problem is the other side of the dialectic. They created a world economy, but they did so terribly badly. This is a botched-up job in which a tiny portion of the world economy they created became very wealthy: North America, Western Europe, and Japan. And the rest of the world became the hewers of wood and the drawers of water, poverty-stricken from beginning to end. You know, I think of Belgium. My students want me always to give the example of Belgium. Belgium is a poor corner of Northwest Europe, but once it acquires the Congo, it becomes a very rich, solid place where the European Union, now in Brussels, can enjoy the lovely medieval architecture and all the rest of it.

So, you had an explosion of a world economy, horribly unequally organized, a terrible job. Even worse, because when they run out of territory to take from local poor people, they begin to bump against each other: the British Empire against the Russian, the French against the German, all over the place. My doctoral dissertation many years ago, when I didn't understand most of this, was about East Africa and the clash of German and British imperialism in that part of the world. Okay. It erupts and it finishes its historic mission by two of the worst wars the human race has ever conducted. World Wars I and II were wars about empire, by empires, at the expense of empires.

When the dust cleared, all of the empires, either in World War I or World War II, were gone: Japan, Germany, Italy, France, with one exception, the United States. Because air technology and air power hadn't been developed, the United States had the insulation of the Atlantic and Pacific, and they escaped. Twenty-eight million people died in Russia in World War II. What's the number in the United States? Four hundred thousand. That gives you an idea who survived and who didn't. But here's where people begin to get confused. What happens immediately after World Wars I and II is that the United States inherits all the empires that went before it.

I don't think there's a case in history like this. The whole world, organized under colonial European and, a little bit later, American and Japanese colonialism, organizes the world, sets it all up, organizes the supply chains and all the rest of it, locates all the industry in its own home base, and then blows itself up and hands the entire global empire to the United States. We, you and I—and more me than you, because I'm older than you—I lived my life in this bizarre second half of the 20th century with stupefying wealth in this country. Why? Because we inherited, you know, it's like the stupefying wealth of Donald Trump. He got that from his father.

#Glenn

He didn't do anything.

#Richard Wolff

He lost much of it, you know, or he rode the real estate wave of New York. But he did nothing. He's a wonderful do-nothing. We were a nation that inherited it, and now we unfortunately recognize that if you inherit all of the old empires, then the dialectical other, the revolt against colonialism, which began already in the 19th century and built up throughout this story I'm just telling—on the surface, it's all about colonialism, but underneath, the basis for breaking away. Gandhi did it in India, you know, Jomo Kenyatta did it in East Africa, and on and on and on. And what the United States is now getting is the culmination of the anti-colonial era, which is replacing the colonial era, which shouldn't surprise anybody. Very typical in human history.

You move, and then there's the reaction, if you like. I think the thing that Europe has is they're even further along in the loss of the empire than the United States. They lost a smaller empire. We're losing the totality of the whole colonial project. And I think I can, with that framework, explain two other things that are lurking here. A kind of colonialist fantasy that's remarkable if you think about it. When Kaja Kallas talks with great passion about fighting Russia and defeating Russia and carving Russia up, what are you doing? You are recasting, without being aware of it, the Berlin Conference of 1884, when all the imperialists got together in Berlin with the blessing of Bismarck to take a map of Africa and mark it up. You Germans get this one, you French get that one, you British get this one.

I mean, it is a fantasy. It's not going to happen. They're losing in Ukraine. But they're desperate because of Ukraine, not for a minute. NATO has a wonderful story to tell about how it expanded to the east after 1990. Every which way: Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, all of them. Yes, they're not going to get Ukraine. It isn't Ukraine. It's that fantasy of a revival of colonialism. And as if to make my thesis stronger, Mr. Trump raves about Greenland, making Canada a state, taking back the... These are delusions of a dying empire, imagining that it can hold on to its wealth by some fantastic reliving of colonialism.

Israel tries settler colonialism and ends up committing genocide. That's it. You can't do what history's motion is blocking you from doing. The last thing, if I read the history of empires correctly,

every time an empire is born and develops over time and then reaches the point where it peaks and goes down, the people who can occupy a position of wealth or power begin to use the wealth and power to insure themselves, to insulate themselves from the declining empire. And so what we will see is an almost obscene inequality of wealth because it's getting harder and harder, absent the empire, to sustain the wealth of the West.

And so those who can hold on, who have something, some new technology, some corner of the market, some oligopoly or monopoly position, they solidify it. They focus on it. They buy the politicians to protect it. Meanwhile, the mass of people are going to be paying the price of a declining empire, which will protect itself against what I just said by looking for and cultivating every scapegoat imaginable as they destroy their own middle and poor classes. So you get this lunatic upsurge of anti-immigration mentality, or even the ability to transform Mr. Putin into a reincarnated Stalin. What is this? This hysteria, that's the way you are coping with this decline.

#Glenn

I agree. And, well, when Kaja Kallas talked about breaking up Russia into smaller countries, she said they would be better governed if they're smaller. But I think what she meant was that they will be easier to govern or manage. So, no, it is.

#Richard Wolff

As if European countries like hers ever gave a damn about how the rest of the world is governed. I mean, country after country in the world governed horrifically, and there's not a word of complaint. I mean, it's just a joke. When politicians, even mediocre ones like her, when they talk that level of nonsense, then it's usually a sign of something very serious, but one displacement away. And our job is to analyze what that real problem is that gets expressed in this oddly displaced way. By the way, my wife is a psychotherapist. That's how they practice. You come in and you talk with great passion about your horrible dog. It's not your dog. Something is bothering you, and you have transformed it onto the dog. You take your upset seriously, but you ask the question, what is the seriousness? You don't accept the first-line rendering of what it's about.

#Glenn

No, that's interesting, actually. I keep making the point that I think instead of international relations analysts, we need psychologists, because there is something deeper going on there. But we see that in the West, political liberalism has often gone hand in hand with economic liberalism. And we know that the Americans in the beginning of the 19th century referred to the British as a free trade empire because the British dominated the technology, the industry, the financial power. They controlled the world's seas. So free trade essentially meant an international economy under the control of the

British. Now, you can say that the era of globalization now, which has passed over the past 30, 40 years now, when, you know, free trade, it allowed or it sustained a dominant position for the United States.

However, this appears to be over. That is, the U.S. can't really compete anymore, first in industries and then technologies, with China. It doesn't really control the world's, you know, maritime corridors. We see that from the Arctic to the Strait of Hormuz. Financial power—you see BRICS de-dollarizing, setting up their own development banks. And do you see this structural decline, though? But more important, how do you interpret the efforts by the Trump administration to reverse its decline? Because it doesn't want to give up its dominant position in the world, even though I think that has already passed. But how do you see any, I guess, structure or order in the chaos here?

#Richard Wolff

Not much. I think the quest is hopeless, which often goes together with it's not going to be sustained, because you can't sustain it across the hopelessness of the quest. I think what you have here in the United States is a much more, how shall I put it, simpler, more vulgar process. You have industries and enterprises that are still profitable in a free trade or relatively free trade environment. If you actually look at what is produced by the Business Roundtable and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, they in many ways hold on to liberal, global, that kind of language. And they send a memorandum right up to the president. He always listens. These are two of the most important business interest groups in Washington. But they are usually the spokespersons for a clump of American enterprises who have carved out a niche for themselves.

They did that during globalization. They didn't care about it. Whether or not they needed globalization, they carved out a niche for themselves. I'm going to give you an example. The most famous is called the military-industrial complex because it came right out of World War II, and there was the famous statement of President Eisenhower that we should all beware because of a cozy relationship between the military apparatus and the companies producing armaments, and that they had gotten together and had organized that there would be military bases in all 50 states, that the production would be distributed so that they could lean on all the senators and congressmen, each of them being approached by a factory or a military base in their area, which gave them the votes and all of that.

This was so successful in greasing the defense. And, you know, the United States budget, the federal budget, spends money on defense way more than the rest of the world combined. Why is that? Because they showed the way: don't make a monopoly. Don't have one company. Have three or four, an oligopoly, and integrate it carefully with whoever else you can get to share. And then go as a coordinated group to the Congress and buy your prosperity. It worked. It worked brilliantly. It's working to this moment for our defense industry. Who copied it?

The next one to copy it: the medical-industrial complex, not the military, the medical. What is that? Four industries: the doctors, the hospitals, the medical insurance—because we don't have national health here, so the private companies that provide medical insurance—and number four, the drug and device manufacturers. Those four work just like the military. We pay ridiculous premiums for our health insurance. The health insurance companies make a fortune. They, respectful of the group they're in, allow the drug companies to charge ridiculous prices for drugs. They go to the employer. The employers don't like it.

The employers are bitter, but the employers are too dispersed, too many. They haven't yet. You know who's able to do it now, who learned a lesson? High tech: Amazon, Apple. They've learned they need to coordinate their AI and all the rest of it and try to function. And you could see them lined up behind Mr. Trump at the inauguration last year. He brought them all together. They got together to be up there on that platform. I think what you're seeing is a disintegration in which government becomes the arena of very vulgar clumps, subgroups of capitalists—that's basically what they are—who work out amongst themselves a deal that allows them. It's the logic of a union.

The workers get together and bargain collectively, okay? The capitalists get together—many fewer, of course—and bargain using their combined profits, which are staggering in size, easy for you to give money to every single congressperson in both parties, which many of them do, just to make sure that there's nice continuity. You see it today. You see it literally today, when the general economy, in many parts of it, are suffering because they can't get diesel oil. Diesel oil because of the Strait of Hormuz, the war in Iran. That's all it is—a little bit the war in Russia, but not that much.

So diesel oil has gone through the roof, even worse than oil and gasoline. So all kinds of people hurt by this price complain bitterly. Farmers are terrified because between the oil price, which they have to pay, and the diesel oil they have to pay, and the fertilizer from oil, and then the fertilizer from potash, which unfortunately is in Canada, not here, they are squeezed beyond all. They're screaming. Yeah, but the refinery and the oil companies, that's a whole other complex. They're screaming too. And they have a head start because they mobilized to squash the electric vehicle industry in this country. Mr. Tesla could be the big rich man.

He could be in Mr. Trump's office, but he didn't have the power that the oil and gas companies did, developed over the last century in this country. And so the Chamber of Commerce and the Business Roundtable said, "You must not ban exports of diesel oil in this country," which would solve the problem. The United States is by far the biggest producer of diesel oil, so it could solve the problem with regular production, let alone draining reserves. And it goes through this charade with the Europeans, who are desperate, of course, because if a ban was put in, the price of all of this stuff in Europe would go yet again higher.

They're already suffering, and they can't. They're in an impossible situation. So it's a long answer, but here's the answer. That battle is underway. It's still fought, but not in the grandiose terms:

globalization versus neoliberal globalization versus economic nationalism. Economic nationalism was completely impossible before. I should tell you, when I went to graduate school in economics and got my PhD, anybody who said anything about economic nationalism would get very ridiculed. In other words, it was a settled matter. International trade, free markets were the guarantor of growth and efficiency and prosperity.

And that had been settled. That was as certain as the sun will come up tomorrow, like it did today. None of that exists anymore. Now it's all murky. Mr. Trump, the way he did that was interesting. The way he did it was by suddenly and massively intervening in the economy. He just changed the way this was thought of. I could say he was carrying out an intellectual move in that direction. I don't think so. I think that move was very, very small. For him, it was self-evident. You know, if a big company is in trouble and they're supporters of him politically, and they come to him and say, "We're in terrible trouble. Why don't you take 20% shares? We'll issue a new non-voting stock, and we'll sell it to you, Mr. President. How about that?" Sure, here.

And then that was it, until the other huge corporations were suddenly okay. They're just okay. He did it a little bit with labor, but that was phony, because the anti-labor bias, that is as strong as it's ever been. They're not going to go there. He'll have a speech or two where he'll talk about how there shouldn't be factories moving to Mexico or something. But he did very little about that. You know, there's statistics. He has brought manufacturing back to the United States—not one iota, nothing. Complete fakery, you know. But by the way, I once did a little research. Ten of the last presidents promised as part of their campaign to bring manufacturing back to America. So it's a standard promise, and it's a standard non-deliverable in the sense that it never happens.

So I think what you're going to see is, if you ask the question, are we economic nationalists or free traders? The answer is, we may still occasionally talk that way out of habit, but what we're really seeing is the battle of different groupings. The oil and gas don't want a ban on exports of diesel oil, so we won't have one. They're strong enough. The farmers, even though they control politics in half a dozen states and can be very influential in the politics of Washington, D.C., they can yell till they're blue. And he's going to lose. I don't know exactly, but my guess is he's going to lose farm votes big time. Unless he does something spectacular in the next four weeks, that's gone. Those people are horrified at what has happened to them economically.

#Glenn

But the truth is, it's because...

#Richard Wolff

Whatever else farming is, it's small potatoes compared to the other industries, and they don't have the history the way the other ones do. So that's what we have. We have that kind of fighting among Goliaths. If we were watching this in Russia, there would be all this conversation about oligarchs,

because that's what we have. We have these industrial clumps led by their respective oligarchs, and they are forever squeezing the politicians to do what they want.

#Glenn

I think it's quite fascinating, though, the extent to which Trump can intervene in the economy, even for political purposes, and how this has become, well, essentially normalized. As you said, how he brings in the oligarchs. He argued that the new developments of the military, the ideas should come now from Elon Musk, Palmer Luckey, and Newt Gingrich. I mean, this is quite extraordinary. But I wanted to ask about how the U.S. model is towards the rest of the world, because what I found interesting with both Venezuela and Greenland is not just what they did, but how it was communicated. They were very explicit about what made it so great was that they got exclusive influence. They cut out especially the Chinese, Russians, the other main centers of power.

And you see almost a similar formula being done for Europe. They should cut themselves off from other centers of power, just develop exclusive influence or exclusive dependence on the United States. As you said, Canada should be incorporated. The Panama Canal should be brought under U. S. control. Why not Cuba while we're at it? I mean, is this the new model set up, going to exclusive spheres of influence or colonies which have to pay tribute? Because obviously, you can say Venezuela will have to pay tribute, but even the Europeans, because now they will pay top dollar for their energy. They're going to have to pay more for security. And you do see that there's something... It's not the system as it was only a few years ago.

#Richard Wolff

Well, again, I don't want to beat a dead horse here, but we—I'm talking now as an American—we got used to a level of wealth and a level of global hegemony that really is extraordinary. If you inherit the empires built up over three centuries in Europe by Europeans, and also the much younger one built up by the Japanese, if you inherit all of that, yes, your attitude is—it's the mentality of the European Belgium in Congo—whatever the secular god might be, you know, a superpower, a dominant... Everything starts there. Everything focuses there. All the instructions about what to do come from the headquarters.

This is the mentality. What does that mentality do when two things happen at the same time? Quite typical in history. Namely, your dominance declines, and an alternative starts to rise. You feel threatened. You want to draw in whatever you have, and yes, the whole world is now explicitly to become tributary. Before, it was, in fact, tributary, but you didn't say it. You didn't need to say it. You came out of a history not just of the dominance of free trade, but of the dominance of free trade over and against an empire from which the United States violently withdrew. Okay. That works nicely.

You are now in a position to say, wait a minute, this new arrival, denying your own decline, this new arrival is an aggressive threat to what we have. We have a wonderful world economy. It has worked wonderfully. You know, all my life, Glenn, ever since I've been a high school student, when I began to learn about how poor the rest of the world is, and when I was in college, I spent a time in what was then Tanganyika, East Africa. It's now Tanzania. Then it was Tanganyika and Kenya. I spent time there. The level of poverty, the absence of medical care, the fact there were four high schools for a population of two and a half million people, and on and on and on.

I understood in a very visceral way the gap between New York that I could go to all my life and what I was seeing. But I've never been able to show that to my... I've taught in America all my life. I can't teach it to my students. They're beginning to learn it because they see it now around them. That's new. But I used to have to persuade them of the statistics of poverty. This country... That's why our leaders, I mean, if you talk to Jamie Dimon, the head of J.P. Morgan Chase, biggest bank in the United States, he will talk to you about how good the economy is. And he's oblivious. And that's not—he's not stupid. It's not bad.

He has a normal education. He reads the newspaper. He has to. But he is part of what has been the dominant debate group of this country, and it is steeped in them. It's like going to England and encountering some of those people who live in the lovely houses out in the British countryside, for whom the empire is still there, the Commonwealth. They are very excited when Prince somebody visits an African country and lovely little children come and give him a bouquet. What? What? But in their world, they're trying to hold on. And here in the United States, China is an evil disruptor. Look, the fact that it's communist no longer means very much. It probably never did. But in any case, it doesn't now.

They worry about socialism and communism, absolutely. But that's an evil alternative that they can dismiss. What scares them is China, because they see themselves. China is our enemy because China is taking away what we had. Well, what did you have? The rule over the world. I went to a seminar not very long ago here in New York, where I'm sitting in Manhattan, a seminar of people high up in the hierarchy of this country. And for them, the struggle in the Strait of Hormuz—they were fond of saying to each other across the seminar table—that the real enemy here isn't the Iranians. Oh yeah? Well, what is it? It's the Chinese. The Chinese are now what comes out of European history: *éminence grise*.

It was what Louis said about Cardinal Richelieu, that because of his power in the church, he was the real force, the *éminence grise* in France. Well, the *éminence grise* of a declining American empire is the rising new one. That's why it is so easy for them to attribute classic psychology—it's called projection in psychology—it's so easy to attribute to Mr. Putin his real goal: to invade all of Europe, to go and take over France and Germany and Belgium and Luxembourg. This endless mantra that

he's really got an imperial purpose. And Xi Jinping, exactly the same. They are colonial alternatives waiting in the wings. That's how deep the colonial assumption is in the consciousness here in the United States.

#Glenn

That's interesting what you said about political elites, because for many years we could observe that the hegemon was coming to an end. We could observe that other powers were preparing alternatives, such as BRICS. But I always assumed that once it happened—again, I assumed a rational approach—from the political West to this rebalancing. That is, okay, the era of hegemony is over. But as you map out this psychology of the political elites, it's something I had not taken into account when I see the panic, the extreme language, the criminalization of basic diplomacy, the chanting for war, even when we don't have actual militaries. I mean, all of this craziness, and just talking openly about regime change in Russia, breaking it up into pieces.

I mean, this is—and the Chinese as well—none of this is rational. But actually, I had one last question because I know you have to go. It's a short one. We're in the middle of an energy crisis, as we know, as you said, war with Iran, but also with Russia. And diesel shortage is now the most pressing issue. And we know that Trump, he threatened an export ban on the Europeans to pressure the Europeans to release large amounts of diesel from their strategic reserves to drive down the prices. Do you think these efforts will be successful, and for how long? Because if this was an easy fix, I guess, why do the Europeans have to be coerced to do it?

#Richard Wolff

Well, I think this is a wonderful example. Let me try to explain. When Mr. Trump was confronted by the farm states, about a dozen senators and congresspeople, very influential, from the Midwest, which is in California partly, where we do our agriculture, they demanded a ban on exports to drive down the price of diesel. They didn't care about Europe. They could care less what this does to Europe. They wanted it because the profitability of agriculture depends on it. The price of diesel is literally extinguishing the margin for them in their agricultural pursuits.

And, you know, most of our agriculture is now very large corporations who have huge amounts of profits that they can throw into lobbying and all the rest of it. So they have an established group of sycophantic, bought-and-purchased politicians, and they all went to Mr. Trump and said, "Right?" He responds—he always does—that his role of governance is to try to give to whoever comes to him what they want. We don't have an electric car industry worth anything in this country because the old fuel burners went to him and dominated, and he stopped the subsidies. You know, he changed everything. Sorry, let me just get this away.

#Richard Wolff

So he made a remark, our president did, about 10 days ago, a week ago, that he was considering banning exports of diesel oil. Once he said that, his advisors swung in around him and started coming up with some kind of plausible story, really quite far-fetched usually, in which this might make sense. They don't spend much time, and they're not good at it. So they come out clumsy. A clever reporter can ask a question they didn't think about. It's awful to watch. I mean, you're watching really shoddy performance. But okay, everybody kind of now knows. In arrive the oil companies, who own the refineries that convert oil into diesel oil. Okay. And here's what they said. It's so wonderful. They went to Mr. Trump and they said, "We have been your loyal supporters. We don't want this."

And by the way, when they did that, they threw in some freebies called free trade. They made some allusions to globalists because that's still lingo that you can use. So they tried that. They threw everything in there. But Mr. Trump understood. He now had a problem he's used to: one group of his supporters want it; another group of his supporters don't want it. What is he going to do? Well, he made a big mistake. He repeated that he was thinking about it, giving the impression to the oil people that he might actually do for the farmers and the big agribusinesses what they want. Here was then the remark made by the oil and gas company, officially, publicly: "It is a mistake," became their position. You can't lower prices. Why not? Well, if you put a ban on, the prices will go down.

And if the price goes down in the United States, we will cut back on refining, and it'll go right back up, and you will look bad, Mr. President, because you couldn't deliver what you promised you would. That seems to have worked. So they went to the Europeans and they said, "You have to use up your oil, diesel oil reserves." We will do a little window dressing. If I understand correctly, the amount they're going to release is the equivalent of one day's demand for diesel oil. That's not going to make a very big difference. It's not going to last very long. But I want to stress, when they said that, it was not understood to be what it is: a threat by an oligopoly to use its oligopoly to force the prices high so they can make a profit, because that's what they did.

No, no. This was treated, get ready, as though, well, that's how the market works. That's not how the market works. That's how the market is manipulated, because the people who run the businesses, they've learned supply and demand too, and they know that if they're getting a good result because of the Strait of Hormuz crunching the supply of diesel in the world, and that drives up the price, the way you maintain that price is to maintain the shortage of diesel. And if it isn't maintained by the Iranians in Hormuz, they will maintain it at the refinery. If you know how to understand it, it is a wonderful example of how American economic policy comes about.

#Glenn

Well, Professor Wolf, thank you for taking the time. As I understand, you have a big day ahead of you, so I won't take more of your time. Thanks again.

#Richard Wolff

Oh, my pleasure, Glenn, and thank you for the programs that you create.