

Nima R. Alkhorshid: Iran Just Sent WARNING: the Axis of Resistance Ready to WIPE OUT IDF

This interview analyzes the escalating Middle East conflict, examining strategic miscalculations in recent military actions against Iran. It explores the failure of maximum pressure campaigns, Iran's resilient defense systems, and the strengthening of regional resistance movements. Key topics include sanctions' impact, Strait of Hormuz dynamics, and why conventional warfare assumptions don't apply to Iran's complex terrain and society. The discussion highlights how hostilities are reshaping regional power structures, with implications for global energy markets and diplomacy. Despite claims of air superiority, reported losses of advanced aircraft and successful Iranian counterstrikes suggest a prolonged conflict. The analysis argues military solutions cannot achieve political objectives against a civilization with millennia of strategic depth, while Arab states face critical choices about hosting foreign bases. The conversation concludes that the "axis of resistance" is growing stronger through confrontation, and that lasting regional stability requires new diplomatic frameworks acknowledging Iran's security concerns and sovereign rights.

#Nima

The conflict and the war in Iran, in the Middle East and West Asia—I think there are a lot of things happening right now on the battlefield, especially with the new information we've learned. Last night we heard that an Israeli F-16 was hit by an Iranian air defense system, and the night before, an F-35 was hit. But before getting into what's happening right now on the battlefield, I want to talk about how we got here and what has happened so far. I think if you want to understand the conflict, the war in the Middle East—what's happening and destroying so many places—you just have to look at today, at how they're bombing each other and destroying everything.

It's just unbelievable. But before getting to this point, let's remember what happened during Donald Trump's first term in office, his first presidency. One of the main goals of the Trump administration in those days, from 2017 to 2021, was to put tremendous sanctions on the Iranian economy—and he did everything. He even went far beyond that. He assassinated the Iranian commander, General Soleimani, if you remember. He was not just a simple commander; he was a very respected commander in the Middle East and a diplomat, I would say. He was a very successful diplomat in talking with politicians both in and outside the Middle East.

He was well respected in China and in Russia. The assassination was meant to break Iranian power in the Middle East because they thought that everything Iran had—this sort of hegemony, as they called it, the so-called hegemony Iran has in the region—was based on one person, General

Soleimani. You had to kill him to break the backbone of the resistance. That was the main agenda for Donald Trump, along with the sanctions on Iran. Then what happened was, he couldn't manage to negotiate with the Iranians. In those days, the Supreme Leader of Iran said, after the assassination of General Soleimani, "No way we can talk or negotiate with Donald Trump."

There was no way to go in that direction, so he tried so hard. He did everything. Before leaving office in 2021, he said, "I brought the Iranians to their knees. I just needed a little more time—more time to convince them, to force them into negotiations." But it didn't happen, by the way. Then we had the new administration, Joe Biden. But the main agenda was still to destroy the Iranian economy and the Iranian resistance—the acts of resistance in West Asia. When he came to power, the situation was totally different. You remember there was the assassination of Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah.

You know, many people were arguing in the mainstream media that the acts of resistance were being destroyed by the Israelis. It was a huge impact, a big problem for Hezbollah. For many years, he was the head of Hezbollah—very powerful, respected in Lebanon and outside of Lebanon, within the Axis of Resistance. So his loss was a big one for the Axis of Resistance, really crucial. Then they said Hezbollah was weakened. We had the fall of Bashar al-Assad in Syria. With that fall—well, basically, Bashar al-Assad decided not to fight. He told the Iranians and the Russians he didn't want to fight. And it didn't happen suddenly.

It started, you know, long before—like, over a span of two years ago. It happened gradually, reducing the presence of Iranians and Russians in Syria and somehow getting closer to the Arab states in the Persian Gulf, hoping that could bring some sort of improvement to the Syrian economy and make life better for Syrians. But that didn't happen. And finally, we saw the fall of Bashar al-Assad, and HTS and a faction of ISIS coming to power without fighting. You have to remember, there was no fight between the Syrian army and these people—these HTS fighters who came from Idlib, supported by Turkey and the United States, both.

And Israel did everything to support them as well. Later on, they had their differences. But after all, putting aside the situation in Syria, you have to understand what has happened in Lebanon, then in Syria. Donald Trump came to power and said, "So what's the problem right now? How can we go after the Axis of Resistance? Syria is destroyed. Lebanon—Hezbollah—is not powerful enough anymore. Let's go after the Yemenis, the Houthis, and Saleh in Yemen." Then you saw Pete Hegseth coming out, saying, "We're going to go after the Houthis. It's going to be different. We're going to force them into submission."

They started the fight in March 2025. They went after the Yemenis, and after two months, in May, they decided that the Houthis had suddenly capitulated and said they weren't going to continue the fight because they couldn't achieve anything. What was happening in those days in Yemen was that they were bombing every place they could, because they didn't have much intelligence coming out of the country. You might remember Donald Trump posting about one of the religious gatherings in

Yemen—he targeted that gathering and said, “These are terrorists; they were preparing to attack us.” But that wasn’t the case after all.

And the difficulties of the Yemenis—the difficulties they were facing in those days in the Red Sea—you know, you might remember, one of those incidents where two fighter jets were somehow damaged by the Yemenis. They even managed to shoot down American drones. We can say at least one of those drones was destroyed each week, and in some weeks it was two or three. Then the United States, Donald Trump in particular, started to see this as a trap. He realized he couldn’t sustain it, that it was going to be a quagmire for the United States in Yemen, because they didn’t have the intelligence to go after the key commanders or the main positions of the Houthis.

They couldn’t hit them. Most of those weapons and missiles were underground, so they couldn’t strike effectively. They couldn’t defeat the Houthis. Then Donald Trump came out and said they had capitulated—“We’re out, we’re not going to be there.” And just to remember, during the war, or before it happened in the Red Sea, the Vice President of the United States, J.D. Vance, came out and said, “We are not dependent on Bab al-Mandab in the Red Sea; the Europeans need that.” That kind of statement helped fuel this rhetoric of capitulation on Trump’s part. So Yemen couldn’t be defeated. In the mind of the Trump administration, Syria was defeated—Syria was removed.

And Donald Trump, as he argues today, says that if Syria is in our hands, we can manage it—we can do whatever we want in Syria. And Hezbollah in Lebanon is defeated as well. So what is the main goal? The war, the capitulation, was announced in May 2025. Then in June, we had a new war—Israel attacking Iran. On June 13, you remember, while negotiating, Donald Trump was talking with the Iranians, trying to convince them that the U.S. was serious about these negotiations. I talked with Iran when I was there; I talked with officials, you know, the foreign ministers.

One of the deputies from Iran’s foreign ministry told me that the night before the attack, they were in Geneva talking with Steve Witkoff. They thought something was going to happen, but in the end, nothing did—nothing diplomatically, at least. And then we saw how Israel attacked Iran. So when it comes to Israel’s attack on Iran, you have to understand why Donald Trump decided to let Israel strike while he was still negotiating—while he was deceiving the Iranians. Netanyahu had given Trump solid information, saying he’d built a strong network of spies inside Iran, that he could move freely and do whatever he wanted.

He can bomb Iran, he can neutralize the air defense system—decapitation, assassination of the Iranian leader together with his commander. That would bring a huge change, maybe even a regime change, which would be the best outcome for the United States and Israel together. So Donald Trump said, “Go and do it. We are prepared. We are deceiving the Iranians. You can attack.” Then the attack happened. The 12-day war showed the United States and Israel that it doesn’t matter who the commanders are—you kill the commanders, you assassinate them, you attack Iran. It was a surprise attack, by the way. In the initial hours, you remember, everybody was asking what was happening in Iran, why they weren’t responding to these attacks from the Israelis.

And together, it wasn't just Israel. Believe me, it was Israel along with the United States and all the NATO countries—Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand—all together. All the intelligence work, you know, they were trying to do everything, provide everything to Netanyahu and his regime in Israel to make this operation as successful as possible. Then, as time went by—on the second or third day, or maybe after 12 hours of the initial attacks on the Iranians—you saw everything coming out, and the Iranians reshaping and attacking Israel. The attacks were so strong that Israel finally decided—because, you remember, about 25% of the air defense system interceptors were depleted during those 12 days of war.

Then Israel was hit by Iranian missiles, right and left. So Israel was begging, at the end of the 12-day war, begging for a ceasefire. Donald Trump, as an outsider—he's trying to play the same way in Ukraine, by the way—said, "We are not part of the war right now." He asked the Iranians to let the United States end the conflict by hitting both sides, the nuclear facilities in Iran. Then Iran attacked. These were more like symbolic attacks by the United States and Iran on Qatar—two attacks, and then the end of the war. But it wasn't really the end; it was more of a truce, a ceasefire happening.

The other thing that was happening since Donald Trump took power was the same sort of policy to attack the Iranian economy. They did everything. They started with China, with Russia. Since the war in Ukraine wasn't going the way the United States and the West wanted it to, their leverage on Russia wasn't what it had been during the first administration. So Russia and China are not in the same position. They're not supporting the United States in its agenda against Iran, because the whole system has changed since the war in Ukraine started. The war in Ukraine was a watershed moment, in my opinion—it changed everything, every calculation.

So, coming to the conflict—the war in Iran—you see Donald Trump. We had the U.S. Treasury Secretary talking about how they were successfully putting pressure on the Iranian economy. Then that pressure hit the Iranian people, the Iranian society, and they came to the streets. It wasn't just people coming out; the remnants of those Mossad agents in Iran were still there after the 12-day war. Iran was trying to capture them, to find them, to destroy them. But it wasn't easy—it was a huge network of spies in Iran, people cooperating with the Israelis, Mossad, and the CIA. So Donald Trump was trying to understand the situation in Iran by imposing more sanctions and bringing more pain to the Iranian economy.

Then we suddenly see people coming out into the streets. I was in Iran when this started. You know, the day I got there—I remember it was Thursday. On Friday, I had a talk with Colin Wilkerson and Larry Johnson, our friends of this podcast, and there were no protests outside, but they were talking. In the West, they were saying protests were coming. Then we saw the protests actually start in the streets. For two days, the government in Iran tried to talk with the protesters and with economists about how they could reduce the pressure on the Iranian people—how to manage the market, how to provide people with some sort of subsidies. But while they were doing this, the agenda was something else. They were preparing in the streets, as Mike Pompeo put it.

They were working with Mossad agents on the streets, among the protesters, to set up the whole thing because they wanted riots. They didn't want protests. Protests can be negotiated, can be discussed with the government, can be slowed down, and then fade away. But riots are something different, because you have to create riots to justify killing people. Without riots, it doesn't make sense to kill people. Then the riots broke out, and you saw people getting killed. The problem for the Iranian security forces was that they didn't know who these people were among the civilians. After everything that happened during those days—it started over a week, and after about two days it turned into riots—you could see protesters turning violent and changing the whole dynamic of what was happening in Iran.

So it's happening—riots are coming, killing people, civilians, mostly civilians, and pushing this kind of agenda. They said more than 30,000 people, maybe more—some of these positions were paid by Mossad and NGOs. They even said 80,000. What Iran realized during those days was that the commanders running the show, these protests, weren't inside Iran. Their network was inside, but the masters were outside. The connection between the masters and the people on the ground—the Mossad agents—was the internet. So they shut down the internet in Iran. But it wasn't just the regular Iranian internet; it was Starlink.

Many Starlink units, this equipment, were in Iran. They tried to find them, but it was a time-consuming mission. It wasn't something you could do right away, because it was a very difficult operation for the Iranian security forces. So they decided to shut down Starlink. The first time they shut it down, it was a big deal. After that, you saw everything start to collapse, because those people who were receiving orders from outside weren't getting them anymore. And you saw a lot of people killed on the streets during those riots. Just imagine what was happening with the economy then—the riots, the killings, the claims that 30,000 people were killed by the Iranian government, even 80,000. In those days, when there was no internet in Iran, I remember I was there, and people outside...

Then I learned—somehow I got access to the internet because I went to Press TV to see if they had a connection so I could do some podcasts. And I saw that they were saying the Iranian government was using chemical weapons against the Iranian people, and that's why they shut down the internet. So it was all propaganda. They were preparing everything to influence the Iranian people psychologically, both inside and outside the country. The people inside, as time went by, started to understand what was happening. But most of those living outside the country didn't have any connection with people inside, so they started believing the rhetoric in the mainstream media, or even in some of the alternative media.

The other problem I was seeing, along with the economic pressure on Iran, was the way most of these so-called Iranian experts outside the country—mostly in the United States—were talking. They kept saying that Iran is weaker than before, weaker than it was 20 years ago. These experts were arguing that Iran is weaker, while at the same time talking about all these economic difficulties and claiming that the Iranian government is killing its own people. It was all just to prepare everything

for Donald Trump psychologically, to say, "Look what Iran is doing. We're going to be there. We're going to help you. We're going to save you."

He was buying into these lies that he was going to save the Iranian people. That was the rhetoric. It wasn't just that Donald Trump knew what was going on—his agenda was war from day one. That's why he started the war against the Houthis. It wasn't just Netanyahu convincing him after the election; they had been preparing Donald Trump even before he was elected in the United States. That's why Trump decided to go after the Houthis. It was part of the plan: weaken the axis of resistance when it's not capable of firing back. Go after what Netanyahu calls "the head of the snake." Let's go after the head of the snake.

They were all preparing this kind of agenda to go after Iran and to somehow convince the Iranian people that their government doesn't work for them. You remember yesterday, Pete Hegseth said the Iranian government is just building missiles and weapons, not improving the lives of the Iranian people—while he was asking for \$20 billion more for his war against Iran, as is happening right now. So it wasn't something that suddenly came into Donald Trump's mind—"let's go and fight Iran." He knew he was going to fight Iranians, that he was going to go to war with them. He was preparing everything—considering the axis of resistance, the Iranian economy, and public opinion inside and outside Iran—to go after the Iranian government.

Because you remember, he said, "I told the Israelis during the 12-day war"—when that war happened—"I told Benjamin Netanyahu, or the Israelis, not to assassinate the Supreme Leader of Iran." This was a total lie. He was just making things up, because they did want to assassinate the Supreme Leader. They couldn't do it with that surprise attack—that was the problem. So, with everything being prepared for Donald Trump to come in, he was already setting up for this attack. But to start a war against Iran, the United States had to mobilize a lot of equipment. It took time to get there—to bring aircraft carriers and all those weapons to the region, preparing for that.

Somehow they believed that an attack on Iran would bring down the Iranian government and lead to regime change. I think when it comes to the Middle East, many in our audience—those who don't live there or aren't from the region—don't really understand the reality of the Middle East. They may wonder, what is the agenda? What is the agenda of the United States and Israel in the Middle East? I think that was said by Tom Barrack, Trump's envoy to Turkey. The final goal, the main objective, is submission. They have to learn how to submit. That's why their best friends in the Middle East are those who submitted long, long ago—all these Arab states. Who has to submit right now? The Axis of Resistance and Iran.

Are they prepared to submit? He's negotiating—he's trying to, you know, convince them, to force them into capitulation. But that's not going to happen. Because even if he wanted to—remember Marco Rubio said Donald Trump was willing to talk with the Supreme Leader of Iran, Ayatollah Khamenei—he was prepared. But there was no willingness on the part of the Iranians to go in that direction, because the Supreme Leader didn't recognize Donald Trump as a viable negotiator or

someone who could bring any sort of change to what's going on between the United States and Iran. So he refused. He didn't want to negotiate with Donald Trump. So Trump said, "Let's go with the plan. Let's attack."

And the Israelis said—remember, Israel told the United States—it was all over the mainstream media that they had destroyed the Iranian air defense system. "It's mostly destroyed," they said. Look at the videos on Fox News, CNN, ABC, MSNBC—all of them together. The main rhetoric was that the entire Iranian air defense system had been destroyed, that Iran had nothing left to defend itself, that Iranian society was in turmoil. They were saying Iran was ready to be attacked, ready for the government to be overthrown. So Donald Trump told some of the Arab states in the Persian Gulf, "I'm going in. It's not going to take much time—four days of regime change in Iran—and I'm going to overthrow the government."

I'm going to do the same. What was happening? One of the miscalculations, or one of the false assumptions by Donald Trump himself, in my opinion, was based on what happened in Venezuela. Because we have to consider what happened there. The Maduro government—well, they carried out a regime change in Venezuela. They replaced Maduro with his vice president, Delcy Rodríguez. And then they had total control over Venezuelan oil, Venezuelan minerals, everything. They could do whatever they wanted. Donald Trump could order this or that, fire someone, appoint someone else. That gave him a false understanding about Iran, because he thought he was going to achieve something similar.

It's going to be difficult, but not that difficult, because of the economy and the situation with the Iranian military—they were destroyed. Everything: the air defense system, the economy—it's all destroyed. People are angry with the Iranian government. So, let's get in, let's attack Iran. We were talking about the attacks happening at 12:30 a.m. or 4 a.m. local time, but the attack actually happened at 10 a.m. local time. They assassinated the Supreme Leader of Iran along with many of the commanders—or at least they thought they did. But Iran was prepared. You remember how long it took the United States to bring all those weapons and aircraft carriers to the region and get ready.

And what was crucial in the whole calculation was the reaction of the Arab states. They told us they weren't going to be part of the conflict, hoping that if something happened—and they knew it was going to happen, the war was coming—they'd be spared. Because Donald Trump told them, remember, he said it would be four days of war and then everything would be over. But they thought that in such a short period of time, Iran wouldn't attack them, since they'd said they weren't part of it. They also said they wouldn't let the United States use the air bases in their countries. So as soon as the attack happened, Iran started hitting back.

Iran was not just—Donald Trump said he was surprised by Iran's response toward these Arab states, but he wasn't surprised. He's lying because he wants everyone to believe he didn't know Iran would hit those Arab states. He had convinced these people—these naive, in my opinion, Arab leaders—that everything would be over in a short period of time, so they wouldn't be too affected by the war

against Iran. So, the war breaks out. The United States is attacking, and Iran is responding. And all these air bases—today, when you look at them—I remember, twenty years ago, the IRGC was arguing with the Iranian government, with the Iranian politicians, with those who were negotiating the JCPOA with the Americans.

They said, why aren't we using the Strait of Hormuz to put pressure on the United States, on these Arab states—basically on the United States, because the main goal of pressuring the Arab states is to ultimately reach Washington. They argued this for such a long time, but the diplomats, the foreign minister of Iran, didn't agree with them. They said, no, we're going to negotiate during the JCPOA. I'm talking about those days. Then the war brings something new into the equation. Iran is responding. Nobody can deny that the United States, together with Israel, is carrying out airstrikes, mostly from outside Iranian airspace.

They're attacking mostly, you know, without much information. I thought they would have a lot, considering the targets inside Iran. But so far, from what I've seen, I don't see any Mossad agents or intelligence coming out of Iran, because the targets are so stupid, so dumb. They're hitting civilians, hospitals, schools, highways, squares—these are not important. Police officers—these are not important targets when you want to fight. Look at what Russia is doing in Ukraine: they're fighting a war, they're not destroying Ukraine. But the mission of the United States and Israel is to destroy Iran, while they're talking to some of the Iranian diaspora and somehow forcing them into this delusion that they're going to go there.

We're going to change the government. We're going to do the so-called regime change in Iran, and it's all going to be good—you're going to see a prosperous Iran. But this is a false narrative from Donald Trump and his administration, together with the Israelis. Donald Trump wants something like Venezuela in Iran. What does that mean? It means submission. What Israel wants in Iran is to make it as weak as possible. What does that mean? It means destroying and breaking down Iran into provinces, so that some parts of Iran could end up like Bahrain or Qatar—diminished militarily and economically. Then, if Israel ever decides to attack them, they wouldn't be capable of responding. That's the problem. This is Iran.

But what is the miscalculation on the part of the Israelis, together with the United States—that Iran doesn't matter? You want to call them mullahs, you want to call them religious leaders, as though they don't have any understanding politically or militarily. But the reality in Iran today is that they've built a robust system inside the country, both militarily and politically, that cannot be destroyed. This is the heritage of Iranian culture, of the Iranian people. This is the heritage of the Iranian Shia concept. The whole concept of Iran—people should understand that Iran is Shia Muslim—is based on resistance, not on killing civilians. They're not going to kill civilians; they're not going to go after civilians.