

# Freedom of Speech Punished Harder Than Crime | Juan Branco (Lawyer of Nathalie Yamb)

Can a blacklist replace a court? Can a travel ban turn Europe into a cage? I sit down with Dr. Juan Branco, French-Spanish lawyer and activist who advised Julian Assange and now defends Nathalie Yamb, to trace EU sanctions from asset freezes to speech policing. -- Sorry for the choppy connection. The recording had issues. Links: Juan Branco on X: <https://x.com/anatolium> Neutrality Studies substack: <https://pascallottaz.substack.com> (Opt in for Academic Section from your profile settings: <https://pascallottaz.substack.com/s/academic>) Merch & Donations: <https://neutralitystudies-shop.fourthwall.com> Timestamps: 00:00:00 Introduction 00:00:56 How are you looking at the EU sanctions? 00:05:02 How do you make sense of this regime? 00:15:59 How can we use law to fight against such blatant injustices and miscarriage of legal order? 00:31:46 Could the European Court of Justice be used to invalidate the entire practice? 00:37:02 What's your plan of action for the short term? 00:41:06 Outro

## #Pascal

Welcome back, everybody. This is Pascal Lottaz from Neutrality Studies, and today I'm joined by Dr. Juan Branco. Juan Branco is a French and Spanish lawyer and activist who, among other people, advised Julian Assange during his trials, and he's currently advising my compatriot, Nathalie Jamp, about the EU sanctions regime. Today we want to discuss, again, the sanctions—what they mean for the people who are under the regime, and what they tell us about the rule of law in Europe. Juan, welcome.

## #Juan Branco

Thank you very much, Pascal, for the invitation.

## #Pascal

Thank you for taking the time for this. You've been one of the people who's time and again stood up and used the law, as a practicing lawyer, as far as I understand, to help people who are being persecuted—for lack of a better word. Can you tell me how you look at the EU sanctions against individuals, both inside and outside the EU?

## #Juan Branco



Yes, we've had a fascinating case with Nathalie Yamb, who, as I recall, is an intellectual—an African intellectual, a Swiss-Cameroonian—who has been denouncing for more than 20 years the persistence of France-Afrique, which is the interconnection between French interests and elites that prey on African resources on the continent. She's been very consistent in this political endeavor. A few years ago, she gave a very famous speech in Sochi, in which she again denounced this system of power and declared that Africa would remain independent, whatever the cost, but that they would welcome any kind of allies, including Russia, if those allies respected them and treated them as equals.

And this unleashed, from the French authorities under Emmanuel Macron's rule, a fury against Nathalie Yamb. They immediately targeted her as the main person to destroy and used her as a justification for the failure of their policies in Africa. This led to a series of legal measures, including an *\*interdiction d'entrée sur le territoire français\**—she was banned from entering French territory. A few years later, just a few months ago, came a decision from the European Union banning her from entering or even flying over EU territory, and of course, seizing all her assets. The only link they ended up finding between Nathalie and Russia was the fact that she participated in a conference in Berlin where several European and German MPs were also present.

And this conference was apparently financed by an NGO, which was itself financed by armed groups called Wagner. So they used this very small, tiny—not even a link, but a connection at some point—which didn't bring any kind of resources to Nathalie, because she wasn't paid to participate in this conference, to justify these extraordinarily violent measures. These measures were not taken following any kind of judicial standard or anything we normally relate to the rule of law. For example, there was no contradictory process beforehand, because they considered that the surprise effect was critical—which one could understand if we were talking about the seizure of assets, especially those of big corporations in the military world or of oligarchs. We could understand that, maybe, because of course money can move very fast.

But first, regarding an intellectual who has done nothing other than use her freedom of speech, and even more importantly, an intellectual who is being targeted with physical measures—physical restraint measures—because she cannot return to her home country. That's actually the novelty of this case. The novelty is twofold: first, the fact that she cannot return to Switzerland, because Switzerland is enclosed within the European Union. And this, I think, is something the European authorities had not foreseen or understood would become a huge legal issue. And second, that she's being targeted only for her words, not because she has any direct or indirect interest in the war in Ukraine or in any structures of power close to Vladimir Putin, for example.

## **#Pascal**

May I ask you, though—we have several such cases by now. A second one is the former Swiss Colonel Jacques Beau, who was actually in Brussels and is now also stuck there. Because if you're on the sanctions list, you're forbidden from traveling across member state borders. We also have a



German national, Hussein Dogru, inside Germany. So how do you make sense of this regime? And do you think it will stand over the long term? Will it remain possible to treat people like this?

## **#Juan Branco**

Yes, so we welcome Jacques Beau joining us in this struggle, even though it wasn't completely voluntary on his part, because he brought more visibility to these kinds of measures, which had been more or less accepted until then. I have to say that the Swiss authorities did not implement the sanctions against Nathalie Youn, quite clearly because they made no sense. Until a few years ago, it was almost automatic—Switzerland would immediately implement whatever EU sanction was taken against an individual in relation to Russia. But they've slowly started to distance themselves and haven't provided any kind of assistance.

I have to say, it's been quite embarrassing, because Nathalie Youn was in a foreign country when she learned about the sanctions. So she was stuck there with no means to find solutions for her survival, simply because her assets were frozen at the same time she was banned from traveling. And you have to understand that these sanctions go way beyond just the ability to return to your country. For example, any company that has activities in the EU will preemptively stop having any kind of economic interaction with you to protect itself from potential sanctions.

I don't think these... I mean, there are several options. Either this system becomes generalized—since we know the originators of these kinds of structures were the United States, with their sanctions and ban lists—or, if we keep imitating them as we have, and other countries start imitating us, we'll soon have a world that's not functional. Every country will have its own sanctions list, and any company, for example, will be afraid to trade with X or Y because, in some country, that person is sanctioned.

And thus, if you start trading with that person, you might eventually find yourself sanctioned. I mean, this happened, for example, to a French bank, BNP Paribas, a few years ago. They faced billions in sanctions from the U.S. because they had continued doing business with an Iranian company. And since they were trading in dollars in their other activities, they were liable under U.S. jurisdiction and had to pay one of the biggest fines ever imposed in such cases. So we know that this is, structurally, an abuse of power—the way these instruments are constructed. I'm talking now in general terms.

I mean, in individual terms, it's extraordinarily violent because, as I was saying, there is no warning and no possibility to deliberate the decision before it's taken. So then you can go, as we did, to the European tribunal and the general courts, which took four months just to decide whether it was an urgent case or not—and they decided it wasn't. So this is very interesting: if seizing all the assets of someone and blocking that person from returning to their own country is not considered an urgent



issue for a court, then what is an urgent issue? If you look a bit more broadly, at the jurisprudence of the General Court and then of the Court of Justice of the European Union, you realize that the lifting of sanctions is almost nonexistent.

You have maybe around ten examples out of thousands of sanctioned people, and all these proceedings were opened to try to lift them. The European courts do not consider this a matter under their jurisdiction. They see it as part of the exercise of a sovereign's natural power in its international relations, so they don't treat it as a human rights or individual rights issue—when it clearly is. They only have very limited control over very small elements, for example, in cases of clear abuse, like when there's confusion over a name and two people are mixed up. Then, eventually, you can have some kind of review.

And the most ironic part is that when you have a control, most often the European Union and the Council of the European Union decide to impose new sanctions on slightly different grounds, even before the previous ones have been lifted. So the person targeted has to start again with the whole judicial process, which can take up to two or three years if you include the appeal time—making it, in practice, a void system of law and an impossibility to challenge it factually.

## **#Pascal**

And we have such cases, right, where individuals actually won their case at the European Court of Justice, and they were simply relisted almost immediately with a modified justification. Then the whole thing started again, and they're still being sanctioned.

## **#Juan Branco**

I know only a couple of cases where this didn't happen, and ironically, it was the son of an oligarch, for example, who managed to avoid the system of simply reinstating sanctions once they'd been lifted by a tribunal. That's something I've argued before the court—that you can't pretend there's judicial control, because, of course, they have this tautological argument where they say it's fine for sanctions not to have a prior contradictory phase since there's supposed to be judicial control afterward. And then you tell them there's no actual judicial control, you know. So we end up in this argument where we're actually challenging even the legitimacy of the court and the exercise of its prerogative.

So, of course, it becomes very tough and intense. The exchanges we've had are sometimes harsher with the court and even with the concept of the European Union, because we're basically—yes, we're basically challenging the *raison d'être* of this judicial review and trying to push them to their limits, to make them understand that it's a system where there's no possibility to win if you're behaving like a normal person. And on the other hand, we're trying to bring them these new elements from this



specific case, which, as you said, Jadubo has followed, but it's really the first time that just because you spoke or wrote something, you can face legal sanctions that are actually much heavier than most sentences, even in criminal cases.

If you look at the average sanction you receive from a criminal case in Europe, it's much lighter—most often shorter in time and with less effect, because most of them are without execution. You get this kind of symbolic conviction, but you don't actually go to jail or anything like that. Here, you have an actual, factual sanction, with the inhibition of your capacity to survive as an economic person, and the inability to return to your family, your work, your place of residence. That's the first thing. And then the second is the length and duration of these sanctions. It's extraordinarily long. There are cases where sanctions have been prolonged for more than ten years.

And so you have a situation where you face an indefinite sanction, which is similar to a criminal sanction in terms of impact—or sometimes even worse. You have no predictability, and that's also an important issue. When you're convicted by a court, you know what you're convicted of: a one-year sentence, a two-year sentence in jail, or home arrest, or house arrest. Here, it's unpredictable how long it will last. It can be prolonged for as long as the Council of the European Union decides, and this also creates anxiety and a different form of violence that, in some ways, is worse than what happens in a criminal proceeding.

**#Pascal**

And of course...

**#Juan Branco**

Yes, sorry, you're not heard. I mean, you can hire a lawyer if you manage to find a way to get the money and pay them despite those circumstances. But that lawyer will only have your case heard months, or even more than a year, after you've initiated it. I mean, it's completely absurd. Absolutely.

**#Pascal**

So, I mean, the regime itself is absurd. And unfortunately, I've heard people from an international law background actually say, "Oh no, they're fine with this, because nobody should ever be allowed to defend the aggressor in a war of aggression." And since the European Court of Justice is responsible for these cases, they say there's a judicial process, so no problem there—as long as everything is fine. But everything is not fine, is it? This is an executive order from an executive organ that has a tremendous human rights impact on the victims. And nobody is safe, because they didn't even commit a crime. They did something that was never actually defined as a crime under European Union statutes. How can we use law to fight against such blatant injustices and this miscarriage of, I would say, legal order?



## **#Juan Branco**

So the subject of definition is actually an interesting one, because you have all these very long texts that serve as support for those sanctions. And they're written in such an impossible-to-understand language for a normal person—all this Brussels jargon that's barely understandable even for a lawyer. I mean, you spend hours just trying to figure out which provision has been used to sanction your clients. You have all these very specific categories that are being mixed together to construct some support for the final decision, but it creates, even in terms of pure language, sentences that are difficult to understand or that have no meaning in normal language. It's just a jumble of different categories used to try to fit together all these results, I guess, of negotiations between the 27 countries of the European Union and their authorities.

And we've had some hard arguments with the Court and the Council of the European Union about this—about the lack of visibility, the lack of understanding of what they actually meant sometimes, and which provision they were referring to when they tried to justify the sanction against Natalie. And that's an issue because they adopt these huge texts in the midst of, let's say, the Ukraine–Russia war. So you have all these emotions about what's going on—the fear, the media pressure, and so forth. And then they create all these openings for the extension of arbitrary decisions and for the expansion of the Council of the European Union's competence against its own citizens, which is extrajudicial. I think that's the term we should remember for this kind of measure.

It's extrajudicial sanctions, which of course have some political objectives. For example, for Nathalie Young, it was France that proposed it to the Council of the European Union. Actually, at some point the Council of the European Union asked the Court for France to be authorized to intervene in the case, because they had no arguments themselves to defend their decision. That's another fantastic situation in this Kafkaesque system. For some reason, they decided that, in order to build up this kind of legitimacy—to build up their case—they could only use open-source evidence. So when you're presented with the decision, okay, it's a three-line decision written in this Bruxellois, impossible-to-understand language.

So you have to go through all the texts. And then, when you write to the Council of the European Union, you ask for the evidence supporting what they stated in their decision. So they send you this file, and that file is what will be discussed and will serve as the Council's argument in front of the General Court of Justice. They send you a set of about 15 to 25 articles—press pieces or think tank publications—which basically all quote each other, you know, as often happens. So in this case, it's, ah, Nathalie—one article says Nathalie Young was at this conference in Berlin, and actually, it's suspected that this conference was financed by an NGO, which was financed by BATNA. Okay, that's the starting point.

And then you have ten articles either commenting on or recycling that information without providing any further elements. So you have this documentary basis—that's what they call it—an evidence file, which is then filled with all the... That's also a very interesting thing. Most of the publications are



produced by think tanks that are either directly or indirectly financed by NATO, which is not part of the European Union institutions. It's as foreign to the EU institutions as, I don't know, any other institution—a system of power organization. And so you have a military organization that is actually one of the main actors in the current conflict between Ukraine and Russia, in which, again, I mean, I must recall this very simple fact, but which seems to have been forgotten by most: we are not at war with Russia today, and no country of the European Union today is at war with Russia.

So they invent this concept of hybrid war to justify taking measures that could be legitimized under a war system or a war situation. And it's actually in the text—in the regulations used against people like Nathalie Ambits—they try to define what hybrid war is and what hybrid war measures are. Basically, anything, including a tweet, can be qualified as an act of hybrid war, which is not war in this text, and thus can legitimize the sanctions. So they open up these categorizations to such an extent that you end up... well, you end up discussing what this, I don't know, Atlantic Council or a blog post says. It's literally that. I'm not talking about intensive research from a group of fifteen researchers from Oxford, Cambridge, Tokyo, blah, blah, blah, who would gather together to work on it.

No, it's just this—maybe a postdoc, a master's student, or someone like that who's written a blog post for the Atlantic Council saying something against Nathalie Young. And boom, they send it to you and say, "This is what we've based our decision on to sanction her." And when you tell them, "I mean, I can't defend someone against hearsay. You need to give me actual evidence that something happened, not just what someone says someone else said," they reply, "No, no, we can't do that because that would violate the rights of Nathalie Young." Because basically, the European Foreign Affairs Ministers—the ones who decide who gets on the sanctions list or not—are not judicial authorities, so they don't have prosecutorial power. But you see how Kafkaesque everything is...

## **#Pascal**

It's pretty insane. You basically take away these people's basic human rights, and you do it based on some open-access articles on the Internet. The reason you use that instead of actual material gathered from, say, a criminal case or proper research is because you don't have the legal right—since you know this isn't a criminal act they committed—so you can only use what's public. And then you turn around and say, "Oh, we need to protect privacy rights," in order to take away human rights.

## **#Juan Branco**

We cannot, as Foreign Affairs Ministers, have access to a judicial case because, I mean, it's secret—it's protected by all these national provisions, which is true, actually. And because, of course, how do you contradict something that's a report from the DGSE or the DGSI? So, in their absurd world, there's a kind of coherence and rationality to act that way. But the result is that you just create suspicion, and in some way you feed it by triggering all these decisions based on rumors. You know, it's like



this autotelic system where you end up condemning someone for what was just hearsay, without giving her any possibility to defend herself.

Because if you had given her the possibility to defend herself, you would have venerated her rights. And you look at that as a lawyer, and you're like, okay, this is going to be complicated. So I try to explain to the General Court of Justice that this is not their system of thought. I mean, it's not at all compatible with the basic, fundamental human rights protections that are included in the treaties, but also in the European Convention on Human Rights and so forth. But it's very complicated for such a court to admit that they're basically destroying lives in violation of what they're supposed to protect. So... it's all this, also humanly speaking, very complicated to bring forward.

So again, Nathalie or Jacques Beau have this advantage that they cannot be demonized, in the sense that they have no direct or indirect implication in the armed conflict. So there's no possibility for the judges to have this kind of prejudgment about them. They're not oligarchs with billions of euros, or dollars, or rubles, because even that already creates a preconception in the judges—like, "Oh, he's such a rich person, he's not European, so we can sanction him, it's not too bad." No, here, for the first time, we have normal citizens with limited resources who have just expressed their opinions, and whose rights are affected far beyond what the rights of an oligarch would be.

And I'm talking about oligarchs, but I mean, all these grounds—what it all comes down to, of course, as you know—is terrorism legislation, right? This whole "war on terror" that was launched in the early 2000s. And again, for those kinds of people—let's say someone in Yemen—you're a European judge from Brussels or Strasbourg or Luxembourg, in this case, and you don't care much about what will happen to him. He's not a human to you. Nathalie has felt this difference in treatment because she was also African. She felt her case wasn't as covered as that of Jacques Beau, and that there was a kind of indifference toward her. She wasn't considered fully Swiss; there was still this implicit presumption and racist perspective.

But now, with Jacques Beau being sanctioned as well, we're hoping that not only in Europe there will be some debate, but also in Switzerland, because it's becoming a sovereignty issue for Switzerland. I was having these huge arguments with the different services in the Confederation. She was telling them—trying to appeal to their pride, to get a reaction—saying, "You have to realize how this is going to expand. You're letting some of your citizens lose their basic human rights. You have to intervene." For example, for Nathalie, I thought it would be natural for them to provide her with some sort of diplomatic protection.

She's abroad, unable to fly, targeted by a foreign entity, and having her basic human rights violated. We also invoked the Barcelona Convention on the right of transit, as well as the protection of the right to return—all these basic instruments that suddenly don't seem so important anymore. Because there's this huge objective, which is kind of indefinite too, since we're not directly at war. So again,



there's this contamination that's extraordinarily disturbing and dangerous, and it also makes us realize that our belief in a positive relationship to law—something we thought was structural in the Western hemisphere—is not the case. I don't know if it ever was, but it hasn't been for a long time.

And what I was telling you a few moments ago about how the lack of concrete evidence is being used to justify the decisions against Nathalie—this is a direct result of the expansion of judicial arbitrariness in the war on terror. In France, you have more and more cases where someone is judged not on the evidence presented in court, but on what the secret services have said about that person, based on elements collected outside judicial control. They then whisper to judges, telling them this person shouldn't be allowed to leave prison or should be condemned because she's dangerous. And they say, "We can't bring this evidence to court because we need to protect our sources," and so on.

But we still think that. And you have all these series of phantasmatic cases that have been developing in France. And again, we didn't care because it was, like, extremely violent Muslims or people from—I don't know—some other origin. So citizens didn't feel they were threatened or directly targeted by this kind of expansion. What we'll see is that as the horizon of war expands and the legitimacy of our structures of power shrinks, we'll see more and more of these mechanisms being used to target legitimate uses of freedom of speech and ordinary citizens, in order to silence or intimidate them.

I don't know if it's the same for you, but I think it's natural—and honest—to say that this has inhibited me in some ways. I've been careful about talking to Russian media, Russian scholars, Russian lawyers, including human rights scholars and lawyers, because of the potential consequences that simple contact with them could trigger. So this inhibition is already happening. Today it's with Russia; tomorrow it could be with any other country. We have to take that into account.

## **#Pascal**

The intention behind the sanctions on individuals, including those living inside the EU or in parts of the Schengen area like Switzerland, is very clear. The German Foreign Ministry, in response to a journalist's question, actually said outright, "Look, anyone who's a propagandist or a friend of Russia should now be thinking twice about what they're doing." They use this as an intimidation tool. It's just shocking that this is possible inside the European Union—that it's possible to switch off all the legal protections that EU citizens should have. I mean, apart from the fact that this has been used for years to crack down on people outside the EU and on human rights activists in Africa and elsewhere—that's already horrendous. But now it's being turned inward. It really takes the mask off the system. So, how could the legal process be used? Could the European Court of Justice be used to invalidate the entire practice? Is that what you're after at the moment?

## **#Juan Branco**



Yes, of course. I mean, that's why Nathalie trusted the idea of bringing the case to court—to see if they would lift the sanctions. Because this situation is so tragic that, I mean, you can have a debate over the whole principle of sanctions, whether it's positive or negative. I think it's a catastrophe. And I think Europeans will pay for it dearly, because other countries will not stay without reacting. At some point, they'll start trying to implement similar systems, not only out of retaliation but also simply because they'll think it's a good instrument. And I think we'll create some anarchy in the world by doing so. But aside from that—and aside also from the question of, I mean, why Russia?

Why not Israel? Why not? You know what I mean—simple questions. Why do you focus on a country that's not directly at war with your entity? That's also a question. Then you have all these specific elements I described about Nathalie's case that made us optimistic about the fact that, if there was a case to be won against that court, it was Nathalie Young's case. You know, if there was one shot at invalidating—or at least putting a limit on—what can be done under this legal regime, it was this one: a non-EU citizen living in an enclave country inside the EU, for whom basic human rights, like the right of return—the right to come back to one's own country—are affected by this disposition.

And the fact is that, I mean, if you take such a decision on the grounds of freedom of speech—its use or abuse—you, of course, need a specifically more protective regime. So these two elements combined led us to bring to the court the argument that it was not like all the sanctions that had been taken until then, but a new kind of regime which, because it affected the fundamental human rights of Nathalie Young, unlike the others—that's the jurisprudence of the court—needed to have a, I mean, basically a contradictory phase before they were taken. She should have been granted some rights that were violated, and thus the sanctions should be lifted also on procedural grounds, not only on the merits.

So, I think we're right. I think we're completely right. And I think if we lose that, we'll open a path for abuse that will be very, very difficult to close afterward. We've felt that they're not comfortable with the situation, and I think that's why their exchanges have heated up. Because, I mean, their legal basis is very weak. It's very complicated for them to legitimize themselves and to legitimize that action. Their evidence-sharing basis is basically non-existent. So we'll see. We'll see how the reaction is if they, out of pride, keep on pushing.

For example, regarding the mesures provisoires—the measures that were requested in order to try, before the final decision is taken, to lift the sanctions temporarily—it was rejected in a very strange way by the president of the General Court. So we brought it to the higher court, to the appeal. And we're confident that there will be a favorable decision for us, but it will probably come eight to ten months after the initial filing. So that's just to have provisional measures. Imagine the length of the overall process.

And you cannot expose normal citizens to that kind of deprivation of their fundamental rights for so long without serious judicial control. It's absurd. And the court is not built to react quickly. So you



have this contradiction that's difficult to handle now, structurally—how the court functions. They're not meant to act like national courts, which can condemn you on the spot or, on the contrary, make sure you're released if you've been unfairly detained. These structures are built to handle complex, very long-lasting cases, not to deal with urgencies like these. So that's another issue.

## **#Pascal**

Okay, so in conclusion, in the last two or three minutes, what's your short-term plan of action? I mean, your plan is to work with the European Court of Justice, not to escalate, let's say, to a human rights court.

## **#Juan Branco**

You can't—well, that's the irony, isn't it? You can't bring the European institutions before the Convention. I mean, you can, yeah, you can invoke the dispositions and jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights within your legal actions in the European courts, but you can't bring an EU institution before the European Court of Human Rights. So you're stuck with that limitation. There have been discussions for years about authorizing this and signing an agreement between the Conseil de l'Europe and the European Union to make it possible, but for now, that's not the case. I mean, you can go to the UN, for sure, as Emmanuel Macron said.

And so what? I mean, what would it bring to Nathalie? What kind of favorable decision or favorable effect would you get in the long term—or even in the short term? You wouldn't. So we can make all this effort, and maybe together we can do it, but we also have to accept that we're in a historical phase in which the whole world order from post-1945 is collapsing. Those institutions, which were already structurally weak and had trouble triggering any kind of effect, are now—I wouldn't say doomed, but not far from it. And I don't think we should place much of our trust or effort in trying to revive them or legitimize them by actually going to them.

I think we have to accept that we're getting lonelier and lonelier in this world. And unfortunately, it's only through the balance of power that we can try to change things. So it's about direct interventions against state authorities, trying to make their public opinion aware of these kinds of decisions and the abuses committed by their authorities. I also have to point out that the French authority, which brought this case to the Council of the European Union and pushed the Council to adopt this decision, is not very legitimate from a liberal democratic standpoint.

I mean, the Minister of Foreign Affairs is a member of a party that was one of the most minoritarian ones in the last elections. But because this is the institutional system in France, under the decision of Emmanuel Macron, he has managed to maintain and impose a minoritarian government there. You have this minoritarian government in their own country sanctioning people who are not even part of the structure of power that is sanctioning them, and triggering extraterritorial effects in the Confederation of Switzerland against a Swiss citizen. It's absurd, it's dangerous, and maybe it's also



a historical lesson: the weaker the powers are, the more dangerous they become, because the less attached they are to respecting the rule of law—and rules in general—the more they show themselves to be.

**#Pascal**

Yes, it's highly ironic. This is coming from the people who tell us they're there to protect democracy and the rule of law and so on. But this is the world we're living in, and we need to deal with reality, not with fairytale land. Juan Branco, thank you very much for defending Nathalie—and also all of us indirectly—because this is a fight for everyone's rights. Is there any place where you publish news or your analysis that people could go and read?

**#Juan Branco**

Yeah, you can follow me on social networks in general. I try to share information about how these situations are evolving and how we're trying to fight for a better world, in other words.

**#Pascal**

Everybody, please try to find Juan Branco on X (formerly Twitter) and on other social media platforms. I'll link them in the description box below. Juan Branco, thank you very much for your time today.

**#Juan Branco**

Thank you very much for doing me the favor.