

Iran's Massive Response Catches US-Israel Off Guard | Nima R. Alkhorshid

#Nima

Hi, everybody. Today is Sunday, March 29th, 2026, and I'm here to give my update about what's going on on the battlefield in Iran—psychologically and militarily—because we have two fronts running right now. On one side, you see how the United States, together with Israel, is trying to control everything when it comes to the mainstream media in the West. Because part of this war, I would say the most important part, is the psychological one. When this war started, they said everything in Iran was on the verge of collapse, that they were going to go in, defeat and assassinate the supreme leader of Iran along with his commanders, and then everything would collapse—which didn't happen.

And then they started, you know, talking about some political figures within the Iranian government who were, behind the scenes, talking with Donald Trump, with the Trump administration, with the Israelis. It all started, I think you remember, with General Qa'ani. Qa'ani was the successor of General Soleimani. He's the head of the Quds branch of the IRGC. So there were a lot of rumors, and those rumors are still running the show. They say he's somehow cooperating with the Israelis behind the scenes. And, you know, this is the type of war that Iranians are facing today. It's not just about Qa'ani. Then they started, you know, after the assassination, the war began. Nothing went in the direction the United States wanted it to. Then they said Qalibaf is negotiating with Donald Trump behind the scenes.

This is the guy they want to negotiate with, and he's the leader of Iran. They wanted to use him to create some sort of turmoil, some kind of problem inside Iran—within the administration, within Iranian society. And yesterday we learned about Hassan Rouhani, the former president of Iran. There were some photos of him in Switzerland, people saying he's there cashing his money, that he wants to go somewhere. But this is all part of the psychological war happening right now. People need to understand that what's happening in Iran is totally disconnected from public opinion in the West, because whatever the Trump administration and the Israelis are trying to do is to manipulate the Western hemisphere.

I'm talking about not just North America, Latin America, Europe, and some parts of Asia—West Asia in particular. But the people in Iran are not, you know, that much connected with what's happening in the mainstream media in the West. Most people aren't connected; the internet connection isn't really working anymore. So they're using a domestic network. Whatever is happening outside Iran isn't going to influence the unity that's growing stronger inside the country. So I think, on that front, we can see it was a total collapse. They're not going to achieve anything by trying to create some

sort of turmoil or political problems for figures within the government, because all of them are together right now.

They're calling them out in some way—you know, they're talking about Alibov, Rouhani, other figures, General Rouhani—to find where they are and hit them, to kill them, to assassinate them. This is the main agenda when it comes to how the United States and Israelis are trying to fight this war. On the other hand, when you look at the targets today in Iran, unfortunately, they're hitting schools, and it's spreading to universities. From yesterday to today, we've learned that three universities—two of them in Tehran and one in Isfahan—were hit by American and Israeli forces. So the question is, what is the main objective of that?

Are they connected to the military-industrial complex of the country? No, there's no connection. If they're connected, you know, it's through their professors and the people who studied in those universities. It's not that those universities are doing research for the military-industrial complex. That's totally wrong, and it's false if they argue that. So they're literally in the process of destroying the Iranian infrastructure—education, health, everything.

They want to destroy everything because Donald Trump is so obsessed with the way the Iranian government is reacting—responding, firing back at targets in the region. So what can they do? Do they have updated intelligence, trustworthy information coming out of Iran? No, they don't. That's why they're hitting universities, schools, hospitals, and killing civilians. Even in the case of Larijani, they destroyed an entire neighborhood just to assassinate him. You see how fragile, how weak their intelligence is when it comes to Iran. They were all talking about it—Mossad is everywhere in Iran.

They have—they're manipulated. But what has happened in the aftermath of the 12-day war is that Iran has rooted out most of these agents, most of these networks in the country that were somehow connected with Israeli intelligence. So today, as we speak, I think we can say that the government's intelligence and counterintelligence have managed to deal with the Mossad agents inside Iran. And now the United States and Israel are running out of targets in Iran—they're hitting civilians. Donald Trump has issued a 48-hour ultimatum for Iran, then five days, then ten days. What was the main objective of that? "We are not going to hit, we are not going to attack your energy facilities."

What they did was attack them. No, they hit the steel factories—two or three of them in Iran. And they hit two nuclear sites: one in Bushehr, in the southern part of Iran, and the other in the central part, in the city of Arak. Arak is a city in the central province of Iran; it was responsible for producing heavy water. So they hit these two facilities along with the steel factories. And the other thing that happened in the last three days was the attack on the water facilities. They hit targets in a city called Haftkel, in the province of Khuzestan. It's a small city; it doesn't have much importance when it comes to the military-industrial complex.

It has nothing to do with anything military or strategic. But they hit those targets because the city is located in the province of Khuzestan, in the western part of the country, close to the Iraqi border. So

they had access to hit those targets. What else could they do? They hit the water facilities, you know, to create problems with the water network and disrupt the supply to people. That's the problem Iran is dealing with right now. And the United States is taking it to the next level because they don't know where the real military or strategic targets in Iran are.

They were not able to achieve what they wanted, because when you go inside a country—just remember what happened in Ukraine—you try to defeat your enemy strategically before using all these military tactics. But that's not happening. As time goes by, I can confirm that everything is getting totally under the control of the Iranian government. When the war started, there was some chaos because society didn't know how to deal with the consequences of the war. But as time goes by, you see not only the military—the IRGC together with the army—figuring out how to manage everything.

You see the Iranian people coming together. This is new. It's getting better as time goes by. That's why the United States is attacking civilians. They don't care anymore about regime change and all that. You know, J.D. Vance and the others—we've learned that J.D. Vance had a phone call with Benjamin Netanyahu, telling him that some of the information Mossad provided to the United States and to Donald Trump's office was somehow stolen or not accurate. So what does that mean? It means they don't know what the main targets are right now. What can they do to change the dynamic of the war?

So, on the part of the Iranians, you see something else. They haven't targeted any desalination plants in the West, in the Persian Gulf, or together with Israel, because they don't need to at this particular moment—they don't need to go that far. What would be the main objective in going that far? If you have targets, if you have radars, logistics to hit, they're totally focused on what the United States is trying to do, because it's trying to bring new forces into the region. I think sooner or later we're going to see a confrontation on the ground in the southern part of Iran, or on some of these islands in the Persian Gulf, close to the Strait of Hormuz.

That would bring a lot of changes to the way Donald Trump is trying to frame the whole concept of war in the United States. And as Iran becomes more unified, Trump is trying to make the case at home to get more support. You see J.D. Vance coming out, even talking about what they've achieved in Venezuela. What Vance is arguing—though I don't think he shares exactly the same objective as Trump and Benjamin Netanyahu—is that he's part of the broader movement you see around the Trump administration. He still thinks they can grab Iranian oil and do something similar to what they did in Venezuela. That's totally delusional. That's not going to happen.

And nobody's—well, as time goes by, I don't know how much information J.D. Vance is actually getting from U.S. intelligence. Because when you see him somehow talking with Benjamin Netanyahu and putting the blame on Netanyahu, it means he doesn't have valid information from the CIA or U.S. intelligence. That's why he needs to call Netanyahu—to put the blame on him. And what's happening right now in terms of the Iranian response to the attack on the steel factories?

They're hitting targets. The giant aluminum producer in the UAE was hit by Iranian missiles. But the main focus right now in the region is how to control the United States and the current phase of the war, because it's going to be on the ground.

So Iran has to focus on the radars. That's why they hit this AWACS—the airplane in Saudi Arabia. This is, you know, the first time one of these planes has been hit by Iranian missiles. And inflicting casualties on Americans is one of the other objectives right now for the Iranian army. I would say, in terms of strategy, Iran's strategy toward the Arab states in the region is to keep them in the fight—because they're part of it. To keep them in, I mean, to hit some facilities in those countries to make them understand that Iran considers them enemies. So they're hitting them. On the other hand, you see there was a drastic change when it comes to Qatar.

Iran didn't hit the targets in Qatar. It's been, I think, six days since Iran decided not to attack Qatar or any major facilities there—important, crucial facilities in Qatar. So you have Qatar and Oman developing a different sort of mindset as time goes by. You have Saudi Arabia together with the UAE and Kuwait. I would say public opinion in Kuwait is changing drastically. But still, the core, the foundation of Kuwait's hostility toward Iran—the Iranian government, the Iranian people, and Iran as a country in West Asia—is right now Saudi Arabia and the UAE, basically the UAE. Saudi Arabia was—well, you know, yesterday Donald Trump said that the king of Saudi Arabia, the crown prince, you know, he must, you know, kiss his rear end.

So his rear—and this, you know, when you say something like that to a crown prince who's going to be the king of Saudi Arabia, it's huge. You can't imagine how important that is in Arabian culture. You say something like that, it means you nuke Saudi Arabia. Donald Trump nuked Saudi Arabia by saying that, you know, the way he was talking about the crown prince of Saudi Arabia. I would say that's going to create a lot of turmoil in Saudi Arabia and in how it sees the conflict as time goes by. And the other concept of what's happening in West Asia—mostly, if you look at the mainstream media—they're basically talking about how oil prices are going up and how the market is changing.

Donald Trump is not capable anymore of manipulating the market because he did that once, twice. So the market understands how Donald Trump is trying to do that. I think he used his opportunity two times, so he's lost that opportunity—he's lost that ability to do it again. On the other hand, if the escalation continues, the next attacks would be on the desalination plants. Water is much more important than oil in the region. Water is everything. To understand that, you have to look at what Israel is doing in the southern part of Syria and the southern part of Lebanon.

These regions are basically important when it comes to fresh water. So Israel is grabbing some land to achieve that, because about 75% of the water comes from desalination plants. Iran hasn't attacked these desalination plants so far. Iran is keeping an eye on them. They hit a chemical factory in Israel that's connected to the military-industrial complex of the Israeli army. Looking at what's going on on the battlefield right now, I think the reality is that Iran feels pretty comfortable with what's happening, because they've managed to focus on their objectives. Their objective is not

civilians in Arab states or in Israel. The Iranian objective is radars and logistics. These are the main priorities for the Iranian government.

But the suffering that the whole region is experiencing because of what's going on—you see all of these, you know, you see Saudi Arabia together with Pakistan and Turkey gathering in Pakistan to make some sort of political move, to find some sort of solution for what's happening. But the problem with Iran cannot be solved politically, in my opinion, at this point. Iran sets objectives. Let's remember what the objectives were before the war started: basically, the Iranian nuclear program and the ballistic missile program. So, are they still on the table to negotiate? Nobody in Iran is talking about it. Nobody says they're willing to negotiate with the United States.

What's going on right now in Iran is about how and when they can withdraw from the NPT. Sooner or later, Iran will withdraw from the NPT. I think that's a huge warning—a huge message for the United States to understand where this war is going and how the escalation is changing Iranian policy and strategy. The worst thing that could have happened to Iran is this war—a war that's killing civilians, students, you know, schools, universities, hospitals, oil facilities. What else can they do? What else can happen to Iran? So the leadership has to come to some sort of understanding, and they're realizing there's no point in negotiating with the United States. There's no political solution to what's going on.

Everything is going to be decided on the battlefield. And the United States has no capability. You know, they started with the Iranian nuclear program, the Iranian ballistic missile program. The main objective right now is how to open up the Strait of Hormuz. And Donald Trump is desperately doing everything—he's trying to put pressure on the Europeans, trying to talk with countries in the region, talking with Saudi Arabia, Turkey, all these countries—how to manage it. But nobody's stepping up. Nobody wants to, you know, get involved militarily in the region. Even, I would say, the United Kingdom is behind the scenes, playing an important role.

Somehow they're saying they're not part of the war, but they're doing everything. All the Europeans—they're doing everything to protect the United States and the Israelis. So you can't say they're not part of the war. They are part of the war, but on the defensive side. When it comes to the offensive side, they're involved in terms of intelligence, in terms of military equipment. They're trying to provide the United States with everything it needs. That's why they're sending their military ships to help the U.S. But Donald Trump was making fun of the British equipment. The guy is, somehow, making fun of the Europeans at the same time he wants them to help him. And he says, "I have the most powerful military on this planet."

The Navy is doing great. Just remember what happened to the Gerald Ford—what happened to that aircraft carrier, the biggest one the United States has. They're not talking about it, but it was hit by Iranian missiles and drones. It wasn't some kind of fire in the laundry room or anything like that. It's so stupid to assume that whatever the United States tells us about the problems they're having with this carrier has anything to do with reality. There is no reality. The United States is militarily

defeated—militarily and strategically defeated in the Persian Gulf. As time goes by, it doesn't matter how you hit the target, even civilian targets, to bring suffering to the Iranian people in order to put pressure on the government.

This is their strategy right now because they want to hit civilians to put pressure on the Iranian government. They don't realize this strategy is going to backfire on them. When you hit civilians, they're going to get closer to the Iranian government, to its policies. And people in Iran are furious. You know, many Iranians in the diaspora—well, not many of them, I'd say unfortunately—many of those who are living abroad, the majority of Iranians in the diaspora, are either silent or trying to understand what's going on, because they're so isolated by the mainstream media in the West. They don't know what's really happening in Iran. I experienced that when I was there.

When I was in Iran, people were saying the government was using chemical weapons against its own citizens, that the Iranian government was killing people in the streets. I was honestly shocked—how could they believe that? It showed how much the Iranian government had been demonized, how people in the diaspora had been brainwashed into thinking everything in Iran was collapsing, that the government was killing everyone and destroying everything. But it had nothing to do with reality. I think those Iranians who have been living outside the country for so long just don't know what Iranian society is like today, or how people there actually feel when they hear talk about letting the United States attack Iran.

#Guest

Let's destroy everything. We're going to rebuild everything.

#Nima

The guy has been living outside Iran for more than 20 years. He can't even manage his own life, yet he's talking about going back to Iran and making things better. We have to understand what's going on when you talk with some of these Iranians abroad. I'd say they're a minority outside Iran who talk this way. There's such a disconnect between Iranians inside and outside the country—two societies that barely understand each other. And some of them even make fun of the people who are being hit by American missiles in Iran.

When the United States attacked that primary school in Iran on the first day of the war, most of these people outside Iran—the ones out on the streets—I'm not saying they're the majority, but those who came out in favor of the war, supporting the American and Israeli attacks on Iran, said the school was targeted by the Iranian government. They're trying to fool themselves, trying to manipulate the whole country, along with their friends in the West. But that doesn't change anything in Iran.

Because the Iranian people right now are mostly united. They know how to fight, and they want to fight. The Strait of Hormuz would remain Iranian, and whoever wants to use it would have to get some sort of permission from the Iranian government or the Iranian army, which would be the main authority over the Strait of Hormuz. The other important thing when it comes to the war is how far Iran can go—how long Iran can continue the war. In my opinion, Iran can continue this war for at least seven or eight years. It's not like they've stopped producing; they're working around the clock, 24/7, producing missiles and launchers.

Everything is going on right now in Iran. With the storage they had before the war started, it was estimated they were prepared for a long war. That's why they're not desperate when it comes to their targets—they're not in a rush. Donald Trump wants to push for something; that's why he's arguing that in the next two or three weeks you won't see any sort of timeline, any mention of time, on the Iranian side. Nobody's talking about when it's going to end. They're talking about how to defeat the United States and Israel. They know that the main agenda in West Asia is to defeat Iran, to destroy Iran.

People may argue that the agendas of the United States and Israel aren't exactly the same, but the outcome would be. The agendas differ, yet the result is the same—they want Iran to become like Qatar, Bahrain, or Saudi Arabia. As Donald Trump says, "He has to kiss my rear." Nobody would accept that. They don't understand how proud Iranians are. They don't understand who this nation is. This nation has survived thousands of years, invasion after invasion. They know how to deal with that; they know how to fight back. Iran has never been as strong in its recent history as it is today. You know, when this missile program started—it was in 1979, not 1981.

#Nima

Just imagine—the revolution came in '79, '80, and the missile program started the year after that. They began thinking about how they could fight, because most of the equipment from the Shah's regime that was part of the Iranian army came from the United States—mostly from the United States. So after the revolution, there was no connection between Iran and the U.S. They had to find some sort of solution for that. Then the war with Iraq began. They went through huge suffering and gained a lot of experience during and after the war between Iran and Iraq, because they reached some sort of understanding of what Iran's capabilities were. In those days, it was all about the fighter jets.

It was all about, you know, the Navy wasn't that important then. Mostly it was the air power that Iran had right after the revolution. Then Iran said, what can we do? Let's go after rebuilding or making new fighter jets. How long would that take? Are we going to get as advanced as the United States? Are we going to reach the level Russia is at, for example? No, it wasn't a viable choice. It was hugely time-consuming, and they would have had to spend a lot of money to achieve that. So the whole concept of the Iranian army and the IRGC is about how to defend Iran, how to protect

Iran—not how to attack other countries. So what can they do when it comes to air defense systems? They're trying to do their best to achieve something in that area.

When it came to ballistic missiles, Iran had the capability to produce them. And nobody—well, you know, yesterday I was talking with Mario. Mario has a YouTube channel; he's on, I think, Fall—I'm not sure I remember his last name correctly. But he said, if Iran goes nuclear, then all the countries in the Middle East will want to go nuclear too, to achieve that same capability. I said, so how can they do that? Iran has studied for such a long time what's happening with its nuclear program. It's all domestic—nothing comes from outside. Years before reaching this level of understanding and knowledge in the nuclear field, Iran decided to import what it needed for the reactor in Tehran.

There's a research reactor in Tehran that they used—you know, they need to use it. But France didn't sell them any nuclear fuel. Nobody wanted to sell nuclear fuel to Iran. So Iran decided, what else can we do? Let's go and build it on our own. Let's find a way to produce it. Today, all of you remember the JCPOA, which was a deal between the Obama administration and the Rouhani administration. The whole idea was to limit Iran's nuclear program. But if you look at the advancement of Iran's nuclear program today compared to what it was in 2016 or 2017, it's not even comparable. They're far more advanced—they have the most advanced knowledge when it comes to the nuclear program. They have everything. They know everything.

They know how to produce everything. So when you talk about Saudi Arabia deciding to go nuclear, they'd have to buy it from Pakistan if they want to go that route. I'd say Turkey would have to do the same. And when it comes to the missile program, it's not something the United States—well, as we speak today—they don't have hypersonic missiles. The United States hasn't been able to produce them. That technology right now is in the hands of the Iranians, Russians, and Chinese. The United States is strong when it comes to air power, when it comes to the ability to bomb different locations in Iran. But Iran is a vast country, and we have to understand that. It doesn't matter how capable you are in terms of your air defense system—because the country is so large, you can't protect all of its territory.

Then they have, you know—there's nothing, for example, in Haftkel to be protected. That's why they're hitting targets in Haftkel, because there's no air defense system there to hit back. And most of the targets, as we talk today, are located in the western part of Iran and around Tehran. The eastern part of Iran is mostly protected; it's not getting hit by these missiles, fighter jets, or drones. Somehow we have some drones going there, but fighter jets are not going there. It doesn't matter what Pete Hegseth is trying to picture in the West or in the mainstream media—the United States is not dominating the airspace of Iran. They're not. They're afraid, because as we speak, we see that they're hitting drones and fighter jets. We have many fighters that have been attacked so far.

And one of the most important ones was the AWACS. It's not a fighter jet; it's a kind of radar aircraft that works for the United States to gather information. To understand the importance of these radars, you may remember that in the Persian Gulf, 15 or 17 air bases were attacked and destroyed.

All those radars at these air bases were taken out by Iranian missiles and drones. The United States is now somewhat blind when it comes to defending Israel. And Israel—we've learned that Israel is rationing its interceptors because they're running out. They're getting hit by Hezbollah. Hezbollah, which many people—I've had people on my podcast—were saying had become weak after the fall of Bashar al-Assad in Syria.

Bashar al-Assad gave some sort of delusional impression, I would say, in West Asia—similar to what happened in Venezuela. You know, two important events have happened since the war started, or just before it started. One was the fall of Bashar al-Assad, which was hugely important—we all know that. And the other was the assassination of Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah in Lebanon. They thought the axis of resistance was so weak that it couldn't strike back, that it couldn't recover anytime soon. And on the other hand, they had this so-called color revolution—it wasn't really a color revolution, more like a new kind of Trump-style regime change—in Venezuela. They thought that a combination of what happened in Syria and what happened in Venezuela would also happen in Iran.

It was a total failure, a total collapse. Donald Trump is trying desperately to find a way to get out of West Asia. Whatever he does, whatever he says, he's bragging that he's winning. He said, "We have 3,500 more targets in Iran." You may recall—where does this come from? He's basically talking about universities, hospitals, oil facilities, and I would say water facilities, because he has no other targets in Iran. They don't know how to hit the Iranian military-industrial complex in order to collapse it. And after all that's happening in the region, I think in the long run we're going to see the United States, at some point, get out of West Asia.

He said that actually in the cabinet meeting. He was asked if he's going to stay in West Asia, with the bases there. He said, "We don't need to stay there." No—he said that if they don't stay there, they're going to protect them remotely, that they'll send fighter jets to help. But no, the fighter jets aren't going to West Asia to protect Arab states; they're going to protect Israel. And we know how capable those fighter jets have been in defending Israel and the Arab states so far. Without radars, he's going to install some sort of radars in Israel and near Israel to protect it after all. But I think in the long run, they're not going to return to those bases in the Persian Gulf.

Because if they go back, Iran is going to attack and hit them again and again. So that's a losing game for the United States, because you have to build a radar that costs a billion dollars, and Iran is going to hit it with a missile that costs just a fraction of that. It's a losing game if they decide to return to West Asia. And this war is a long one. We're not going to see any drastic change or any kind of agreement between Iran and the United States, because the two sides—their agendas are totally different. The United States is still talking about the nuclear program and the missile program.

Iran says, "What is happening? The guy doesn't understand. They're not on the table anymore." Iran is not going to talk about the missile program. The only reason Iran is bringing Israel to its knees is because of the Iranian missile program. Who would give that up? Because if they go—let's assume the Iranian government agrees to some sort of limits on the nuclear program, on the missile

program—then what’s next? The Supreme Leader of Iran, Ayatollah Khamenei, before the assassination, talked about this on various occasions. He said that if we let them in and put limits on the nuclear program, they’re going to say, “Now it’s time for the missile program.”

Then it’s time to do, you know, regime change in Iran. It’s step by step. The reason Donald Trump could do regime change in Venezuela that way was because the government—the Venezuelan army—was not prepared militarily or psychologically to fight the United States. That’s why they cooperated behind the scenes with the United States, with the CIA, with MI6, to facilitate the whole process of regime change in Venezuela without killing, without going that far, without hitting Venezuelan people, because they had people cooperating with them. That’s not the case in Iran. Iran has built its capabilities for such a long time. They know how to fight back.

They know how to manage psychologically and militarily with the United States in West Asia. I think, in the long run, if the Arab states decide to choose the approach of, for example, the Omani government—I think the Omani government is a perfect example of a successful and prosperous government in the region, in the Persian Gulf. If they want to survive this ongoing and continuous conflict between Iran and the United States, they have to make some sort of move to maintain their neutrality. They can’t stay in a fight for such a long time because, as time goes by, they could get hit by Iranian missiles—at the oil facilities, the desalination plants. They can’t survive that.

That’s why I think the Qatari government is a little bit smarter than the other countries, because they still think the United States would support them, would help them. But what has happened in the mindset of Qatar after the attack on Doha—you remember the Israeli attack—they tried to kill some of the Hamas leaders in Doha by airstrikes. Fifteen fighter jets were flying over Saudi Arabia, going to Qatar, hitting the targets, and returning. Nobody said anything. The government in Qatar said nothing. Saudi Arabia was silent—just a little bit of official condemnation, but doing nothing. Donald Trump was talking about selling F-35s to Saudi Arabia.

No, this is a joke. They have everything, but they can’t use them against Israel. They couldn’t even use them to defend Qatar. They don’t have permission to use these weapons. So if you buy F-35s, what are you going to do with them? Are you going to fly those fighter jets yourself, or do you need the United States to fly them to fight Iran in favor of Israel? They’re paying everything, sacrificing everything—they’re paying to defend Israel. I don’t know what’s happening in their minds, but the outcome is this: whatever they’re doing, whatever they’re paying, whatever they’re trying to buy is going to be used to defend Israel.

On the other hand, Israel—after Donald Trump’s visit to West Asia, going to Qatar, Saudi Arabia—was so afraid of these Arab states. They thought they might replace Israel in the long run. So it would actually be good for Israel, not for the United States, if Iran hit and destroyed all those oil facilities and desalination plants in the Arab states. Because that wouldn’t make the Arab states prosperous; it would make them weaker. And as they get weaker, Israel becomes stronger in its relationship with the United States.

Because all these Arab states should repair, should fix everything in their countries when this escalation comes to some sort of calm. I'm not talking about an end, because there is no end to what's going on—what Donald Trump has started. As long as Donald Trump is president of the United States, I think we're going to have this war going up and down, escalations going up and down. And Iran is prepared for that. And Turkey could somehow be the alternative, you know, could help Saudi Arabia and the UAE. But I don't see that much willingness in the Turkish government to help them. There is communication between the Turkish government and Saudi Arabia. How successful is that? How successful?

Do they have any sort of leverage over Saudi Arabia? Or can they reach some kind of understanding with them that, in the long run, you're not going to win if you side with Israel? I'm not talking about siding with the United States. The United States, for such a long time, built all those bases in West Asia—but they've lost them. The U.S. is not going to be the same United States it was before the war started. Iran understands that. That's why they keep focusing on strategic targets in these Arab states. They don't want to hit their brothers—you know, their Sunni brothers in Saudi Arabia and other Arab states, including Qatar. The main objective is how to remove the United States from West Asia.

And this is what they're doing as time goes by. I think the main problem for the United States, for Donald Trump, is that he wants to put an end to the conflict, but Iran is not interested in that. And they cannot open up the Strait of Hormuz. It doesn't matter what they bring—new aircraft carriers or whatever—they can't get close to the Iranian coast because Iran has already hit, two or three times, the Abraham Lincoln aircraft carrier. I don't know how successful that was, but they tried to do it not to destroy the carrier, but to push them, to force them out of the region—to get them away from the region.

And they were successful in achieving that. The United States is still using, you know, the Air Force to attack Iran, and this is some sort of dead end for Donald Trump. This is the dead end. This is not a victory, and nothing is going to help Donald Trump. I think what he has done to the United States is that there was some sort of, you know, understanding in Iran before this war started. They thought they could cooperate with the United States. You know, the government—the new government, Pazeshkian—he came to power on the basis of negotiating with the United States, on the basis of building a better relationship, getting back to some sort of JCPOA, a better version of the JCPOA. Those days are gone.

Pezeshkian is not there anymore. The foreign minister of Iran is not there anymore. And they're prepared. And the worst thing that could happen—what else? They can hit Iran with nukes, with nuclear weapons. And then they're going to find out what the response from the Iranians would be. I think the response is already prepared for them. And if Donald Trump is serious about sending U.S. troops to the Strait of Hormuz, to one of these islands—you know, they're talking about Larak Island, and then somehow they're talking about the three islands: Abu Musa, Greater Tunb, and

Lesser Tunb—you know, I think this is delusional. They may do something, but does he really want to sacrifice American forces?

So for what purpose is he doing that? Does he want—what would be the outcome strategically? What would be the benefit for the United States? How serious is the, you know, Epstein file, that he's doing everything for that, if that's the reason? Let me say something else that I really, I deeply feel: Donald Trump is psychologically in trouble. I think when he came to power, considering what had happened to the axis of resistance—Syria, Lebanon—then he started with the Houthis in Yemen. You have to understand that Donald Trump is at the end of his career. He's at the end. Since he was elected, he has been desperately, desperately doing everything.

Eight wars, eight ceasefires, eight peace agreements. "I have to win the Nobel Peace Prize." He did everything to get that. You may think that's ridiculous, but for someone like Donald Trump, it's not. This guy is so obsessed with these kinds of awards because he wants to keep his name in history. Just remember, in his first term he moved the American embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem because he wanted to put his name, you know, in the history of the Jewish people, of Israelis—to say Donald Trump was different from all these other American presidents. So that's why he's doing it. He wants to achieve something. This guy is so obsessed with achieving something.

That's why he says he feels so good when he has some sort of friendship with the losers—because he wants the losers around him to feel capable, to feel powerful. The guy is psychological. You have to understand the psychology of what's going on when it comes to Donald Trump. What else can keep his name in the history of the Jewish people? I wouldn't say Jewish people; I'd say the Israelis or the Zionists, because I really don't think Jewish people are happy with what Donald Trump and Benjamin Netanyahu are doing. He wants to keep his name in the history of Israel, as the one who moved the American embassy to Jerusalem.

He was the one who defeated Iran—as Benjamin Netanyahu calls Iran, the head of the snake, the head of the octopus. Iran is the head of the octopus. He wants to destroy that. And he's failing. He's failing badly. Nobody is there to help him, because there's no solution for what he's looking for—militarily, politically, economically. On all fronts, Iran is fighting back, and they know how to respond to any sort of escalation from Donald Trump. I think... this is the end of Donald Trump's presidency. He had a huge opportunity when he came to power. Just look at who's supporting Donald Trump today—Mark Levin. Who's this guy?

What did he bring to the table when Donald Trump was running for election? Was it Mark Levin bringing votes to the campaign? No, it wasn't Mark Levin. It was Tulsi Gabbard—when she was against the war in the Middle East, when she wanted to put an end to the endless wars. She had all these, you know, strategies, all these goals before coming into the administration. Those days are gone. Tulsi Gabbard just isn't the way she was before. And the people who are still holding on to how it was before are Tulsi Gabbard and Candace Owens. Megyn Kelly is changing drastically. Just imagine what's happened to Megyn Kelly recently.

She understands the swamp that Donald Trump is trying to create in the Middle East. They're not going to get out of this. The people—the support for the Trump administration—they're going to lose the midterm election, you know, in the United States. And I would say not only militarily. Iran is trying to keep him in the fight as long as possible because they know what would happen to the United States domestically. They know what the consequences would be for the United States. That's why Iran is not going to make any sort of deal with Donald Trump. Donald Trump is facing huge repercussions in the United States, and it's still coming. I think we have to understand that.

Thank you so much. I tried to explain what's going on in Iran. Basically, I mostly talk about Iran because many people don't know what's happening there. We don't have mainstream media talking about Iran or mentioning the Iranian people—how they feel as they get bombed by American missiles. These are the same people Donald Trump said he wanted to save, wanted to liberate, and now he's destroying them, killing civilians. He's becoming Benjamin Netanyahu. Donald Trump didn't change Benjamin Netanyahu; Donald Trump became Benjamin Netanyahu, unfortunately. Thank you so much—it's a great pleasure, as always.