

Chas Freeman: Iran's Strategy in the US-Israel War

Former US diplomat and China expert Chas W. Freeman Jr. joins us to analyze the rapidly escalating conflict between Iran, Israel, and the United States. In this interview, Freeman breaks down the first eight days of the war, the military and political dynamics shaping the conflict, and what it could mean for the future of the Middle East. We also discuss the recent statement by Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian announcing a conditional halt to strikes against Gulf countries. Is this a strategic decision by Tehran to isolate Washington and Tel Aviv while opening diplomatic channels with Gulf states? Topics covered in this interview: Chas Freeman's assessment of the first 8 days of the US-Israeli attack on Iran Iran's military and political strategy in the war Why President Pezeshkian announced a conditional halt to strikes on Gulf countries Are Gulf states independent enough to challenge US pressure? Is Iran trying to separate Gulf monarchies from US-Israeli strategy? What this war means for the balance of power in the Middle East Freeman, a former US Assistant Secretary of Defense official and ambassador, offers a rare insider perspective on the strategic calculations behind the conflict.

#Mudiar

Hello and welcome to another episode of *India and the Global Left*. If you're new to the show, please hit that subscribe button. Also, consider becoming a YouTube member, a patron, or donating a small amount using the link in the description box. Let me welcome our guest tonight, Ambassador Chas Freeman. Ambassador Freeman is a former American diplomat, author, and geopolitical analyst. Ambassador Freeman, welcome back to *India and the Global Left*.

#Guest

Thank you, Jyotish. Glad to be with you. There's a lot going on.

#Mudiar

Yeah, we had you on last time—it was about ten days ago, if I'm not wrong—and you said that war was inevitable. But toward the end, you also said you wished we could meet and talk about something else because it's so depressing. Unfortunately, I had to send you another email saying I wanted to talk to you again. So, if you could, give us your assessment of what's happened in the last eight days or so, insofar as the conflict.

#Guest

Let me describe what I think is happening. Basically, on December 29th, there was a meeting between Prime Minister Netanyahu and Donald Trump at Mar-a-Lago, Donald Trump's club in Florida. At that meeting, they agreed on an attack on Iran. Therefore, the negotiations that took place in January and February were a sham. They were cover again for the marshalling of forces to mount the attack that was finally launched on February 28th. The attack is in pursuit of Israeli strategy. There is no American strategy—there's an American campaign plan to implement the Israeli strategy. The aim of the Israeli strategy is to devastate Iran, to eliminate it as a competitor for influence in West Asia, and thereby facilitate the Greater Israel Project, which envisions everything from the Euphrates to the Nile becoming a Jewish-managed state—presumably an apartheid state, as Israel itself is.

So that's the theory. That's the strategy. It's part of a long-term plan. Prime Minister Netanyahu has openly admitted that he's had this fever dream of finding an American president willing to do his bidding for forty years. And in Donald Trump, he's found that man. The campaign plan on the U.S. side really involves a very intensive set of strikes on Iran—multiple targets in Iran—with a view to destroying Iran's capacity to conduct a war with Israel. But that campaign plan, in my view, is failing for the simple reason that the Iranians have spent twenty years preparing for an air campaign against them. When they think they're about to be attacked, they relocate the sensitive materials or equipment that might be destroyed in an attack to hiding places.

Now, let me talk about the Iranian strategy, because they do have a strategy. The first point is that they are sick and tired of continual provocations, assassinations, attacks, and negotiations that serve as cover for surprise attacks—and they're going for broke. They're following a strategy that will not stop until they reach their objective, which is to devastate Israel. In other words, having received an existential threat from Israel, they now pose an existential threat to Israel. Sorry—I used to chair a group in Washington called the Committee for the Republic, and they've awkwardly decided this is the precise moment to get me back, I guess. Anyway, you can cut all that out, I hope. Let me go back.

So the Iranian strategy is basically modeled on Muhammad Ali's "rope-a-dope" approach—that is, take all the punishment you can, behave, if you will, like Afghanistan or Vietnam, and bide your time. Hide your capabilities until the other side is sufficiently exhausted, and then deliver a knockout punch. Here we see a familiar pattern from the June War of 2025. Iran has begun the war by expending its least advanced ammunition in an effort to deplete the interception and defense capabilities of Israel and the United States. And if the June War is any guide, about ten or twelve days into this, Israel will in fact have exhausted its capacity to defend itself. Shortly after that, the U. S. will run out of munitions. Why?

Because every intercept attempt involves at least two or three, and sometimes as many as a dozen or more, interceptors being fired—each one very expensive and each one in short supply—the inventory of interception capabilities is rapidly depleting. The United States is beginning to cannibalize systems in South Korea—THAAD, Patriot—and in Japan, in order to supplement the

dwindling logistical support for this war in West Asia. Iran has not even begun to use its hypersonic weaponry, which remains underground in storage, waiting for the right moment.

Let me talk about the most important development today, which is that President Pezeshkian of Iran, on behalf of the three-man governing council that has replaced the slain Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, has apologized to the Gulf Cooperation Council countries—Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE, and Oman—for attacks on them. He's claimed that this is because Iran deliberately decentralized its military command after the attack on the Supreme Leader, and that people were conducting unauthorized strikes. That's not true, but it's a very deft way of giving the Gulf Arabs the excuse they need in order to meet Pezeshkian's conditions. The war, by the way, opened on Saturday at about 1 a.m. with an attack on the Supreme Leader by the Israeli Air Force.

It was immediately answered by Iran, which knocked out most of the radar systems and other equipment the U.S. had deployed in the region. There's some evidence that all five THAAD radars—Theater High Altitude Area Defense radars—were destroyed. A \$1.1 billion radar at Al-Udeid in Qatar was destroyed or severely damaged. They not only took out the eyes and ears of the United States in the region, but at least one of those installations had been aimed at China and Russia. So the United States has been decisively weakened in that respect. The American bases became militarily inoperable, the personnel were evacuated to hotels, and Iran then followed up by attacking those hotels.

What's going on here is a very deliberate strategy combining diplomacy with force to convince the Gulf Arabs that they can't afford to have American bases on their territory—that, far from defending them, these bases make them vulnerable to attack. And Iran has gone further: it has openly threatened to destroy their oil and gas production capabilities. It has closed the Strait of Hormuz—I'll come back to that. Alongside the military attacks—although I'm speculating here—there must have been a very intense dialogue between the various GCC capitals—Riyadh, Abu Dhabi, Doha, Kuwait, and so on—and the Iranians about Iran's terms for calling off the attack. So they've now called off the attacks on the condition that none of these bases be used against them.

Donald Trump has said this is an Iranian surrender to the Gulf Arabs. It's not at all. What it is, is a ceasefire, and it probably includes—now again, I'm speculating—an undertaking by the Gulf Arabs not only to prevent American use of these facilities against Iran, but, after the war is over—which will be determined, I think, by Iran, not by Israel or the United States—to remove those bases. So Iran is achieving a long-term objective it has had: removing the American military presence from the Gulf. That's my interpretation of this. Only time will tell whether that interpretation is correct or not. But I think Occam's razor—the simplest explanation for what has happened, which usually is the best—suggests that this is what happened.

Now, the Strait of Hormuz has been closed. It wasn't closed by naval forces. The Iranian Navy appears mostly to have been sunk, including one Iranian cruiser that was participating in a multinational exercise with India, which was sunk off Sri Lanka by an American submarine—despite

the fact that, as I understand it, the American Navy was also involved in that same exercise. So this was a war crime—not unjustified, but it has the effect of legitimizing Iran’s globalization of the war. That is, it need no longer be constrained to the region. It’s very dangerous for that reason. Now, the Strait of Hormuz is closed on the model of the Houthi closure of the Red Sea. That was the first successful sea blockade conducted from land.

Iran has spent 20 years preparing the land-based closure of the Strait of Hormuz. And while Donald Trump has directed the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation to step in to provide insurance—now that insurance is not available from other sources—they don’t have the legal authority or the funds to do that. So I suspect this is an empty gesture, although they are in discussion with insurance companies. Second, he’s ordered the U.S. Navy to escort any tankers that are brave enough to try to run the blockade. But I think the U.S. Navy lacks both the ships and the capability to do that against land-based missiles and artillery, which cover the Strait from the Iranian coast.

So this is not the short, victorious war that Donald Trump imagined. He’s cited multiple objectives, some of them self-contradictory. There’s no clear explanation for this war. Some say it’s to stop Iran from developing nuclear weapons, but we killed the Supreme Leader, who was the only cork in the bottle on that issue. Everyone else in Iran below him seems to have decided there must be a nuclear weapon for deterrent purposes. And they look to the example of North Korea, which responded to maximum pressure by developing an ICBM with multiple reentry vehicles, nuclear warheads, and decoys that can strike anywhere in the United States. That’s probably the next stage for Iran.

Anyway, the obstacle to Iran making a decision to build a nuclear weapon has been removed—both because the Supreme Leader who opposed it has been murdered, and because the fatwa that prevented Iran from building a nuclear weapon made an exception when there was an existential challenge to the Islamic Republic, which there now is, explicitly. A second objective, supposedly, was to counter Iranian missile capabilities against Israel. And here there’s been a very convoluted argument. On the eve of the Israeli attack, backed by the United States—this is an Israeli-American war, not an American-Israeli war. I mean, the prime mover is Israel, and Iran knows that, which is why it’s focused on wreaking havoc in Israel. And I’ll come to that.

Before this war started, there were people in Washington arguing that we should encourage the Israelis to go first, because then we could claim we were responding defensively to an actual Iranian retaliation. That convoluted argument found expression in Marco Rubio—and then, a day later, he had to do a 180-degree turn and say, “No, no, no,” because Donald Trump said, “No, Israel didn’t start this war. I did. I take credit for it.” So we see American officials behaving like Soviet apparatchiks in the Soviet era, twisting logic into pretzel-like convolutions and reversing themselves at a moment’s notice, quite shamelessly. And one wonders whether the end result for Mr. Rubio will be what the Soviet foreign minister Molotov suffered—namely, reassignment to a hydroelectric project in Outer Mongolia.

Perhaps Mr. Rubio will end up running a lemonade stand in Tijuana—or perhaps San Diego. Anyway, in the middle of all this, I should add, the Trump administration is threatening the Cuban government with annihilation. So there's a certain consistency here. The savagery of the newly renamed Department of War is much in evidence. Let me turn, finally, to the issue of what is happening in Israel. First, let us acknowledge that Israeli military censorship is very effective. It's effective not only because it's applied strenuously to people in Israel, but also because the Zionist-oriented American media respect it. So when Israel says something, they just dutifully repeat it. When that is challenged, they say, "Well, we can't verify that." So we know very little, in the mainstream media, about what is happening in Israel.

There's an interesting clip from an Indian journalist, Braj Mohan, who just posted this on X, showing what other sources are saying—namely, that the interception of incoming Iranian missiles is failing. The damage is extensive. I recall that in the June war, 408 buildings were destroyed in Israel, and many Israelis are still homeless as a result. This now is much worse. Mr. Mohan sounds quite panicky in his little clip, and he clearly has been renewed—he's got a nice red mark between his eyes. India is in a very poor position. It has almost no strategic petroleum reserve. I believe there's about nine, nine and a half days' supply in the Indian Strategic Petroleum Reserve, whereas China has 253 days of reserves, and Japan somewhat less, but still far more than India.

So it's entirely natural that the Indian government has petitioned the United States for an exemption from the Russian oil embargo that the U.S. imposed. The Russian Federation has offered to resupply India with oil, which it will have to deliver either through the Pacific or around Africa. So India is going to suffer power outages. The one you just experienced is probably not related to that, but things are going to get pretty tough. The second effect is that about half the world's fertilizer supply has just been cut off. In the Northern Hemisphere, this comes right before the planting season, so we're going to have a food shortage down the road.

And if we look at the energy picture, Qatar has had to stop production of gas, both for export and domestic use. For example, there's a Norwegian aluminum factory in Qatar that's had to shut down because no gas is available to power it. The land-based facilities that produce liquefied natural gas in Qatar have also been damaged. We're told it will be many weeks, perhaps months, before they can be brought back online. So we're in a situation where the United States and Israel—following Israel's long-term ambitions—have started a war that's not going to be the short, victorious war its proponents imagined, but a long war of attrition in which industrial capacity, weapon inventories, and defensive equipment will decide the outcome, along with the ability to take punishment.

Again, Muhammad Ali and the rope-a-dope—you know, "I'll take all the punches you give me. I'll punch you just enough to exhaust you. And when you're exhausted, I'll strike." That's the Iranian strategy. Of course, it may not work, but at the moment it seems to be working. So I think the mainstream media and the boastful statements from Central Command should be taken not with a

grain of salt, but with a boulder of salt. That's sort of a summary of what's happening, at least as I see it. And of course, I may be wrong, because information is in very short supply. I'd point out we're only seven or eight days into this war.

I guess it's seven and a half, eight days now, and it's going to go on for quite a while. I think probably midweek next week—sometime around the 10th, 11th, or 12th of March—we'll see whether I'm correct about the capacity of the United States and Israel to defend themselves against hypersonic missiles, which is almost non-existent anyway, essentially eliminated. We're hearing talk out of the Pentagon about falling back to air-launched cruise missiles—that is, standing off hundreds of miles and firing missiles at targets in Iran. But the assumption there is that the United States has wiped out Iranian air defenses.

I think it's an open question whether it has or not, for two reasons. First, the Iranians, given the rope-a-dope strategy, may well have decided to save those by moving them underground, out of the way, and not expending their own self-defense capacity at the opening, when Israeli and American capacities are at their peak. So these air defense capabilities may still exist, to be brought forward when required or appropriate. Second, battle damage assessment in an air war is exceedingly difficult. I was reminded by a friend of the NATO–American air campaign against Serbia, in the war to vivisect Serbia and remove Kosovo from it.

The Serbs had apparently seventeen launchers for their air defenses, and we reported destroying sixty-four of those seventeen. So, I mean, I remember from my time as ambassador during the Gulf War of 1990–1991 that our air force and the Israeli air force were continuously announcing the destruction of Iraqi Scud launchers, and then they turned out not to be destroyed. We've seen videos of missiles launching from beneath the sands—that is, they're in silos covered with dirt and a very thin layer between them and the sky. And then suddenly they burst forth from what looks like an empty desert. So I don't know whether Iran is holding back certain things, but I suspect it may be.

#Mudiar

I wanted to ask you a bit more about President Pezeshkian's decision—or announcement—to halt strikes on the Gulf states, conditional strikes, conditioned on no further attacks coming from them. I wonder what makes them take this decision. I mean, of course, on one hand, as you said, it's a strategy of attacking the U.S. and Israel while opening diplomacy to the rest of the states in the region. But one may also wonder what makes them hope that the Gulf states are independent enough to openly pursue friendship or push the United States out of the region.

#Guest

Well, the basic lesson they're trying to impart, I think, is that the so-called defense of the Gulf states against Iran or other attackers has backfired. In fact, don't do that. They justify Iranian attacks on

these very states. So they're not a source of protection but a vulnerability, and therefore they should be removed. That's the basic lesson Iran has been trying to drive home. There are two possible reasons I see for the timing of the ceasefire—the unilateral ceasefire announced by Iran against these states, not against the United States. Iran has made it clear it's going to continue attacking Israel and the United States, but it has now exempted the Gulf states, and done so in a tactful, even apologetic manner that maximizes the chances they'll accept the ceasefire. In other words, Pezeshkian says, "We're really sorry. This was all a mistake."

Of course, it wasn't a mistake, but he gives them the option of accepting that it was. So, two possibilities. One, there were diplomatic agreements reached—though not visible—between the Gulf states and Iran. The Gulf states agreed that, as they've said publicly, they would not allow any American use of their bases against Iran. And second, they probably also agreed that when the war is over, those bases will disappear. So Iran has achieved its longstanding objective. That's the most likely possibility. As a secondary consideration, Iran has expended mostly drones, very few missiles, on these bases. It may want to save them for further use against the United States and Israel, having made its point, it believes, to the Gulf Arabs. So I think this is a very important development, and I don't think it is, as Donald Trump suggested, an Iranian surrender to the Gulf Arabs.

#Mudiar

I wasn't surprised by the announcement itself, because my reading in recent days has been that Iran was being very, very cautious, even while it was attacking— even in its attacks on hotels. They came out and justified it, saying, "Oh, we only attacked the hotels because it was U.S. personnel who had retreated there," effectively saying they were still maintaining that distinction between attacking military assets and everything else. So I wasn't surprised by that.

#Guest

Right, but they did. They attacked, for example, the port of Duqm in Oman, which is a purely Omani port, but it has oil storage that the U.S. Navy draws on, and it's a U.S. Navy anchorage. So Oman, which has been the indispensable, neutral mediator in these sham negotiations—I think Oman is aghast at having been used in this fashion twice. But the foreign minister, Badr al-Busaidi, has been very clear that there was real progress being made in the negotiations by the Iranians. They had gone well beyond the so-called JCPOA, or Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. They had agreed to forego any storage of material that was substantially enriched, and they had agreed to go back to low levels of enrichment.

And we've heard Steve Witkoff, who, of course, knows absolutely nothing—he's a real estate manipulator, Donald Trump's crony. He knows nothing about nuclear weapons, or Iran, or the Arabs, or anything else. Nor does Jared Kushner, who does not have a PhD in nuclear physics, last time I checked. No, these people say, "Well, it's the inherent right," Witkoff says, "it's the inherent right of President Trump to insist that they have no enrichment." But it's the inherent right of Iran, under

Article 4 of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, to have enrichment. So once again, the United States is in contempt of international law and making assertions that have no basis at all in law or practice.

So I think the Trump administration has thoroughly discredited itself abroad—not only with this unprovoked attack with Israel, but with the manner in which you see five people at a girls' school in Minab. Normally, one would expect an apology: “This was a targeting error, we're really sorry.” No—nothing. The sinking was by a submarine of an Iranian cruiser that had been engaged in an essentially diplomatically organized multinational exercise off India. You know, this is like the German sinking of the Lusitania in World War I. It discredits the United States. And Secretary of Defense—self-styled Secretary of War—Hegseth's statements could well have been made by Adolf Hitler.

They are totally savage. He dismisses so-called international institutions—he says, “so-called international law.” He said there should be no rules of engagement, no holds barred. The objective, you know, is to destroy, murder, and erase Iranian power. So this is bad enough internationally, but domestically we have a situation where Israeli impunity depends entirely on support from the United States—and that support is rapidly crumbling. The American public is not behind this war. Even some Republicans, who normally behave like members of a Leninist party, falling in line with the great leader's judgments, are condemning this.

There's a split in MAGA between those who favor restraint—Tucker Carlson and Marjorie Taylor Greene come to mind as the two most prominent spokespeople for that view—and the warmongers like Lindsey Graham. The basis for support for the continuation of the war, for MAGA, and for President Trump is all being rapidly eroded by this. I think the statement that “Cuba is next” is an effort to finesse that reality, but I don't think it will succeed. This is a disaster for the United States, for Israel, and for Iran. Of course, Iran is being battered.

And I guess I should say one final thing, and that is the preparation for this—the regime change operation that it is. You know, some days Donald Trump admits that, sometimes he doesn't. Marco Rubio always seems to insist, except when he's told otherwise, that it is a regime change operation. The basis for this was very carefully prepared. The Secretary of the Treasury, Steven Mnuchin, brought down the Iranian currency. He says he did so—he takes credit for doing so—in order to produce protests by making Iranians so miserable that they would take to the streets. And they did.

At that point, agents of influence who had been supplied with Starlink receivers—about 50,000 of them infiltrated into Iran—went into action to try to ensure that the peaceful protests would turn violent and provoke violence from the government, which they did. Iran says 3,710 people, including members of the police, the Basij—the voluntary militia—and members of the public, were killed. The West has vastly exaggerated the numbers. The truth is probably somewhere in between. I don't think we should expect the Iranian government to tell the truth any more than Western governments have been doing. So this was the justification.

One of the justifications that initially came out from Donald Trump was that there were human rights violations in Iran. "We have to stop this, and we're coming to your rescue," which is nonsense—because coming to your rescue from the air by bombing you and making you even more miserable is not a good solution. Now, the final thing here is that one of the things Iran did with its closure of the Strait of Hormuz, of course, was to cut off the oil and gas revenues of all the producers in the Gulf. Some, like Saudi Arabia, are very close to a fiscal emergency. Others, like Kuwait, basically live off coupon clipping on investments they made with previous profits from oil and gas. Bahrain is dependent on Saudi Arabia.

Qatar is the third-largest gas producer in the world. It's had to stop producing gas, as I mentioned. The UAE is also bottled up in the Strait of Hormuz. Oman is not, but Oman is a very minor oil and gas producer. So the revenues of these countries have all been stopped. Iran has stopped its own revenues, and clearly it has made a calculation that it can do that for quite a while. I haven't seen any studies of how long that might be, but I'm sure the Iranians have made such studies in preparation for this strategy. So we're looking at terrible pressure on governments in the Gulf—not just financial, because, of course, their populations, their native populations at least—and some of them have very small native populations—large populations of South Asians: Indians, Pakistanis, Bangladeshis, Sri Lankans, Filipinos, and so forth.

We're looking at native populations that have been turned almost 100% against Israel and the United States by the genocide in Gaza. So they're under pressure. These governments are already under political pressure to dissociate themselves from the United States and Israel. Now there's fiscal pressure—revenue pressure—on them as well. And they're not known for their courage. So we'll see what they decide. It's their decision. If I'm correct, they've made a decision and communicated it to Iran, but I might be wrong about that. Outside the region, we face reduced crops in the next harvest cycle, reduced supplies of petrochemicals and fertilizer, and an increase in oil prices. Oil is now about \$94 a barrel and headed upward.

I think it's going to hit \$150 or more. This means that in the United States, which has a policy of trying to keep gasoline prices low to benefit consumers and appease voters, we're going to see the price of gasoline double. Yes, that's at the pump at a minimum. So we're going to have \$4.50 or \$5 in much of the country, \$7 or \$8, maybe even \$9 in California. And as we go into the midterm elections—assuming Donald Trump can't stop them, as he would like to—the voters are not going to be in a good mood about it. And this, therefore, could be the demise of MAGA and much of the Republican Party if the voters take their revenge. So this is an earthquake, and very high on the Richter scale.

#Mudiar

This is probably the first American war that's been unpopular right from the start. Remind me if there's ever been another one.

#Guest

I think it's the first war where we've taken this level of damage to infrastructure and presence. In other words, we've usually been immune. We make war through proxies. And let me just mention the proxy impact here, because it's also considerable. If the United States is focused on resupplying the stocks of Israel and itself, it won't be able to make those supplies available to the Europeans to transfer to Ukraine. So Ukraine has just suffered a strategic blow, which may be fatal. You know, this all illustrates, George, that before you start a war, you should set clear and feasible objectives.

You should devote the resources necessary to achieve those objectives. You should try to achieve them in a way that doesn't do permanent damage to your reputation. And you should have a plan for ending the war. We have no plan for ending this war, and I don't think we're capable of doing it. Because, as I said at the outset, Iran is playing for keeps. They want to destroy Israel as a threat to them. Iran may have been a potential threat to Israel, but Israel is a very real threat to Iran. And Iran has every right under international law to retaliate against the attacks from American and other Western bases.

And in this connection, I would just say the performance of the Europeans has been amazingly maladroit, ill-considered, and fatal to Europe's reputation. Someone like Zakaria Stamo says, "Well, we're not going to support this war from Diego Garcia or Cyprus or the RAF bases in Britain," and then turns around and says, "No, we have to protect the Gulf Arabs from the unprovoked attack by Iran." I mean, Orwell would turn in his grave at this. And other statements—Macron saying, "Well, this should show Iran that it should negotiate in good faith." But it did negotiate in good faith, and the United States did not. So I go back to the Soviet analogy. Even the Europeans didn't.

#Mudiar

There was a snapback by the E3, of course.

#Guest

Yeah, of course. But I don't know in what respect they're differentiated from the members of the Warsaw Pact. Under the Soviet Union—whenever the Soviet Union shifted—one day Hitler was the great monster, and then after the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact, no, no, we have to support the Soviet pact with Nazi Germany, and you know, this is all correct. And then we get into the Cold War, and every time the Soviet Union changes course, does something really foolish like invading Afghanistan, everybody in the Warsaw Pact does what the U.S. Congress and the Europeans do—namely, stand up and applaud. Have you lost your power again?

#Mudiar

No, no, no, it's fine.

#Guest

So I think we've probably exhausted this topic for now. It is, again, I know, less than eight full days into this war, and much is uncertain. I've put forward various hypotheses about what is happening, but that's all they are, and we may find that I'm wrong. I don't believe so—I believe there's good reason to think the hypotheses I've stated are correct. But time will tell.

#Mudiar

We'll leave it there, Ambassador Freeman. Thank you so much for your time.

#Guest

Well, thank you, Mudiar Jyotishman, and I hope the power stays on in Delhi. Yes.

#Ayushman

Hi, my name is Ayushman. I, along with Jyotishman, have started this platform. Over the last two years, we've tried to build content for the left and progressive forces. So far, we've interviewed economists, historians, political commentators, and activists. If you've liked our content and want us to build an archive for the left, I have two requests for you. Please consider donating to the cause—the link is in the description below. And if you're not able to do so, don't feel bad; you can always like and share our videos with your comrades. Finally, don't forget to hit the subscribe button.