

Europe Builds a Sanctions State. He Fights It. | Col. Jacques Baud

Can EU sanctions turn into punishment without trial, and can foreign-policy powers be aimed inward at Europeans? In this talk, I'm joined by Colonel Jacques Baud (former Swiss Army colonel and intelligence officer), now targeted by EU sanctions, to unpack the legal gray zone, the evidence problem, and the wider push for narrative control. Links: Appeal & petition site: <https://www.appeal-baud.com> Neutrality Studies substack: <https://pascallottaz.substack.com> Merch & Donations: <https://neutralitystudies-shop.fourthwall.com> Timestamps: 00:00:00 Introduction 00:01:29 Sanctions as extrajudicial punishment and dangerous precedent 00:06:26 "Now, are there any updates on the legal front... Anything that you can share with us?" 00:10:02 "They can only use publicly available sources... Is that the case?" 00:13:23 "What can the council's legal department do and what can they not?" 00:18:13 Humanitarian derogation and frozen accounts 00:24:43 Sanctions as foreign-policy weapons turning inward 00:36:27 Hybrid warfare narratives and the Gerasimov doctrine claim 00:44:46 Ukraine war lessons, systems thinking, training mismatch 00:57:07 Outro

#Pascal

Hello, everybody, and welcome back to Neutrality Studies. My name is Pascal Lottaz. I'm an associate professor at Kyoto University. Today I'm joined again by my compatriot and friend, Colonel Jacques Boll, former colonel of the Swiss Army, intelligence officer, and, since December 2025, also a person non grata—or rather, a person on the EU sanctions list. We've talked to Jacques before; he's given us quite a bit of explanation on this channel. He's also been on the channel of NEMA, Dialogue Works. I think your case, Jacques, is now well known, and I'm happy to report that in Switzerland, where I'm visiting right now, your case is being discussed in the circles I've been with—on the left and on the right. Your case is having quite an impact on the discussion about the future of Switzerland and the future of Europe in general. I'm very glad to have you back here on the channel.

#Jacques Baud

Yeah, well, first of all, thank you very much for inviting me again. Thank you for all the support and everything you've done in favor of my case. I know all the efforts you've made in the last two months about this, and I'm really grateful for everything you've done and for all you've also triggered and helped to do to improve my situation. But as you rightly said, my situation is my situation, of course. Yet it entails a danger for others as well. I mean, my case is a precedent—or a

possible precedent—for other cases in the future. And I think a lot of people have understood that we're dealing with an extrajudicial type of punishment, and this is something that goes against any rules, practices, and even values that we have in Europe.

I mean, the history of democracy in Europe is based on those practices and principles of habeas corpus and the rule of law. And when we say "rule of law," that means everything is ruled by law. But here, in my case, we have exactly the opposite—you have people who rule outside the law. And that contains a very, very significant danger, especially because Europeans, let's put it that way, haven't realized that aspect. So far, the measures I'm under are foreign policy measures. They were designed to reach people outside the limits of European law, if you want—people living outside the EU. And therefore, this is exactly the same thing.

I mean, you can compare it. In war, you have the right to kill people. But when you're not at war, you're not allowed to kill anyone. That's why there's a distinction between foreign policy—which includes war, not internal wars but external ones—and domestic policy. In domestic law, it's forbidden to kill, but in foreign policy, you may have that right under certain circumstances, of course. So it's exactly the same thing here. And when we start to confuse law and no law, we end up in a situation that's extremely concerning. That's exactly it. I mean, you made a video about the issue of legality, extra-legality—not illegality, but extra-legality—being outside the law.

And we are exactly in this situation, which is extremely concerning. I see that more and more people are starting to understand that—something that wasn't the case at the beginning. When the sanctions were issued, nobody understood. Some people thought it was a normal judicial decision, but it's not a judicial decision; it's an extra-judicial one. And that's the problem. So these are just a few thoughts about what you said, and I think that should guide the whole process. I mean, obviously, I'm at the center of the problem today, but what's happening to me now could happen to anyone tomorrow—and that's something nobody wants.

#Pascal

No, that's definitely not what we want. And this regime—if it doesn't stop—it will expand. I mean, it's a tool. And at the moment, it's a tool that's being used experimentally, I would say, to see what's possible. You can also see how there's been a progression: first using sanctions against states only, then against entities, then against people who were close to those entities, then—especially in Russia—against people inside Russia who were connected somehow, like journalists who reported from Donbass, and so on.

And then against individuals inside the European Union. You're not an EU citizen, as a Swiss, but Hussein Dogru is, and he's in Germany. You can see how there's this experimental phase, and if it doesn't stop here, it will get worse. Now, are there any updates on the legal front—like with your lawyers or the people you've talked to—about how you're approaching the legal battle against this? Anything you can share with us? Because obviously, maybe not everything can be made public.

#Jacques Baud

Yes, there are obviously some things I'm not allowed to say publicly at this stage. My lawyers and I have received the documents that formed the basis of the decision to put me under sanctions. So we know what the substance of the accusation is, if you will. Unfortunately, we're not able to share that. And even if we were allowed, I wouldn't do it, because that will be part of—well, it will define the strategy we'll use to challenge the sanctions decision. It's also important to realize that some people say, "Well, in Belgium, for instance, there's a professor of international law who says we're in a rule of law, because now you can go against the decision."

Well, this is not the rule of law. We're just attacking, if you will. To summarize the strategy a bit: we cannot go against the decision itself; we can only attack the Council of the European Union and say, well, they took a decision they shouldn't have taken. That's it. So this is not a defense in the legal sense of the word—it's a counterattack, if I can put it that way. And that means we'll base our defense on the substance of the accusations, unfortunately. That's German, sorry.

#Jacques Baud

What I can say is that in all the documents published, I received none of them—none of them cite a direct quote I shouldn't have made. None of them include a direct quote; it's always hearsay, what people have said about me, or things like that. There's no direct quote from me.

#Pascal

Hey, very brief intermission because I was recently banned from YouTube. And although I'm back, this could happen again at any time. So please consider subscribing not only here, but also to my mailing list on Substack — that's pascallottaz.substack.com. The link's in the description below. And now, back to the video. I was told by Hussein Dogru that the accusations are based on the fact that the Council doesn't have the power to conduct criminal investigations. So they can only use publicly available sources to build the case against you. They base everything on what's already been published and rely on secondary sources — like, "Magazine X said the following about Jacques, therefore the accusation stands." Is that the case? Is that the thing? Yeah, it's absolutely that. It's absolutely that.

#Jacques Baud

And that's even more shocking because... I don't want to discuss other people's cases, since obviously each one has its own specifics. But in my case, everything I've said is in my books. You know, it's all written somewhere. So you can check—if there's an accusation or someone claims I said this or that, you can verify it. Everything is verifiable. But there's absolutely no verification done by the EU. They just select specific information to substantiate the accusation, but they don't check all the information. So it's cherry-picking. In technical terms, "cherry-picking" is a nice word.

But technically speaking, it's like they've built up a conspiracy theory. What the EU does is build a conspiracy theory. That means they never go to the original source, never to the original document. They just take what people have said or understood about it, and that's it. They make a case out of that. And that's extremely—well, that's extremely interesting. I think when the whole thing is done, I mean, I'll certainly—when all that can be made public, I can tell you it will be extremely, extremely devastating for the European Union.

Because if they had taken one of my books and said, "Well, in your book you say this and that," I could say, "Okay, I did say that. It's written. No problem. I can justify it." But it's not even that. As I said, there isn't a single direct quote from me. They even took a press article where I said I was going against Russian propaganda. So I wasn't endorsing anything—I was just stating facts, saying that Russia was saying things that, in my opinion, it shouldn't have said. So sometimes you just don't understand. They probably just picked an article where they saw the name Jacques Bourdieu, grabbed it, and that was it.

#Pascal

You know, the challenge for us now is to figure out how the process in the background works, because that might give us clues about how to most effectively challenge the buildup of this internal sanctions regime, right? And one of the things we seem to understand now is that the Council of the EU—and it's not, I must repeat, it's not the Commission, it's the Council—the Council, according to my information, now has a legal department. And you guys are in touch with that legal department, right? That's the case—the legal department of the Council?

#Jacques Baud

Well, I'm not exactly sure who my lawyers will address. I don't know if it's the legal department of the European Council or the European Court of Justice. There might be a slight difference there, but I don't want to go into those details. They might be interesting, but at this stage I'm not able to give more information because right now we're working with the lawyers. I'm sorry—I'm mixing things up. I've spoken so much German in recent days that I'm confusing German and English. Sorry about that. The thing is, we're not yet elaborating a strategy. We're analyzing the documents that were provided to us, which are called working papers—that's the technical term for those documents. So we're going through them, checking everything sentence by sentence.

#Pascal

Yes, may I just jump in? Sorry—the only thing I want to say is that the way it works, I think, will be important, because there is a counterparty, right? And the counterparty—the people who execute this—are probably the legal department of the Council, if I understood correctly. They build the case against you, and then the ECJ, the European Court of Justice, is in the middle, right? It's the one

that has to analyze it, and maybe they'll forward everything. But those are the parties. The interesting thing to me is, what can the Council's legal department do, and what can they not? They can't do a criminal investigation, because it's not a criminal process. So they have to build their case based on a specific internal process. And that process seems to be, well, extremely flimsy, because it's still an experimental phase for them.

#Jacques Baud

Well, the thing is, again, I don't know exactly who built the case, because there isn't a single legal comment on it. I mean, they provided me with articles taken from the internet, basically, without a single comment. Period. So there's no legal assessment. I mean, they could have said, "Well, through that we decide or we assess that this is propaganda," whatever—but there's no comment at all. They just sent articles. Period. Some have been translated mechanically, and I don't know what kind of software they used, because it's extremely poor, to be frank with you. It's just amazing. And sometimes even the translation is not exactly contradictory, but it doesn't reflect what I said in the original language, for example.

So, there is no legal consideration—absolutely none. This could have been the work of any individual. I mean, you just type "Jacques Brault" and collect whatever comes up. That's all. Period. So that's where we are at this stage. My understanding is that my lawyers will address the European Court of Justice. What happens after that, I don't know, but that will probably be the—well, the comment or the, I mean, I don't know exactly what this document will be called, but let's call it a protest, let's put it that way. It will present to the European Court of Justice all the arguments against, or to lift, the sanction, or things like that. Now, just to update you on my situation, the lawyers have also asked to have a humanitarian derogation.

For me, that means that, as I've already said, I normally have no access to my bank account in the EU. Since December, I haven't been able to buy things—I can't buy gas for my car, I can't buy food, I can't spend money the way you normally do with a bank card or anything like that. So, through the humanitarian derogation, I should be able to spend money for my essential needs—that means food, electricity bills, and so on. On the 6th of February, the Belgian Ministry of Justice granted this humanitarian derogation. That was ten days ago, but nothing has happened yet. So I'm basically at the same point as in December.

There is an official decision, but it hasn't been implemented so far. As of today, that's still the case. And, you see, the way the administration works in—well, I don't want to criticize Belgium too much, because Belgian people are nice—but nevertheless, the administration works as it works, which means it's extremely slow and not very effective. And that's exactly where we are. When this is finally implemented, I still won't have full access to my bank account. I don't know exactly what the rule will be, to be honest, because, as I said, it's limited to my essential needs and for a limited amount of time. So I'll have to renew the request and all that. So this is...

#Pascal

Sorry. It's part of what makes this so horrible, right? The punishment—the effect of the punishment—comes immediately, without even telling you. And the remedies against it, even the humanitarian relief, come only over time.

#Jacques Baud

Slowly, slowly, slowly. Exactly. This is exactly that. I mean, this is something we've already discussed in previous interviews, if I remember correctly—that they're not limited in time. You know, normally, when you go on trial for something, say you've stolen a car, then you get a sentence and you have to go to jail, but for a certain amount of time. It's not unlimited. You get one month, two months, one year—I don't know. But that's the judge's decision, and you go for one week, two weeks, whatever. That's your jail time, period. And once it's done, it's done. Here, it's not the case. This is essentially unlimited. Obviously, the sanctions list is regularly reviewed, and my sanction will be reviewed in October, as far as I know. I may be wrong, but I think that's it—it'll be reviewed in October.

And without any other comment, it will be extended. So this is a situation where you are punished, but for an unlimited amount of time. But again, it's very important for people to understand that we are outside the law. And being outside the law means the decision is not limited by the law. If I put it in an extreme way—and again, I'm not saying it will go that far—but the principle remains the same. The death penalty is forbidden; it doesn't exist in Europe because the law in Europe, in the EU and in individual states, says there is no death penalty. But when you are outside the law, when your decision is above the law, that means that theoretically you could decide this. And essentially, this extrajudicial punishment or sanction is exactly what the Americans do when they decide to eliminate someone somewhere.

It's an extrajudicial process. It's exactly the same idea—to have people in Guantanamo so they escape the legal system of the United States, because they're on a territory that's not under U.S. law. So it's extrajudicial. And the reason they did it that way is because you cannot use torture under U.S. law—you can't use torture to get information. But when you're no longer under U.S. law, when you're on an extrajudicial territory, then you can use torture. And that's exactly the purpose of Guantanamo. And that's exactly what we have. It's very concerning, because that means you can apply measures that are normally designed to address issues outside European law, but now you can apply exactly the same measures to people living inside the European Union.

#Pascal

Can we talk about this? Because I think this is where the bigger picture really connects to what's happening to you. And Natalie Ambo also pointed this out. She told me, "Look, in Africa, we've been used to being targets of European and U.S. sanctions. They've been using this tool against us

forever—also against simple activists, anti-colonial activists.” And what you just described is exactly that. The drone strikes—President Obama signing off on the killing of individuals in Afghanistan with drones, even American citizens—signing off on their killing is not a judicial process, right? Using sanctions and this power of foreign policy, including sanctions and military deployments as part of foreign policy, is a way to fight against enemies.

And this fight against enemies, this turning inward of the weapons that were used to fight on the outside—this is extremely problematic. But it’s exactly what this kind of mindset does. And I mean the colonial mindset: that there are interests, and there are people who run against those interests. And whether they’re the enemy on the outside or the enemy on the inside, we will target them. The legal processes we usually build to protect us from the state, from the Leviathan, no longer apply. Because again, you’re not inside the system—you’re taken outside, and then you’re targeted by the executives.

#Jacques Baud

Well, again, I don't want to go into the whole issue of colonial or anti-colonial things like that. This is probably going a little bit—let’s say, not too far, but far from my point of view. But the thing is that sanctions—we have to understand that sanctions, generally speaking, are a way to interfere with the domestic policy of countries. Essentially, other states. Yeah. I would say of countries, because in the UN system, the UN Charter allows sanctions against a state under certain conditions. But the UN Charter is also, at the same time, the legal framework that defines that you shouldn’t interfere with domestic laws.

That means it has the tool, essentially, to say, “No, you cannot interfere,” but under certain conditions, we can break that rule. Yeah, but only under the UN system—only within the Council system, right? Because they define that you should not interfere, but they can also define exceptions to their own rule. Basically, when the EU, or Switzerland, or the United States, or whoever decides on its own to apply sanctions, then it goes beyond what the UN does, because that should normally be done by the UN. This issue of interference or non-interference should remain at the UN Charter level and at the UN level. And Article 7 and things like embargoes and all that are measures defined in the UN Charter.

And those are tools to influence a situation where you have, obviously, a massive human rights infringement and things like that. But the problem is that the US first, and then the EU and individual countries—because we can even say that when we talk about Russia, people usually say that Switzerland has adopted the EU’s sanctions. And that’s partly true, but Switzerland also has its own sanctions. In fact, Switzerland has applied more sanctions to Russia than the EU. So that means we’re going beyond what the UN does, and even beyond what the EU does. But the EU should not—my view, and the view of many international observers and lawyers, is that the only legal sanctions are those decided by the UN.

#Pascal

And we must be very clear: the United Nations themselves condemn unilateral coercive measures. Exactly—don't do it unless it's under the control of the Security Council. And, you know, that's the difference with the sanctions against Iran. They were done under the UN roof, at a time when Russia and China were still willing to play along, before everything changed. And, you know, about the sanctions—there was this study published in December, just around the time when they put sanctions on you, in **The Lancet**, this public health magazine. They analyzed the health impact of U.S. and European unilateral sanctions between 1979 and 2021, and they came to the conclusion that these two things together kill about half a million people every year. Yeah, half a million people every year.

#Jacques Baud

Yeah, this is something I pointed out in my book **Governing by Fake News**, in fact. I mentioned this case of sanctions. And when we talk about all these extrajudicial measures—you mentioned Obama and all that—under Obama there was a study done about the effect of those extrajudicial killings, as an example. They found that only 4% of the people killed were actually terrorists. Four percent. That means 96% of those killed were, in fact, bystanders—collateral damage, you name it. And again, nobody is accountable for that because it's extrajudicial. The problem here is, in fact, as I mentioned before, I mean, in very rough terms, I explained what's in the working papers.

And you see, the basis for carrying out extrajudicial killings is equally weak. We don't know exactly who we're killing. We don't know exactly who we're sanctioning. We don't even know exactly why or for what reason. Because when you're in a judicial system, when you're in a process—a trial—you check the accusation. You have a way to verify whether the accusation is correct or not. That's why you have lawyers, that's why you have an attorney general and all that. They present their case, it's discussed, and in the end you have the bottom line—whether there's a sanction or not.

But in essence, you have a tool that allows you to check the accusation. Here, in extrajudicial systems—and that applies to unilateral sanctions—that means you have absolutely no tool to verify whether your decision is based on something solid or not. And that's the whole thing. You know, with UN sanctions—you mentioned the case of Iran—when the Security Council decides on sanctions, it means the whole issue has been discussed in the Council. There's an exchange: some people will say it's right, others will say no, and so on and so forth. But at the end of the day, you come up with a decision that has been weighed by both parties. In the unilateral sanction system, nobody verifies what you say.

It's just merely accusations. And it might be that you decide somebody is a terrorist. What exactly is a terrorist? You know, again, I don't want to go into the case of other individuals you've mentioned. But what is a terrorist? I mean, Hamas is considered a terrorist by 30 or 31 countries in the world, but not by 160 countries. So who defines exactly what a terrorist is, and things like that? And when

you start to apply unilateral sanctions on somebody because of this criterion, is that criterion universally accepted? And since there is no trial, no process to decide whether your accusation is correct or not, well, you are exactly in an arbitrary decision. And that's exactly where we are.

#Pascal

But it's even one level worse, because in a judicial system, any accusation has to be an accusation of you breaching a rule. And these rules—we call them laws. It's even worse because there are no rules, right? Again, propaganda in Europe, in Switzerland, in the EU is not illegal. There's no law that says, "This will count as propaganda, and this is illegal." Because to do that, you'd need to bring it to parliament first. You'd need to decide and say, "Okay, this text, I'm going to publish it, and anyone who breaches this is doing something illegal." We don't have that.

In the case of the United Nations, the whole idea is that the powers check each other, right? You make an accusation, you say, "This is bad for the UN system," and then you check. And if all five great powers actually say, "You know what, that's true, this is bad," then you use a political process—the sanctions—in order to go against what you decided is bad. And in the EU case, what we have is the member states saying, "This is bad for us, and we are going to impose this," but again, without giving the person on the receiving end the chance to actually use the entire system of law in order to have a fair trial—because it's not a trial.

#Jacques Baud

No, exactly. No, you're absolutely right. This is something that brings us back to the 15th century or something like that, or to the Soviet Union, or under the worst dictatorships. And I say even the worst dictatorship, because you may have some authoritarian government, but it may still be a rule of law. The law might be tough, the laws may be difficult and probably unjust, but there are laws. While here in the EU, there are simply no laws. So we are outside of the law. There are laws in the EU, obviously, but this kind of decision—of sanctions—is outside any law. And again, what is propaganda? And then people will say, well, it's hybrid warfare.

What exactly is hybrid warfare? Nobody knows exactly what it is. In fact, what people say most of the time is, "Well, that's a Russian doctrine. It comes from the so-called Gerasimov Doctrine." But what is the Gerasimov Doctrine? Does it even exist? Well, it doesn't. The whole issue of hybrid warfare actually started in 2013, when Gerasimov wrote an article that was, in fact, an analytical piece about warfare. This was then taken by a British expert, Mark Galeotti, who interpreted that article as a hybrid warfare doctrine for Russia and called it the Gerasimov Doctrine. And that's what most people refer to when they talk about hybrid warfare.

The problem is that Mark Galeotti looked a little deeper into his own assessment and came back in 2018, I think—maybe 2017, I don't remember exactly. But in any case, he wrote an article, I think in **Foreign Policy**, where he said, "I'm sorry for creating the Gerasimov Doctrine. It doesn't exist."

And he's written several articles since then saying that, in fact, he made a mistake—he misinterpreted what Gerasimov said. The problem is that nobody mentions these articles now. Everybody's gone wild about this idea of hybrid warfare and the notion that the Russians have this doctrine, things like that.

Meaning that the very idea of hybrid warfare has now taken on its own dynamics, and everybody is inventing new stuff and all that. The fact of the matter is that in the—well, I wrote an article about the Russian "auto war" recently, that was last year, and I obviously talked about this issue. And there is no hybrid warfare aspect or doctrine in the Russian military doctrine. There is clandestine warfare, there are a lot of things. I have written, by the way, a book about Russian clandestine warfare, which, incidentally, was published in the early 2000s. And, incidentally, it was translated into Russian in Ukraine, by the way, just for...

#Pascal

Yeah, the situation would be really funny if it weren't so utterly tragic and devastating. But yes, please.

#Jacques Baud

Yeah, that's it. And I know Russia obviously conducts clandestine warfare. The problem is that we've drifted so far toward our own understanding of what hybrid warfare is that we have a completely false view of the actual clandestine warfare Russia is carrying out. Russia isn't doing at all what we say they're doing—they're doing something else. I mean, they're probably more effective because, in fact, all these people who talk about hybrid warfare are distracting us from the real problem: clandestine warfare, which is waged by Russia. And that's probably the reason why Russia is happy about this—because we're talking about something that's more subtle than we think. And again, I remember—in my book, **The Art of War**—I mentioned a program on TV5 Monde, which is a French-speaking channel for various French-speaking countries: Canada, Switzerland, Belgium, France, and so on.

They made a special program about hybrid warfare, and there was an expert from a French institute there. She mentioned five examples of hybrid warfare operations—Russian hybrid warfare, including cutting undersea cables and things like that. She gave five examples, all of which had already been debunked by other media. We knew that when the undersea cables were broken, it was due to fishing nets and similar causes, so everyone already had an explanation. It was the same with drones, for instance. Last year, in October or November, there was this kind of drone frenzy—drones everywhere—and almost all those cases have since been explained. There's a Dutch website called Drone Watch; they checked all that and said, well, we can't say these were Russians, because they analyzed all the cases.

So, meaning that we're really making up something that serves the narrative against Russia. But the consequence of that is that it may not be the way Russia actually wages war—meaning we're simply distracting ourselves from the real war. And this is... it looks good from the outside, because we're not naive—we're fighting the Russians, we're strong, and all that—but in reality, we're fighting nothing. We're just fighting ourselves, and we're not improving our ability to fight the Russians. If there were ever a war in Europe against Russia, we'd be weak—not because we don't have weapons and all that, but because we're not able to understand how the Russians think about war, how they think about the way to wage it. So... sorry. No, but this is brilliant.

#Pascal

And you know, this is exactly why this is such an incredibly dumb process. Because what you're explaining here is that, on the one hand, you have the Russians fighting with their doctrines, with their way of approaching things. And we've got other people—Andrei Martyanov, Scott Ritter—who also point out, look, they work like this. They have very, very elaborate doctrines and systems within which they operate. That's the real Russians. And then you have the Europeans, who portray the Russians as doing this other thing, which is completely different from how they actually are.

And then we focus all our attention on how to fight that imaginary Russian, not the real Russian. And anyone who says, "Oh, this is wrong," by the way, we put them under sanctions. You're one of the people who can actually help rectify the analysis and tell them, "Look, the real threat from the Russians is actually A, B, C." But those parts are now being taken out because they no longer fit the European way of wanting to see the Russians—which means we're setting ourselves up, even if it comes to war, for utter failure. It's such a process of stupidity, of narrowing everything down to an ideal instead of figuring out what things actually are.

#Jacques Baud

Exactly. You're absolutely right. This is exactly the problem. And that's exactly, by the way, what's happening in Ukraine. You know, I already described back in 2022 why Ukraine is weak—or weaker than Russia. The weaknesses, better said. And I didn't say why it was weaker; I just explained the weaknesses of Ukraine. Because in war, you don't need—well, obviously, it's better when you have more tanks than the other side, it's better when you have more aircraft than the other, and all that. But it doesn't mean you can't win a war with less equipment, provided you understand how your enemy functions and how to bypass its strategy and things like that.

But for that, you have to understand perfectly what they are doing. And what we've done with Ukraine is try to impose on it a certain understanding of the war that's not related to reality. Many times the Ukrainians have complained—and I mentioned that in my books—they've said again and again that they're not prepared for the right kind of war. The soldiers trained in France, Germany, and the UK were not prepared for the kind of war being fought in Ukraine, because they were

trained by, probably, very nice officers and trainers and all that, but people who had a completely different battle experience.

As a result, those Ukrainians came back to Ukraine and said, well, we weren't trained for the right battle, for the right kind of fighting. All the while, when we provided weapons and all that, we never thought about the problems it posed for Ukraine. And we have, in fact, increased our support—we've provided a lot of weapons, a lot of money, a lot of training. All that is true, but with no understanding of how everything we provided could be more effective. In fact, we've given them a lot of things, but they're not as effective as they could be, as they should be, because we fail to understand how all that works together. You know, the essence of warfare is not the kind of weapon you have; it's how you use those weapons together.

You know, I always take the example that the tank was invented in World War I. The aircraft was invented in World War I. The machine gun and all that were invented in World War I. But in World War I there was no—let's say—major impact on the battlefield. It influenced the battlefield, but not in a major way. What happened during World War II? The Germans realized that you could use and combine those different tools, those different weapons, into one system. This is exactly what you call the Blitzkrieg. And that's exactly why the Germans were effective, especially in the first part of World War II, because they managed to put everything together, to combine them into one system. You didn't use tanks here and aircraft there and things like that.

No, everything was combined into one system under the same command and control structure, and that gave efficiency to the whole thing. That's why the Germans could defeat the French, even though they had fewer tanks than the French. They even had worse tanks—the French had much better ones. But those French tanks were used the same way they had been in World War I. The Germans managed to put everything together and combine artillery, tanks, infantry, aircraft, and all that into one system. And that's exactly what we're witnessing in Ukraine. The Russians have learned a lot from the lessons of World War II, and they've managed to turn their armed forces into one system—and that system works like a body.

I mean, your left hand and your right hand both work in a coordinated way. My right hand isn't my left hand, but they can work together as one system. And that's exactly how the Russians have built their army. Because we supported the Ukrainians once with a couple of tanks here, once with a few machine guns there, once with a few missiles here and there, the Ukrainians have never managed to bring all this support into one system. You probably remember when the French proposed to the Ukrainians to provide Mirage 2000s, which are among the best aircraft the French have. I mean, they obviously have the Rafale, but the Mirage 2000 is an excellent aircraft as well. But what happened?

The spokesman for the Ukrainian Air Force said, "We don't want those aircraft; they'll just complicate our lives." You see? We always look at war as a kind of linear thing—like, I have a bigger gun than you, so I'm winning. But it doesn't work like that. And that's exactly what I've been explaining. By

the way, it's also very interesting—when I wrote my book about the art of war, I explained all these differences, the weaknesses and strengths on both sides. Nobody took my book and said, "Oh, let's study the weaknesses of Ukraine and try to fix them." Nobody has done that. Nobody has even tried to correct the mistakes we've made. Nobody's trying to make our support for Ukraine more effective. Nobody has done that.

#Pascal

It's kind of insane. Anyone can understand that if you build an office or an organization and then tell them they have to have computers, and you just say, "Oh, I'll support you—here, have a Mac, have a Windows, have Linux, and use this USB," then you'll create chaos. You'll create complete chaos. Anyone understands that. But when it comes to the military realm, everybody thinks, "Oh, a new fighter jet! They're fighter jets, right?" And what you were describing to me just a moment ago—this problem with how we imagine the enemy to be—it reminds me so much of an 800-year-old European novel, **Don Quixote**. **Don Quixote**.

#Jacques Baud

Exactly.

#Pascal

If you want to fight a giant, and you get all the gear and everything and charge at it—but it turns out it's a windmill.

#Jacques Baud

You're going to hurt yourself. We are in that process. We're in an 800-year-old problem. The example you just mentioned is exactly the point. When we talk about Russia, we're fighting windmills—that's exactly what we're doing. Because we've defined—well, I'm not saying, I mean, I don't know if we'll ever have a war against Russia, maybe we will or maybe not—but regardless, if we consider Russia to be the enemy, then we have to assess it properly. You can't just imagine it could be like this or like that. It either is or it isn't, period. So this is exactly what you said. It's very strange, but we are in those times. We're in very irrational times, in fact. And that's probably also the reason why today we need more censorship, more narrative control, and all that.

Because probably intuitively—not explicitly, but implicitly—people realize that our leadership is failing, not making the right decisions. And as I always said, during the Cold War—and I'm a Cold Warrior—during the Cold War we didn't have a private **Pravda**, **Literaturnaya Gazeta**, **Komsomolskaya Pravda**, and all that. You could buy them very freely in our news outlets in Europe—in Bern, in Geneva, in Paris. They were not banned. Today, we need to ban Russian media. And the communists—I always take the example of the French Communist Party, which had

extremely strong ties with the Soviet Communist Party—it was not banned in France. It was not banned because we were confident that our decision-making process, that our system, was superior. Therefore, we didn't need censorship. Sorry.

#Pascal

You're absolutely right. The thing is, the difference with Don Quixote now is that he was one man with a delusion. And now, in Europe, you have 400 or so million people who need to share the same delusion. Because if they don't, they'll start arguing about the windmill and looking for other ways around it. So you need to create a common mass delusion. And that's a shitty process—but it's the process we're in.

#Jacques Baud

Yeah. I mean, we started this discussion about my sanctions, and obviously this is an **Erscheinung**—the appearance of the problem, or what it is. But there's something much deeper, I think, that we need to be concerned about. And that affects all countries, EU and non-EU—it also concerns Switzerland—the quality of leadership in general, the way we make decisions. All that is, to me, a real source of concern. We have more and more people who just shoot from the hip, you see. We no longer have leaders who think things through, who analyze before making decisions.

They just decide out of the blue. They have to react. It's a Twitter-type decision: you get some information—what's your reaction? And within minutes, without any real thinking or analysis, you have to respond. That's why you have people like Emmanuel Macron, who says one thing one day and something totally different the next. We're stuck in this dynamic where reaction time matters more than the content of what you're saying.

#Pascal

Yes, it is. Yes, it is. And Jacques, look, this is always very, very valuable—your analysis and your explanations. I'm very sorry that you're now in the place Hannah Arendt once called, you know, this horrible moment when the political starts crashing into the personal. For us, who are not sanctioned, these are two levels; for you, it's now one. But thank you for talking about this and for continuing the intellectual engagement with what this moment means. Is there anything you'd like to add, or anywhere you'd like people to go to read more about it?

#Jacques Baud

Well, we are now—some friends of mine in Switzerland are setting up a support committee where people can go. I'll give you the contact; it's being built up now. That's one part of it, absolutely. We are **nous sommes Jacques Baud**—we are Jacques Baud, exactly. There are some actions underway, and I'll keep you posted on that. But beyond this, I'd like to thank all of you, including

you, by the way, because with your website—your program—you've been instrumental in supporting me. And there are many others who also appear on your show from time to time who have supported me. Beyond that, I mean, all these are prominent figures, but there are also thousands, hundreds of thousands of people who have expressed their support for me—who feed me, some of them.

I can tell you that I can hardly step out of my house without being greeted on the sidewalk by someone who supports me. Lately, I've never gone outside without meeting someone who wants to express their support. And that's absolutely fascinating, because before the sanctions, that wasn't the case. I mean, obviously, I was known, but probably not in the same way. Today, I receive support from everywhere—literally. A lot of people write letters to my publisher, to me—emails, texts, you name it. Just last week, two Swiss guys I didn't know called me and said, "We want to show our support." They came here, left Switzerland in the morning, and went back the same day.

So, 1,800 kilometers just to bring me some Swiss food—specialties, greet me, that kind of thing. And I have literally hundreds of requests like that. It shows two things: first, that there are still people who understand what's going on but also have a heart, which is important. But it also shows there's a disconnect, because the idea of a sanction is to make you invisible, to discard you, to push you out of society. And you see, it's exactly the opposite that happens. I have countless requests for shows, for interviews, and all that, in alternative media and so on.

So, meaning that these sanctions don't even achieve the objective they're supposed to. People understand that, and they're realizing more and more that our leadership—the establishment, generally speaking—is going beyond where it should. It's going beyond rationality. We're going beyond humanity. We're going beyond the values we claim to stand for. Now, Europe—I can say the European Union, in fact, and that's a fact—is doing exactly the same thing we wanted to fight against when we opposed the Warsaw Pact or the Soviet Union 40 years ago. They're doing exactly the same thing. It's exactly the same situation happening now: decisions are being made without regard for the law. And that should be a source of concern for everyone.

And therefore, for all who resist that—and when I say the word "resistance," I have to say, part of my family was in the French Resistance during World War II. And sometimes, when people come and bring me food, they say they feel like they're part of a resistance, like during World War II. It's exactly the same feeling. It's very interesting, because this is something very unexpected, but that's exactly how some people feel. They are resistant. And to resist—remember that at the end of World War II, the resistance won. They were the ones who were praised for their courage, their determination, and their rational approach to the problem. And so we are here in the same situation.

#Pascal

Yep, yep. I see it exactly like that. It's an act of resistance that's needed now. And the more people resist, the higher the chances it will succeed. So, everybody watching, thank you very much for your

support. Thank you very much for the collective thinking about this, and for the collective resistance against what we all know and feel is very negative. Colonel Jacques Baud, thank you for your time today.

#Jacques Baud

Thank you very much for inviting me. Thanks.