

Douglas Macgregor: A New World Emerges: Iran Will Win & Israel May Not Survive

Douglas Macgregor is a retired Colonel, combat veteran and former senior advisor to the U.S. Secretary of Defense. Col. Macgregor argues a new world is emerging with a new Middle East - in which Iran will win and Israel may not survive. Please like and subscribe! Follow Prof. Glenn Diesen: Substack: <https://glennDiesen.substack.com/> X/Twitter: https://x.com/Glenn_Diesen Patreon: <https://www.patreon.com/glennDiesen> Support the research by Prof. Glenn Diesen: PayPal: <https://www.paypal.com/paypalme/glennDiesen> Buy me a Coffee: buymeacoffee.com/gdieseng Go Fund Me: <https://gofund.me/09ea012f> Books by Prof. Glenn Diesen: <https://www.amazon.com/stores/author/B09FPQ4MDL>

#Glenn

Welcome back. We're joined today by Colonel Douglas McGregor, a decorated combat veteran, author, and former advisor to the U.S. Secretary of Defense. Thank you for coming back on. We're now heading toward the end of day three of the war against Iran, and I think it's fair to say that Trump was hoping for a quick war. But it doesn't appear there will be any quick regime-change operation happening here. How are you assessing it, though? How should we measure the developments of the war and what to expect?

#Douglas Macgregor

I think the first thing we can say is that the Iranians have targeted at least 27 bases, including port facilities across the Middle East, ranging from Incirlik Air Base all the way down to Dubai in the Gulf. The war has effectively become regional, and the consequences of these actions can't really be fully understood yet. Everyone knows about the Gulf and what's already happened in the oil markets. Today, oil markets in Europe opened about 20% higher, simply on the expectation that the oil supply could be disrupted for some time. So I think we're headed toward more than \$100 a barrel.

We'll get there pretty quickly. How high, I don't know, but I think that's going to happen. And if you look at a place like the United Arab Emirates, very inexpensive drones have defeated what appear to be some of the world's most expensive air and missile defenses and have put a number of airstrips and airports out of business. You have to understand that in the Gulf there are all sorts of international conglomerates—especially a lot of Indian conglomerates—that do huge business through the United Arab Emirates and Dubai. All of this is effectively being shut down. You also have millions of people.

There are about 4.6 million Indians who own businesses in the Emirates who are now stranded, and they're a critical component of the economy. In addition to those, you know, there are hundreds of thousands—probably millions—of Europeans, Americans, and others who are stranded. Right now, you've got to cross the mountains down to Muscat to find an aircraft that will take you out. I think the damage being done to the oil infrastructure is only now really beginning. We have evidence that some oil refineries have been struck, particularly in Saudi Arabia. I think we're going to see more of that. So we're at the beginning of what is, ostensibly, a long regional war.

And we haven't even begun to assess the possibility that others may become involved, because this emergency created by the Gulf War affects India. It affects Northeast Asia. It affects Turkey. It affects Europe. Effectively, the entire world is now focused on this war that is ostensibly between Israel and Iran. Now, the funny thing about this war is that it did not begin with a joint Israeli-American assault—it began with an Israeli attack. And Secretary of State Rubio seems to have told the Group of Eight—these are senators in the U.S. Senate who are part of the Senate Armed Services Committee—that Israel began the attack. We had not been informed of it.

We were not warned that they were going to do this. All we knew was that it was always a possibility. We decided to simply join in because we were not yet satisfied with our posture at the beginning of this. So we seem to have come late to the party. And now we've begun to feel the full impact of all these missiles. A number of missiles have been fired at ships, though none have struck them yet. We know that three F-15 fighters were downed. We're attributing that to friendly fire, although there are some disputes about that—others in the region and around the world seem to think the Iranians did it. In any case, we lost three F-15s. We didn't lose the pilots, but we have lost American sailors, soldiers, airmen, and Marines.

We just don't know how many. We've admitted, I think, to three or four, but I suspect there are more than that. So the question is, where are we headed? I think we're headed into a long campaign. And, you know, you listen—I'm sure you listen—to statements by Secretary Hightower and President Trump, laced with all this talk about the state sponsor of terrorism and how it will ultimately have to submit to Israel and the United States. I think these are very incautious and stupid statements. They don't comport with reality. I mean, frankly, Glenn, if we were interested in combating radical Islam, we would probably be focused on Pakistan and certainly on Syria right now, which is still influenced by the remnants of ISIS and al-Qaeda.

Those two states don't seem to come up for discussion very much. And Pakistan, in particular, has been the sort of incubator of radical Islam and Islamist terrorism for a long time. So this is really about Israel's interest in destroying Iran and removing it as an obstacle to Israeli military hegemony—or Jewish supremacy, however you want to put it. And we're in it. We're committed to it. And I think, ultimately, logistics will probably have a big impact because we'll eventually run out

of missiles. I think we're already on that road, because I just don't think President Trump or his advisers really believed they would end up in a long war with Iran. And that's where they are right now.

#Glenn

Well, aside from the military targets, as you mentioned, we've also seen attacks on ports, oil refineries, shipping, airports, and some hotels. There seem to be several civilian targets as well. Did this take you by surprise? And how do you see the cost-benefit for Iran here? Because on one hand, they want to inflict as much pain as possible, but I assume they don't want to pull in too many other external actors, since that risks expanding the war. The Gulf states, or even the Europeans, have suggested they would come in to defend their assets, their bases, and their allies. How do you assess the calculations on the Iranian side?

#Douglas Macgregor

I think the Iranians know that the Emirates and the Saudis have played a duplicitous game—that they've tried to play both sides to the middle, as we say. So I don't think the Iranians regret any of that. And I think they want to make the world feel pain because they're feeling acute pain. So that's not surprising in the least. As far as the Europeans are concerned, they've known from the very beginning that Iran presents no threat. You know, it was laughable when we insisted on that installation in Romania—this anti-ballistic missile installation—on the grounds that we were protecting our European allies from an Iranian missile attack. Nobody believed that. It's nonsense. As for the Europeans intervening to do anything, I think the British have sent their F-22s. Whether or not they've done anything, I don't know.

Now, I know that their bases on Cyprus have been struck and probably put out of action. So I don't know what to make of European intervention. I think that's more hot air, but we'll see. They could certainly send some ships, but then again, they'd be in harm's way. It all depends on whether the European peoples are willing to sign on for this. Again, you've got to distinguish Iran and the Shia from the vast majority of Muslims, who are Sunni, Arabs, and Turks. I think the Europeans are a little more sophisticated than the Americans—they don't mix them up. They understand Iran is different, and Iran's interests are different. Iran, as a civilizational state—Persia—is an entirely different animal from the rest of these post-World War I artificial constructs.

So, you know, we'll see, but I don't expect much from the Europeans. I'm more concerned about the Chinese and the Russians. And when I say concerned, I mean I wonder how long they'll sit on the sidelines and let this go on, because it's not in their interests. Obviously, they want Iran to survive. Iran is a critical component of BRICS; it's part of the Belt and Road Initiative. The Turks want Iran to survive too. I haven't heard any complaints from the Turks about destroying our air base at Incirlik,

because they know that's our base, and they've always been reluctant to let us operate from there against anyone we wanted in the region. So I think we're seeing the world move in an entirely new direction. I'd argue this is the end of Sykes-Picot. I think the maps are going to change.

I'd be very surprised if all these family dictatorships in the Persian Gulf survive in their current form. I think the damage being done economically is going to stay with us for some time. The Indians have already started purchasing oil again from the Russians, and that makes perfect sense for them. I'm surprised they ever went along with us to begin with. The dollar is losing airspeed and altitude. Economically, this is a catastrophe. Financially, for us, I think it's a disaster. It's going to take more time, but over time it's only going to get worse for us. Remember, we're the ones who've been boasting to the world about how powerful we are and how the entire world needs to shake in fear of American military power. Well, then people are going to expect us to perform.

Iran, on the other hand, doesn't have to do anything other than survive. As long as Iran survives—and the longer the war lasts—the weaker we look, the weaker Israel looks, and the stronger Iran looks. And I think Iran is going to survive. I don't see any evidence that it's suddenly going to pick up the phone, call Washington, and beg for mercy. I don't see that happening. So we're in a real bind. I think, at the end of the day, we're going to be swept out of the region. Look at what's happening in Iraq right now—the Shia are rising, and the Iraqi government wants us out of the country. It's wanted us out for years. I think we're going to have to get out. I don't think anybody living in the Gulf is going to want us anywhere near their harbors, airports, or anything else.

So I think this is a developing disaster for us. And Israel—Israel's Iron Dome isn't working very well. Although we're definitely trying to fire missiles in support of Israel, at air and missile defense, the Iranians seem to have moved technologically much further than we anticipated. They're now able to deliver missiles—missiles that have decoys that, you know, produce multiple warheads. And then the real dangerous missile you're trying to intercept flies through while we're preoccupied with the decoys. So this is not working terribly well for us. But the interesting part is that, in the West, the media—as always—is showing us a wonderful picture of American and Israeli military success. Quite astonishing. I don't think that's the picture the rest of the world is beginning to get.

#Glenn

I recently checked the media, and you get the impression they're already planning for the new government to take over—how relations will shift—and it's quite strange how the narratives deviate so much from reality. But this looks like it's going to be a long war, so... how do you expect the United States and Israel, for that matter, to be exhausted? Because you said you assume they'll be exhausted first, and then I guess it's over. But will they run out of interceptor missiles? Do they have a limited ability to hit Iran? Or what do you expect to give in first? Or is it simply that the Gulf states will demand that the United States put an end to it?

#Douglas Macgregor

Well, all of the ports we usually use to replenish our naval forces—to reload them with missiles, rockets, and so on—have been destroyed. We're forced to fall back all the way to India, which is quite a distance from the region. Now, we can fall back to Italy at this point; I think Crete may be just out of reach—I hope so. But the point is, everything we were accustomed to doing now has to change. War has become a much more arduous task for us. Remember, they've not only shut down the Strait of Hormuz, they've also shut down the Suez Canal, for all intents and purposes, because they've closed off the Red Sea. So the commercial picture is grim, and the military picture is problematic.

I don't think we can manufacture missiles fast enough to keep up with their use. We've been supplying vast numbers of missiles to Ukraine all this time, and now we're beginning to feel the pain because so much of that stock is gone. It won't be long—maybe a few more days—before we have to start using our missiles more sparingly. That means we won't be able to shoot down most of what's being fired at us. Remember, you're talking about firing at least two or three missiles at every incoming one, and we still can't reliably target and destroy hypersonic missiles. A lot of these are coming in at Mach 3, 4, 5, even 6—speeds beyond our current technological ability to counter. So, logistically, yes, we're going to have a huge problem.

And we may pause. Now, whether or not the Russians and the Chinese are willing to mediate—or the Indians—I think India would probably be the best choice for mediation. They are, after all, neutral, despite Modi's recent visit to Israel, which I think was ill-considered. But nevertheless, Modi and India have cultural ties to Iran. Sanskrit and Indian civilization are a component part of Persian civilization itself. So I think there's an opportunity for the Indians to bridge the gap between us, the Israelis, and Iran. But we'll have to see. Right now, I think Iran is not dissolving into chaos. Yes, we killed the supreme leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, but I don't see any evidence that that has disrupted unity of effort and command and control.

The other advantage the Iranians have—and this is an important one—is that much of their capability is widely dispersed. That makes it very hard for us. Even on the best day, historically, we've had a lot of trouble dealing with anything that's mobile. So I just don't see any good news in the near term. I hope we're talking in Washington to others who might be able to help mediate some kind of end to this catastrophe. But I know that over the weekend we apparently expressed an interest in negotiation. I don't know through what channels, but apparently that came from the Trump White House, and the Iranians said not only no, but hell no.

#Glenn

Is this because they're not ready to end the war yet? I mean, it seems a bit foolish, perhaps, to stop it now, given that the other side could just replenish their missiles and come back again in a few weeks. But what do you think the Iranians would want out of this war before they'd agree to let it end?

#Douglas Macgregor

I don't know what they'll say, but I think what they want is to get us out of the region. And I think we're going to oblige, because this war is something we've helped bring on, and we've aligned ourselves with Israel, which is a pariah state in any case. The Israelis are already widely hated and despised for their program of mass murder and expulsion in Gaza. Now this war is only going to make those matters much, much worse. So I think the Turks are now going to feel much more comfortable asking us to leave. And I think, as I pointed out earlier in the Gulf, we'll be invited to leave.

In other words, I think we're sacrificing our position in the region strategically for the benefit of Israel, but I don't think Israel is going to benefit. And, you know, this sort of thing is going to have widespread repercussions. If you're sitting on the Korean Peninsula, you're already tired of the American military presence. You don't see the need for it, because the Chinese are not interested in starting a war. The Chinese have made it very clear to the Koreans that if they do anything, they won't be helped in any way by China. I think the Koreans are probably saying it's time for the Americans to leave, and that they need to work with China to reunite the peninsula and come to some kind of stable solution there.

I think the Japanese are watching this and beginning to wonder just how tightly aligned with us they want to be. I guess my point is, do we look strong, powerful, and invincible—or vulnerable? Unfortunately for us, we need to look invincible and invulnerable. Now we've opened ourselves up to all sorts of extraordinary problems that we might have otherwise avoided. You know, military power is one of those things where, until you use it, nobody really knows what you've got. Remember, in 1940 everyone was saying, "Thank God for the French army—the largest army in Europe, the best equipped, more tanks, more of everything."

That went away pretty quickly. So did the British Army—it didn't last very long. I think we're living in a world today where the old era is ending and a new one is beginning. There will be new rules for the future, and those are not going to be written in Washington. They're going to be written, I think, largely in Asia and, to some extent, in Europe and the Middle East. But they'll be written by indigenous peoples, not us. That's the long-term forecast. How long this will take is anybody's guess. Right now, the Iranians are feeling a lot of pain, but they're also inflicting a lot of pain, and there's no incentive for them to stop.

#Glenn

Well, if someone wanted to kick the United States out of the Middle East, I guess you could look at three areas. One would be, of course, the military presence—the bases are being pummeled. The second is the economic interests. And the third is what you also alluded to: U.S. credibility, the idea that it's all-powerful and that any country seeking security should align itself with the U.S. How do you see the wider geopolitical ramifications of U.S. credibility being shattered in this way?

Because this was seemingly the opposite of what Trump wanted. His whole approach, I think, was to show a lot of strength and hope that adversaries would stand down. I thought the assumption was that he would mount all this military force. As Witkoff said, Trump was very surprised they hadn't capitulated yet, given that they saw all this U.S. military might. But what happens now if it becomes evident that it's the United States that has to walk this whole thing back and find some kind of dignified exit?

#Douglas Macgregor

Well, you're talking about an ignominious retreat, which is the last thing in the world Donald Trump wants. We need to talk about how we get there from here. The problem is that we've already displayed, in the first 24 to 36 hours, our tactical expertise—our tactical supremacy, if you will. We managed to kill a number of key personalities, though not the supreme leader. Tactics win battles, but ultimately strategy wins wars. We have no strategy. When everybody asks, "What's the purpose?" well, it sounded like it was regime change. But I think we've discovered by now that regime change hasn't worked.

This is a large country—93 million people, about the size of Western Europe. It seems to be holding together. There's no reason to believe it won't stay together at this stage. So the strategy is what, then? If you can't remove the government, what do you do? Do you keep lobbing missiles and rockets at it, hoping somebody will say, "Please, please stop, we'll do whatever you want"? Maybe that's the goal. I don't think that's a reasonable goal. I don't think anyone has thought through the critical issue of how to end the war. How do you end it? And the funny thing is, I heard the Secretary of War say this morning, "We didn't start this war, but we're going to end it."

Well, I think we did start this war. The Israelis started it, and we jumped on board. All the things we keep citing as reasons for going to war are specious, but the most depressingly stupid ones go back 47 years ago—or 40 years ago. You know, the number of people whose deaths you can trace back to Iran is in the low hundreds. It's not a large number. And the Iranians didn't behave during the Iraq War any differently than we would have behaved if there were a similar war in Mexico. In other words, you do what you can to deter the force that's on the ground in the neighboring country from entering yours.

You know, the other thing is that we have—I think—about 4,000 missiles left in our inventory, something like that. Maybe those are different kinds, cruise and ballistic, I don't know. Iran has about 450,000. So that's quite a gap. The other thing is, you can kill a leader, but you can't bomb a civilization into submission. We've never really understood what we were dealing with in Iran. Everybody talks about Iran as some sort of radical Islamic state—nothing could be further from the truth. Iran is ultimately Persia, and that civilization is much older. Persian civilization, Persian thinking, Persian philosophy, Persian art and history—all of those have been asserting their dominance over the last 25 to 30 years.

And the people of Iran have largely walked away from this more ideologically rigid form of Islam. They didn't hate Khomeini, and they didn't dance in the streets when he was killed. On the contrary, people saw him as a very, I think, humble and decent human being. He sacrificed his life. He stayed where he knew he would be killed. Killing him has made him a martyr that even people who don't like Islam can honor. So I think we've galvanized the place against us. We've mobilized the people against us. I don't see anything good coming out of this. And this is the problem with us: we project our values, our thinking, our experience onto others. Well, our experience may hold up in connection with European experience, but it doesn't match the experience of people in the Middle East and Asia, or Africa for that matter, or even Latin America.

So that's why I think we're in a different world right now, and we don't even understand it. The world is changing, the old world is ending, and we're fighting the emergence of a new one. I think we could say that. You know, the future of the world is not being written by us anymore. And what is victory in this war? Well, I think, truthfully, victory is stability. And we've done everything we possibly could to destroy stability—stability in markets, in trade, in commerce, in interstate confidence. You know, we've once again demonstrated conclusively that we're completely unreliable. I've been saying for months that the decision to attack Iraq was made, and it was. It was only a question of when, never if.

Yet we continued with the fiction that there were negotiations underway. This has hurt us with Russia. It's hurt us with China. It's destroyed us in the Middle East. We are rapidly following Israel into this corner reserved for pariah states. For instance, the Indians depend on 2.6 million barrels of oil from the Persian Gulf flowing into their ports every day. When that closes, every Indian family is going to be effectively made to pay a war tax they never voted for. A ten-dollar rise in crude means fifteen billion dollars in terms of the burden on the Indian economy. They're not the only ones. But we don't think in those terms. We don't think about what the impact is on others. There's no sense of this sort of thing. And I think we're going to pay a terrible price, Glenn, and it's only just beginning.

#Glenn

When Trump came to power a year ago, he seemed to have some of the right ideas. Again, one of my concerns about the United States is that the strategy of the past 30 years doesn't work anymore. That is, the United States exhausts itself and then incentivizes the other great powers to collectively balance it. So from my perspective, it made sense for the U.S. to pull back a bit. Then it could strengthen its position more, and the Eurasian powers would, to a greater degree, balance each other. And it looked like Trump was heading in that direction—pull back from Europe, from the Middle East, and focus instead on the Western Hemisphere.

And, well, it all made sense. It doesn't mean the Venezuela operation was a stroke of genius or anything, but at least he looked toward the homeland, if you will. What happened here? How—after a year, he's still in Ukraine. Again, that's one of the problems now. I think they gave away a lot of

the air defenses and other weapons that could have been used, but also now they're cementing the U.S. position in the Middle East. Perhaps not cementing it, but spending a lot of resources. How do you explain how what seemed to be a strategy doesn't seem to be followed?

#Douglas Macgregor

Well, first of all, there is no strategy. You know, this is the problem. This new document that was published was supposed to represent a new national military strategy, but there's no real evidence we've followed any of it. You know, focusing on the Western Hemisphere does not—and should not—mean invading other people's countries in the Western Hemisphere. This is just ridiculous. And again, it's sort of similar to what I said before: you're talking about radical Islam and Islamist terrorism, and then you attack Iran. It doesn't fit. If you turned around and said, "We're going to focus on the danger in Pakistan, the danger in Syria," that would be plausible—but not Iran. At the same time, you say we've got a huge drug problem, a problem with human and drug trafficking. The locus for that—the main locus—is Mexico.

That is what's most dangerous to us. But we attacked Venezuela when there was no real reason to do so. Venezuela was willing to do business with us. And then we kidnapped the president and his wife, and we paid millions of dollars to various people in the country to let us in. Then we talked about this brilliant military operation. Well, I'm sure it was brilliant—it was a police operation, a paramilitary police operation enabled by the U.S. military. It's not a strategy. It's not really an outcome. We don't control Venezuela; Venezuela controls Venezuela. And they can wait us out almost indefinitely. That's exactly what's happening right now. In the meantime, we've changed nothing on the border with Mexico. Oh, it's better than it was, but we haven't stopped the drugs and the human trafficking from pouring into our country.

It's still coming in. It's not coming in at the same rate as it was, but it's still coming in. And billions of dollars in hard cash are still flowing south into Mexico. So there's an awful lot that's just fiction. And I don't think there is any strategy, because any sober-minded American would look at the Middle East and say, "This place does not need American military power. If we involve ourselves here, we'll blow it up." Now, that may suit Israel, at least temporarily, but I've never believed that was good for Israel.

I don't see any evidence that this idea of "Greater Israel," which they talk about openly—meaning the acquisition of territory all around Israel to make it into some great state with, what, six or seven million Jewish citizens—has any chance of success. I think what it's done is offend, anger, and alienate virtually everyone in the region. So before this is over, the question we'll be trying to answer is: does Israel survive all of this? That's the real question. I'm not sure it will. Iran will survive—it's been with us for about 2,700 years. It's like going to war with China. Will China survive? Of course it will; it's been around for 5,000 years. And so will India.

You know, the question is, if you involve yourself in these stupid wars, whether or not we Americans can survive it. We're relative newcomers to the world. We're not a civilizational state, per se. All of these things are going to come up for discussion over the weeks ahead. And I think that, for the moment, President Trump is just going to order everybody to continue to attack, bomb, target, and strike. That's all he can do. He can threaten more sanctions, but I think that's lost its bite to a large extent. I think that's responsible for the hatred and hostility inside Iran toward us. So, I see nothing good coming of this for us. I think Persia, though, will reemerge from this as a much stronger and more influential entity.

#Glenn

You say Israel may not survive. How do you think that would happen? Would it be from the U.S. pulling out, or from the economic consequences of this war? Would people simply flee, or do you see them being militarily defeated? What's the path?

#Douglas Macgregor

All of the above. I mean, just go back and listen to Mr. Netanyahu explain his so-called seven fronts—that's not sustainable. Supposedly, the Israelis have now mobilized another 100,000 reservists. It'll be interesting to see how many of them actually show up for duty. There's talk in Israel about invading Lebanon to go after Hezbollah, because you can't do everything from the air. At some point, Israel is going to end up exhausted and tapped out, much like Ukraine. Today, the question is not whether Russia survives—it's whether Ukraine survives. What will it be? It certainly won't be what it was. So does that mean Israel survives in some form? Maybe. But it won't be what it was, or what it is today. You know, these things depend on a number of factors, but you've got to look at the trend lines—and the trend lines right now are not favorable.

#Glenn

Well, what do you see happening over the next few days and weeks? I mean, what kind of escalation is possible? I don't really see what the U.S. can do differently, except maybe attack or just keep doing what it's doing. But how do you see Iran possibly escalating? And given that, as you said before, the conflict has already become regional very quickly, do you see a chance of it becoming global again? Under what conditions do you think the Chinese or the Russians would join? I mean, if they're watching what we're watching, they might conclude that the Iranians are handling things on their own.

#Douglas Macgregor

Well, if the Israelis decide to use a tactical nuclear weapon—or any nuclear weapon—with the goal of stopping Iran's relentless missile attacks, I think that would change the situation dramatically. I'm

not sure Israel would survive it. The Russians and the Chinese, at that point, would definitely intervene and make it clear to us that if this isn't stopped and continues, they will actively join the fight against Israel and us. I don't think the Israelis are going to do something like that immediately. I'm forecasting that at some point the Israelis might say, "If Iran won't stop, we will launch a nuclear weapon." That's kind of what I think could happen. Well, we don't have any control over Israel. Israel controls us. That's very clear.

So if we can't control Israel, and Israel does this, then Russia and China intervene. Well, they would intervene at a point in time when we've already exhausted our inventories. So how do we put up a significant fight? You know, up to this point, all through the proxy war in Ukraine—behind the scenes and even in public—people raised the issue that we can't go too far, that we have to think in terms of our war reserves. But eventually, over time, that caution was thrown to the wind, because there was no evidence that Russia was being defeated, that Russia was being destroyed, that the sanctions were working. And so we decided we'd put more and more and more into the Ukraine war. Well, that's failed miserably, and they've exhausted their war reserves in Germany, France, Britain, and other countries.

We've done the same thing with much of our munitions. So if you've done that, and then all of a sudden the Russians and the Chinese say, "That's it, stop—Israel's used a nuclear weapon, and we will not tolerate that. If they don't stop, we may use a nuclear weapon in response," that's always a possibility. What do we do then? I think we have to tell the Israelis, "You've got to stop. And if you won't stop, we're leaving." I think we'll get to that point. And that's not an end state we've planned for. We've planned for the other end state—where Iran and its evil leaders, who are responsible for terrorism and threatening the whole world, will have to submit. No, they don't. And they won't. It's difficult to predict how this will develop.

#Glenn

I mean, if you look at the Ukraine war—how cautious the rhetoric was in the beginning, how cautious the West was about sending weapons—and where we are today, when you have a German chancellor bragging about how they, or we, have caused untold casualties in Russia. I mean, you didn't see this at the beginning of 2022. So, given how fast this war with Iran is escalating, it's definitely possible. Just one last question: do you see any possibility, or any pathway, for Trump to put an end to this war? Or is it simply impossible because the Iranians need to, I guess, evict the Americans from the region?

#Douglas Macgregor

Netanyahu is in charge. So listen carefully to Netanyahu, and you'll know what Trump is going to do. Let's be frank—he's taking his orders from Netanyahu. He's not a free agent. He has people at home pushing him in particular directions. As a result, I don't see anything changing in Washington in the near term at all. Everyone will simply say, "Well, we'll continue to bomb, we'll continue to launch

missile strikes, and eventually we'll be successful." We did that for 78 days over Kosovo, and ultimately it wasn't the air and missile war that persuaded the Serbs to get out of Kosovo—it was Russia's decision to pull the plug on the Serbs and say, "No, we can't provide you with fuel, food, and medicine over the winter."

That happened because Strobe Talbott, the Deputy Secretary of State, went to Moscow and negotiated a deal, as Russia's President—Trump likes to say. And the deal involved a number of promises we made to persuade the Russians to do that. The Russians now, in retrospect, regard that as a moment of deep shame in their history. And indeed, I think they're right. But I don't think they had much choice at that point. Well, they have a choice now. The Chinese have a choice. The rest of the world is no longer as weak as it once was. This is part of the groundswell of new changes in our civilization and in the world that the American government doesn't want to accept. We are in a fight at this point, when it comes to missiles and rockets and conventional capabilities, with almost a near-peer, as they say.

You know, that's something we could never have imagined. And I think President Trump has expressed shock and surprise, just as Mr. Witkoff said, that the Iranians hadn't already capitulated. Because from their standpoint, based on their experience in the New York real estate business, this kind of damage is so terrible that you cry uncle and walk—you walk away, you submit, you sign the deal. Well, this is not real estate. This is not New York City. This is a civilizational state that absolutely will not surrender to the demands of the Jewish state in the Middle East, which are then backed by American military power. So I don't think we're going to get very far with President Trump at this time.

Maybe down the line something will break. The one area we haven't talked about, that everybody needs to watch carefully, is our bond market—especially the 10-year bond—and the yield will rise. Look at de-dollarization. Look at our financial weakness. Those things are important. I think we could end up in a very serious financial crisis, certainly worse than what we faced back in 2007 and 2008. That's probably the other factor in this multivariate equation that could fundamentally drive us out. But whatever ultimately happens, we're seeing the end of the old Middle East. We're seeing the end of American military hegemony and political dominance. That's what we're watching.