

# Iran's Retaliation POUNDS Israel & US Bases as Trump LOSES IT | Greg Stoker & Lowkey

Former US Army ranger Greg Stoker and rapper/journalist Lowkey join the show to break down Iran's latest round of Iran's Operation True Promise 4 as the US-Israeli war of aggression against Iran begins to unravel. Follow Greg Stoker: <https://x.com/gregjstoker?lang=en> Follow Lowkey: <https://x.com/Lowkey0nline> FOLLOW ME ON RUMBLE: <https://rumble.com/c/DannyHaiphong> FOLLOW ME ON TELEGRAM: <https://t.me/dannyhaiphong> SUPPORT THE CHANNEL ON PATREON: <https://www.patreon.com/dannyhaiphong> Support the channel in other ways: <https://www.buymeacoffee.com/dannyhaiphong> Substack: [chroniclesofhaiphong.substack.com](https://chroniclesofhaiphong.substack.com) Cashapp: \$Dhaiphong Venmo: @dannyH2020 Paypal: <https://paypal.me/spiritofho> Follow me on Telegram: <https://t.me/dannyhaiphong> #iran #trump #israel

## #Danny

Welcome, everyone. Welcome back to the show. It's your host, Danny Haiphong. You're tuning in to another update on the war on Iran. As you can see, I'm joined by Greg Stoker, former U.S. Army Ranger and geopolitical analyst. He's also running for Congress in Texas. Greg, good to be with you. Thanks for having me on. Crazy times. Yeah, yes, they are. Well, how about we get started? Overnight, there were massive missile salvos sent at Israel. The videos I'll pull up are pretty damning and convincing. Here's Tel Aviv in one instance. I'll turn off the volume because it can get quite loud. This comes in conjunction with what I believe is now wave 15 of Operation True Promise 4. We know that the United States and Israel are continuing their bombing campaign, and there's a lot of talk about running out of air defense interceptors, Greg. I actually want to pull up what Donald Trump just said about the war.

## #Greg Stoker

What an amazingly unhinged post.

## #Danny

A very contradictory statement, given that we're only about four days into this war and Donald Trump is talking about how wars can go on forever—how they can be fought indefinitely and “very successfully” with an unlimited supply of weapons—while also saying that at the highest end we have a good supply but are not where we want to be. He added that much additional hybrid weaponry is stored for us in outlying countries, and of course, he blamed Joe Biden for this problem.

So, Greg, where are we right now? We know that Iran's retaliation this time is far different from the 12-day war, especially given the fact that they're hitting U.S. bases and air defense systems. There's just been a report of a THAAD battery taken out in the UAE by Iran. They're trading blows with drones now, it seems, in the latest waves of Operation True Promise 4. So what's been your reaction to the latest developments in this conflict?

## **#Greg Stoker**

I mean, it's almost boring to talk about at this point. I think you had me on last week when we had this exact discussion about how we knew we didn't have the stockpiles for these kinds of interceptors. They take forever to produce, they're hugely expensive, and we don't really have the industrial base to pump these things out. And it wasn't just us warning about it—it was Defense Magazine, all these defense reporters, and ex-Air Force colonels talking about munition stockpiles. We've been talking about this since the genocide in Gaza started. And now, a lot of generals didn't want this war to happen, especially inside the Pentagon. That's why the Pentagon was leaking like a sieve.

Up to the start of this operation, we didn't have the munition stockpiles. We could reference the old war game from last year, the CSIS study, where they ran it using over 60 ex-military general officers. It showed we'd run out of munitions within four to five days in a conflict over the Strait of Taiwan. This is nothing new. What I wanted to talk about, especially when it comes to drone warfare and these hypersonic missiles, is that when you don't have air superiority and you don't have complete domination of the skies, this is what allows you to democratize warfare against a power that has massive air assets and carrier strike groups. And we're seeing that now.

I've talked about this—especially early on, when Hamas was still firing rockets into Israel proper during the opening days of the genocide—that there was a massive cost imbalance between these asymmetric missiles and drones versus the interceptors. It speaks more to the equalization of the ability to wage aerial warfare, whether defensively or offensively, than to the exhaustion of financial capacity to run wars. These missiles and drones cost a fraction of what those massive interceptors do. As aerial explosives get cheaper and cheaper, deterrence and the ability to inflict reprisals become more and more accessible to semi-peripheral or non-state forces.

It kind of makes aerial warfare—originally the monopoly of the imperialists—available to poorer or sanctioned countries, you know? And this is what we're seeing right now, because they can keep sending them. The United States has hit a lot of stockpiles; they've hit hundreds of military targets in Iran. But you're not going to get them all, and it's highly likely—and this is the main concern in the Pentagon—that they're going to run out of interceptors, which haven't been completely effective, obviously, before Iran runs out of its stockpiles of more democratized, cheaper aerial assets.

## **#Danny**

Yeah, and we're seeing—Greg, I'll just pull up some of these, too. I'll pull up what has shocked not only Israeli but also U.S. military analysts as they watch what's happening in these waves of Operation True Promise 4. There are some weapons that I think they underestimated Iran even having—for example, these multiple cluster-head missiles that break off into many different parts right before they land. Here's one example of that. As the interceptors try to hit it, we see they're just absolutely demolishing the effectiveness of these interceptors, Greg. And here's the hypersonic weapon I wanted to show, because I think people don't understand—you're talking about them being cheaper, right? And, you know, how Iran builds these weapons. But they're incredibly effective.

I mean, just look at how fast—people just can't blink when you watch this, because you can't even see it. That's how fast these missiles are. And Iran doesn't even have to fire that many of them to make this work. Here's another one I'll play that shows all these interceptors in the air. You know, it's funny—in one of these videos, you see Iranian missiles getting through. Despite that, you'll hear settlers in Israel say, "Oh, it's like fireworks." And then, when the missiles get through, they're screaming for their lives because they just don't understand how this could be happening. So, Greg, continue your analysis of Iran's strategy here, because I think there's a fundamental misconception about this that a lot of people aren't getting.

## **#Greg Stoker**

I mean, it was kind of hard to anticipate what the strategy would be. This is very much an open-air weapons test—way more so than the last Operation True Promise or even during the 12-Day War. This is more of Iran going on the attack mode, targeting U.S. assets in different Gulf states that were complicit or giving support to these attacks. Of course, Saudi Arabia and the UAE didn't want to get hit. That's why they wanted to close their airspace, and that's why the U.S. moved some of its troops out and reallocated assets—because they didn't want their, quote-unquote, allies or sub-imperial states to get hit.

But Iran did it anyway. Basically, Iran's strategy is to create a conflict that the U.S. wanted contained. Whether Israel wants it contained is very debatable, and we can have that conversation. But the U.S. wanted it contained—and now it's not. There are a lot of problems being exposed in this open-air weapons test. It's not just the hypersonic missiles getting through and hitting targets. It's not just the cheap weapons—shorter or medium-range ballistic missiles that Iran's firing—and the Patriot missile batteries and THAADs really aren't intercepting. There are massive problems with radar detection.

And also, it seems like we had a friendly fire incident where three F-15 air superiority fighters got shot down over Kuwait. I was on here last week talking about mechanical failures and a one-in-a-million shot. Like, what happens if a fighter goes down over Iran and the massive problem that would be? I mean, luckily for the U.S., it happened over friendly airspace. But it's actually been a

mess. No one who has ever existed in the defense sector or in the military, from an analytical perspective, thinks this is going well. Everybody knows this is a dumpster fire of an operation, and there's no clear vision going forward.

And just like when we were talking about Hamas fighting the IOF in Gaza, what they have to do to win is just survive. You know, like the Viet Cong were never going to defeat the U.S. empire in the field—they just needed to survive long enough, do enough damage, and cause enough friction at home for the American people to say, "Yeah, we're really not doing this anymore." So that's kind of what the strategy is. And now, of course, it seems overwhelmingly likely—and actually, I think Iranian state media put it out—that the Ayatollah was killed this weekend, and that was done by Israel.

All the controversial strikes are being carried out by Israel with U.S. intelligence support. So, the Ayatollah girls' school—the massacre at the girls' school—can probably be attributed to an Israeli strike. I can't confirm that; I don't think anybody can at this point. But there's also reporting coming out of the \*Jerusalem Post\* from about an hour ago that they hit the Assembly of Experts—you know, the body of around 88 people, or I forget the exact number—who choose the next replacement for the Ayatollah. So they're just trying to kill anybody who could take that role.

And that's basically the strategy from their perspective—to keep a power vacuum open long enough for the government to collapse. It doesn't look like that's going to work, because the myth of decapitation strikes should've been debunked a long time ago. It didn't work with Hezbollah, and it's probably not going to work here. So their plan is just to kill everybody who would step into that role. Of course, Pozeshkin is still at large, and I'm not sure if there's another process underway for picking another president. But when you talk about Iranian strategy, they decentralized a lot of their military command before this happened.

The IRGC didn't. There are other elements, like the regular army and the Basij, in the state too. So the decapitation strike strategy is unlikely to work. And now Hezbollah has entered the battlespace. The Houthis might also join in; at least they've disrupted Red Sea shipping traffic with threats. But yeah, the Iranians just need to hold on. There's currently, in Congress right now as we're recording, a war powers resolution being fought on the floor of the House. And this is deeply unpopular. So they just need to hang on, do enough damage, and hope for the U.S. to stop doing what it's doing.

## **#Danny**

Yeah, well, how likely is that, Greg? Because you mentioned they're targeting U.S. bases, and we can see the damage here. I'll pull it up—there's satellite imagery showing what happened in Bahrain, at the U.S. Naval Support Facility, the Fifth Fleet, the Al Udeid Air Base, and of course CENTCOM's headquarters. And then what happened in Kuwait, where we're told, Greg, that's where the six U.S. casualties from this conflict originated, due to Iranian drone fire. But Iran is saying the casualties are far higher on the U.S. side.

Right now, Iran is saying 650 casualties in two days. That's the latest update on that number. And you've heard it, Greg—I'm sure you have. Donald Trump, and I believe Danny Haiphong just said it as well, that there's going to be more. So it's not a popular war either. What do you make of this? The U.S. side is taking a lot of hits. They're trying to minimize it, saying, "Oh, well, this isn't really happening. The Abraham Lincoln hasn't moved back, it wasn't hit at all by missiles, and there's only minimal damage to our bases." What are we supposed to believe here?

## **#Greg Stoker**

Okay, well, it's not minimal, first of all. That's the most significant damage a U.S. base has taken since the opening days of the global war on terror. Yeah, so when it comes to the casualties, I'm very mistrustful of wartime propaganda coming from both sides. It's just an information war, basically, so I'm definitely distrustful. Now, from my own experience—and again, I don't like to use personal experience too much because it's not really a data set—but the U.S. didn't lie about its casualties during its engagements in Iraq and Afghanistan. You know, we had casualties almost every hour on the evening news. You'd see the people killed in Iraq and Afghanistan, their units, and stuff like that. That's really not happening right now.

It's kind of like a different age and a different military than the one I was in. What was interesting is that CENTCOM put out that three service members were killed, and then they released footage of the caskets being brought back to a U.S. airbase in the continental United States—and there were four caskets. So that was kind of weird, that they messed that up. And now it's six. It was a makeshift command center, a tactical operations center. It was like a triple-wide trailer—kind of sophisticated, I guess—but Iran knew about it because it wasn't a hard site or a traditional tactical operations center, especially on one of those bases that's been developed and built up for a long time.

It's all deeply bizarre. Do I think 650 service members have been killed? No, that's not something you can actually hide. It's U.S. standard operating procedure that if someone's killed in theater, they shut down all comms until the families can be contacted, because there's an entire branch of service that goes and contacts families in person before comms can go back up. And we haven't seen those comms blackouts you'd expect when a mass casualty happens. So it looks like a lot of wartime propaganda. However, U.S. service members are getting wounded.

## **#Danny**

Yeah, that's what I'm saying. Could they be talking about casualties as in wounded and killed? Because the number killed might be far lower than 650 casualties.

## **#Greg Stoker**

Yeah. Well, they don't really have to release information about the wounded and injured in the same way they do with casualties. But again, this is a completely new, ideologically driven military—nothing like the one I was in back in the day.

## **#Danny**

Yeah, it seems like CENTCOM is kind of, every other day or so, updating the numbers by two. So we don't actually know what's going on, but we'll probably know a lot more once this is over. But I wanted to—Greg, you know what, I'll just pull this up, because I think the issue of air defenses is getting pretty intense. There's now talk about relocating THAAD and Patriot systems from the Pacific to the Middle East, which is something the Pentagon really didn't want to do before this even started. There's also ample evidence that Israel's air defenses, in and of themselves, are running out very dramatically. I'll just pull that up while you react to it, because I think it's becoming—let me just pull this up—yeah, here we go. I think it's made quite clear that this is a major problem, and I can pull up Marco Rubio talking about it.

So here's the video. A lot of people are saying that Iran is using older missiles, older technology to start all of this, and that there might be more to come. I don't know how accurate that is, but this is the picture we're getting—where even in Israel, sometimes there are just no interceptors going up to fight off these attacks. How big of a problem is this? And can the U.S.—we were talking a little before the show—can the U.S. actually transfer these systems from the Pacific as quickly as they need to?

## **#Greg Stoker**

First of all, when it comes to interceptors, Israel has a very low threshold for taking damage or casualties. In fact, when U.S. politicians talk about stopping arms sales to Israel—specifically offensive weapons—what you actually want to be voting against are the defensive weapons, because those allow them to maintain the psychological safety net of the Iron Dome. That gives the government and the military public consent to wage these messianic, expansionist wars and bombing campaigns throughout the region. So, you know, in my political journey, I always advocate for no defensive weapons.

That's actually what gives them the impunity to do that. So a lot of people aren't enjoying it right now. We've seen a massive number of booked flights going out of Tel Aviv back to Europe, New York City, and L.A. Uh, so, yeah, when it comes to bringing more THAADs into the region from South Korea, I'm just reminded—even since I was a kid—I'm fourth-generation Army. I grew up in the whole "arsenal of democracy" propaganda. We've always been trying to prepare people for an existential war or conflict against China over the Strait of Taiwan. That's why we have the bases in South Korea, Okinawa, and Taiwan.

Every time we—when I say “we,” I mean the imperialist government of the United States—try to shift focus to isolating and directly confronting China, we always get dragged back into a Middle East conflict. So there’s kind of a running joke in defense circles: everyone shifts assets to Indo-Pacific Command, then something happens, and everything goes back to Central Command, and then back to Indo-PACOM. It’s just this constant cycle of assets—naval, air defense—moving around because of conflicts that don’t need to happen and are completely avoidable. I mean, if we just lost a THAAD battery, that’s an insanely expensive piece of hardware.

**#Danny**

How much is it, Gregor?

**#Greg Stoker**

I would have to fact-check.

**#Danny**

Forty million—yeah, around forty million, something like that.

**#Greg Stoker**

Well, I think interceptors are, uh—they’re fat, multimillion-dollar interceptors, per interceptor. And they can only produce a handful a year. So it’s like, okay, they make the bet, they ship the battery, but do we actually have these munitions? I think this really speaks to how end-stage finance capitalism has captured the U.S. defense industry—to privilege precision over mass—so we actually can’t fight a high-intensity conflict anymore. We only have one factory in Poland right now that produces all of our 155mm howitzer shells for mass artillery. What this is revealing is that we can only do things like Venezuela operations—send in Delta Force and our special operations community—because no one else has that capability.

They don’t, but it’s all we can really do. And as I talked with you after the Venezuela operation, that’s where we get a lot of our military propaganda—it’s what I call “special operations porn.” But when it comes to actual high-intensity conflict, we can’t do it anymore. We don’t have the industrial base. Everything’s financialized, privileging all these high-dollar research and development contracts—like Northrop Grumman and General Dynamics—to make these interceptors, which are defensive. They don’t really even work, but they’re hugely, hugely expensive. So it’s not really about winning the war anymore.

It's about making money for private contractors, which is why slightly more than half of the Pentagon's budget doesn't go to the military—it goes to these private contractors. And there's this deep rot there. Inside the military, it's not just because there's a lack of readiness or a recruiting

crisis. It's because all of our logistics, all of our so-called industrial base, doesn't really exist—it's all done by private contractors. I was talking to my uncle about this—he's still this MAGA guy—and I had to use a Roman Empire analogy because he knows about that. Could you imagine how effective the Roman army would've been if they didn't handle their own logistics?

That's what allowed them to be this massive imperial force. We don't have that right now because it's all done for profit, not for the actual functioning of the military. What this conflict has really exposed and highlighted is this massive rot inside the Department of War and the military apparatus—something there's no political will to fix. The Democrats don't have it, the Republicans don't have it. It just makes too much money. And again, all we can do is special operations, and that's not something a lot of people are eager to try in Iran. We have a really bad track record of special operations disasters in Central Asia. So, we'll see.

### **#Danny**

Yeah, and Iran's terrain is very challenging as well. Yeah, we'll have to see. I wanted to pull this up—I think I've seen this cost. This is from *The Islander*, but I feel like I've seen this before. It can be up to \$44 million a shot for Patriot interceptors chasing down what's often \$250,000 worth.

### **#Greg Stoker**

I think the \$44 million figure is closer to the THAAD or Arrow interceptors. I think Patriots are going to be much cheaper than that.

### **#Danny**

Right, right, right. So, you know, their lack of effectiveness, though, in terms of being able to hit an Iranian missile or drone, I think really speaks to exactly what you said—there's a changing way in how war is fought, and the U.S. seems very behind. Which begs the question, Greg: a lot of people in the audience wanted to ask my guests today, who do you believe is winning this conflict? Because I think right now, of course, Iran has taken civilian casualties. The U.S. and Israel are bombing—you know, they bombed the media, what is it, the IRIB? They're bombing schools, they're bombing anything. They're trying to essentially break the Iranian people. And Iran has been very strategic and very intentional about how they're going about this, and they've hit very important targets and already caused a bit of panic inside the Pentagon. So, what's your take on this question?

### **#Greg Stoker**

My take on this question is that it's not an equivalent relationship. The conditions for victory for Iran are different from the conditions for victory for the United States. And can anyone in the audience actually describe to me what the United States' conditions for victory are? Yeah—like regime change, killing the Ayatollah and anyone who would succeed him, destabilization, balkanization, destroying all

of the IRGC, collapsing the central bank. What are the conditions for victory for the United States? They haven't set any. It's like Iraq 2.0 in some ways. The conditions for victory in Iraq were to overthrow Saddam and do an interminable nation-building, forever-war exercise. But we don't even have that for Iran. So I don't know what the conditions for victory for the United States are, because they haven't been set.

We're just doing this kind of "mowing the grass" operation every two years, it seems now—with Iran—or every year, where we just ignite a new conflict, kill a bunch of people, IRGC commanders, politicians, nuclear scientists, declare victory, and then walk away. However, this time is going to be different, because Iran—well, we clearly started this conflict in conjunction with the initial Israeli strikes, whether or not people in the White House or the Pentagon were super excited about that prospect. It's debatable. It doesn't matter. This conflict has expanded in dimensions far beyond what U.S. decision-makers would have liked, and it's not going well. It's rampant—it's revealed deep strategic and operational weaknesses.

And I don't know—can anybody tell me what a U.S. condition for victory would look like? It hasn't been set. And again, all Iran needs to do is survive as an entity, and they win. There's really no way out of this for the United States unless they've lost the propaganda or information war. The Trump administration—this is going to destroy his legacy, I believe. A lot of people are jumping ship. A lot of people are realizing this was the final straw. He's straight-up lying to you now. I mean, it's not just been a military disaster, but also an information disaster as well. So I don't know how the United States pulls itself out of the fire and achieves, quote-unquote, "victory conditions," which haven't even been set—if that makes sense.

## **#Danny**

Yeah, well, let's talk about that information disaster, because we can definitely pinpoint the incredible difficulties the Trump administration is having—not just justifying the war, but also, I think, trying to hide what we know. We played it the last time you were on the show: we know that CENTCOM, the U.S. military brass, the foreign policy establishment—they pay attention to what people are seeing on social media. They're seeing the same things we're seeing. They're in this war, so they obviously know what Iran is doing and how that looks.

## **#Greg Stoker**

There are entire divisions within the military that just monitor this stuff.

## **#Danny**

Exactly. So they know. And now, as they're trying to hide what's really going on—those difficulties, as well as justify this—we're seeing some pretty stark contradictions. So here's Marco Rubio's longer reasoning for why the U.S. is doing this in the first place.

## **#Moderator**

This operation has a fair goal in mind. I haven't had a chance to see a lot of reporting, and I don't understand what the confusion is. Let me explain it to you, and I'll do it once again as clearly as possible—perhaps you'll report it that way. The United States is conducting an operation to eliminate the threat of Iran's short-range ballistic missiles and the threat posed by their navy, particularly to naval assets. That's what it's focused on right now, and it's doing that quite successfully. I'll leave it to the Pentagon and the Department of Defense to discuss the tactics behind it and the progress that's being made.

That is the clear objective of this mission. The second question that's been asked is: why now? Well, there are two reasons why now. The first is that it was abundantly clear that if Iran came under attack by anyone—the United States, Israel, anyone—they were going to respond, and respond against the United States. The orders had been delegated down to the field commanders; it was automatic. And, in fact, that proved to be true because within an hour of the initial attack on the leadership compound, the missile forces in the south—and in the north, for that matter—had already been activated to launch.

In fact, those had already been pre-positioned. The third point is the assessment that if we stood and waited for that attack to come first, before we hit them, we would suffer much higher casualties. And so the president made a very wise decision. We knew there was going to be an Israeli action. We knew that would precipitate an attack against American forces. And we knew that if we didn't preemptively go after them before they launched those attacks, we would suffer higher casualties and perhaps even more killed. Then we'd all be here answering questions about why we knew that and didn't act.

## **#Danny**

So, yeah, the last part is actually an interesting admission. First of all, nothing about nuclear, which we can get into when we hear J.D. Vance. But also that last part—"we knew Israel was going to attack, so we had to essentially attack as well."

## **#Greg Stoker**

Yeah, or if we even break down the so-called logic further, it's like Iran thought we were going to attack them first, so they were going to attack us first, which means we had to actually attack them first. In his defense, trying to logically argue for this war is kind of like trying to use the scientific method to disprove gravity. So, I mean, I feel for him. And again, when it comes to these strategic goals—you know, one person is saying one thing. Marco Rubio is like, yeah, it's the ballistic missiles. And then you have another White House official saying, it's actually the Iranian nuclear program.

## **#Danny**

So long as we achieve the president's objective—to make it clear that Iran can't build a bomb—I think the president will be happy with the outcome. You know, the bomb meaning a nuclear weapon.

## **#Greg Stoker**

Yeah, and then you have other officials talking about regime change. So which one is it, guys? Take your pick. It's very clear there are factions within the White House and the Pentagon that don't support this, but there are also religious extremists inside the U.S. government and the military who are behind it—not for any logical reason, but because they think they need to bring about Armageddon.

## **#Danny**

Literally, that's where we're at. Here it is—Asia Times: "U.S. troops were told the Iran war is for Armageddon, the return of Jesus." ABC Group reports commanders giving similar messages at more than 30 installations across every branch of the military. A combat unit commander told non-commissioned officers at a briefing Monday that the Iran war is part of God's plan, and that President Donald Trump was anointed by Jesus to light the signal fire in Iran to cause Armageddon and mark his return to Earth. So... there you go, Greg. Please help us understand this.

## **#Greg Stoker**

This is actually a pretty big story that nobody is reporting on yet—at least no Western mainstream media is reporting on it. The complaints were taken by a nonprofit watchdog that monitors religious extremism in the military, the Military Religious Freedom Foundation. They received around 110 complaints from 40 different units across 30 different installations, if I remember the exact numbers from the article. These came from non-commissioned officers and lower-ranking officers reporting that their company, battalion, or division commanders are saying this. You know, like, every time you come back from the weekend—return to work on Monday in the military—you get the commander's briefings and emails for the week: your agenda, your training schedule, everything.

And this was in there—insane. Uh, so, you know, I grew up, spent the most formative years of my life in a special operations unit. And there are basically two different types of people in these kinds of units. There are the secular degenerates who just party—that was me—and then you have the evangelical Christians who get married at a super young age. They're highly religious, evangelical, do prayer circles before operations. And if someone's going to do war crimes, it's generally those guys. But those are the two archetypes. So now you've got all these secular people in the military being briefed by these religious zealots, and this is happening at a scale I've never seen before.

Of course, we always had that. You can look at reporting from the early days of the Iraq War—generals and admirals who were evangelical, supporting the war in Iraq even though they knew we

didn't have WMDs. They were doing it for this messianic vision of a greater Israel. A lot of these senior commanders in the military actually believe in that vision, and that's a huge problem because it kills morale. You know, a lot of these people are secular—most people in the military are secular. And actually, the overwhelming majority of the military, like over 50%, votes Democrat, because a lot of them are people of color, from cities, large urban centers.

So this is actually a huge friction point in the military right now. I've never seen anything like it before, especially to this extent. It's absolutely bizarre, but it speaks to the politicization of the military—especially at the command echelon. And that's something we should all be deeply fearful of, because military decisions should be made by logic, not by some religious zealot ideology. That's another point of deep rot within the U.S. imperial military. It's not just private contractors, it's not just deindustrialization—it's also politicization. And that's only going to destroy morale and fracture it even further. This war is exposing so many systemic problems, and there's no political will to fix them.

## **#Danny**

Well, Greg, as we've been going through now four days of this thing, there's such a massive difference, I think, when you talk about morale. We have, for example—and I think this is where I believe Iran has certainly won, at least this part of the battle, if not made it a total turning point in the war. All the murder, all the assassinations, killing Ayatollah Ali Khamenei—that was supposed to break the Iranian people, but they immediately came out in droves. I've seen some of these videos, Greg, where the air defenses are going off right above them. I mean, that is something. And then we've had Hezbollah join in. We know that Ansar Allah is probably going to get involved if this goes on as long as we think.

And then, you know, on the other side, on the U.S. side, we've had bases visibly destroyed. We've had three fighter pilots eject, their planes crashing to the ground because of friendly fire from Kuwaiti air defenses, supposedly. And over and over again, we see Israel getting pounded every single day, with their air defenses likely running out soon. So this part of it feels very much, at least on the side of Iran, like they have the initiative. And Iran has said—they're saying—they want a long war, while the U.S. can't decide. They keep saying different things: the Trump administration supposedly said in secret they only wanted a few days, then he says it can go on forever, and now we hear, "We can't tell you how long this is going to go on." So one side looks like chaos; the other side looks like they have the initiative. What do you think of that?

## **#Greg Stoker**

We all knew there was going to be this rally-around-the-flag effect if they started hitting girls' schools, hospitals, and killing political and military leaders. We knew that was going to happen—that's not really surprising. A lot of this, of course, we covered more in a geopolitical deep dive about BRICS and the Belt and Road Initiative, and why Iran needs to fall to basically prevent a tripartite

strategic alliance between Iran, China, and Russia—an anti-Western, essentially global infrastructure. That's beyond the scope of our discussion here today, but from the Israeli perspective, they know this is one of their last chances to really go all out.

There's a deep sense in their leadership that unconditional U.S. support for what they're doing isn't going to last forever. They need to strengthen their own military and do as much damage as they can while they still have the aegis of the U.S. empire protecting them unconditionally—and, in a way, being led by them from a foreign policy perspective. So we're seeing civilian targets getting hit all throughout the south of Lebanon. It looks like they're going to potentially reinvade, or at least establish security checkpoints south of the Litani River. They'll probably, if Ansar Allah gets involved, start doing bombing runs on Yemen.

And they're going to focus on local targets while the U.S. focuses on targets in Iran, because we have more force projection than they do. And we don't have to, like, refuel over Iraqi or Syrian airspace like they do. So this is going to be one of their last chances, I believe, to enact the Eretz Israel plan. And again, just like I was talking about ideologues in the U.S. military who think this is going to bring about Armageddon—and it really doesn't make any strategic sense—we can look at these decision-makers in Israel and say the same exact thing. Yeah, we know they're trying to disarm Hezbollah. Never going to happen. I mean, they're in it right now.

## **#Danny**

They're hitting tanks. They've got drones, they've got rockets—they're hitting them.

## **#Greg Stoker**

So this is going to be, I think, one of the last chances. And a lot of this is—if you look at what's happening with the Venezuela oil—and the lead-up to this operation... sorry, I have allergies—like, you had to do that first, you know? Because everyone was saying, “Oh, we're stealing Venezuela's oil for us.” Like, we can't even refine that oil. It's too crude; it doesn't have the purity that our systems require to refine petroleum. So who can use it? Cuba and the Gulf states. And, you know, if the Strait of Hormuz gets shut down, you're going to need another alternate supply of oil. So this is helpful—like, the Venezuela operation was helpful for Qatar and Saudi Arabia.

And if you actually look at the moves behind the scenes, a lot of actors in the United States are starting to kind of move or envision an alternate power base in the region—shifting from Tel Aviv, which is kind of toxic right now, to Riyadh and Abu Dhabi going forward. So, you know, you have massive real estate investment deals. The Trump administration is heavily involved with the Saudis and the Emiratis in joint real estate projects and stuff like that. So it's not just all about Israel anymore, which is interesting. And again, because as an imperial colony, it's kind of been tainted. So

we're seeing the ascendancy of these sub-imperial states coming out of the Gulf. But again, it's not that clear-cut, because the Gulf states don't want to be getting hit by Iran either. This regional instability doesn't really serve them at all. It's just an absolute mess.

## **#Danny**

Yeah, yeah. Well, I wanted to ask you, Greg—we don't have firm numbers on Iran's capabilities. They don't announce them, and they don't actually even reveal them. Their strategy for how they hit Israel and U.S. military assets doesn't really reveal it either, because they've taken a very measured approach. But I'm wondering—you said this is the last chance for Israel to get its Greater Israel project. Of course, it's not the last chance, but it is running out of time. And it's also about getting full U.S. support for that. There's a very narrow window, I think—I would definitely agree with that. But is this the last chance, or is it just time that's running out—like the hourglass has been turned over and we're watching the sand fall, "days of our lives" kind of thing going on for them?

Do we see this, though, as a kind of miscalculation—that Iran might actually hit them hard enough to make life very difficult for Israel, even? I mean, you know, they always complain about Iran wanting to wipe them off the map. That doesn't seem to be in play. But to make their existence even just... difficult. Unlivable.

## **#Greg Stoker**

If Israel cannot be secured, there goes a lot of foreign investment—all these data centers we're building in Israel. Even during the first Hezbollah war, that massive Intel chip factory, worth about half a billion or \$800 million, got canceled. A lot of foreign investment, which Israel relies on because it doesn't really produce much besides tech stuff and diamonds—strangely, since there are no diamond mines in Israel—that's it, that's their economy. It's been struggling for a long time. A lot of people have left Israel and gone back to Europe. There's a brain drain situation that's in danger of happening. And we haven't talked about this much, but what about the morale in the Israeli Defense Force?

You know, the social contract in the Israeli occupation force is that you do two years as a conscript, and then you go back to Tel Aviv and get to live a nice, upper-middle-class life as a data engineer or something like that. And that's just not happening. Now they're getting involved in what's looking increasingly like a forever war—reinvading the south of Lebanon. A lot of reporting—if you look at the Jerusalem Post, Ynet News, and Kan—they used to really focus on troop morale and things like that. They're not really doing that anymore. And they also have a moratorium on reporting suicide rates. So, we can call them ideologues or whatever, but for the rank-and-file troops, it's highly likely they don't want to be doing this either. It's kind of like a house of cards. All they can do is bomb stuff.

## **#Danny**

Yeah, yeah. I mean, I think we talked about this before it even started—that that was likely what was going to happen, that they would bomb stuff, and that would mean Iran and the Iranian people would say, “Yes, welcome. Welcome to our government. Do whatever you want to our sovereignty.” Now, Greg, final question before we get to maybe an audience question or two here: the White House actually just released this memo on what the actual objectives are. And it might be a little small.

So I'll zoom in, because the Q&A part is cut off and not really relevant. It says right here that major combat operations against the Iranian regime were launched this past weekend, and that the objectives are clear. So here are the objectives: destroy their missiles, raze the industry to the ground, annihilate their navy, ensure the terrorist proxies of the regime can no longer destabilize the region, and ensure that Iran can never obtain a nuclear weapon. Greg, we're in day four—how successful has the United States been in these objectives, if they are, in fact, the objectives?

### **#Greg Stoker**

Well, here's the thing about both the missile industry and the nuclear program. Even if they achieve those objectives, they're not destroying the knowledge, right? It can all be rebuilt—and it will be rebuilt if the Iranian government survives, which I predict is likely. Annihilating their navy isn't really a flex. There are, like, two nuclear-powered carrier strike groups around, and of course Iran has regular navy vessels too—not to the same extent that China does, but it's not just their flagged and armed vessels. And as for ensuring the region's terrorist proxies can no longer destabilize the region or attack our forces, I don't see that as an achievable objective. We've been saying that for, like, three years now. Yeah, so, okay, cool. Also, it's a stupid operation name—Epic Fury. At least they put out a cohesive statement. It'll be interesting to see what comes out of the War Powers Resolution in Congress today.

### **#Danny**

Yeah, well, the resistance groups—yeah, Hezbollah—they said Hezbollah was dead, and now Hezbollah is fighting again after the Ayatollah was assassinated, was killed. And, you know, the missiles are still going up, so it's obviously not razed yet. What else was there? The nuclear question—Iran has said over and over it doesn't want a nuclear bomb, but it's not going to give up nuclear energy, and it's likely that it will continue to pursue that regardless of what happens in this conflict. And we should also... over and over and over.

### **#Greg Stoker**

I don't want to sound like a broken record, but, hey, countries are allowed to have navies, they're allowed to have nuclear programs for energy, and they're allowed to have missiles. This is absolute, blazing hypocrisy. A lot of people in the United States see that as reasonable, but what they don't

understand is the rest of the world sees us as the aggressors—us as the terrorists. And this is doing absolutely nothing for U.S. soft power, especially when we're carrying out things on behalf of Israel, like the Dahiya Doctrine—bombing civilian targets to demoralize the population so much that they abandon their government because it can't protect them.

That is actually the definition of a terrorist attack: you create chaos, destroy civilian life, and make people believe their government can't protect them. So they start siding with the terrorists, or they stop wanting their government to exist at all. So we're kind of—well, we're doing that. And, you know, some Americans—or sorry, U.S. citizens—are coming to the realization that we're the bad guys in this situation. We are the terrorists. And it's also undoing a lot of 9/11 propaganda.

## **#Danny**

I mean, the polling numbers—what did Trump say? He doesn't care about polls. He doesn't care about them at all. Yes, he does. I know, that's what he says, though. He says he doesn't care, but the polls are not in his favor. They look bad right now, and there's no sign they're going to reverse that 20–80 spread—20% in favor, 80% opposed or don't know, don't care. But either way, the 20% support is incredibly low for this operation, just like the dispensationalist evangelical bloc. Yeah, yeah. And then the Navy flex—Trump was going on and on about this Navy flex. Iran, even if they bombed naval vessels at port—okay, so yes, you destroyed their naval vessels—but if they wanted to shut down the Strait of Hormuz, which is what's being signaled, they have drones. They have drones that could make life very difficult for naval vessels, commercial vessels, and all that.

## **#Greg Stoker**

And what we saw is that they have more sophisticated drones than the Houthis did—and the Houthis shut down the entire choke point. They're going into the Red Sea. So, you know, all you have to do is make sure the ships are uninsurable, and they won't sail through it.

## **#Danny**

They don't want to be hit by drones. Yeah, that's obvious. So, here are some questions, Greg—just a couple. I think they're... let's see, where's the first one? Here we go. Is the Strait of Hormuz completely shut yet? Will it? Will the closure escalate the conflict?

## **#Greg Stoker**

I think I haven't pulled up my naval tracker. There are open-source sites, guys, where you can see all the ships' transponders broadcasting around the world. I think there's still—well, I haven't checked today—but there's still some traffic going through. And will shutting down the Strait of Hormuz escalate the conflict? Well, Trump himself said he doesn't care about polling numbers, but Americans and presidencies are won and lost over gas prices. So if the Strait of Hormuz is shut

down—and again, this goes back to the Venezuela operation and getting alternate sources of oil for Gulf states—I don't see it escalating the conflict. I mean, I think there are some strategic reasons why they haven't tried shutting it down yet, but I don't think it would escalate anything. In fact, I think it would really curb a lot of military considerations in terms of expanding this conflict.

## **#Danny**

Yeah, well, it would hit the world economy very hard. And then the Trump administration would actually have to wonder—or really have to consider—what people think of this war.

## **#Greg Stoker**

I mean, I'm concerned because I think they've just completely given up on the midterm elections this coming November. And that's kind of nerve-wracking if you're a U.S. citizen. Like, what kind of shenanigans is this administration going to pull to retain power in the House, the Senate, and the judiciary? So this war is concerning not just for the immediate present, but for what it means for U.S. citizens in November.

## **#Danny**

This is an interesting question, Greg. Why hasn't Iran issued preconditions for peace talks? I'm thinking of things like nuclear disarmament of Israel and the closure of U.S. bases in the Gulf. The Western axis couldn't agree to those, but regionally...

## **#Greg Stoker**

Preconditions for peace talks? See, I've been talking about this for a while. It's kind of the same reason why Hamas never set preconditions for peace talks. Even while Israel was using diplomatic talks as a tool and a cover for political assassinations against them—no matter what Israel did—they always came to the table, all right? Because they're waging an information war. And the information war is that these guys are religious zealots, completely unreasonable, people who can't be talked to or trusted.

And so, them coming to the table in good faith every time, from a very reasonable position, is how—they're framing this to push back on literally centuries of orientalizing propaganda that paints these people as "third-world savages"—their words, not mine. But while exposing that, they're also showing how the other side acts like the "third-world savage": uneducated, violent, cheering on the death of people they don't even know or understand. And by Iran consistently acting as a good-faith, rational actor—as opposed to these religious zealots in the White House and in the Likud party in Israel—they're showing the world that they are an actual part of the Congress of Nations. They're not this rogue state. And it's part of a larger information strategy, I believe.

## **#Danny**

Yeah, yeah. Well, and Iran—Greg, here, this is something I wanted to pull up. Oh, where did it go? Oh, here we go. Donald Trump—I had it up, I don't know why it's... hold on one second. Because Donald Trump has said it's too late for any of these talks. That's his position now. That's what he said here on his Truth Social. So, supposedly, Iran reached out. Their air defense, air force, navy, and leadership are gone. Now they want to talk. He said, "Too late." But here's Ali Larijani, who said just a day before that Iran didn't start this war. "We will fiercely defend ourselves, and we will make it very difficult for the enemies." And he said that Iran is prepared for a long war. So either Iran is bluffing, or Trump is lying. I don't know which one it is. Well, I know which one it is—but I'm curious about yours.

## **#Greg Stoker**

Well, first of all, Trump is lying. The Iranian military has not been destroyed, the Navy has not been destroyed, and all their aerial assets have not been destroyed. That's easily verifiable. And even if—like, what does he mean by "the military"? Is it the IRGC? The regular army? The Basij militias? Like, no, okay? And Iran is prepared for a long war. That's why they built the tunnels, the hardened bunker sites, and the massive military stockpiles beneath them—because that's what you do when you can't establish air sovereignty against the United States. Just like the Viet Cong, just like Hamas, just like Hezbollah—you build tunnels.

They've been preparing for a long war, and one of the reasons is that they've been doing it since we invaded Iraq. Pete Hegseth got up on stage yesterday and talked about how Iran killed U.S. service members in Iraq. Why was that? Well, because all the neocons back in the Bush administration—Wolfowitz, Rumsfeld, Cheney—said Iran was next. So what did Iran do? They sent the IRGC into Iraq to start training Shia sectarian militias to bog down the United States indefinitely in Iraq so they wouldn't get invaded. This has all been in response to U.S. aggression in the region, starting with us overthrowing their democratic government in the '50s.

And so, when they started building their nuclear program, they always knew that Israel wouldn't tolerate it. That's why they built these hard sites deep, deep underground—not because of Israel, since Israel doesn't have the capability to do that, and never will have the capability to use massive ordnance penetrators to hit those sites. It was always about the United States and U.S. aggression for decades now. So, yeah, I think they are prepared for a long war. And even if they're not, the U. S. is not prepared for a long war. Every time I've come on this show, we've been talking about how we don't have stockpiles or an industrial base. So, like, what are we even talking about here?

## **#Danny**

Yeah, yeah, I don't know. I mean, even if—what Donald Trump said, that everything is gone—I mean, there's a desperate attempt, it seems, to make it look like these objectives are being achieved.

## **#Greg Stoker**

Why are we even still listening to him? He said, you know, we set their nuclear program back decades, like last year—and now, “obliterated,” right? Oh, yeah.

## **#Danny**

I thought it was obliterated, but then—oh, yeah, sorry.

## **#Greg Stoker**

“Obliterated. It was tremendous.”

## **#Danny**

So—and then on March 2nd, J.D. Vance says, “We can’t let them build a bomb.” Well, how could they? It’s obliterated. And, you know, the math just doesn’t work out for the United States. Even Marco Rubio acknowledges it. I don’t know if you saw this—here it is.

## **#Moderator**

They’re producing, by some estimates, over a hundred of these missiles a month. Compare that to the six or seven interceptors that can be built in the same time. They can make a hundred missiles a month, not to mention the thousands of one-way attack drones they also have.

## **#Danny**

So, not good math there when we’re talking about just a few interceptors.

## **#Greg Stoker**

Even if you take the price differential out of it, yeah, it’s just not going to happen.

## **#Danny**

No.

## **#Greg Stoker**

But I guess we're going to go ahead with it because, you know, this is just end-of-empire imperial violence. You can look throughout history—this is what happens, even before capitalism, you know? So I definitely think that. I don't like to make predictions anymore because the world's so insane and the news cycle's so insane. But I'd be surprised if this lasts until next weekend. But we'll see.

## **#Danny**

Yeah, I mean, we still have some time as we wait for Loki here. Because there's a lot of—of course, first of all, what I noticed before this started, Greg, was that the mainstream media—Politico and other outlets—were talking about how Donald Trump's administration has not communicated any kind of message to people in the United States, not just about why, but about how this is going to happen. And they cited 9/11, they cited World War II, of course Vietnam—these were different kinds of wars—but then they even started talking about how the war on terror began after, you know, that really jumped off after 9/11. And they said, well, George W. Bush, you know, he went up to the camera multiple times and said, "This is how it's going to happen." Donald Trump did it zero times. The one time he did, they were already striking Iran, which took a lot of people by surprise. So now it's hard to believe and hard to understand exactly how long this could last, and on what planet this conflict could actually last beyond this weekend, as you're saying.

## **#Greg Stoker**

Well, I guess we'll just have to stop using interceptors and get hit—just like we did back in the good old days, just eating rounds and hoping to survive. Because we don't have any consent for this war, U.S. service members aren't even going to have an appetite for it. When you look at why the USS Gerald R. Ford had to go into port—because 80% of the toilets didn't work—and they started finding shirts and debris inside the pipes, that's like Gen Z's version of fragging. I seriously believe that U.S. service members aboard the flagship of the U.S. Navy sabotaged it. And you can't remain at sea if you don't have, uh, any sewage or sanitation. Because what's the biggest threat?

Like cholera, like dysentery—all these, uh, diarrheal diseases you get if you don't have clean water and you're backed up in sewage. So, uh, there's just really not an appetite—not in the American people, not in the U.S. military. I was, like, the last time the Iran war was happening, I was talking to Mike Prysner, who's the producer of The Empire Files. He's big into veteran activism and helping people get out of the military as conscientious objectors. And he said the last time this happened, there was an unprecedented number of people calling the G.I. Bill hotline to get out, which is not something that happens very often.

And people need to know this, because I've been getting into Twitter fights about it. I've been triggering a lot of MAGA cultists by saying, even if you don't agree with the war, pray for their safety. They'll get thrown in jail if they don't follow orders—that's not true. You can file as a conscientious objector. You just have to write an essay, have an interview with a chaplain, a

psychiatrist, and your commanding officer. And the overwhelming majority of people who file as conscientious objectors keep their VA benefits and everything—can file for disability, get free health care for the rest of their life—because you get an honorable discharge.

And your benefits reflect the time and service you've already done as a conscientious objector. So you can absolutely leave the military and be protected while doing it. Now, they don't teach you this. They don't tell you this because they don't want you to know. But this has been in place since after the Vietnam War. I know conscientious objectors who did a couple of years in service, filed, got out—I've interviewed them. Yeah, they're good to go. They have VA health care, dental, all that stuff—GI Bill, VA home loans. So all these people can actually get out if they want to. Most of them just don't know about it, so I'm kind of trying to do an education campaign.

So I don't think anybody in the military—or at least not a lot of people in the military—watch your show or listen to my podcast. But if you know somebody in the military who's kind of questioning whether this should be happening, or if they want to get out, they can. Just go to the GI Rights Hotline; it has all the information you need. There are also a bunch of 501(c)(3)s that support veterans transitioning out as conscientious objectors. So it's absolutely a protected process, and everybody needs to know that—so you don't have people, you know, excusing this kind of stuff.

## **#Danny**

Yeah. Yeah. Well, I mean, when we talk about it, there could be far more conscientious objectors coming out of this war, Greg, if these air defenses run out. And, you know, the damage to the bases is significant, but once they run out entirely, there will be far more hits that are more damaging, as long as Iran keeps doing what it's doing. We haven't even heard about the Gerald Ford, Greg. Where did that go? What's it doing? Have you heard anything about it? Is it docked outside of Israel? Is it there? It had all these issues with plumbing—I haven't heard anything about it. A lot's been made of the Abraham Lincoln, but not much of the Ford.

## **#Greg Stoker**

Okay. I'm trying to see if its transponder is on right now.

## **#Greg Stoker**

Uh...

## **#Greg Stoker**

Okay, I think its AIS transponder has been off since the beginning of the operation. So unless someone actually has eyes on it in the port of Larnaca, Cyprus, I don't really know.

## **#Danny**

But we're hearing a lot about the Abraham Lincoln. There were even some rumors that the Abraham Lincoln dispatched the aircraft that carried out that horrible massacre of the young girls at the school in Iran. But nothing about the Gerald Ford. Iran said they hit the Abraham Lincoln—CENTCOM said no—but still nothing about the Gerald Ford at all.

## **#Greg Stoker**

Yeah, I think there was a lot of really bad press. If you read Stars and Stripes or Defense.com, everybody in that community was like, "Yo, the sailors sabotaged this entire plumbing system." And that's a huge personnel problem and a huge security and operational risk. I wouldn't be surprised—this is pure speculation—if they were just taken off operational duty to deal with internal sabotage, potentially. Because that'll get your entire unit taken off the line until it's solved.

## **#Danny**

Yeah, yeah. And Greg, as we continue, what are some things you believe about this war so far? You know, we see all the chatter on social media about the attacks, the U.S. bombings, and then, of course, Iran's retaliation. But what do you think isn't being considered as much when we talk about how this war is going and why it's being fought?

## **#Greg Stoker**

OK, well, every time—and I talk about this a lot—every time we do wars overseas, it comes back home. Danny, have you heard about the shooter in Austin, Texas?

## **#Danny**

No, but somebody actually wanted me to ask you about that. So I'll pull up that super chat if I can find it. But please, go ahead.

## **#Greg Stoker**

So I grew up in Austin. I've lived in Austin on and off my entire life. I live about 12 minutes away from where the shooting happened over the weekend. What we're told is it was on 6th Street—I don't go to 6th Street anymore. It's the big party street that's shut down on the weekends, and I'm not in my 20s anymore. Yeah, he was a naturalized citizen from Senegal who went around with a rifle and a gun and shot people at a number of venues. The entire operation is incredibly sketchy. First of all, the classic "oh, there was a Quran in the car," and he was a Senegalese Sunni apparently shooting people at random in solidarity with the Ayatollah, a Shia, who was just killed.

He also had a picture of himself wearing a “Property of Allah” shirt, and, um, actual practicing Muslims can’t have the name of God on any clothing they wear. And the FBI is kind of just like, “Trust me, bro, it was terrorism.” Then Greg Abbott’s like, “We’re going to do a terrorism crackdown,” you know, because the war is coming back home. And, um, it’s just got PSYOP written all over it—meant to gin up more and more consent for attacking Iran and bringing the hammer down on Muslims when, you know, the consent for this war is failing every time.

I swear to God, every time this happens, I just don’t— I might sound like a conspiracy theorist, even though, you know, the CIA and FBI have released files showing they do this kind of thing. They recruit mentally unstable people on the internet, in chat groups or messaging apps, and get them to do these kinds of things. It’s just—there’s no compelling evidence after the Charlie Kirk assassination attempt and the Tyler Robinson stuff. And there was no transparency. There’s zero reason to trust Kash Patel’s FBI at this point. It really feels like a psyop, and it’s making massive news here in Texas.

And so I think this war in Iran is just going to be used to gin up more consent for a further police crackdown and a further mobilization of the Department of Homeland Security and ICE. Because again, guys, whatever imperial violence and forms of repression and control we implement overseas is almost immediately ported back home to us, the citizens of the imperial core. So that’s something that happened over the weekend—it’s absolutely bizarre. There’s no transparency, and it’s very much a “trust me, bro” situation. Yeah, that was Joseph George, a longtime member—thanks so much for the question. And yeah, I mean, please, you know, how many white boys have shot up Sixth Street? And it’s just like, we’re praying for the mental health crisis and the white male loneliness epidemic. But of course, we’re going with this narrative now.

## **#Danny**

Yeah, and it gets worse, Greg, though, I feel, when things don’t go well. Everything on the spreadsheet right now in this war is bad. And then we have to factor in that the longer this goes on, of course, the economy—the capitalist economy, the world capitalist economy—is going to take major hits. Hormuz or not, because we know how these oil companies, these so-called investors and financiers, operate. While they profit off war, when wars don’t go well and things become unstable in major sites of investment, like Saudi Arabia—which we didn’t even talk about, Greg, after their embassy got hit by what’s being said are Iranian drones—they’re now looking to directly enter the war and are positioning HIMARS to fire at Iran.

## **#Greg Stoker**

That would be really insane if they fired long-range artillery at Iran. But again, just like Israel, we gave them the HIMARS. I don’t think they’ll enter the war. They’ve been cultivating a—obviously, they’re a sub-imperial state of the U.S., but they’ve been cultivating a relationship. MBS, Mohammed bin Salman, the crown prince, went to Tehran last year for the first time in a very, very long time. Again, nobody in the region wants this war. Nobody wants a failed state in Iran. And nobody wants

Israel and the CIA getting involved in controlling resource fiefdoms drawn along territorial and ethnic lines. Donald Trump, just before we got on the stream, said—probably in response to how poorly the war is going—that in the future we might directly support armed separatist militias.

But let's talk about that. Do you think Turkey is going to allow—or not intervene, not engage, or protest—us arming, enabling, and funding Kurdish separatists in what the Washington war hawks call South Azerbaijan? Do you think Pakistan, which is dealing with its own Baloch insurgency, is going to not see us arming Baloch separatists as a direct threat to its territorial integrity? Nobody wants this. The UAE doesn't want it. Saudi doesn't want it. They're just having to say things. I don't think they'll shoot HIMARS at Iran—to what purpose? So yeah, it's just completely destabilized the region and soured a lot of our longstanding relationships.

## **#Danny**

Well, it also seems to have—and we're just waiting for Lowkey, everyone. I believe he's having some technical issues. And Greg, thanks for being generous with your time. As we do that, I just wanted to say we're now seeing reports—some of this stuff is happening as we speak. We know Hezbollah is back in, and Hezbollah being back in also throws everything off. Israel is going on a rampage in Lebanon right now too—yeah, trying to mass-murder the population, as they generally do. But Hezbollah is back in the fight, Greg. Look at this—always with StreamYard. So here we go. They're destroying tanks again. There are now, as we're speaking, rockets being fired.

## **#Greg Stoker**

Oh, that's—Al-Naya Deen is reporting that, so it's most likely accurate.

## **#Danny**

Yeah, so again, these are all up-to-the-minute reports. There are sirens, according to The Cradle, going off in Israel because missiles are being launched from Lebanon, which means Hezbollah is still going. And that upends this whole project—not only disarming Hezbollah, but also trying to establish that permanent occupation zone for Israel to continue their project. So a lot of things are just kind of erupting. Do you think the U.S. even expected this? Because Hezbollah was deemed dead.

## **#Greg Stoker**

Well, the ODNI—the Office of the Director of National Intelligence—is the department that aggregates all the information collected by every foreign and domestic intelligence agency: the CIA, FBI, NSA, DIA, all the three-letter ones. They didn't think Hezbollah was disarmed. I can't imagine they didn't see this coming. But again, the Israeli government is willing to take these hits if it means further punishing and immiserating Lebanon, and maybe even reoccupying parts of Lebanon south of the Litani River. Again, I'm going back to my initial thesis—they know, because they're not stupid.

They might be zealots, but they're not completely stupid. They know that U.S. unconditional support isn't going to last forever. And I don't mean it's going to disappear in the next couple of years or overnight, but it's going to end with this generation that currently dominates political power. The older boomers, the silent generation folks—right?—who are very hawkish, they've held the reins of power since the late '90s, early 2000s, and they're just not going away. But once those guys are gone, the unconditional support is going to dry up. This ride isn't going to last forever, so I think they're trying to make hay while the sun shines.

## **#Danny**

Yeah, I mean, there were, of course, rumblings that Israel was going to use the U.S. and Israeli strikes on Iran to justify further aggression against Lebanon. I think they even announced they were planning to hit Lebanon and essentially anyone they considered a so-called threat to Israel. But nonetheless, I think Hezbollah is still around, and it's still going to cause at least some problems for the Israeli regime.

## **#Greg Stoker**

Yeah, and they're never going to truly disarm, because once they do, they're done. And that's why Hamas is never going to, I don't think, ever completely disarm. They might pull a PKK move in Turkey or in parts of Syria, where they send out a social media video of them burning a couple of AK-47s. But no, once they give up their arms, they're done. And that means Lebanon completely becomes a vassal in its entirety, not just in its government. So they can't afford to if they want to survive as an institution. And right now, they're fighting for their existential survival. That's why they entered the war not just in solidarity with Iran, like they did with Hamas in Gaza, but because they have to. They have to make this hurt as much as possible to make it end.

Because if Iran goes, they're completely isolated, and this is an existential war for their own survival right now. So I definitely think they're going to be sending it—waging a ground war, destroying as many tanks as they can. Maybe not so many rockets, but I definitely see small anti-tank teams running around, just like they did last time, just like they did back in 2006, just like they did back in the '80s. So probably older, more decentralized tactics. Of course, they haven't had enough time to really build up their leadership structure, and having it that centralized and hierarchical actually really hurt them last time. So I think they're going back to old-school playbooks of decentralized cells and networks running around the south of Lebanon.

## **#Danny**

All right. Yeah, Greg, thanks so much for joining me today. This was great. I appreciate you taking the extra time. Our second guest has arrived—here he is. Hey, Loki, how are you doing?

## **#Greg Stoker**

Yeah, bro. How are you? Okay.

**#Danny**

Yeah, I'm good, I'm good. Nice of you to show up, man.

**#Greg Stoker**

It's been a minute. I'm not sure what's going on with my technical stuff right now, but yeah, it's good.

**#Danny**

Oh, sorry, I've lost your mic. I don't know what happened there. Okay. Yeah, I know, this is going to be low-key. I can't hear you at all anymore. Let me see what happened. I tried to make you louder because you were a bit quiet, and now it seems you've been turned off.

**#Greg Stoker**

Should I check it and come back in?

**#Danny**

Oh, no, you're good now. I can hear you, I can hear you.

**#Greg Stoker**

All right, well, I'm going to head out. I've got to go do campaign stuff. Guys, I'm running for Congress in Texas District 31—just a heads-up if you're in the area. So good to see you again, man, and thanks for having me on, Danny.

**#Danny**

Of course, yeah. And everybody, you can follow Greg on his X and his campaign—links are in the video description after the show. All right, Greg. All right, Loki. Good to see you, man. I know it's been kind of rough technically, but I definitely wanted to get your view on what's going on in this war. Maybe you can help us analyze it, because I can show the images of what's happening to Israel, I can show the images of what's happening to U.S. bases in the region—and that's been a lot of the talk. But what has this demonstrated to you in terms of the significance of Iran's retaliation, the resistance, etc.? What's been important for you? Your volume—I can't hear you anymore. I don't

know why. What's happening here? Let's see. Maybe if you want to come back—no? Okay. Okay, no, you're good, you're good now. I think it's because every time I try to make you a little louder... I just won't mess with it anymore. So, continue. Okay.

### **#Greg Stoker**

Okay. Ultimately, I think what's been demonstrated is that Israel is, in essence, a paper tiger. It has an air force that can attack civilian buildings, and a military that can spy on communications. Low-key, that's one thing.

### **#Danny**

I don't mean to interrupt you—do you have any headphones by any chance? Because there's an echo, I think. Okay.

### **#Greg Stoker**

The headphones, unfortunately, can't connect while the phone's charging.

### **#Danny**

Oh, there's no Bluetooth or anything like that? Okay.

### **#Greg Stoker**

There's not, unfortunately, because it has to be plugged in. Right. If possible—this is quite an old phone. I'm so sorry, man. It's all right. The technology's letting me down today.

### **#Danny**

It's all right, it's all right.

### **#Moderator**

There's a lot of crackling, I think.

### **#Danny**

I don't know if the audience—yeah, there's an echo on my side, I think, because of the setup. But it's not the worst. Continue, Loki. We'll get through this. Are you still—yeah, yeah, yeah, definitely.

### **#Greg Stoker**

Okay, so ultimately, what we're looking at is a situation where Israel believed that the decapitation model would be successful in removing fifty years' worth of preparation. You're talking about people who have understood from the very beginning of the process—since the Islamic Revolution in Iran—that they would eventually have the United States go to war with them. From the Zagros Mountain strategy, which was hatched during the Carter administration, to the other methods adopted under other U.S. presidents, Iran always had an awareness that this day would come. And for that reason, it set about building its military capabilities without any U.S. technology and tried to conceal them as much as possible.

So you had production technology—industrial-scale ballistic missiles underground—that can be launched from surface to air with fairly precise targeting. And since the lesson of the 12-day war, you've seen governments in the region look at how they can adopt some of Iran's methods. For instance, Turkey began ballistic missile development after the 12-day war, having seen how successful Iran was. And it's worth remembering what exactly happened in that war: you're talking about the use of over 1,000 drones and only 500 ballistic missiles. Iran was able, according to the Israeli Land Authority, to destroy 11,000 buildings within the political entity of Israel, damage over 30,000 more, and about a third of those damaged buildings also had to be brought down and destroyed.

In addition to that, over 41,000 Israeli citizens filed claims with the Israeli compensation authorities for monetary compensation for damaged property during that time. So just so we understand the scale of what happened during that period. It's also important to note that Israel Katz, Israel's defense minister at the time, stated that they would have killed Ali Khamenei if they could—but they couldn't, because he was nowhere to be found then. And in this way, you can see a difference in the operation that Israel launched with the United States and the timing of when they launched it.

Because most military operations take place at 2 a.m.—the understanding is that, in terms of the human cycle, 2 a.m. is when people are least alert. And, like with the Venezuela operation against Maduro, it was 2 a.m. That's the standard practice, really. But in this case, what happened was they launched it around eight or nine in the morning there, because they were responding to intelligence saying all of these individuals would be together at the same time, and they could kill Ali Khamenei in a place where it was already well known he would be.

But that move essentially signaled to Iran that now was the time to defend itself in the way it had been building up for fifty years. You've seen unprecedented targeting of U.S. bases in the region, and they're moving from being a protective factor to being a liability. At that point, when U.S. bases actually become a liability for the countries that host them, the empire begins to fall—its veneer, its prestige starts to disintegrate. You've also seen the actions of U.S. soldiers on those bases: rather than protect those states, they've vacated their bases and gone into hotels, endangering the people around them.

But also, Iran is impressively showing that it has intelligence about where these soldiers—and in some cases CIA individuals—are based, and it's been able to strike them. Ultimately, what that does is place real antagonism between the U.S. and its key allies in the region. And of course, when you look at Trump's targeting of Venezuela at the time he did it, it was for the U.S. to have access to the world's number one oil reserves—really, the top producer—at a time when he knew that if they were going to move on Iran later that year, it would be difficult to maintain the oil supply from the Middle East in the same way.

And already we've seen in the UK that gas prices have increased by almost 100 percent just in the few days since this war began. So really, from the Iranian perspective, the mission is to inflict the largest cost possible so that the United States is unable to sustain the war. Ultimately, the alliance with Israel becomes more and more costly by the day. Public perception is furious—really, I'd say people are angry with Trump. They feel betrayed by him. This was someone who came in on an anti-war ticket, who told people he was against the forever wars, that he wasn't a neocon.

But when you actually look at who the main forces are that have been pushing for this war in tandem with Israel, it's been the neocons. In the early 2000s, Richard Perle and others in organizations—Douglas Feith and others—wrote a report for Benjamin Netanyahu called \*A Clean Break\*, which basically foretold what happened in Syria: the encouragement of sectarian forces that would then turn into separatist forces, leading to the balkanization of the state, the decentralization of power, and the weakening of any chance of there being a centralized military that could oppose Zionism effectively.

And the same mentality is what Israel has when it looks at Iran. But the difference is that the Trump regime thought more along the lines of the Maduro model, where you're able to decapitate the government and then use that as a kind of bargaining stick—a threat to whoever remains afterward—and then use that to try to push your will on the remaining people from the political class. But in the case of Iran, they don't realize the depth of the ideological commitment that's been built up over these 50 years, and the perception people have of the struggle against Zionism. So now they're faced with an equation of an intransigent population, which isn't limited just to the government or the political elite.

It's spread across the region, and they have very clear clarity about what the United States' intentions are and what Israel's intentions are. I think what they're trying to do now is encourage ground forces through Kurdish groups—the Barzani family and others in the north of Iraq—and Kurdish groups in Iran to try to move on the government as a ground force in some way. But then, as an air force, it seems they want the Saudis to possibly get involved and take over from Israel and the United States, to take that pressure away from them. The question is whether that will work.

And of course, there have been reports in recent days that Mossad agents were arrested in both Qatar and Saudi Arabia, who seemed intent on causing problems there and possibly blaming it on

Iran. Israel has a long track record with these kinds of activities, from the Lavon Affair in Egypt, where they planted bombs at U.S. interests in the country to try to push the U.S. government against the government of Gamal Abdel Nasser. Lavon was the minister of defense in Israel at that time and later received a medal for carrying out this operation. And then, of course, you have the case of Iraq, where Mossad—still a fledgling intelligence agency in 1951—planted bombs at sites of Jewish interest within Iraq.

They placed bombs at synagogues and at cafés frequented by Jewish Iraqis, trying to compel those people to become Israeli and leave Iraq. At the time, Prime Minister Tawfiq al-Sawadi had introduced something called the denaturalization law, which allowed Jewish Iraqis to leave the country and become Israelis. Of course, when many of them eventually left following the bombing campaign, they were put in camps and sprayed with DDT by Israel once they arrived. So anyway, what we see here is an attempt—an attempt to throw the entire region into war.

But what Iran has done is respond in a way that will be written about in the history books for centuries to come. And this was something that those of us who are level-headed said before—that the United States and Israel have never faced any opponent like this. In the history of Israel, certainly, it has never faced an opponent like this. And after the 12-day war, this was exactly what those in the Israeli Land Authority were saying: that they had sustained damages they had never before sustained, and they were trying to get things back together. So this is an entirely different animal, in a way, from what they had faced previously in Lebanon and Palestine.

## **#Danny**

Yeah, I mean, that's one thing I've wanted to harp on, too—how historic this already is. And, of course, we do live in the collective West, and there will always be a lot of doubters, given that our particular regimes are Zionist and imperialist in character. There are a lot of doubters about what Iran can do and how long it can sustain this. My question to you, Loki, is: what are some of the factors? There's always the military factor—what Iran has—but there are other factors as well that drive, I believe, what we're seeing. The resistance that Iran has said is not going to stop. They're rejecting U.S. overtures toward talks.

Now the Trump administration wants to say, "No, we haven't been—it's too late, no more negotiations." But there have been many reports about how there were already overtures, and Iran said no—that this is going to be a long war, that they have their own objectives. So now the U.S. is starting to come out with its own objectives. They're throwing all the pasta at the wall, saying, "This is what we want to do, this is what we want to do." It's not very clear, but Iran says it has its own objectives. So what are these factors and objectives, do you believe, that are at play here—things we might not be paying enough attention to—that influence Iran, what Iran does, and what Iran is doing?

## **#Greg Stoker**

Well, I think what's often overlooked in the story of Iran's bond with the Palestinians is that, prior to the Islamic Revolution, those who would go on to work for it actually trained with Khalil al-Wazir, Abu Jihad, of Fatah. He was the head of intelligence in Fatah and was later assassinated by the Israelis in Tunisia. He helped train those forces in Lebanon who would later return to Iran and work toward that goal. Of course, you have to remember that, in the words of Talal Naji, the head of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine—the PFLP—who is currently imprisoned in Damascus, it would have been impossible for the Palestinians to achieve the victories they did and defend themselves the way they were able to without the support of the Iranians.

You also look at someone like Saleh al-Arouri from Hamas. He stated very clearly that Iran is the only state in the world with a budget specifically for the liberation of Palestine. Qasem Soleimani, of course, was instrumental in training these forces in Lebanon, Syria, and even in Gaza itself. You have the introduction of the Kornet missile—a Russian missile—that they were able to bring in. There was even an underground base in Sudan built by Iran for the purpose of arming the resistance in Gaza. And that's why, of course, the division of Sudan was a key objective of the Zionists, and something they were able to achieve.

But it was a key link in the chain. And Iran was able to—well, you know, the well-known phrase about the Palestinian revolution is that it went from the stone and the slingshot in the first intifada. Then, in the second intifada, you see the appearance of different methods that were largely due to who they called the engineer, Yahya Ayyash, who was himself assassinated when Israel booby-trapped a telephone he used once a week and killed him by detonating it in his hands. From there, Iran was able to arm the Palestinians with more advanced hardware.

And then you see the method of resistance change, and you can trace that line very clearly. The Iranians, in their attitude toward supporting the Palestinians, were actually very non-partisan. For example, even when Fatah was at odds with the Iranian position and went through Oslo and the rest of it, there's the example of the Karine ships, which were intercepted by the Israelis. One of them was intercepted, but the rest were not, and the arms on those ships got to Gaza and were used to arm Fatah as well as other Palestinian resistance organizations. Iran has gone out of its way to give all of those factions anything they wanted, and I think that's one aspect of the story that's often overlooked.

I think the Iranian support for the Palestinians is often caricatured or seen as a proxy, or as something done purely for Iran's own interests. But you've never seen a more selfless support for the Palestinians. And let's be clear—what Iran is going through now is literally because of its support for Palestine. When you look at United Against Nuclear Iran, for example—and this was a point I was alluding to earlier—it literally features on its board the brother of George Bush. It also includes someone who was Bush's representative at the United Nations during the Iraq War, a number of

neocons, and the former head of Mossad during the 2003 Iraq War. John Bolton was key to United Against Nuclear Iran. And interestingly enough, this is the same way that this military adventure has been carried out against Iran.

Even John Bolton is trying to distance himself. This is someone who was instrumental in the war in Iraq, instrumental in the war on terror, and now he's trying to disassociate himself from this current campaign on Iran because they're seeing how much of a disaster it's been. That's because Iran was ready—they knew what was coming, and, as I say, they'd been preparing for it for 50 years. They built technology with no involvement from any U.S. company whatsoever. When they're launching these strikes, people look at it and say, "Well, how does Iran even know? How can it see where the Israelis are to strike them?" Because the Iranian jets aren't flying into other people's airspace. They're using the satellite systems BeiDou and GLONASS, which are Chinese and Russian.

And with those systems, they're able to see into the other side in quite an invasive and serious way, and to achieve what are really, objectively speaking, miracles in terms of how they're striking back. And ultimately, there isn't a country in the Global South watching what's happening right now that isn't taking notes on how Iran has been able to defend itself. Twenty-five percent of humanity lives under political systems currently subject to U.S. sanctions. Millions of people around the world have been killed by U.S. sanctions. No country in the world is more sanctioned right now than Iran. For it to have been able to do this is really a testament to the brilliance and scientific genius at work in that country. And ultimately, those who look at this objectively will say these are achievements that will be remembered for centuries to come, for sure.

## **#Danny**

Yeah, yeah, those are great points, Lowkey. And one of the objectives the U.S. always has—well, once in a while, I mean—I think it gets downplayed because the U.S. wants to amplify the threat of Iran to levels far beyond what this actually represents. But they always say, "We need to stop Iran from supporting the so-called terrorist proxies." And who are those so-called proxies? They're all the resistance organizations and groups, especially the Palestinians, and also extending out to Lebanon, Yemen, and elsewhere. So it's a huge goal, and I think it's unprecedented. A lot of people look at the deaths that Israel and the United States have caused in Iran.

But a lot of people, I think, are trying to understand how a Global South country can do this—can fight back in this way, with this kind of technology, with this kind of weaponry—and make significant changes, impose significant damage on the U.S. and Israel. And if we add the U.S. into this, unlike the 12-day war, we're talking about something that's actually history-book worthy, regardless of the outcome, which I can ask you about, Lowkey—where you think this is going. But right now, four days in, we see the outcome is at the very least not where the United States and Israel want it to be, which is, of course, full regime change.

## **#Greg Stoker**

Yes, and I think they have slightly different objectives. For Israel, the aim is social collapse and chaos—but a kind of creative chaos they can shape to their interests. On the U.S. side, particularly with Trump, it's different, because he's not Bush. He's not a believer in committing large forces for attritional warfare and long, drawn-out operations. Trump sees it as more advantageous to just dip in and out with a very clean-cut operation. But those are actually diametrically opposed approaches. And what's fascinating is that someone like Marco Rubio is coming out now and saying, essentially, that Israel was going to take action, and we didn't want Israel to take action alone—but Israel was going to take action whether we liked it or not.

This is interesting because it's really depicting the U.S.–Israeli relationship in a new way. But this was a massive gamble for Trump to take part in. Ultimately, people—both allies in the U.S. domestically and in the region generally—will be looking at him and shaking their heads at how he could do something so reckless. Because when they compare the way Iran responded to the 12-day war, it was completely different. In the 12-day war, what partly brought it to an end was when Iran targeted Al Udeid in Doha. That was obviously telegraphed, and people were informed it was going to happen. But it was a warning—and that warning ultimately wasn't heeded.

What needs to happen regionally is for people to start looking, at least over the next few decades, at pivoting away from this idea of the U.S. military being the key guarantor of the global economy. Move away from the U.S. military as the protector of supply lines and toward a more independent situation. Ultimately, Iran in the region supports forces that are working for independence from neo-colonialism. It doesn't support forces—contrary to what many will say—that have a strictly sectarian outlook. If it did, it wouldn't have supported some of the groups it has stood with, definitely among the Palestinians, in Lebanon, and in Iraq.

There are non-sectarian components to all of those organizations mentioned. But ultimately, what's been revealed here is that the United States is basically not fit to protect the supply lines or the states themselves. I mean, when can you imagine a time when you'd see U.S. forces vacating their bases and then being essentially chased with ballistic missiles into the hotel rooms they're trying to hide in? You know, this is reminiscent of the humiliation the U.S. military faced in Vietnam, in history, in a similar way. It's also important to remember that both China and Russia have played an interesting role in this whole process.

So, as I pointed out, Beidou and GLONASS have been essential to all of Iran's military operations, from Al-Wa'id al-Sadiq al-Awad—the first "True Promise" operation. And Israel was not happy about that, of course. But in this case, we know that Russia made U.S. Air Force plans clear to Iran several days before they took action. We also know that China has been helping to replenish Iran's defenses. And of course, from the Chinese and Russian perspective, it makes sense, because drawing the U.S. into a war of attrition in Iran would take pressure away from Ukraine and Taiwan, without a doubt.

They're now talking about moving the THAAD system away from South Korea and bringing it—well, you know, there's this idea that perhaps Iran has taken out the THAAD platform around the UAE. All of this is unprecedented. None of this was expected by the U.S. or Israel. And there's actually little that Israel can offer the United States. You also have to remember that Iran easily has over 100,000 drones and tens of thousands of ballistic missiles—at least, if not around 100,000. It can continue this almost ad infinitum. The United States and Israel both have very limited air defenses. What are they going to do? And this is why, in the 12-day war, this was partly what made the United States and Israel essentially beg for a ceasefire.

It wasn't the Gulf begging for a ceasefire at that time, because none of the U.S. bases were being targeted. It was solely Israel, and the United States was unable to protect Israel. Israel was out of air defenses, and so it was able, through the help of the Gulf, to persuade Iran to stand down. Rather than take that warning and heed it, everyone in the region either took it as a sign of weakness or didn't learn the lesson being communicated to them. So they went for a maximum escalation strategy, which is the Israeli way—it's the Zionist way. The Zionist way is a maximalist, unrealistic, utopian perception of how things are going to go. They believed, for instance, that they could drive two million Palestinians into Egypt—that they could drive two million Palestinians, by killing them en masse on an industrial scale, out of Gaza.

They failed, and they lost. They believed that with an air force campaign, they could then militarily occupy the south of Lebanon. They actually tried and failed to do that. Ultimately, the lesson from Syria is that without local agents, Israel is unable to achieve its objectives. Those local agents may be knowingly or unknowingly working for Israel, but they're still local agents. In Lebanon, they have, you know, local agents, but those agents have to be a bit shy about their position. You can see the Lebanese government now attempting to neutralize the resistance. But those Israeli soldiers and those tanks—four Israeli tanks—have been lost today in Lebanon. If Israel thinks it can go in and occupy Lebanon, it will learn the very same lesson it learned before.

You know, Trump is talking about boots on the ground in Iran. That's a completely unrealistic idea. It would definitely be the nail in the coffin of the U.S. empire. The United States is in no position to carry out any kind of occupation like it did in Iraq or Afghanistan. They were already stretched thin. And if they think they could do that in a country like Iran—which is three times the size of Iraq and has a very coherent state—they're mistaken. You know, those countries the United States went into, Iraq and Afghanistan, had, unfortunately, by the time they were occupied, no army to speak of. Iran's not the same. It's very clearly not the same.

And they are learning that lesson. These U.S. soldiers—how much longer are they going to be willing to die for Israel? Their perception of Iraq and Afghanistan, rightly or wrongly, was that they were dying for 9/11. And that's a very different, psychologically speaking, a very different equation. What you're now saying to these soldiers is, yeah, you're dying for Benjamin Netanyahu. That's not going

to hold for much longer. And when you look at the aircraft carrier—the USS Gerald Ford—where the toilets were being blocked up, it's entirely possible, and I'm aware that it's been said, that this was a form of mutiny.

And so, if you saw that form of mutiny before the war, what do you think is going to happen when U.S. soldiers are feeling the kind of pressure in the region that they've never, ever felt before? What kind of stigma do you think will then be attached not only to the U.S. military but also to the Israelis? Do they really believe they're invincible in the face of public opinion? Do they not believe that's a factor at all? Do they really think people who moved to the Gulf to escape taxes in their home countries are going to be happy living next to U.S. bases?

Do they believe the people employed to clean the bases are going to want to go in? Do they believe the people working in restaurants on these bases are going to want to go and work at Burger King or McDonald's inside a U.S. military base? When this level of pressure is sustained for even a few weeks—imagine this type of pressure lasting for six months, because that's what Iran has in mind. It plans to fight like this for six months. The whole world will change. If you have six months similar to these last few days, we're in a different world at that point.

## **#Danny**

Yeah, and there's a lot of talk, low-key, about this turning into a war of attrition. However we want to define that term, I'm not sure I'd use it, just because I think Iran—if we look at all these waves of Operation True Promise 4—we can see they have a very diverse and unpredictable strategy they're employing. And if a war of attrition means a long, drawn-out kind of standoff between the warring parties—the aggressors, the U.S. and Israel, and Iran—we just don't know. The Pentagon and the West in general are very worried about their ammunition, stockpiles, and air defenses.

Iran is not spreading the message of having—well, you just said there are indications of almost infinite capabilities if they're continuing to produce drones, if they're continuing to produce even just short-range missiles, which probably don't need all that much if they're doing it underground. Yeah, this could be a forever war that I don't think the United States and Israel have ever really understood. I'm wondering, in closing—there was a question, kind of low-key—how do we avoid the Samson option? Because the unpredictability of a declining and collapsing empire like the United States, and of course Israel attached at its hip, also leads to some unpredictability in how its so-called rulers react to this kind of disaster.

## **#Greg Stoker**

Well, you know, Danny, there are different lessons from the Vietnam War, depending on how you look at it. In the case of the Palestinian resistance, and in the case of Iran, this idea of working underground to produce the means to defend yourself was seen in the Vietnam War. They learned from that insurgency how to develop their own ways of doing things. Of course, you had the punji

trap in Vietnam—spikes under the ground where U.S. soldiers would trip and fall in—and they had a really expansive tunnel system. The Palestinians, of course, have the same. The Lebanese have the same, with help from North Korea in the south of Lebanon. And Iran has the same. The United States came out of Vietnam and created the internet because what they wanted was to be able to predict insurgency, to surveil people.

In fact, when the internet was being created—and Yasha Levine has a great book about it called *\*Surveillance Valley\**—it looks at the foundation of the internet and how, at universities like MIT, you had sit-ins and protests against it because students understood the consequences it would have for people and the intentions behind its invention. However—and here's where the interesting part of this question comes in—if you look today at how the internet has been used by supporters of the Iranian government, you have Handala, the Palestinian refugee boy created by Naji al-Ali, who's shown with his back turned.

Now, it's said that he would only turn around and face the world when he was able to return home to Palestine. Handala today is the name of an organization that has hacked the emails of Ehud Barak, Benny Gantz, and several figures from Israel's cyber unit. It has also hacked the emails of Netanyahu's entire close circle and released that information to the world, and it's had real-world consequences. The group even hacked David Barnea's phone—the head of Mossad. So what you're seeing now is a very creative way of using the methods of the enemy against them, on the part of Iran and others, in this epic battle for self-determination and ultimately liberation from neocolonialism.

But the question here about the Samson Doctrine is an interesting one, because there will be those on the Israeli side arguing for it—the use of tactical nukes against Iran. Now, even in the case of using those kinds of weapons and the huge amount of damage that would cause, you wouldn't be able to completely subjugate the population. But you would ensure that the perception of those in the present, and those in the future—the children and grandchildren of those in the future—would ultimately clarify who was good and who was evil, who was right and who was wrong.

And you would certainly, if he hasn't already, put Netanyahu's name in the history books alongside the great oppressors of humanity who were responsible for the deaths of hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of people. So that's something he would have to weigh carefully. Ultimately, it's something Donald Trump would be against. But I actually think it would guarantee a break between Israel and the United States and make clinging to Israel an untenable position. It would certainly render Israel *persona non grata* in civilized company around the world for decades to come.

**#Danny**

Yeah, great point. I think this is a good place to leave it. I just want to make sure everyone knows that I really appreciate all the super chats, the memberships, all of that—and I appreciate everyone for watching. Also, Loki's X account is in the description, where you can find what he's tracking and what he's doing. I want to ask you, Loki, is there anything you want to mention here?

## **#Greg Stoker**

Nothing at all. Just keep doing what you're doing, Danny, and thank you for your patience today. My apologies to everyone—I was a bit late.

## **#Danny**

No worries at all. Everyone, we're going to head out of here together. Hit the like button before you go. I'll be back tomorrow, I believe, with Professor Mohamed Marandi and Pepe Escobar. That'll be at 11 a.m. Eastern time for these daily updates on what's happening with this U.S.-Israeli war of aggression on Iran and, of course, the historic retaliation and response by Iran that we're covering here every day. Everybody, hit the like button before you go—it helps keep the conversation going so more people can hear from both of our guests today. You can also check the video description for all the ways to support this channel. Without further ado, everyone, bye-bye.