

John Helmer: Attempts to Russiagate the Epstein Files

John Helmer is one of the longest-serving Western journalists in Moscow. Helmer discusses the significance of the Epstein files, the attempts to Russiagate the scandal, and the political divisions that have grown in Moscow. Jeffrey Epstein's Putin Hustle: <https://johnhelmer.net/jeffrey-epsteins-putin-hustle-was-a-decade-long-failure-but-his-story-keeps-proving-american-exceptionalism-is-a-failure/> Follow Prof. Glenn Diesen: Substack: <https://glennDiesen.substack.com/> X/Twitter: https://x.com/Glenn_Diesen Patreon: <https://www.patreon.com/glennDiesen> Support the research by Prof. Glenn Diesen: PayPal: <https://www.paypal.com/paypalme/glennDiesen> Buy me a Coffee: <https://www.buymeacoffee.com/gdieseng> Go Fund Me: <https://gofund.me/09ea012f> Books by Prof. Glenn Diesen: <https://www.amazon.com/stores/author/B09FPQ4MDL>

#Glenn

Welcome back. Today we're joined again by John Helmer, one of the longest-serving Western journalists in Moscow since 1989, if I'm not mistaken. Thank you for coming on the program to talk about the Epstein files and, I guess, their complexity and impact on international politics.

#John Helmer

Thanks for having me. It's good to be back.

#Glenn

So, well... we can start with what's now being presented as the Russian connection. That is, Epstein apparently tried through several channels to get a meeting with Putin. But according to the evidence, those efforts were seemingly unsuccessful. Yet we see this being used, to some extent, by the political media establishment to link Russia to the scandal and even suggest that he was a Russian agent. I was wondering if, yeah, perhaps we can start with the Russian connection in this whole thing.

#John Helmer

Let's start, yes, by putting a number of general contexts. And when we get to the particulars of Epstein's attempts to connect with Russia, they all come to zero. But let's put it in these kinds of contexts. First of all, power politics is a pretty incendiary matter in every country, and every log that's added is fuel for the fire—every piece of paper. The Epstein scandal is obviously a major issue in U. S. politics. And there are individual associates of Epstein: Mandelson in England, Jagland in Norway,

Lajčák in Slovakia, and, uh, what's his name, Lang in Paris. All of these individuals are political fuel for the fire in those particular countries, in those particular political contexts. In Russia and in the United States, we have an unusual context—the two are at war with one another. That's very important.

Second, they're trying to negotiate out of that war. We could call it the tale of two midterms. Trump faces a midterm election, where he's likely to lose significant support in Congress. And President Putin also faces a midterm, on the 20th of September, in which, if the current central bank policies are followed without a political or military breakthrough at the front, there's likely to be considerable political dismay, disappointment, and possibly backlash in Russia. So we have impending midterm crises for both countries. In this context, we have another general problem. For some reason or other, in all countries, people have forgotten what ruling classes do when they're not under observation—the fact that they have sex, the fact that they treat their sexual partners abusively, the fact that this is hardly new.

And it's not new for ruling classes. One only needs to read the memoirs of Casanova to understand how people behaved in the European courts of the 17th and 18th centuries. Does anyone believe that when Henry VIII went hunting, after they came back to the lodge, there were no females forced out, recruited, made slaves—God knows what? Were they consenting adults? Were they children? We understand what ruling classes do. The problem is that Epstein, as a relatively amateur finance manager—managing tax evasion schemes and money laundering schemes—has been exaggerated in importance, just as he exaggerated his own self-importance, while people forget to track the money, track the clients, and trace how his businesses actually operated. So these are general contexts.

I'm happy to get into them. But for a man who was a money launderer and minor tax evasion advisor to two clients who dominated his financial transactions—Leslie Wexner and Leon Black—two clients who dominated his business for more than a decade, for him to be trying to approach Russia and the Russian oligarchs and sell them what he thought were original ideas for tax evasion and money laundering is funny. It's funny because the Russian oligarchs had been pioneering their own systems for money laundering and tax evasion for ten years before Epstein arrived on the scene. And they already had their own U.S., European, and worldwide networks for doing that. What we have at the moment, then, are the particulars of what he tried to do, and those have been blown up because the emails can be misread.

In the English press, they tried to make him appear in the columns of, let's say, the Telegraph or the Times—to make it seem like he was a Russian agent. In other outlets, they tried to make it look like he was close to Russian oligarchs in New York. We can go through the facts. The facts are that if you go—and our audience who doubts what I'm about to say can do this—go to the Epstein Library and search the names. Put in "Putin," and you get approximately 1,021 entries. Believe me, reading through them is a dreary job. Most of them are press clips that Epstein's offices in New York or elsewhere received from all sorts of sources.

And the interesting thing about them is that they're not particularly competent. They don't reflect any real effort to understand Russian politics. He was sent clips from the Washington Post, the New York Times, the Wall Street Journal. Now, what do you learn about Russian politics from those media? You learn nothing but misinformation. Epstein was too ignorant to know the difference between misinformation, disinformation, and the truth of any matter. He had a second-rate brain with a huge ego attached, and a lot of money flowed through his pocket. He misunderstood the difference between his pocket and his brain—and also his fly. So what he tried to do was use the Norwegian, Thorbjørn Jagland, to approach Putin.

He tried to use the Slovak Miroslav Lajčák, who had been foreign minister and had met Sergei Lavrov four times, to arrange a meeting. He also tried to get Ehud Barak, the former Israeli prime minister and head of military intelligence, who met Putin twice as prime minister in 2000 and 2001, to arrange a meeting with Putin. All he got back were offers of invitations to the Vladivostok Economic Forum—which you know very well—or the St. Petersburg Economic Forum, which you know equally well, or one or two of those business forums in places like Sochi, where, as a lure, he was offered a crowd handshake—a handshake with the president of Russia in a crowd of businessmen, all selling something, especially themselves.

Epstein declined and insisted—you can see it in the email record—on a one-on-one meeting. What did he think he was offering to Putin? What was he telling these go-betweens? He believed he had a digital or cryptocurrency scheme that would make Russia a global leader in cryptocurrency transfers, and he thought he could sell that to Putin just as he'd been selling it to his tax adjustment, tax optimization clients in the United States. Well, maybe the Chomsky family fell for it. Maybe Stephen Bannon fell for it. Maybe Wexner and Black fell for it. But they were Americans, and they weren't either as experienced tax evaders as the Russian oligarchs, or as experienced in handling American deceptions, salesmen, and hustlers as Putin already was.

So they turned it down. When Epstein found he was unable to get a face-to-face with Putin, he tried various other things. You can see in the emails that he asked his secretary to book him a flight to Crimea. He tried that for two years in a row—2012 and 2013. He never got to Crimea. He never got to Moscow. What did he try to do at home in Manhattan? He tried to crash Roman Abramovich's parties. He tried to lure Len Blavatnik to his dinner parties. He was told Blavatnik was close to Putin. That's nonsense, but never mind.

Blavatnik was Russian—Russian-Jewish—oligarch-sized in Moscow, New York, and London, as you know, and was considered a Russian oligarch. That part's true. Blavatnik politely declined to show up at his dinner parties. He tried pursuing Oleg Deripaska. He tried pursuing Prokhorov. I followed each of the oligarchs, especially those with U.S. connections, and he failed every time. None of them showed up. I can find no record of them showing up for lunch, dinner, or on airplanes. Why would they need his airplane? They had much bigger ones themselves. They had their own islands, their own boats. What was he selling?

Well, you can see from all the files that he was selling art advisory. That's another scheme for moving assets in and out of tax havens. I've done a lot of due diligence on how oligarchs evade taxes and move money. There was nothing Epstein was doing that was original—nothing they didn't already know. And most of them are relatively polite. When Epstein was approached by a real estate hustler in Manhattan to bring a couple of Russians to look at and possibly buy his Manhattan townhouse, I'm trying to think who they were. One of them, I believe, was Alexei Kuzmichev, one of the Alfa Group oligarchs. And one was Abramovich.

What Epstein replied by email was that he'd already seen Abramovich, and Abramovich had offered him \$250 million for his townhouse, which he turned down. I mean, this is a complete fabrication. First, Abramovich didn't show up. Second, his house in Manhattan was far inferior in value and size to the row of houses Abramovich himself had bought. And \$250 million was, if I'm not mistaken, about five times more than the house was worth on the market at the time. To think that an oligarch would make a mistake like that shows the level of his curiosity and his capacity to read about the Russians. The one he seems to have connected with—but not directly—was Dmitry Rybolovlev, the potash oligarch, who came in and out of Miami buying the Trump house.

And there's something in the Epstein files about an attempt by Trump and Epstein to save Trump from bankruptcy by getting someone to buy a house—or some kind of real estate combination—at a price way above market. That constituted a bribe, a financial transfer. It's very unclear what happened, but Rybolovlev didn't engage with either Epstein or his intermediaries. So, summing it up, Epstein tried for a decade and failed—failed politically at a high level, failed with the Russian oligarchs—and he failed for several reasons. One was his ignorance, his American exceptionalism, thinking he had something to offer that the Russians hadn't already thought of or weren't already experienced in.

And his lack of intellectual curiosity—he had none of those things. And none of the Europeans he used as connectors or contacts or links—Barak, Jagland, Leitchuk, and others. There was an Emirati called Salaim, who resigned yesterday from his corporate position. None of these people had much Russian competence. None of them had dealt with Putin face-to-face, always in groups. And Epstein had no curiosity. He showed no curiosity in his interactions with them about Russia. The one individual—and this is significant but not mentioned in the Russian press—that he did have lunch with, that he did have personal contact with, was Vitaly Churkin.

Vitaly Churkin was a very good Russian ambassador to the United Nations—an able speaker, witty, and accomplished—who died prematurely in February 2017. The record shows Churkin agreed to meet with Epstein at his Manhattan house and was courted to come back. There's no doubt that Churkin met with him more than once, maybe half a dozen times. Arguably, those meetings were a regular diplomatic connection. At the time, Churkin knew that Epstein was involved with individuals like Tom Barrack, a major financier of Trump's first campaign. Barrack is now the U.S. ambassador—Trump's ambassador to Turkey—and a significant player in Syrian politics. Barrack was a financier.

It's reasonable for Churkin to have gone to Epstein to meet others and listen to the gossip. But then Churkin did one thing that was arguably improper: he asked Epstein for the favor of finding his son, Maxim, a job—and Epstein arranged that job. The email record shows that both before Vitaly Churkin died and after, Maxim Churkin maintained a relationship. I'm not saying there's anything immoral about that. I'm saying that's the only official in the record I've been able to find who interacted with Epstein and exchanged favors. It's not much, and it has nothing to do with President Putin, the Kremlin, or the allegations that come from Le Monde, the Telegraph, or the other trash people read in Europe.

#Glenn

Well, it does seem that Jagland, the former prime minister of Norway who later served as secretary general of the Council of Europe, exaggerated his ties or influence with Putin in order to sell himself to Epstein and acquire favors. But again, this is what influence peddlers do—they offer connections, and then they want something in return. So he essentially, to a large extent, faked this, because he wasn't able to deliver a meeting with Putin anyway. But what do you think Epstein actually wanted from the Russians?

That is, obviously, you said what he was selling to the Russians—they weren't interested. But is this simply, you know, about having a connection with the president of the Russian Federation as a kind of currency to gain influence across Europe and the United States? Or, going through the files, was there any evidence of specific things he wanted out of this? Or again, when he requests all these meetings and an introduction to Putin, is there any indication of what he actually wants to achieve with it?

#John Helmer

I think you put it very well, Glenn. And the Jagland case, if it goes to court in Norway, will show several of the points you made. Yes, Jagland exaggerated his own personal power. He never met Putin except as part of a delegation—either with other Norwegian officials or with the Council of Europe—and he never met him one-on-one. He always failed at those meetings because the Russian side was increasingly concerned about European sanctions, and Jagland was never able to deliver any modification or softening of the increasingly aggressive European line against Russia. Yes, I think you've got the point right. Epstein, reading newspapers like the Wall Street Journal, the Washington Post, the New York Times, and so forth, understood that Putin was a major world figure.

So he thought that by having a meeting, he could establish something he could then sell to others as his connection to Russia. And he repeats that modus operandi. It's a standard con, a standard hustle for so-called financial managers. Geneva and Zurich are full of them—dozens of them. Liechtenstein, too. No doubt Oslo has more than a handful of financial managers who tell clients that, for a special kind of fee plus a percentage, they can arrange for them to have inside knowledge through their contacts—whether it's stocks about to go up, government contracts about to be signed, ships about

to be chartered, or whatever the business is. The financial manager, so-called, is selling inside knowledge through supposed connections.

Yes, that's what he was doing. However, I need to stress that the press investigations of his sex offenses far outstrip the capabilities of Forbes, the Wall Street Journal, and the others to look at his financial situation—and it wasn't great. You can see from the Forbes analysis that he managed to assemble a so-called fortune of approximately \$530 million, based on roughly half cash and half real estate. How much of that he stole from his clients is worth asking. You see, it's very common, especially in Switzerland, Liechtenstein, and London, for financial managers like this to steal the principal from their clients.

They steal the principal because they think they can get away with it. For them, it's like stealing from a thief. Why does Wexner pay a financial manager \$200 million, then later break relations and get \$100 million back? The honest answer will only be found when Wexner is put in front of Congress, under oath, and cross-examined—or better yet, in court. The United States has the RICO statute—the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act—which would nail all of them: Wexner, Black, Noam Chomsky, Stephen Bannon, all of them. They enter into a conspiracy, as it's termed in law, with a predicate crime.

Tax evasion is one of those crimes; insider trading is another. Between them, there's a Trump dead end. The Trump administration has opened the Justice Department files we're talking about now, but it has refused to open the Treasury Department files. Those show transactions—more than 4,200 of them, according to Senator Wyden, an Oregon Democrat. They show more than a billion dollars moving through a single account, again according to the Wyden committee. The Democrats have been unable to force the Republicans to open the financial files. So, to go back, Forbes ends its investigations on the—well, we don't know why that small number of fee payers paid so much.

But I can tell you from my experience doing due diligence—art advisory, insurance schemes, free port schemes, tax evasion through Cyprus, multiple transfer schemes that are being used. What's happening here is a conspiracy to avoid tax at home. It requires trust in a small staff—usually two or three lawyers, two or three accountants—and lots of other people moving money through dozens of corporate entities and hundreds of names and accounts to hide it. And if an advisor understands the criminality of the scheme, he steals the principal. There's a famous case, a very famous case, of such a scheme involving Dmitry Rybolovlev and his art advisor, Yves Bouvier, in Switzerland. It started with Rybolovlev's suspicion that Bouvier was overcharging him for major paintings.

By major paintings, I mean a Leonardo da Vinci piece that allegedly sold for about \$450 million. Bear in mind, these aren't art lovers. The financial or art advisor isn't teaching someone about Rembrandt or Da Vinci—they're using hot money, washing it through the art market, storing the painting in a warehouse at Geneva Airport, and then reselling it for untaxed capital gains. That's the scheme, roughly. When Rybolovlev went to court in Switzerland and later at Sotheby's in New York, Bouvier's defense was complex. He was essentially acquitted of overpricing the commodity to the client and

was never accused or convicted of stealing, which is what Rybolovlev had accused him of—fraud and theft. In Epstein’s case, it didn’t just involve art.

It covered shares, stocks, insurance, premiums, real estate, false bankruptcies—you name it. But we haven’t reached anything like the bottom of that yet. So, to go back to your question: if we got to the financial transactions, got to each of the individuals, we’d get to a situation where you have a large number of Americans committing RICO offenses, which the Trump administration doesn’t want to prosecute. Now, that’s where we are—with a man selling connections essentially to a handful of clients who’ve got hot money they want him to dispose of for a 5% or 10% return. And then they notice he’s stealing much larger sums. That’s how you account for the large sums. When you come to the Russian interpretations of what’s going on, you get into a different kind of politics—and perhaps we’ll come to that too.

#Glenn

I did want to ask, though—besides the tax evasion and the money laundering—I was wondering how you see the systemic problem of this kind of shadow governance among elite networks. I guess in this area, the Norwegian case stands out because, at least in this country, people have been shocked. It’s a small country, about five million people, yet it’s so disproportionately represented in the Epstein files. There are so many contacts. And again, from my perspective, it makes perfect sense based on where the government puts its money. The Norwegian government has this ambition to be an international humanitarian superpower. It’s going to spend billions on aid—but when they say “aid,” it’s not feeding the poor.

This money is then channeled through NGOs and think tanks, essentially creating this huge feeding trough where politicians can keep going back. So you have this elite circulation—they all have an incentive to provide cover for each other. And these politicians can buy influence for themselves as well. They can build careers, buy positions in international institutions, and get the extra money back. Again, it’s not just the NGOs. A lot of what they call “aid,” which comes from taxpayer money, even goes to the Clinton Foundation and similar organizations. So they do this and end up in comfortable positions in international institutions, gaining access to powerful networks.

You know, Hillary Clinton will fly into Norway and have dinner with them, and it’s paid for by the taxpayer. And this isn’t always in the national interest—it’s also about building their own careers. It basically allows politicians to form their own policy. Like our previous foreign minister, Brende—he was also in the Epstein files. Now he’s heading the World Economic Forum, and he’s essentially telling Epstein that, yes, this can replace the United Nations. So these are things they would never say in public. But here’s the problem: when you pump hundreds of millions and billions into these non-governmental organizations, they operate outside government control or public scrutiny.

So this allows the government to pursue its own policies without scrutiny. It also lets politicians dip in, and it becomes a big influence operation. For example, one of the politicians who led the Oslo

peace process in the '90s—Epstein left his kids ten million dollars. I'm not sure exactly why that was, but probably not just out of generosity. They're trading favors. They're using public money to buy themselves into influential positions, and then they can use that to get re-elected, land nice positions, get kickbacks. But the problem is much wider, from my perspective, because once you do international governance through NGOs, you're not accountable anymore.

So, for example, in 2019, the politicians were all shedding these crocodile tears—"We have to help Ukraine, we have to support democracy." But what the government did was finance this NGO, the Ukraine Crisis Media Center. After 73% of Ukrainians voted for Zelensky's peace mandate, or peace platform, to make peace with Donbass and Russia and implement Minsk, this NGO—financed by our government here, as well as by Western governments and the National Endowment for Democracy—essentially drew red lines, saying you're not allowed to concede on any of the points you actually ran on, and you're not even allowed to negotiate with Russia without NATO in the room.

So this is kind of the red line we should draw. But you wouldn't be able to do this openly—just like the previous foreign minister isn't allowed to say outright that we should replace the UN with the World Economic Forum. But, you know, through these hidden networks, you can do whatever you want. So I guess my concern now is the cleanup—the consequences. They'll just look for individual cases, a few bad apples, while warning, "Don't try to pull down the whole system. This is MAGA. This is not something we want." And eventually, the elites will decide to forgive themselves and move on.

And anyone who criticizes it would be labeled an anti-state actor, attempting to sow distrust in the government and possibly on behalf of a foreign government. And from there on, they'll move on, and the system itself won't change. That's all these billions being pumped into these, you know, government-run "non-governmental" organizations—which is an oxymoron if there ever was one. But yeah, I guess, how do you see this working out? Because you mentioned that in the United States, there are no arrests, really. The media just seems to try to distract with Russiagate, the whole thing. Um...

#John Helmer

Well, look, you've put it very well, Glenn. Essentially, you've laid out part of the structure of imperial rule, and suddenly we see through the Epstein papers the way in which imperialism works—financially, economically. Now, Norway is a major player, I don't need to tell you—you put it very well—in shipping, and yet I haven't checked to see if any of the shipping schemes or the shipping oligarchs of Norway were involved. I think not. Norway is a major oil and gas power, and as you said, it generates through its influence and through its NGO reach a large range of think-tank propaganda organizations that purport to be independent but are, in fact, running the war against Russia.

So the empire—the imperial organization led by the United States against Russia in this war—is partly revealed. And I think you made a very good point for our audience: individuals will be made culpable, and they'll resign. They'll resign on account of their attendance on a plane heading for a sex party. Or we'll hear a story of Israeli blackmail of individuals, of a Mossad role, or we'll hear of the Russian agency. These are diversions. In Russia, you have somebody like Alexander Dugin, considered a respectable Russian philosopher, saying—and I'm looking at the paper to give you his words—describing this empire as satanic.

And we've also had stories from the Epstein files—the pictures of his house and the allegations of satanic practices, bloodletting, torture, and all of that. So what you don't have is a rediscovery of old-fashioned imperialist domination. What you do have is each country attempting to remain within the imperial system that's currently at war on the Ukrainian battlefield and elsewhere—preserve the system, but throw out a few bad apples caught with their pants down, so to speak. This doesn't mean we treat unseriously or improperly the immorality of the exploitation of young women, especially young Russian women.

That was the only Russian success, so to speak, that Epstein ever had. He recruited Russian women to act as prostitutes at some of these parties. That was it. But the sex story, the Israel story, the Satanism story, the Dugin version—these are distractions from the underlying financial mechanisms of U.S. imperial rule in Europe, in which Norway plays a subsidiary, affiliated role. Yes, but now, just to make this point relevant to our Russian conversation, we have at the moment a very serious crisis in Moscow over the terms on which Russia can agree with the Trump administration for peace on the Ukrainian battlefield.

And for the first time in my memory, the foreign minister is being actively criticized along Kirill Dmitriev's line regarding the negotiations. President Putin has just changed the delegation that will go to—where are we going this time—Geneva, this coming week, for the talks with the Ukrainian delegation. He's demilitarized the delegation and put Vladimir Medinsky back in charge. What we have right now is a serious crisis of policymaking on the war front in Moscow, in which Kirill Dmitriev is winning. Now, that's significant if you look at Dmitriev. What's he saying about the Epstein affair? He's playing up the sex, he's playing up the Satanism, he's playing up Mandelson's culpability, and he's keeping clear of any form of criticism of the Trump administration.

He's actually attempting to appease and ingratiate himself with the Trump administration, which includes people he's been negotiating with. And if we want to see what terms Dmitriev is negotiating, look at the terms that Ritkov, Lutnik, Besant, Kushner, and Josh Gruenbaum have been discussing with Dmitriev in Miami and other places. That memo, or the summary of some of the points, appeared in Bloomberg about 24 hours ago. So I agree entirely with you, Glenn. What we have here is old-fashioned U.S. and Anglo-American financial imperialism, and there are plenty of

people you broadcast who are experts on how these systems work—at work on Russian negotiators like Kirill Dmitriev—to make sure they bring to the table a form of negotiation that President Putin no longer wants Admiral Yakoshtchikov's group to represent.

Now, that's an example of—let's call it—applied imperialism, where one of the Russian parties is trying to divert attention from the underlying structure. Why? Because the theory in Moscow is that Russia can advance its interests by making a deal with these very elements. At the same time, there's a large Russian faction—probably the majority of the Security Council—that says Russia cannot make a deal with these elements on the U.S. side. So we have applied Epstein politics here, and they're very serious.

#Glenn

Well, what do you think would be the consequence, though, of this effort to essentially "Russiagate" the Epstein files? Because the whole lesson from former versions of this would be that it's quite unpredictable. For example, if we go back to 2016, the original Russiagate was very much about the domestic politics of the United States. As we learned from all those documents, Hillary Clinton's team couldn't stop Trump. As Trump said himself, he could shoot someone in Manhattan and it wouldn't affect his position in the polls. So anyway, they assumed that linking him to Russia was the kryptonite that would bring him down.

This is what Obama was informed of by the CIA as well. That's why Clinton was fabricating these ties. But my point is, this was a domestic squabble within the U.S.—yet the Russian interference story was born, and it had tremendous consequences. I'm very much convinced that if we hadn't had Russiagate, we might not have had a war in Ukraine either. Even in 2020, during the new election, you saw a similar thing play out with the Biden laptop scandal. That would likely have cost Biden the election. So what did the Americans do? Well, they "Russiagated" it—they pulled Russia into this whole internal squabble, which it had nothing to do with.

So you had these 51 intelligence agents lying, saying that, you know, Russia's fingerprints were all over this. There was no trace at all. And later on, they tried to walk it back. But the media repeated it, and social media offered censorship. I mean, Twitter even suspended the New York Post's entire account at that time. Of course, you couldn't even share the link. Facebook did the same—they tweaked the algorithm so people couldn't see it. Later on, Zuckerberg said the FBI had told them to. So yet again, you have this fabricated Russia story to cover up internal corruption and scandals in the U.S. And again, this is the purpose of a boogeyman.

And it further destroyed international stability, as it got the public convinced that the Russians were engaged in some hybrid war against them. Anyway, it just feels like we could go down this path again. So we have this scandal—Trump tried to blow it off as a hoax. Now, of course, it's very clear this is anything but a hoax. And it seems like the impulse is again to "Russiagate" it—just pretend this is a Russian agent. So instead of cleaning house internally, the solution becomes to confront

Russia. Don't question our elites. Do you think we could go down this path again, or do you think the media has kind of exhausted its credibility by now?

#John Helmer

Well, I think you put it very well, Glenn, and I can only agree with your account of how propaganda warfare reinforces imperial warfare. What I would add, speaking from the Russian side, is a bit different. Propaganda is always a byproduct—the surface manifestation of underlying clashes of economic and military forces. And in this particular war, we'd have to say Russian military force is winning on this battlefield. If it's allowed to continue by the Kremlin, without reaching negotiating terms with the Americans who benefit from this propaganda warfare, the outcome will be the end of NATO expansion eastward—at least on that front.

Russia perfectly well understands—and I don't have to tell you—that the war will continue on the Polish front, on the Finnish front, everywhere. The war is escalating right now at sea and also in the Arctic, from Greenland to Canada and around to the Far East. So Russia faces the invidious problem of winning on one battlefield in order to continue fighting effectively on all the other battlefields. Propaganda in the United States doesn't matter. Russian counterpropaganda—certainly the truth—doesn't matter at this level of warfare. Guns matter. Force matters.

The truth long ago ceased to persuade the European regimes—all of them politically weak—to desist from this. So it won't matter if there's a force in London or a force in Washington that holds Russia to blame for this or that. It's simply not going to matter. What's much more fundamentally problematic is that there's a faction in Moscow that believes Russia's interests will be served by business cooperation—economic cooperation—the so-called Anchorage formula—with the very elements of the Trump administration who are most threatened by, let's call it, the Treasury file on Epstein.

If they won't prosecute for fear of unraveling the illegal schemes that involve many of their own financial campaign contributors—if they won't prosecute, they won't expose—then yes, they're very likely to find scapegoats. And they can't scapegoat the Israeli government. They can't scapegoat the Mossad. They can devise various satanic theories. They can pick on individuals as sexual perverts. They can pick on the Democrats. And Bill Clinton didn't just catch Epstein's plane; I've had sources who told me about his sex-plane adventures in Mexican resort towns. There's nothing new about that. But we can expect that sort of propaganda. The Russian problem is: can you make long-term economic cooperation agreements with these kinds of people?

It's not their moral character that's at issue; it's the fact that they make agreements and still violate their word. This is what's being fought out at the moment. And if we have one faction in Moscow that says you can do business as usual with these people, and another faction that says, no, no—these people—it's not because they're satanic, it's not because of their sexual perversions, it's not because they abuse women. All of that may be true, but it's irrelevant to their war plans for Russia.

And those war plans extend to the breakup of Russia, just as they've always done since 1917, and certainly since 1945. So... I agree with you, Glenn. The propaganda seems to have political force by itself.

But the Epstein financial files show that propaganda is essentially paid for—run by money and political power—and ultimately, political power rests on military power. Right now, Russia is winning on one battlefield but undermining the trust it built with its allies: President Xi of China, Prime Minister Modi of India, Kim in North Korea, Raúl Castro in Cuba, and the IRGC in Iran. Russia is risking its alliances for a worldwide war that could continue indefinitely by trying to say you can make a partial agreement with the business-as-usual attitude of the Epstein character. And you don't have to nail Howard Lutnick's visits with his children, his wives, and his nannies to the island—that's not the issue.

He may or may not have visited the island, but the financial structure of the people who put Trump in power—and who profit from war against Russia, from the "Golden Dome" in space, from the tariff walls—all of this structure of imperial aggressiveness against Russia, India, China, Korea, Iran, Cuba, Venezuela, all of it is being exposed. And it doesn't matter what propaganda diversions the American press comes up with. What does matter are the decisions President Putin is reluctant to make right now: the terms for fighting the short war until Russia's midterm elections, and the longer war for the future—for the presidential succession in Russia. Seen from a Russian point of view, we don't get anywhere with Dugin's theory of the world as satanic unless it becomes Orthodox Christian according to his liking.

We don't get anywhere with the idea, I think, of "business as usual" as a way to relieve the sanctions pressure on us. Those are going to continue. What we have to focus on is that we're not part of that system—Russia has played almost no immoral or sexual role in all of the Justice Department files. Russia can basically ask: can you make any kind of negotiation with Americans like this, with a financial structure like that? Why would we, or the Chinese, the Indians, the Koreans, trust them to make such a deal? That's a very serious problem now. It doesn't belittle the immoralities or the culpabilities. It doesn't in any way suggest that the abuse of women is tolerated. No—what we're saying is that this system of perversion is just a small part of the larger imperial enslavement the U.S. community wants to impose on Russia.

#Glenn

Well, thank you for sharing your thoughts on this. I'll leave a link to your article in the description because it's definitely worth reading. Thank you very much for taking the time.

#John Helmer

Thank you, Glenn. Thanks for having me.

