

# Seyed M. Marandi: Ready for War - Iran's Major Retaliation

Seyed Mohammad Marandi is a professor at Tehran University and a former advisor to Iran's Nuclear Negotiation Team. Prof. Marandi argues that even a small token attack on Iran will trigger total war. Follow Prof. Glenn Diesen: Substack: <https://glennndiesen.substack.com/> X/Twitter: [https://x.com/Glenn\\_Diesen](https://x.com/Glenn_Diesen) Patreon: <https://www.patreon.com/glenndiesen> Support the research by Prof. Glenn Diesen: PayPal: <https://www.paypal.com/paypalme/glenndiesen> Buy me a Coffee: [buymeacoffee.com/gdieseng](https://www.buymeacoffee.com/gdieseng) Go Fund Me: <https://gofund.me/09ea012f> Books by Prof. Glenn Diesen: <https://www.amazon.com/stores/author/B09FPQ4MDL>

## #Glenn

Welcome back. Today we're joined by Seyed Mohammad Marandi, a professor at the University of Tehran and a former advisor to Iran's nuclear negotiation team, to discuss what could be a pending war. Thank you for coming back on the program.

## #Seyed M. Marandi

Thank you very much for inviting me, Glenn. It's always an honor to be on this show.

## #Glenn

Well, thank you. We see that the United States keeps building up more and more military capabilities while at the same time engaging in these talks with Iran. So, you know, one can only reach two possible conclusions. Either the U.S. is building up military power to put pressure on Iran to accept a deal favorable to the United States, or the U.S. is preparing to attack Iran and merely using the talks as a cover. I guess it all depends on how much real interest there is in any talks. How are you assessing this increasingly tense situation?

## #Seyed M. Marandi

The Iranians are preparing for war—there's no doubt about that. The armed forces are, uh, preparing, from what we're hearing, they're swiftly building new capabilities and creating new underground bases for a potential war. I think ordinary Iranians are very calm about the situation. They do talk about it, but it really isn't in our hands. So, ordinary Iranians are going about their lives, as you saw when you came to Tehran many months ago. It's the same now—business as usual. We saw on February 11th, the 47th anniversary of the revolution, much bigger crowds than usual across the country in the demonstrations.

In Tehran, up to 4 million people participated. Across the country, anywhere between 26 and 34 million people are estimated to have joined. I've been there—there were many international journalists, some people you know of or at least know about. They were there, and I think that was a show of solidarity, a show of force by ordinary people to say that we're not intimidated, that we're not afraid, and that, contrary to what I would call the Epstein-class media in the West, people do not support the rioters, the terrorists, the West and its aggressive posturing, or the Israeli regime.

So the country is very united. The armed forces are preparing, but no one wants war. Um, so the government, of course, is going to negotiate. It has been negotiating, and it has negotiated in the past. But the framework that the Iranians have given for negotiations is respect for Iranian sovereignty. In other words, the Iranians have told the Americans, "We will not negotiate who our friends are, who our allies are. We're not going to negotiate our military capabilities, because we know if we give up our capabilities, you will attack us." And the Iranians will not give up their right to have a peaceful nuclear program or enrichment.

What they're willing to do is have a nuclear deal. They've already had one before—the JCPOA in 2015—where they gave assurances that the nuclear program is peaceful. Now, if there is a new deal, hypothetically, it's not very likely under these circumstances, I think. But if there is a new deal, it won't be like the JCPOA, because the Iranians will not go back to 2015. They've made many technological advances over the decades, and they've been sanctioned for this decade. So there's absolutely no reason why Iran would relinquish what its scientists have achieved. And therefore, I think when you look at this, and look at what Trump has been saying, it's very difficult to imagine that there will be a deal.

It's not impossible, but it's very difficult to imagine, especially since Trump flip-flops, tears up deals, goes against what he said earlier, and then flips again. So even if you have a deal with the United States, that doesn't mean it's going to last more than a few days. Ultimately, that means the Iranians will be preparing for war. It doesn't mean that if there's no deal, there will necessarily be a war, but I think the Iranians are playing it safe and saying, "We will prepare for war." The best way to prevent it is to have a strong military, and the best way to preserve your country in case of an attack is to have a strong military.

## **#Glenn**

Well, the scope or conditions of any peace deal are also an interesting topic, because if it comes from the United States, as you said, they demand that Iran shouldn't even have a civilian nuclear program for energy. Also, more or less, it's a kind of capitulation — as you said, Iran would have to give up its conventional weapons, meaning ballistic missiles and other arms, and give up its partnerships. So often Iran responds by saying, if you want to deal with the nuclear issue, let's do that separately and not link all these other things to it. But we also saw that Iran's foreign minister gave a speech on February 7th in Doha, and that could suggest that instead of narrowing the

discussion, one could widen it to make it much more comprehensive. Because, again, for the U.S. and the Israelis, they complain that Iran is, you know, working against Israeli interests.

But, of course, what we can take away from the Iranian foreign minister is that if we begin to resolve some of the root causes — that is, the issue of a Palestinian state — then perhaps the tensions wouldn't have to be there to begin with. This is how, traditionally, mutual security is enhanced: you reduce mutual security threats instead of one side forcing the other to capitulate. Do you think there's any prospect for a broader peace agreement where Israel, and the U.S. as well, make peace with the Palestinians by accepting a state — something that allows the source of these tensions to be addressed?

## **#Seyed M. Marandi**

I think the real problem in our region is that the ideology of Zionism carries ethno-supremacism with it — it's part of the package. And because of that, respect for other human beings is basically non-existent. Right now there's a ceasefire between the Israeli regime and Lebanon, yet they bomb Lebanon every day. They kill kids. And the Western media — controlled by the Zionists, the Epstein class — will somehow justify it. It's a ceasefire; no one is supposed to shoot. But they'll either whitewash the regime, look away, or come up with some outlandish justification. The same is true in Gaza, even worse so, or in the West Bank. Every day there are murders — children being slaughtered, women being slaughtered — but all of this is ignored, and the regime keeps doing it without any shame.

And, of course, Trump says that we have peace in this region. So obviously, the lives of Palestinian children are of zero worth to Western legacy media journalists, to Western elites, to the people working for the Epstein class and those who are in control. Under those circumstances, I don't think a solution is anywhere nearby. I don't think we're close to a solution. Ultimately, the only way we can have peace in our region is if the Palestinian people are treated as human beings. And that's not impossible, because the world has changed. The mood toward the Israeli regime, toward Zionism, has evolved dramatically. Here in Moscow, I've been in conversation with many people.

I've had more conversations on this trip with different Russians than on any of my previous visits, and I'm quite stunned to see how hostile they are to the Netanyahu regime — and to the whole project in general. This is something I've also noticed in my travels to China and elsewhere, places where people in the past really didn't focus on Palestine. It wasn't a priority for them; they had very little knowledge about it. But now there's a clear disgust and hatred for what the Israeli regime is doing to the Palestinian people. It reminds me of apartheid South Africa. When I was young, I was an anti-apartheid activist in Iran. It was before the Internet age, so our activism was very different from how activists operate today. But back then, no one I knew ever imagined that the apartheid regime would collapse so swiftly.

And I think the reason was that awareness across the world had grown, and it became, in general, much more difficult to sustain apartheid. So I think what's important is that people across the world — in the United States and elsewhere — are becoming increasingly aware of this group of people and their mentality, and that's going to weaken the foundations of the Israeli regime. One of the important factors in all this is how young Jews have turned against the Israeli regime. We see how activists in the United States say, "We do not accept this." Jewish activists, of course, have shown the world that Zionism is not Judaism — just like ISIS and Al-Qaeda are not Islam, and neo-Nazis are not Christians.

They're just people who use these labels to justify their actions. But in general, I think the tide has turned against the Israeli regime. For Iran, the solution has always been a one-state solution — that Jews, Muslims, and Christians should be able to live alongside one another in peace. And I think the Israeli regime has, ironically, pushed Palestine toward that scenario. That's the only solution left, because when there was talk of a two-state solution, the West allowed the Israelis to undermine it. They allowed them to colonize the West Bank. The Iranians were saying even back then — 30, 40, 45 years ago, since the revolution — that the Israelis would colonize the West Bank and the West would allow them to do it by kicking the can down the road and talking about some hypothetical two-state solution.

And now, after forty-some years, we've seen that's exactly what's happened — and what's still happening. So now that the West Bank has been colonized by the most extreme of the extreme Zionists, I think the only solution left is a one-state solution. Either the Israeli regime is going to have to expel and ethnically cleanse over half of the population of Palestine — because the Palestinians constitute the majority if you include the West Bank and Gaza — and the world is not going to accept that anymore. Or, ultimately, with the changing mood across the world, the regime simply, at some point down the road — I don't know when, I'm not talking weeks or months or even a couple of years — but I think down the road it will not be able to continue to exist in this way and form.

## **#Glenn**

So the underlying sources — it doesn't seem like we're moving toward a political settlement, which is why there are concerns now about U.S. intentions. There's been this report that Washington had contacted Iran about the possibility of carrying out some token strikes. That is, you know, "We'll just launch a few missiles at you so we can say we held the regime accountable," this and that, and then, you know, "You can fire some missiles back, and we'll call it a day." I'm not sure if you've seen these reports, or if you can verify whether this is correct — if you've heard anything on the Iranian side. But how will Iran respond to this? Because, as you and I have spoken about before, it could be dangerous to let the deterrent slip even further, just to make it a casual thing that every now and then one can just drop bombs on the Iranian capital.

## **#Seyed M. Marandi**

Yes, that is something the Americans have put to the Iranians — that “we’ll carry out some token strike, and you can carry out some token strike.” And the Iranians said no. They responded to the Americans that even a token strike would be met with full force. The reason is twofold. One, even a token strike is an act of war. But more importantly, the Iranians recognize that if the United States is allowed to carry out a limited strike, it only opens the door for future strikes. So, four months down the road, some false-flag operation could be carried out somewhere in Europe, somewhere in North America, or somewhere in our region.

Mossad will kill a few— I don’t know, Israelis or Iranians, something like that— and then they’ll blame Iran. Then there will be more threats against the country and more attacks. Or they’ll stage more riots, or hire people to create chaos in some city in Iran, and then again Trump will come in to “save” the Iranian people by murdering Iranian people. This is something the Iranians are saying they cannot tolerate. So it has to end now. If the United States attacks— whether it’s symbolic or a major assault— the Iranians are going to launch an all-out response, and it will be directed toward U. S. bases, of course.

It will be directed toward the U.S. Navy, of course, but it will also be directed toward all U.S. interests across the region. And that can mean many things that are non-military. That means trillions of dollars in assets will be targeted. And of course, the Iranians have already spoken about shutting the Strait of Hormuz, which is very easy to do. It’s not just the Strait itself that can be shut down—they can sink the ships that go through it. They have thousands of anti-ship missiles based in the Persian Gulf that can destroy everything in the region. They can destroy the ports.

They can destroy the oil and gas facilities. They can destroy the pipelines. And they can do the same outside the Strait of Hormuz, in the Indian Ocean. So if there is a war, I believe the oil and gas trade in West Asia, across West Asia and the Caucasus, will come to an end. That will lead to a global economic crash. U.S. assets in the region will, of course, be targeted. And those entities—those tiny Arab countries that host U.S. bases, which are, as we speak, being used to plan against Iran—they’ll be complicit. I don’t think these Arab regimes will last more than a few hours, or a few days, or at most a few weeks.

These tiny entities—some of them have passport-holding populations of just a few hundred thousand to a million—and the foreign workers outnumber the citizens five or ten to one. Most of those foreign workers are adult males. So if there’s chaos, I think the regimes will collapse, and that will change the map of the region permanently. From my understanding, it would be insanity for Trump to attack Iran. But Trump is surrounded by Israeli-firsters. Congress and the Senate are controlled by Israeli-firsters. The Epstein documents give us a small glimpse into the ugly reality of the ruling class. So even though it’s insane, it’s still quite plausible that an attack could happen.

## **#Glenn**

Well, I'm glad you mentioned the oil trade, because in Washington now they're a bit high on hubris after the so-called successful kidnapping of the Venezuelan president. They kind of want to—well, you've heard on many occasions from different people—that they want to ride on this “success,” if you can call it that, and apply it to Iran. Some politicians even commented that Iran should take note, that this will happen to the Ayatollahs next. That's the kind of rhetoric coming out. It doesn't make much sense—no one's going to kidnap the president of Iran, for example—so it really doesn't make any sense.

That being said, one of the instruments used against Venezuela—and which could be used against Iran—would be piracy. In fact, just two days ago, we saw the Wall Street Journal and others reporting that the United States is considering seizing Iranian tankers, essentially taking their oil. So, yes, it's the same policy of piracy, now being applied to Iran. I guess part of the “success” in Venezuela is that they're not really doing anything about it. They're just standing down because anything else would trigger a larger American reaction. How could this be applied to Iran? How do you see Iran reacting if the Americans start seizing their tankers on the open sea?

## **#Seyed M. Marandi**

Well, first, I think it's important to keep in mind that if the United States and Iran are in conflict, Venezuela will have a lot of room to maneuver. And it's not clear whether they would export oil under those circumstances. Even though the amount of oil they export is limited, the Venezuelans might well stop exporting altogether to increase pressure on the United States and force it to back down against the Venezuelan people. So, we have a good relationship—there's an excellent relationship between Caracas and Tehran. And I don't think the story in Venezuela is over. We'll have to wait and see how things play out in the weeks and months ahead.

But with regard to Iran, we've already seen that game before, where the Americans and their allies carried out piracy in the seas and seized Iranian tankers. What the Iranians did in response was start taking tankers belonging to Western countries—ships carrying oil destined for both Western and non-Western markets. This is the Persian Gulf region, after all, and there's no shortage of vessels linked to the United States or its allies. I think it would be foolish for the U.S. to try to stop a couple of Iranian tankers, because the Iranians could, in return, stop ten tankers for each Iranian one—hypothetically, of course.

I don't think that will work. I think it will only make the oil market more nervous, and it will hurt the global economy and the American economy at a time when the economy is not doing well at all. So I don't see that as a successful option that would do the United States any good. Someone asked me about the fact that Iran itself needs oil for export, which is true, but because of decades of sanctions and maximum pressure, Iran's dependency on exports is much lower than that of other countries—far lower than others in the region. So those countries that are in the American camp and host American bases are far more vulnerable than Iran.

Iran can easily outlast all of them. So again, it would be the Americans shooting themselves in the foot if they go down the road of war, or the path of piracy, or anything like that. Another issue I'd like to mention before I forget is that this won't be a war between Iran and the United States alone—it will be a regional war. Iran's allies in Iraq are very powerful. We know that Iran trained the Popular Mobilization Forces to defeat ISIS in Iraq, and they will get involved in the war. They already showed footage a couple of weeks ago of one of their underground missile bases.

So you have a country like Iraq, with over 45 million people, where powerful elements will stand with Iran. We saw that Iran's allies won the elections in Iraq just weeks ago. And Yemen is preparing itself for war too. So two very powerful and influential countries will be fighting alongside Iran. Of course, there's Hezbollah and others as well. And then, who are the American allies? Bahrain—with a population of what? Qatar, a population of what? Four hundred thousand? Three hundred thousand? The Emirates, about 1.4 million? There's no way the Americans can manage such a war.

And in addition to that, something Americans don't talk about is Iran's missile capabilities—the ones we saw used against the Israeli regime with such success. Those long-range missiles are actually a very small part of Iran's military power. Most of Iran's capabilities are directed not toward Palestine or the Mediterranean, but toward the Persian Gulf: short- and medium-range missiles and drones that can easily destroy anything in the Gulf or on the other side of it. Why has Iran created so many underground bases with these short- and medium-range missiles? Because the United States, after 9/11, invaded Iraq and Afghanistan.

And Iran was called part of the "axis of evil." Bush and Obama kept saying, "All options are on the table." So Iran has been preparing itself for war with the United States. Israel has never been a real threat to Iran. It can kill, but it cannot—it's too small, too weak, and too dependent on the West to be a real threat. The real threat is the United States. So Iran has been preparing for a war with the United States for a very long time. Therefore, the real firepower is focused on the Indian Ocean, the Strait of Hormuz, and the Persian Gulf. And if you add all that together—Iran's regional allies—it won't look pretty.

## **#Glenn**

But where would the war likely spread, though? Because I heard, for example, that Saudi Arabia said they would want to stay out of this—that they wouldn't want Americans to use their airspace, for instance. Meanwhile, countries like Bahrain have warned that they will not stay silent if the war is brought to them. Perhaps not the most powerful country in the region, of course. But how do you see it—where might this war actually be fought, then?

## **#Seyed M. Marandi**

I think the elites in these tiny Arab dictatorships in the Persian Gulf will probably be the first to flee. They've already taken many, many billions of dollars out of their countries. They have estates and palaces across Europe and North America, so they won't be around to see the war. I think you're going to see a collapse of these regimes. Also, Hamas put out a statement saying that a war against Iran is a war against the entire Islamic world. I don't think there's any way for me to imagine what the boundaries will be. But what I can say, Glenn, is that for Iran—and for the resistance, the axis of resistance—it will be a fight for survival. It will be an existential war. For the United States, it will be a war of choice.

And so, obviously, when it's an existential war, you're going to fight very differently than an entity that just chose to carry out this war because Netanyahu and the Zionists, and the Zionist lobby, wanted it. It's a very different thing. And I think the circumstances for such a war today are very different from after 9/11. Overwhelmingly, people in the United States are against war—they're tired, the economic situation is not good, and I think the Epstein files, ironically, have created a new level of distrust. And so, if there is a war, people are going to point fingers very swiftly at the Israeli regime and the Zionist lobby, at a time when they're becoming increasingly unpopular, especially among the youth.

So a war against Iran, where American soldiers are dying and the price of gasoline and energy goes through the roof, at a time when the Epstein files are being revealed one by one to the public—at least those that haven't been redacted or hidden from view—I don't think that's a combination that will allow Trump to go on for very long. I think it would lead to a swift end to his presidency. And I can't, of course, predict the future, but I don't think they can continue a war for very long under such circumstances. Iran will pull no punches. They'll hit as hard as possible to make it very painful, forcing the elites in Washington to back off as quickly as possible. And as the world economy collapses, everyone will blame Trump, the Israeli regime, and Zionism. It won't look good for them anywhere.

## **#Glenn**

Well, if we want to get, I guess, insights into what direction the United States is taking, I think a good indicator would be to look at the recent meeting between Netanyahu and Trump. I wanted to know what your takeaway is in terms of how that meeting went. I've seen some belligerent rhetoric come out afterwards, but again, it's hard to read Trump's language because, well, it's often intentionally deceptive and tends to swing in a different direction on the same day. So how do you see this meeting as having gone? I assume that a key purpose would be for Netanyahu to make sure the U.S. was still on the path toward increasing pressure, if not attacking Iran?

## **#Seyed M. Marandi**

Well, at least on the surface, it appears that Trump doesn't want to— or for now, it could be for one of two reasons. One is that he knows what this would mean, and it would mean the end of his presidency. But still, either he doesn't want it, or he wants to bring in more assets into the region—a second aircraft carrier, for example— so that maybe that will tilt the balance, which it won't. There's no doubt it won't. The vulnerability of the U.S. and its allies in the Persian Gulf region is just too great. Anyone who's been to the Persian Gulf would know there's no way any of these assets can be protected. But in any case, it could be that he wants to bring in more assets.

But either way, it's exactly as you said—Trump changes his position very easily. He flip-flops. We don't know what they have on him in the Epstein files, or what files the Israelis have that the Americans don't. We really don't know anything. So the assumption in Tehran is that we have to be prepared for war. If you look at the way Netanyahu spoke upon leaving, it seems he was not happy. If you look at Trump's Truth Social statement, it seems that, for the time being, he was insistent there would not be military strikes. But then again, we were negotiating with the United States before the 12-day war. On day one, Witkoff said the U.S. would recognize enrichment for Iran.

The Iranians saw that as a positive step. Then, from the second session, he moved the goalposts—and kept moving them. And then, between the fifth and sixth rounds, the United States and the Israeli regime conspired to secretly carry out an attack on Iran. So for Iran, negotiations or statements from Washington really mean nothing. They're just going to prepare for war and see how things play out. But on another note, I think what's important to keep in mind is that time is not on Trump's side either, because every day we move closer to the midterm elections in the United States, and things are not looking good for him.

And if Trump attacks Iran—even if he succeeds in killing a lot of people, their families, their leaders, their children, their grandchildren, their neighbors—we have a constitution. The leadership issue will not be a problem. Iran will continue to fight the war. The armed forces have been told how to fight on their own. And the underground missile bases, which number in the hundreds and have been improved dramatically over the past eight or nine months, thanks to the experience gained during the war, will continue to fire away.

And the anti-ship missiles, the submarines, the speedboats—thousands of them, I don't know how many exactly—but they'll all carry out asymmetrical warfare. So, Trump will not have a short war. It won't be a one-day, two-day, or three-day affair. Iran will destroy and destroy and destroy until the global economy crashes and the United States backs off. Trump can declare some sort of token victory, but every day we move forward, we're getting closer to the midterm elections, and a war like that would be catastrophic—not just for Trump, but for everyone tied to him.

**#Glenn**

Well, I'm glad you mentioned this—moving the goalposts. Actually, this has always been one of the reasons for my pessimism: what the US now demands in a peace deal is for Iran to essentially disarm itself—missiles, drones—and also give up its allies in the region. That would be a stepping stone toward war, because in a war there's a security dilemma. If a country disarms itself, that doesn't necessarily lead to peace; on the contrary, it allows it to be steamrolled. So it doesn't really resolve the underlying problems. But on this issue of moving the goalposts, what's strange to me is the narrative.

Usually the narratives are a bit more cohesive—it's clearer what's being said. Now it seems to go in every direction. I saw that, you know, Trump said the Iranians should seize the institutions, essentially topple the government—they want regime change. But then we see J.D. Vance saying, hey, we don't really need regime change; if the Iranians want to do it, it's up to them. We just want to make sure they don't have nuclear weapons. Others are pointing to human rights and democracy, others again only to the nuclear program and missiles. It goes a bit in all directions here—even the efforts to topple the government.

On one hand, there's this insistence that everything was organic, and anyone who disagrees is an Ayatollah apologist. On the other hand, Glenn Diesen gives interviews saying, well, this is economic statecraft—we put a lot of work into trying to break the Iranian economy and currency to bring people out into the streets. So it's very hard to see. It's not impressive, the narrative control, because usually the Americans are quite good at this—the narrative control is excellent. You know, the media, the government, they're all marching in step; they all repeat the same talking points. But how do you make sense of this—this lack of a common narrative?

## **#Seyed M. Marandi**

Well, you know, one thing that I believe is that the West in general has lost its soft power capabilities. The United States, Israel, the Israeli regime, the British regime—they're all very similar in that respect. When you look at, for example, Russia, it doesn't matter if you're reading The Guardian or Fox News, the narrative on Russia is the same. One may be more subtle and sophisticated, the other more bombastic. The same is true with Iran. Those who hate Trump—when it comes to bombing Iran, they support it.

They support the narrative that Iran is evil. During the riots, we now know this was a conspiracy from day one. As you pointed out, the U.S. Secretary of the Treasury said, "We brought down the currency to bring people into the streets." And then what happened? Two days after we had mild protests about the currency—with no arrests, no intimidation, and the government saying, "You're right, we have to sort this out"—we suddenly had an influx of very violent rioters and armed terrorists. On the 8th and 9th of January, they slaughtered police officers and murdered innocent people.

Yet the collective media—from The Guardian to Fox News, Breitbart, The Independent, The Times of London, the BBC, and The New York Times—all of them have the same narrative: that these are just peaceful protesters being gunned down. Even though Pompeo said in his tweet that Mossad was on the ground—the former head of the CIA—even though Pompeo, on Channel 13 in Israel, said the U. S. was supporting these rioters, and even though Channel 14 in Israel, which is close to Netanyahu, was saying that foreign governments—meaning Israel and probably the United States—brought in the weapons to murder hundreds, as they said, of police officers and security agents.

And even though we have the statement by Mossad in Persian saying they were on the ground in Iran—and of course, more recently, we've heard that they brought in six thousand Starlinks. For what exactly? For whom? So obviously, they had people on the ground. And Trump was saying, "Take the buildings, take the cities." So these Starlinks were basically to coordinate these terrorist elements. The footage is there, the evidence is there, the missions are there, the boasting is there. But Western media—whether pro-Trump or anti-Trump—all have the same fake narrative: these are peaceful protesters and the government is gunning them down.

They went up to 80,000 deaths. And then, when the Iranian government released the names of everyone who was killed—whether police officers, innocent bystanders, or rioters—the number was 3,117. Then those fake numbers dropped to 6,000. They couldn't accept the Iranian numbers, so they had to say 6,000 or some other figure. But the point is, all this Western media that was saying 10, 20, 30, 50—they claimed there was no internet, yet they were inflating the numbers. They were the ones responsible. Their own governments were responsible, by their own admission, for what happened. Yet they inflate the numbers and blame Iran because they wanted to create an environment for war.

This was what it was all about. What they wanted to do was create chaos in Iran, say that the Iranian government is evil, that it's gunning down women and children. They've seen the Western media—they really care about women and children, obviously. And then that would give a justification for Trump to strike. And Trump was on the verge of striking Iran. According to what we're hearing—and I don't know if it's true—Netanyahu at that time, being fearful of the implications for the regime and of Iranian missiles raining down on it, asked Trump not to attack at that moment. Again, I don't know if it's true.

This is what we're hearing from Western sources. So, you know, while there's no clear narrative, it's interesting how—it's difficult to understand what's going on behind the scenes in the United States—but it's interesting how Western media is so monolithic in certain ways. It reminds me of Venezuela, when before the war you saw the so-called left—and they're not really left, but the mainstream left in the West—and the so-called liberals in the West. Some of them were calling for strikes and an attack on Venezuela, and some were saying, "No, no, the regime..." as they liked to call it. Whenever someone says "regime," you should be suspicious of that person. You know, when they talk about the Venezuelan regime or the Iranian regime or whatever.

As soon as a Westerner talks about “regimes,” you have to be suspicious of that person. Not everyone, of course—some people are just used to using the term—but in the media, you really have to be suspicious. So, you know, “the Venezuelan regime is evil, Maduro is evil, but we shouldn’t attack.” These people are just as guilty of war crimes as the Zionists and neocons who support war, because they’re trying to legitimize war, to legitimize death and destruction, instead of being courageous and saying, “No, Venezuela is none of your business. The sovereignty of Venezuela is none of your business. You are the criminals for murdering Venezuelans, fishermen, and ordinary people in the country, and for carrying out aggression.”

Instead of saying that, they say, “Yes, they’re evil, but let’s not do it.” Right now, as you and I are speaking, Glenn, the United States has imposed a siege on Cuba, starving ten million people. Yet these journalists at The Guardian, The Independent, or The New York Times—none of them are screaming bloody murder or saying, “This is outrageous, they’re starving women and children in Cuba.” No, instead they’ll focus on Iran as much as possible. They’ll criticize the U.S. government, but they’ll never use the same language they use about Iran or Venezuela when talking about their own regimes.

## **#Glenn**

Yeah, this is the political version of “why do you hit yourself, bully?” They’ve spent decades choking the Venezuelan economy, and then, of course, they point to the government’s mismanagement as the reason the country is poor. Then they say, “We’ll actually help now, we’re going to help the Venezuelans, and finally they can have prosperity.” And of course, it’s the same with Cuba—you see that rhetoric coming up as well. They’ve just implemented this oil embargo to suffocate the population there, which affects everything, even the hospitals.

And then, of course, we owe it to the Cubans to help them have more dignified, better lives. It’s just very strange to watch. Maybe the credibility just disappears. I mean, only today there’s an article in Politico that points out a bit of a contradiction: different Western governments have been hyping the threats—everyone’s coming to get us, the Chinese, the Russians, the Iranians. Everything’s a threat, World War III is coming. And then, in Politico, they report that polling shows even though everyone is now afraid of World War III and the sense of threat is through the roof, people still don’t give their leaders the license to cut welfare spending in order to fund the military.

So it’s usually when you inflate the—well, engage in threat inflation—what you cash in on is more money for the military. But it doesn’t appear to be working as efficiently within these countries that were polled. I can’t remember if it was Germany, France, the UK—the usual countries. Um, no, so it is, it is quite—something’s wrong, because in the past these kinds of narratives had very clear, predictable outcomes in terms of what they would legitimize. But now there’s no cohesion in the narrative, and they’re not achieving what they’re supposed to. So, uh, yes—probably good news for Iran.

## **#Seyed M. Marandi**

The fact that so many Europeans, including people in your country, are implicated in the Epstein files—and again, we know very little. Most of the files aren't going to be released, and the ones that have been released are largely redacted. The most sensitive parts are blacked out. And yet, despite that, you can see the foundations of Western politics shaking in certain countries—definitely in the UK, and in the United States. So when the political elites can no longer count on the trust of the population...

Four years ago, maybe people would have believed them, but now people are far more skeptical and cynical about their intentions. And that's why I think that, as we move forward, it's going to be more difficult for the likes of Trump, Netanyahu, and the Epstein class to deceive the public—because life is becoming increasingly difficult for people across the world, and in the West in particular, for the sake of our discussion. People's lives are more impoverished, their eyes are more open, and I don't think that's a good sign for the elites in the West to be able to push their agenda much further.

## **#Glenn**

Yeah, no, I think a lot of the tricks of the past don't work anymore. I mean, back in 2016, when there was such disgruntlement with American politicians that they voted in Trump, the first response was, "Well, let's blame the Russians." So Trump was an agent of— I mean, it was very ludicrous, and it didn't make any sense. But, you know, they went with it, and most people believed there was something there. And then, of course, in 2020, you had the Biden laptop scandal, and they went with—how can I explain this?—they went with the Russia thing as well. It never made any sense.

## **#Seyed M. Marandi**

And remember, Glenn Diesen, one reason why they went—yeah, exactly—but one reason why they began to blame Russia was actually because of WikiLeaks and the fact that WikiLeaks had uncovered a lot of corruption in the political system. Instead of dealing with the evidence that WikiLeaks and Julian Assange exposed to the world, they tried to distract public attention away from that and blame Russia for the leaks. Instead of addressing the leaks and the reality of them—and apparently the young man who took that evidence was murdered in Washington—they didn't want that scandal to be blamed on the United States, or on intelligence agencies, or on Zionists, or on the Epstein class.

So they went and tried to blame Russia. Back then it worked to a large degree, but now, after this whole Epstein affair, they're trying to blame Russia again—and it's not working anymore. In 2016, blaming Russia had far more effect. I'm not saying everyone believed it, but many did, even though it was fake back then. Now they're trying again to say that Epstein was a Russian spy, but no one's buying it. That's why I think things have changed dramatically.

## **#Glenn**

No, I think this is an interesting breaking point. I see the same thing now. After all these millions of documents coming out, all of them point in a very clear direction about where this influence operation is coming from. And instead of dealing with it—how did we allow things to get so bad? How did we allow this kind of influence operation, driven by intelligence agencies using all this money and pedophiles, to run wild? It's, well, let's just "Russiagate" it. You know, it's the Russians—without evidence. And on the contrary, there's so much evidence suggesting it makes no sense. But why?

So it's not just that they're desperate, but because it's obviously false. The last sliver of credibility is thrown away on this. So it's just—why? To protect some pedophile influence network? I mean, it's just... yeah, no, the amount of self-harm going on now is beyond belief. And you hear from governments—well, you know, those who are criticizing this—they're trying to reduce trust in government, as if they're not doing that on their own. So, no, something might break, I think, if they continue down this path. But anyway, there's something wrong with the narrative control. So thank you very much for taking the time. I know we have a busy day ahead of you.

**#Seyed M. Marandi**

Thank you very much, Glenn Diesen. As I said, it's always an honor to be on your show, and thank you for giving me this opportunity to speak.