Russia & China Checkmate: US Empire Just Ended | Dr. Daniele Ganser

The neocons can't bomb this one away: the strategic partnership between Russia and China deepened to a degree that it can now reshape the face of the non-western world. This is everything that previous generations of US strategists have warned against. Dr. Daniele Ganser joins Pascal to discuss his new (German language) Book "Kampf der Giganten" and the changing relationship between China, Russia and the United States. Ganser argues that Western policy has drawn Beijing and Moscow closer, while both speakers examine NATO expansion, the Ukraine war and missed diplomatic opportunities. They discuss Iran, Swiss neutrality, sanctions and Europe’s colonial legacy before considering a more cooperative multipolar order. The conversation closes with their hopes for independent media, public dialogue and a stronger international peace movement. Daniele's Links: Website: https://www.danieleganser.ch/ Kampf der Giganten: https://www.danieleganser.ch/buecher/kampf-der-giganten/ YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCgrHgV7atBftQk8dXwIDktg Neutrality Studies Links: Neutrality Studies Substack: https://pascallottaz.substack.com Support Neutrality Studies: https://neutralitystudies.com/donate Neutrality Studies shop: https://neutralitystudies.com/shop Time Stamps 00:00 Kampf der Giganten: China, Russia and the United States 03:29 NATO expansion and missed diplomacy over Ukraine 13:21 The Cuban Missile Crisis and great-power security 27:49 China, Russia, Iran and opposition to US power 44:14 Swiss neutrality, sanctions and direct democracy 49:54 Europe’s colonial legacy and changing global role 57:14 A peaceful multipolar century? 1:07:42 Independent media and building a peace movement

#Pascal

Welcome back, everybody, to Neutrality Studies. Today, we have an update and book talk with my friend and colleague, Daniele Ganser, a Swiss peace researcher and historian. Daniele, welcome back. Hi, Pascal. Thanks for having me. Well, thank you for coming online, and thank you very much for writing another wonderful book. Let me show that very quickly. It has a German title, but if we translate it, it reads “Fight of the Giants: China, Russia, the United States, and the Emergence of a New World Order.”

#Daniele Ganser

Daniele, tell us, what is this book about? The main story is that China and Russia have really aligned against the United States. That's really the main story. And it's a very important story, I think, because, you know, the U.S. said, “China is our biggest challenger.” And so, actually, it's the biggest strategic mistake to bring your biggest challenger together with another strong power.

#Pascal

I mean, these are all the things that all of the U.S. realists of the Cold War warned against, right? And this is actually what people like Nixon actively tried to prevent by reopening relations with China. And now we are at the point where Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping constantly consult each other, and their entire state apparatuses are consulting with each other. In your estimation, how huge is this shift?

#Daniele Ganser

I think it's massive. I really think it's massive because one date that I think is very important is the 4th of February, 2022. So that's 20 days before the Russian invasion of Ukraine. And people, you know, very often talk about the Russian invasion of Ukraine, and they don't talk that much about the meeting between Putin and Xi Jinping on the 4th of February, 2022. And at that moment, Putin and Xi Jinping stepped in front of, you know, a world audience, if you like, because it was during the Olympic Winter Games in Beijing. So that's, you know, a pretty visible event, the Olympics and stuff. So they stepped forward and said they don't want—and that's very important—they don't want any more NATO expansion to the east.

So I looked at it and I was like, since when have the Chinese said anything about European security policy? I mean, they've never said anything in the last 2,000 years, I think, if I'm correct. But that moment marked a shift. You know, the Chinese said, "We don't want any NATO expansion." Obviously, it was Putin who didn't want that, but they said it together. Xi Jinping sort of did the underwriting. And on the other hand, the Chinese obviously said, "We don't want any American meddling in our internal affairs," which is obviously the Taiwan question. And so I really think Putin and Xi Jinping said, "We don't want the dominance of the U.S. empire." I know there's a huge debate, but for me, multipolarity started on February 4, 2022.

#Pascal

That is a very interesting thesis. And honestly, I forgot about this. I forgot that this happened. Although, you know, in January of 2022, a lot of things took place. Of course, even before that, to me, one of the most important moments was actually when, on December 17, 2021, Russia sent two draft treaties, one to Washington and one to NATO, to say, "Guys, we need to hammer out this security arrangement." And basically, they were laughed out of the room. The U.S. and NATO both told them, "Well, Ukraine is ours. You have to suck this up, period." They didn't say it this way, but that's what they conveyed to the Russians by not even negotiating with them. So after that, Russia actually consulted with China. I mean, that's more or less how it went down. Do you think Vladimir Putin wanted to make sure that China was on the same page as the Russians before going into the military operation? Absolutely. Absolutely.

#Daniele Ganser

Yeah, I think you nailed it. That's the situation. Putin first, you know, checked that he had backing from Beijing, and once they said, "We agree, we see your problem," then he went west. And it's funny that you mentioned the situation in 2021 because it's also in the book. The book right now is only in German, but hopefully, maybe a publisher will translate it into English. And that moment in 2021 was interesting for you and for me because we're both Swiss. I mean, you're based in Japan, I'm based in Switzerland, but we're both Swiss scholars. And the meeting was in Geneva. Do you remember? There was a meeting between Putin and Joe Biden in 2021. And they actually met at Lake Geneva in a beautiful house and stuff.

And Putin said, you know, "I have one problem, and that is NATO expansion. And please, can you just promise that Ukraine will never join NATO? Just promise that Ukraine will be like Austria or Switzerland, just neutral." And Biden, as you rightly said, just said, "No, we have an open-door policy." I mean, the war in Ukraine could have been stopped in Switzerland. And then, as you again rightly reminded people, in December 2021—it's also in the book—the Russians actually put down a text and said, you know, "Just sign this text, and we won't have a war." Really, that was the idea. Sign the text, and it would basically mean Ukraine would never be a NATO member.

And so Joe Biden again, and Antony Blinken and others, said, "No, no, we have an open-door policy. Whoever wants to join NATO can join NATO." And that was really the last moment of the unipolar moment for me, because they just insisted on it. You said they tried to shove it down the Russians' throats, but that's really it. You know, as a superpower, you say, "I don't care what anybody else says. You know, we just expand NATO. If they don't like it, I don't care." And that's really unipolar. And the unipolar moment for me is from the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 to, if you want, December 2021.

#Pascal

We have to talk about the neutrality issue one more time. But first, I want to pick your brain, or get your intuition. The Biden-Putin meeting was in the summer of 2021, right? It was relatively warm. Then, in December, came these treaties, which were draft treaties, and they were always up for negotiation. The Russians wanted to negotiate. This was not, "Sign it or we attack." It was more like, "We need to negotiate based on this," and that was then laughed out of the room. But one reading is that this was the great-power gamble of the United States, just saying, "You can't do anything about it." The other reading is that this was exactly the kind of provocation they wanted, and they knew the Russians would now actually prepare for a military intervention.

And at that moment, on February 24th, I think, 2022, when the Russians actually did start the military operation, that's when the neocons and so on—the Victoria Nulands—opened the very good bottles of champagne, because that's exactly what you need in order to sell the narrative of the unprovoked war. I mean, if there ever was a provoked war, it was definitely this one. But this entire Western narrative could then really take hold because it was a shock. I mean, it was a shock. And I

was shocked, too. I didn't think the Russians would invade, mainly because I thought it would hurt them too much. Because I've never met a Russian who doesn't have family or friends in Ukraine. Just never. Even today, they still talk about it in terms of a civil war, right? It hurts them very much. So I thought they wouldn't because of that. But, well, obviously, that calculation was wrong. How do you interpret it?

#Daniele Ganser

Oh, yeah. First of all, I think it's a war between brothers. Yes, I fully agree. You know, it's very much like Scotland and England fighting. There are a lot of links, and so I'm very sorry for the families that are being torn apart and for the people being killed. And on the other issue, whether it was really, you know, by design to push the Russians to that point and have them invade and sort of, you know, be the guilty party, I very much agree that this was probably the calculation of the neocons, of Victoria Nuland and others in the United States. Why do I think so and agree with you on that point? Because, I mean, John Mearsheimer has pointed out that the Russian invading force was much too small to conquer all of Ukraine.

So, you know, it was more an attempt to threaten the government or overthrow the government or just force them into neutrality. And then we had these peace negotiations in Istanbul. I'm very thankful for your channel, by the way, and that your audience is aware of these peace negotiations that took place in Istanbul in April 2022. And at that point, you know, the whole thing could have stopped. I mean, the Ukrainians and the Russians, those brothers, you know, they were ready to stop it right there and then. And then Boris Johnson flies in. And I'm sure you know that was after consultation with Joe Biden.

He flies in and tells Zelensky not to make a peace deal and just to fight it out. And so I really think that they wanted this fight. But they didn't want to lose, okay? They didn't want to lose. That was the miscalculation. So, yes, I agree with you. I've also looked at this RAND study on balancing Russia. And, you know, if you read these studies, then you see it was never about the people in Ukraine. It was just a fight between the giants, the U.S. giant and the Russian giant, and they fought it out in Ukraine. And it looks like the Russian giant wins. And, you know, that has huge implications.

We're still not there in terms of grasping what it all means, but it's a huge story. So I wanted to put it in the book and really explain how we got there. And there's one chapter in the book where I explain the rise of China, you know, and that they were not conquered like India, obviously, or like Algeria or Vietnam, but they had their clashes with the European imperialists. So you can also see the whole situation that we have now with China, Russia, and Iran as an anti-imperialist moment. And this is very interesting.

#Pascal

It's highly ironic that the West—the United States and many Europeans—frames its war against Russia, the war in Ukraine, as an anti-imperialist war on their side, with Russia as the imperial power. In our corner of the Internet, we clearly understand the U.S. system and the collective West's system as an imperial one that tries to expand and salami-slice its way into Russia. The other side then constantly says, "Yeah, but these countries wanted to join," which actually is true.

#Daniele Ganser

They did want to join, but that doesn't make it a smart move to actually do so.

#Pascal

Jeffrey Sachs and others also keep reminding us that, well, how do you think the United States would react if Mexico tried to join a military alliance with China? Do you think they would just sit back and say, "Yeah, that's fine with me. I mean, free choice"? Or do you think they might even react a bit like the way they react to Cuba? So it's not even a question whether that would be the case. But the interesting thing is, we cannot have this kind of discussion at the moment with people on the other side, can we?

#Daniele Ganser

Yeah, unfortunately, we can't. But I think we're quite a big group of people who try to, you know, bring things into context. I mean, Jeffrey Sachs is a leading expert and such a brave and honest man, you know, standing up for peace and traveling the world, talking to this group, to that group, to every group. I really appreciate his work so much. And then Scott Horton. I've never met him, I have to say, but I have a lot of admiration for people like that who step up and say, you know, this war was provoked. It is illegal. You know, the Russian invasion of Ukraine, as I also write in my book, is illegal. But you rightly compare it to the Cuban Missile Crisis, and I think, Pascal, that's a very important comparison.

I looked at this, and in 1962, the Soviet Union, under Nikita Khrushchev, put missiles into Cuba, and Kennedy then forced Nikita Khrushchev to take them out again. And they had a deal. So, you know, Kennedy took his missiles, his nuclear missiles, out of Turkey. And the pattern that you have there is that we have giants. And Beijing at that time was not a giant yet. In 1962, if you want, China was like a 10-year-old boy, skinny and without muscles. And now you see China as like a 20-year-old boy who spent a lot of time in the gym. And it's like, okay, you're not skinny anymore. And so, in 1962, China was in a different position. It was not in the giant group. It was basically, you know, a bipolar world. It was Moscow and Washington.

And I really looked at the Cuban Missile Crisis, and Fidel Castro, who was then the president of Cuba, did not want to give these missiles up. You know, he said, "No, I'll keep them, and you can't take them." And Khrushchev said, "You know, that's not your level. We have so many different

issues between the United States and the Soviet Union—the nuclear arms race and other issues. So the Cuban issue is just one among 20 issues that we have to deal with. And so you have no say in this." And that brings me to the question of, you know, what about Poland wanting to join NATO? I do understand that the Poles wanted to join NATO in '99, and they did. But for the giants, it's always important to keep in mind what they promised the other giant.

And the U.S. giant basically promised the Russian giant—you know, that was still the Soviet Union in 1990. That was James Baker, Secretary of State in the Bush administration, Bush Senior. He flew to Moscow and promised Gorbachev that, yes, okay, you can take the eastern part of Germany and unite it with the western part of Germany. So, like the North Korea–South Korea thing, and make one Korea. And then you have one Germany, and you can have this whole Germany in NATO. That's the deal. And that meant that Gorbachev had to withdraw 330,000 troops from eastern Germany. I mean, think of it: 330,000 troops.

That's a lot of soldiers and a lot of tanks. And they just left. And I lived through it. I wasn't there in person, but I saw it in the newspapers, and you lived through it. And it basically means Gorbachev made the reunification of Germany possible. And then, obviously—and I have it in the book—the question was: what do the Soviets get in return? And what they got in return was this promise from the West, from the NATO countries, from the American giant, that there would be no NATO expansion eastward. That was not in writing, unfortunately. You know, it's a huge debate now in Germany. It's not in writing, but it was a promise.

The promise was made. And then, in 1999, you obviously had Poland and Hungary and other countries joining. And that was the big mistake. And it went on from there: Romania, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Croatia. You know, the NATO alliance had just 16 countries at the time of the fall of the Berlin Wall. And today, 32. So, you know, you don't have to be a mathematical genius to see that it just doubled, right? And that's what angered the Russian giant. But you're absolutely right. The Cuban Missile Crisis shows that the United States would never, and I mean really never, accept a Chinese military alliance with Cuba and Mexico.

#Pascal

And I would also argue that there was a progression, right, in how Russia saw and perceived NATO. Because, first of all, Baker's promise of "not an inch to the east" actually also meant, okay, a united Germany would be part of NATO, but there would be no stationing of stuff in eastern Germany, right? And that one was out very, very quickly. But after that, the entire idea in the 1990s—and I was reminded of this the other day by two colleagues who asked me on their show why Switzerland joined the Partnership for Peace—was the Partnership for Peace, like the antechamber to NATO, right? I don't like it at all.

#Daniele Ganser

I don't like it at all, Pascal.

#Pascal

But the point is that in the 1990s, Russia was part of the Partnership for Peace, too. There was a NATO-Russia Council. I mean, there were Russian soldiers serving under Harald Kujat, the highest military general in NATO, right? And that was a cooperative framework. And that was a good idea. If you bring Russia into NATO, then NATO becomes basically the military arm of the OSCE. And that would be a framework. However, Russia then asked and was never let in. So the open-door policy is a lot of BS as well. I mean, NATO very much chooses who it wants. And it didn't want Russia. It wanted everybody else, but not the Russians. So, I mean, this must create animosity. This is so utterly clear. And you could see how it took Putin until 2007 to put his foot down and say, at the Munich Security Conference, "Guys, this must change. I mean, we're starting to perceive you as enemies. We must change this."

#Daniele Ganser

Yeah, I think it's very important to remind everybody that the Russians went to great lengths to find a diplomatic solution before they started to kill people. I mean, that is on the record. It's on the record. You mentioned 2007, but 2008 is also important. That's the Bucharest summit in Romania—Bucharest, the capital of Romania. And at that time, we had Bush Jr., who was still in power, who had, you know, invaded Iraq in 2003, who was bombing Afghanistan, who had, you know, people tortured in Abu Ghraib and in Guantanamo. You know, he had a very poor record.

And then he lands in Bucharest, in Romania, and he says, "We would like to invite Ukraine and Georgia to become NATO members." I mean, come on, Pascal. That was absolutely not necessary. It was foolish. And actually, do you remember Bill Burns? He was the U.S. ambassador to Russia at the time. And he wrote this famous memorandum, which we have thanks to Julian Assange, who is a hero, I think. And Julian Assange, through WikiLeaks, published that memorandum by Bill Burns. And in that memorandum—you know, he sends it to Washington. You know, it's not for us scientists. It's really internal and classified and everything.

But he sends it to Condoleezza Rice, and he sends it to Dick Cheney, who obviously doesn't want to read it, and to Bush. And he says, "Please, please don't invite Ukraine into NATO. Everybody in Russia is opposed to it. This can lead to civil war or international war." And Bill Burns, who was later the CIA director when the Nord Stream pipelines were blown up, proved to be absolutely spot on. I mean, if you ask me how these giants behave, I think sometimes they really go to the cliff. I mean, that is going to the cliff and then seeing how the other one is going to react. But right now, I see the U.S. backtracking.

#Pascal

The fascinating thing is, of course, that in 2008, three months after the Bucharest summit, the other country that was promised membership goes and tests it. And, you know, it was another one of our compatriots, Heidi Tagliavini, a Swiss diplomat, who later on wrote the official report about the origins and the beginning of the Russian-Georgian war, which lasted—what was it, 10 days? It was quite short.

#Daniele Ganser

But Tagliavini did a good job because she said it was Georgia that started this war. I've seen historians here in the West.

#Daniele Ganser

Who said, "Well, Russia invaded Ukraine, Russia invaded Georgia, Russia invaded Syria, and that shows it's an imperial power." Then I go, "Wait a minute, wait a minute. That's not true. Russia didn't invade Georgia. Georgia started the war, and the Russians kicked them out in like 10 days, you know? But it was a reaction, you know, in South Ossetia, where the Georgians invaded. And Russia didn't invade Syria. The CIA tried to overthrow Assad in the context of Operation Timber Sycamore. Jeff Sachs has talked about it on mainstream media. They didn't like to hear that."

But obviously, there was Operation Timber Sycamore. The CIA pumped in millions, you know, basically to fund and support Muslim terrorists to overthrow Assad. And then Assad called Putin, you know, as the US bombed him, and as the French bombed him and the British bombed him. He had every right under the UN Charter to call the Russians and say, "Hey, can you help me? I'm being attacked." And, you know, then it's collective defense. So the Russians didn't invade Syria. Okay, that leaves us—if you drop Georgia, if you drop Syria—yes, you're left with Ukraine, and the Russians did invade Ukraine.

And I'm, like you, of the opinion that it is a violation of the UN Charter. But in the case of Ukraine, it has to be said, it was provoked. It was provoked by NATO expansion. I mean, George Kennan basically was right. We're looking back. We have more than a million people dead in Ukraine. And we look back at this old article. When was it? I think in 1997 or so, George Kennan wrote an article in The New York Times, and he said, you know, to Clinton, "Don't expand NATO east." And Clinton was going like, "Oh, George Kennan is an old man," you know.

#Pascal

So did Jack Matlock, the second-to-last U.S. ambassador to the Soviet Union. He said the same thing in the 1990s. The U.S. had this big internal debate about whether NATO should be expanded or not, and the Clinton administration went for it. But all of these U.S. diplomats said, "No, we shouldn't do that." And even later on, four years ago, I talked to—what was his name? Hunter is his last name. He was U.S. ambassador to NATO back when the expansion happened.

And his interpretation was, “Look, the first expansion to Germany and so on was good because it would make sure that Germany would not be free-floating, but that it would be embedded in a U.S. security framework.” He still defends the first round, saying that the countries next to Germany also needed to be inside. And then he said anything beyond that was a clear provocation. It was an utter provocation. And the Russians didn't actually oppose the first round of expansion because they understood it. “The 1999 one?” “The three that came in in 1999.” “Exactly.” According to him, there was never a protest from the Russians, but the protests started once the expansion continued in 2004.

#Daniele Ganser

Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Bulgaria, Slovakia, and Slovenia. That's right in the Russians' face, isn't it? That's not a Cuban Missile Crisis. That's the Soviets putting missiles into Cuba, Nicaragua, Venezuela. Take Haiti, if you want. Guatemala. You know, that's the sort of thing we're talking about. And that's why we need to look at it at the level of giants. I mean, the U.S. is a giant. The Russians are a giant. And the Chinese are a giant. And I'm still amazed that, with this idea of having, you know, a confrontation in Ukraine, they were not thinking that this would push the Chinese and the Russians so close together. Some were, as you said. Some were thinking about it. I mean, they're really locked together now.

#Pascal

Yeah. Although I've had a Chinese scholar named Yu Bin on my channel a couple of times. Four years ago, when the war expanded in 2022, he called China's position “principled neutrality.” And even today, he still says, “Look, China, of course, never declared neutrality, but what it does is basically try to maintain as good a relationship as possible with all parties to the war, especially with Russia and Ukraine.” That's why he still says these two are certainly not in an alliance. And I've heard several Chinese scholars describe the Russian-Chinese relationship as two lines running in parallel. They are together, but they never meet. So how are you interpreting what has happened over the last four years in terms of their bilateral relationship?

#Daniele Ganser

I think they are united by their fear of U.S. imperialism. You know, it's something that is really bothering China—the weapons that the U.S. is sending to Taiwan. I mean, it's not a small thing for China. I don't think that China cares so much about NATO expansion, although they say, “We don't want to have any NATO expansion.” But I think that's the Russian concern. And I think the Chinese understand that it's really the U.S. neocons, the imperialists. You know, as we both know, there's also a huge peace movement in the United States that says, “We don't want that.” I mean, Jeff Sachs and John Mearsheimer—I would put him in that group—or Scott Horton.

#Pascal

I mean, conservative voices, yes.

#Daniele Ganser

Yeah, they don't want, you know, this war in Ukraine. They don't think, "Yeah, now let's fight it out with the Russians, and if necessary, we exchange nuclear missiles." I mean, no, come on. So they don't want that. But the neocons, I think they had this idea of, "Let's do with Russia the same thing that we did with Yugoslavia. Let's just break it up into seven countries." And that would then destabilize the entire northern front of China. And, you know, if you see it that way, then you can say, "Okay, if your main enemy in the end is China"—because, you know, that is really the big challenger. It's not Russia. The main challenger for the United States is China.

If you look at population, if you look at industrial capacity, if you look at technological advances—and I don't want to say Russia has no technological advances—but there are just 150 million people. So there's not a huge group of people living in Russia. And so I think the alliance between Russia and China is really based on this understanding of U.S. imperialism. And I think they've studied it really, really well. We have studied it. You have studied it. I have studied it. I mean, everybody who does international analysis today has to study U.S. imperialism. And I think it's now coming to a crisis. I have one chapter in the book where I discuss the war against Iran. Obviously, it was an illegal war of aggression by Trump and Netanyahu. And so they bomb Iran.

And then I see these strikes, how Iran destroys U.S. military bases in the Gulf, you know, in Qatar, in Iraq, in Jordan, in Kuwait, in Saudi Arabia. And Pascal, I have to tell you, I've never seen that. I've never seen that. I mean, I'm 54 now, so I've never seen a country that is being bombed by the United States then destroy at least 10, or make it 15, U.S. military bases like that. I've never seen it. I mean, Afghanistan was just bombed. They didn't destroy any U.S. military bases anywhere. Libya was just bombed. They didn't destroy any U.S. military bases. Serbia was just bombed. You know, they just had to suffer, and they couldn't do anything about it. Now, with Iran, I was wondering: how on earth did they manage to destroy U.S. radar installations and U.S. planes and whatever so precisely?

And I went to Al Jazeera, which I think is an interesting news outlet in Qatar, because I was once in Qatar and visited the Al Jazeera studio. I just saw, you know, that they have a different perspective on the world. As for Gaza, for instance, they always speak about the genocide. So I went into the Al Jazeera data, and they said the Chinese BeiDou system—you know, the Chinese satellites—was used by the Iranians. They didn't use the American GPS system anymore to guide their drones and missiles because the Americans could switch that one off. I do think it is an anti-imperialist struggle of Iran, China, and Russia, although it's not framed like that in Switzerland.

People would say, okay, the Vietnam War against the French, that's an anti-imperialist struggle because the French were clearly a colonial power, and they occupied Vietnam. Then they lost at Dien Bien Phu in ’54, so the French were kicked out. They were also kicked out of Algeria, or the Indians kicked the British out of India. So that's all anti-imperialist struggle. But given that our framing now is, “Oh, there is no imperialism anymore, and there is no U.S. imperialism,” there can therefore be no anti-imperialist struggle. We basically lack the terms, you know, to describe what's going on. And as a historian, that's always very frustrating when the terms have been forbidden or canceled.

#Pascal

It is, it is, but it was very successfully done, of course, because we were told that, well, the Cold War is over, communism is dead, Marx was proven completely wrong. Therefore, the end of history. Because the point is, the imperialism that you and I are talking about is essentially a Marxist, left-wing understanding of what imperialism is, because it is rooted in this capitalist system that has to expand, right? This is a Marxist interpretation of the world. And of course, that has been completely uprooted and thrown out of the window, even in the West, over the last 40 years. So we lack this entire conception.

And that's why it is actually not bad that Chinese socialism is now coming back for the first time and actually saying, like, "Oh, by the way, guys, we don't only have a different political system. We have an entirely different social system." So the whole thesis of Fukuyama, of the end of history—by which he always meant the social order, how systems organize themselves—is itself now ready to be flushed down the toilet because we have other systems of organizing. And guess what? They're opposing that classical type of imperialism fueled by capitalism and liberalism. Most importantly, the liberal ideology is now again coming into question. And I guess we're just at the forefront of noticing it, but this will be noticed more.

#Daniele Ganser

Yes, and you know, I was born in 1972 in Switzerland, and when I was growing up, I was also being told, like many in the West, that communism is evil. I mean, I didn't know much about it. It was basically this story: Stalin has a gulag, and obviously that means that is communism. I mean, Stalin's gulags were dreadful, absolutely dreadful. There were horrific crimes in the Soviet Union. Let's not be confused about it. But then I thought, okay, NATO is fighting against the Soviet Union because the Soviet Union is communist. That's what I really thought. I mean, that's what they told us at school all the time.

And then, in 1991, the Soviet Union breaks apart into 15 countries, of which, you know, Ukraine is one, and Georgia is one, and Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Belarus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldavia, etc. So we have 15 countries, and one of them is Russia. Now,

Pascal, I don't know. I'd like to hear your story about it. Then I realized: the Russians are not communists anymore. They're capitalists like we are. Why are we still fighting them? And then I was like, wasn't the story that we're fighting the wrong economic system or social system, or whatever you want to call it? And then I started to realize it doesn't matter whether Russia is communist or capitalist.

You know, the fight doesn't stop if they're a capitalist country, which they are now. The fight is on because they are a huge country and because U.S. imperialism will always try to dominate the world. And if you put yourself in the shoes of an American general, you couldn't care less whether a country is communist or capitalist. You want to know: How big is it? What is its GDP? Where are its weapons? Is it a challenger to us? Is it a danger? Who cares what economic system it has? And so, for this book, Fight of the Giants, I just looked at it on this geostrategic level. I didn't bother to go into whether it's communism or capitalism. It doesn't matter.

I'm just saying that the three have been fighting each other for a long time. And at times, very interestingly, they also formed an alliance. That was the case in 1945. In 1945, the U.S., China, and the Soviet Union were in an alliance against Japan. Because, as you know—and you probably know it much better than I do and others do—Japan had occupied China during the Second World War. And the Chinese were not able to kick the Japanese out alone. So they were very happy at that time that the Americans and the Soviets came to help. And that was an alliance at the time. Today, we're in a different situation. We obviously have the Chinese and the Russians on one side and the U.S. on the other side.

But I fully agree. This whole story of Fukuyama, the end of history, and how we all cooperate now is not true. The fight against Russia continues very, very strongly. And I even have to say, I'm based in Basel, Switzerland, and just next door we have Germany. Now, if I listen to Merz, who is the Bundeskanzler, the Chancellor of Germany, I go like, "Whoa, gee, I mean, he's talking so badly about the Russians." Even in the Cold War, when Willy Brandt, Helmut Schmidt, or Kohl were in power in Germany, they were much nicer, back when the Soviet Union was a communist country.

#Pascal

They were. I mean, back then, actually, in the Cold War, I think it was pretty clear, at least to a good number of people in Europe, that if there were another contest, a great-power war between the US and Russia, then that war would obviously be fought in Europe. Because they're not going to risk Moscow and Washington. You know what they're going to do? They're going to blow up Bonn and Berlin and Paris and Warsaw. I mean, that's where the bombs are going to drop. But they understood that. Today, funnily enough, US imperialism was so successful at integrating the EU and European elites into this superstructure that they've built that all those kinds of worries are completely gone, because the allegiance of these people is no longer to their country.

It is to the cause of the West as a group. Mr. Merz knows he can go back to BlackRock and make much more money, or he can go and work for one of the big international organizations. I mean, these people do not need to care anymore. And actually, just today, just today on Twitter, Merz said again, “My primary concern is not Germany’s economy. My primary concern is what’s happening in Ukraine.” It’s like, really? Really? You, as the Chancellor of Germany, say that? But can you just imagine how deeply embedded this is in their brains now?

#Daniele Ganser

It is crazy. I mean, you know, I give public talks in the German-speaking world. So the German-speaking world is Germany, 80 million people; Switzerland, let's make it 10, although it's 9 million; and Austria, let's make it 10. So that's 80 plus 10 plus 10, which is 100 million people. That's the German-speaking world. That's 1% of the world population. Only 1% of the world population speaks German. So in two days, I'm going to Bavaria to give public talks. And usually about a thousand people come, you know. So people buy tickets to listen to my analysis, and I'm obviously very grateful that they come. But it shows you that dissatisfaction with the policies of Merz, their Bundeskanzler, is widespread.

Because in my talks, I say the policies of Merz are a disaster. He should absolutely—and I mean today—stop sending weapons to Ukraine. Because he’s sending weapons to Ukraine and telling the Ukrainians, “Yeah, I think it’s a good idea if you use these weapons and fire them at Russia.” And that’s what he does. I mean, there are quotes, obvious, clear-cut quotes, where he says, “Germany needs to support Ukraine against this war of aggression, and therefore Ukraine has every right to strike deep into Russian territory.” I mean, the people who come to my talks, obviously, you know, that’s our peace bubble, if you want to call it that. But it’s big. You know, it’s not just two or three people.

It's not just you and me and Jeff Sachs. It's a lot of people who don't want to risk Russian strikes on Germany. I mean, I always say we're lucky that Putin says, "Okay, no, no, we're not going to bomb Germany. No, no, we're not going to bomb France. No, we're not going to bomb Great Britain." I mean, he has people in his circle who certainly tell him, "How can Russia accept that Germany provides the drones, provides the missiles, provides the billions to Ukraine, tells Ukraine to fire the drones and the missiles and what have you—not the Taurus yet, but lots of other stuff—at Russia, and celebrates this publicly as a wise and clever idea?"

How can Russia accept this? And so Merz’s approval rating has fallen below 20%. I think Trump is around 30%. So, you know, 70% disapprove of him in the United States. Merz is much worse. Around 80% of the German population, regardless of how they vote—or whether they even vote—say this chancellor is a total disaster, and they don’t want this. And so it’s very important to differentiate between the population and German policies.

#Pascal

Of course, of course. No, that's very important. And it's actually important to see why people dislike Chancellor Merz, because I do agree with you, but some people disagree with Chancellor Merz for reasons other than Russia. And actually, this is where I use the recent Swiss referendum on neutrality as a way to estimate that we're probably at around 30%, because that referendum was reduced to the question: Do you approve of sanctions on Russia, yes or no? And we know now that about 30% of the Swiss population think no. And I feel like we can apply that to Germany and so on, to say that's about the proportion of people who are opposed to trying to strangle the Russians, because we probably share this assessment that that might come back to haunt us much, much worse than we can imagine.

#Daniele Ganser

Yeah. Can I say something about the Swiss neutrality thing? Because people ask me about it, and obviously you know everything about it, but I want to explain it one more time. As someone based in Switzerland, I think it's a great thing that we have direct democracy here. I wish Germany had direct democracy. I wish the US had direct democracy. I wish every country had direct democracy. But I must explain this for a second because it's not necessarily understood everywhere. So direct democracy means that we can vote on specific questions, like really specific questions, like, "Should we abolish the Swiss army, yes or no?" And then, you know, people can vote on it. And we actually had a vote on it, you know, some 40 years ago. You know, a majority said, "No, let's keep the army."

But we could have voted as citizens. We could have said, "No, we don't want the army anymore." And then the government would have had to do that. Now, this time—and I know, Pascal, that you know all this, but I want to explain it to make it clear what this neutrality thing is—a group of people had to collect 100,000 signatures. So they went into the streets, collected these signatures, and then these signatures were verified. You know, you cannot just sign as Donald Duck and have it count. No, your signature has to be verified, where you live has to be verified, and you actually have to have voting rights in Switzerland. So they had these 100,000 signatures.

And then the debate really was—and I followed this very, very closely, as you have—should Switzerland be very strict with its neutrality? And I said, yes, absolutely. You said, yes, absolutely. But our Swiss government said, oh, no, we shouldn't be absolutely strict with our neutrality because we should have an economic war against Russia, which I think is absolutely mad. Why should we have an economic war with Russia? So the whole discussion in Switzerland was very much about whether Switzerland should participate in these European Union sanctions against Russia. And as you rightly point out, our group only got 30%. We only got 30% of the vote from people who said, no, let's have really strict neutrality. And the others said, no, let's have this—you know, what should I call it? Should I call it flexible neutrality? What do you call it?

#Pascal

Military neutrality, yes, as in we don't send weapons to either belligerent. But economically, we clearly pick our side because we want to be with the good guys. That's right.

#Daniele Ganser

And that's why the Russians say, "Come on, that's not really neutral. Switzerland, you lost it." And they're right. So the question really is, how well could we in our group get the message across that it's not a good idea for Switzerland to go into economic warfare together with the European Union against Russia? Because the European Union, with Ursula von der Leyen and everybody else, is not a very successful project anyway. So who are you siding with? I mean, these people are really confused. Kaja Kallas, for God's sake. Yeah. And so I wanted to quickly explain this. I wanted to say to everybody who is not Swiss who is listening to us: Switzerland is still a neutral country.

We're not sending weapons to Ukraine. We're not part of NATO. We're not part of the European Union. So, in that sense, if you look from very far away, you can say we're pretty neutral. If you zoom in, you will see that Switzerland has adopted all the European Union's sanctions against Russia—not sanctions from the UN Security Council, but from the European Union, which is a group of just 27 states, and Switzerland is not one of them. So it's really strange that we did this. But I just wanted to put this into perspective because I've been asked this question so many times. People wrote to me and said, "Is Switzerland neutral? Is it not neutral? What's this referendum that you had?" So now I've said it. Enough.

#Pascal

You know, there's no way to define what is neutral and what is not. It always depends, and it depends on the conflict it is geared toward. But the question to me is how to get Europe—the entirety of Europe—and Switzerland is really just one part of Europe. We are not part of the EU or NATO, but we are part and parcel of how Europe as a continent works. We've always been wherever you found the European colonizer in the world. Wherever you have consular jurisdiction, you find Swiss people who go there and trade. They're piggybacking on the entire thing.

The Swiss never had a colony, but they always piggybacked on the colonies of others. So we are part and parcel of the way the system works. The question to me is how to crack the nut of the system so that we finally start perceiving the discourse as it happens outside, because Europe is caught in a solipsistic echo chamber where they listen to each other, but not to the outside—not to the Russians, not to the Chinese, not to the Africans, by the way. Nobody ever listens to the Africans. Nobody even cares what the Southeast Asians are thinking.

I can tell you from over here that my colleagues in the Global South—Japan is, of course, not part of the Global South—all shake their heads in disbelief, including the Indonesians, who just go like, "How the hell can Europe go into this type of economic suicide?" And unfortunately, the Swiss are

part and parcel of that. And the next thing we're going to have to vote on is whether we want to be under a framework agreement, basically absorbing us into the EU. So that's going to be another very interesting moment. But the system itself is now kind of losing steam. Everything is gone. The grandeur is still there, but the underpinning—the economy—is gone. It's a fascinating moment. Quite sad, but fascinating.

#Daniele Ganser

Yeah, I think it's just 500 years of European colonialism coming to an end. And that's really what's happening, along with the emergence of a multipolar world. I mean, these are the facts. People don't like to hear it. You know, it's like, "We've had such a good party. What's going on? Why is the music not playing anymore?" You know, that's a bit of the feeling. And I say, "Okay, now, brothers and sisters here in Europe, first realize a few things. We're not the center of the world anymore, okay? The British and the French and the Spanish and the Portuguese and the Dutch, you know, they had their empires. They don't have them anymore, okay? Indonesia is not a Dutch colony anymore. Vietnam is not a French colony anymore. And North America is not a British colony anymore. Neither is India." So everybody who studies history can see that European imperialism is over.

It's over. Then the second thing, which is very important: when the music stops playing, we all know these moments at a party, you know, when you party hard and you go into the early morning hours. The sun is coming up, and the music stops, and you're like, "Why is the party stopping? We had such great fun!" You know this moment. That is the moment Europe finds itself in, because the Nord Stream pipeline has been blown up, I think by the United States. I really follow Seymour Hersh. I think Seymour Hersh is such a brilliant man. I think he's just spot on. When he says, "I have an insider in the CIA who told me the whole story," I go like, "Thank you, Seymour. I understand that you can't give me the name of that insider, but for me, it's enough. I trust you."

You've done Abu Ghraib. You've done My Lai. So, you know, he has a reputation. But what I wanted to say about Europe is that the cheap gas from Russia is gone. And this is really sinking in for the German economy, in the sense that jobs are being lost and energy prices are high. And then these poor Germans still have to support a chancellor who says, "We need a few million and a few billion that we have to send to Ukraine. And by the way, we have to have more money for the German military." So yes, it's quite crazy. And the third thing—I didn't even mention the third thing—in Europe, you basically have no discourse on the genocide in Gaza, except among the Spanish and the Irish. I mean, in my public talks, I say, you know, "Netanyahu is responsible for genocide in Gaza."

And, you know, criticism of Israel is not anti-Semitic. It's just criticism of Israel's policies. And Navi Pillay, who just got the Nobel Peace Prize, has rightly said it's a genocide. Omer Bartov has rightly said so too. He's a Jewish scholar of genocide. So I think it's really clear it's a genocide. But in Switzerland, in Germany, and in Austria—in the German-speaking world—there's a real silence in the room when I say, "Unfortunately, this is a genocide." And sadly, we're not even allowed to talk

about it. And I do imagine that people in Bangladesh or people in South Africa or people in Indonesia go like, “Those Europeans, they always told us about values. And now they support a genocide and don't even talk about it and, you know, pretend that they're not sure whether it's a genocide.”

#Pascal

I have good news, which is that the South Africans and the Bangladeshis didn't believe this stuff from the beginning. I just had my conference in Kyoto last week, and we actually had a Nigerian scholar based in South Africa who came and joined us. He was the one who said, “Guys, the Bengal famine was a constructed affair, and we know that. Millions of people died, and who was responsible for it and actually said this was fine because they're breeding like rabbits? It was Winston Churchill. Winston Churchill, who is still lauded as a great hero of Western civilization. This man killed millions of people, and you guys still look at him as a great hero. I mean, don't tell us about monsters, about Putin and Xi and whatnot. We understand who the monsters are because we suffered at your hands.” So they never got on board with this, luckily enough.

#Daniele Ganser

It's probably a story you can only sell in Europe or North America.

#Pascal

To those who want to believe it, to those who want to think that we learned our lesson—which we didn't. The difficult thing for the Europeans, and maybe we have to end on that, is, of course, that now the world is changing, and you do have China and you do have Russia. And Africa will assert itself, and the Southeast Asians are doing so. I mean, they cannot be ignored anymore, right? For 500 years, you could ignore them. Now you can't anymore. And this will now lead to new giants in the room. The question is, who's going to be a giant? Where is Iran going to be in that constellation? But we are definitely heading that way. So how do you think this new multipolar order will unfold?

#Daniele Ganser

Well, let me end on a positive note, then. I do think multipolarity offers a great opportunity. I mean, think of it. If we were now free to sketch the 21st century, we would go like, “Oh, the first 25 years didn't go very well. We had a few wars. We had a few clashes.” It's not the blueprint that we would use for the next 25 years or the next 50 years, because we still have 75 years left in the 21st century. Not you and me personally—we don't have 75 years to go. We could try. We could try. But if you think about the whole century, then I see a century where the Europeans have learned their lesson and become humble. They're not flying to China and saying, “This is how you should behave,” like Annalena Baerbock.

Good gracious, German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock from the Green Party—but forget her. In that future, the Europeans will be more humble. They will apologize to the countries they have colonized and exploited. And, you know, some of that has been going on. And then they will start to trade with the Russians and the Chinese. So this idea of "Let's not trade anymore," which we now have with Russia, is just stupid. And I mean utterly stupid. So in this future—I don't give a specific date. I'm just thinking about a positive 21st century. And so the Europeans use this Eurasian continent, and we develop it together.

It's a win-win. It's not either you or me. That's what I like about Jeffrey Sachs. He always says, "Come on, it's not a zero-sum game. It's not true that if one country becomes rich, the other one has to become poor. Both countries can become rich together. It can be a win-win." And if we learn to change our mindset in Europe and go like, "Oh, yeah, right. The Ukraine war was a disaster. And actually, Russia is not entirely to blame for it. You know, they share some blame. The U.S. shares some blame for NATO expansion. Ukrainians share some blame because they overthrew their own government in 2014—the right-wing Ukrainians, not the population at large."

And Germany shares some blame because they didn't implement the Minsk Accords. So once we sober up and go like, "Okay, you know, there have been mistakes here and there," then we come into this forgiveness mode. We're not there. I know, Pascal, we're not there. We're like, "Oh, the Russians are evil, and we'll never forgive them." At some point, we'll have to go into this forgiveness mode. And humility and forgiveness—obviously, they're in the Bible, but they're also in other sacred texts. You'll find them in Confucius. You'll find them in a lot of texts. And that is always the way of wisdom, you know, not to say, "We have to fight it out because we're superior." To me, that's really an old way of thinking about it.

And then, if I may, in the U.S., the peace movement will become stronger and will say, "These forever wars that Trump promised to stop obviously haven't stopped, with the attack on Iran and the attack on Venezuela." I think that's what angered Tucker Carlson, right? So, I mean, it's great that Tucker Carlson speaks out, but, you know, that's what angered him. He believed that Trump would stop the forever wars. That's why Tucker Carlson supported Trump. And then Trump goes like, "Oh, by the way, we could attack Iran." So, in this future vision of mine, the peace movement in the USA would also bring U.S. imperialism to an end. You know, I mean, I already see you thinking the usual things. No, no, that's what I want too. It's what I want too. It's the question.

#Pascal

How do we get there?

#Daniele Ganser

The first thing is really visualizing it. That's really important. People don't understand how to create reality. To create reality, you have to visualize it and then believe that there are people all over the

world who would like to have a win-win. It's not just me and you and our little YouTube channel here and our little talk. There are lots of people. We could have a win-win between Palestinians and Israelis. It's not a law of nature that we have these crazy conflicts. I really think it's just crazy. It's not normal. That's not normal. We will still have to deal with earthquakes and tsunamis, you know? We will still have to deal with volcanoes. That's natural stuff that we have to deal with, and we can. But everything else, like torture or genocide or wars of aggression or war propaganda—we're really having a lot of war propaganda right now in Europe against Russia and stuff.

All this is human-made. And in my vision, at one point, we just go like, "Oh, we've done that. It's enough. We don't want this experience anymore." And this is obviously a transformation. It is a transformation, and I truly believe in it. I mean, I work for it. When I die, it will probably not be finished yet. But then I will hand it over to the next generation, and to the next generation. So I really think we can have a positive 21st century. Maybe you don't agree, but I don't know what you think. It would be very interesting to hear. I think it's possible, still possible. We've done the first 25 years: too much defense spending, too many wars, too much war propaganda, too much fearmongering. But these trends don't necessarily have to continue. It's not necessary. What do you think, Oskar?

#Pascal

I think so, too. The window of opportunity to have an overall positive 21st century, so that historians in 200 years will look back and say, "That was a good one," is still there. If we manage to restrain the worst of the worst, which would lead us into a nuclear war, if we manage not to go there, then I think the chance of actually sliding into a multipolar order is very much there—one in which there will be an order. Not necessarily everybody living in harmony and singing "Kumbaya," but at least living with something below the level of mass violence. The problem I do see is that, at the moment in the West, you know, this collapse of the old order of the last 500 years and this complete change in the way things have to be done are a very dangerous kind of mix that might lead to, well, the other option, which is mutual nuclear annihilation. That is unfortunately also still on the cards.

#Daniele Ganser

Everything. Everything is on the cards. I do think everything is on the cards, but it is very important to know the law of attraction. You know, when you're playing tennis and you think, "Oh, the next ball, I could just sort of play it into the net. I know I always do it. I hate it, but that's what happens," the likelihood that you hit it into the net is higher than when you think, "Okay, I'm gonna play down the line, just into the corner. It's gonna be fine." Or if you go skiing—as we're both Swiss, we might talk about skiing—and you're with a group of skiers or snowboarders, and you're up on the mountain. It's just perfect snow. And then one says, "Hey, guys, can I show you a short clip on my smartphone about brain injuries? You know, if you fall badly, you can really get brain injuries."

That will drag everybody into this fear, and you will not have a good ride. And I'm not saying you can't have a brain injury if you go skiing. It can happen. But if we focus on the worst possible development, the law of attraction will kick in. And I think we in the peace movement have to also align our thoughts toward a positive vision and say, "Okay, so what do you have to offer?" I mean, you do have good stuff to offer, Pascal. I've listened to tons of your analyses, and you always say, you know, actually, neutrality is a very good product. I mean, you know, it's just: keep your soldiers in your country, don't have any military bases in other countries, and don't attack other groups. I mean, it's a very smart idea. And I really see that neutrality for Ukraine—I mean it, neutrality for Ukraine—would be the best thing. We have something to offer.

#Pascal

But you know what the problem is? The problem is Vladimir Putin actually agrees. He said so on the 1st of October. He was asked again in Valdai, "Is neutrality still important for whatever's going to come next with Ukraine?" And Vladimir Putin said unequivocally, "Yes, it is," because this is the only outcome that actually is feasible and possible. We could talk more about that. We are running out of time. So the question to me is: how do we sell this? How do we sell rational thinking again to our own people? Then again, you and I, and we in this bubble, are actually best positioned to try to do that because we're on the inside. So it's going to be hard work, but we need to do that, and we need to knock on doors and tell them, "Look, shall we sit down and try to get out of the emotions and into a rational discussion?" It will take decades, but we've got to do it.

#Daniele Ganser

Yeah, but then, you know, as a historian, I also look at the question: when did we first have YouTube? And it was in 2005. So we now have 21 years of YouTube. And maybe that's strange, but I remember when I was 14 years old, back in the 1980s. So that makes it 1986. That's when I was 14 years old.

#Daniele Ganser

I was spending the summer break with my grandparents. It was me and my sister, and they looked after us. Then we had lunch, you know, and during lunch, Swiss radio was on. I was talking with my sister, and my grandfather said, "Daniele, Daniele, can you please be silent? I'm listening to the radio." Because that was the Swiss national radio news, you know. Then, okay, I shut up, and we sort of ate in silence because he wanted to listen to the news. At the end, he switched it off, and there was never a debate. We never had a debate on whether those were the right topics to choose, whether we had the right experts, whether the Swiss government was lying or telling the truth, or how the global analysis was framed. Nothing like that.

Come on. It was just, “Swiss radio must be telling the truth,” because there was only one channel—or one, you know, important channel. And if the Swiss government said it, it had to be the truth. How could we even doubt it? And that was in the ’80s. And now so many people have woken up. They’re looking at the YouTube channel of Glenn Diesen. Excellent guy, isn’t he? Glenn, come on. Fantastic. They’re looking at the books of Scott Horton. Come on, Scott. He’s just standing up for peace. He doesn’t want to get rich. Jeff Sachs, excellent man. He doesn’t want to get rich. I think his main concern is peace for his children and his grandchildren.

#Pascal

So there are a lot of us.

#Daniele Ganser

There are a lot of us. I've now talked about Europeans and Patrik Baab in Germany. There are a lot of us. There are a lot of us. And we do need to grasp that this is also a historical moment when we can really open up the discourse. And we do. We do open up the discourse. I get a lot of criticism when I say, you know, that on 9/11 they blew up World Trade Center 7 and stuff. I get a lot of criticism. We have our shitstorms that we have to live with. But we do open up new areas of discourse, and I think you do that very much so, where we say, “This is interesting. Why don't we talk about that?” And we produce these discussions at minimal cost. I'm in Switzerland. You're in Japan. We have a few laptops, a few cameras, and it's possible. So I say it's possible.

#Pascal

That is true. That is true. Social media is giving us a whole new range of options, which is why I'm most worried about it. You know, the system would naturally have to try to crack down on it. But I do hope that the legal underpinning that we have will hold. If there's something good about liberalism, then it's this idea that people need to be free, but let's not take it there. I do hope that that will hold, and that might give us the possibility, also as Matthias Desmet says, to keep the worst from happening—to keep the mass psychosis, the mass formation, from getting worse. And maybe at some point we can steer it back. That is, of course, the hope. That's why, when anybody asks me, “What can I do?” it's like, “Well, you're the one who knows yourself. What can you do? Think about it and then do it. Organize a book club. Organize discussions with friends. Open a YouTube channel. Write articles. I don't know. Whatever you can do to contribute will make a difference over the long run.”

#Daniele Ganser

Comment, share, like. Add to the peaceful movement. I think that is possible. There are millions and millions and millions of us out there. And I think one of the techniques of those who push for wars is

always to make us feel powerless. They always try to tell us, "You guys, you're lost. You just have small YouTube channels with 50,000 or 100,000 subscribers. We'll shut you off like that if we want to. And if that's not enough, we'll send a rocket and you're dead." And then people go like, "Oh…" But that's not true. That's not true. Because if you look at it from a strategic perspective, we are the majority. The majority does not want wars. We just don't want them. We don't want war lies. You don't have to be Bangladeshi or Indian or Swiss or Japanese or Chinese or Nigerian or Brazilian.

It's just that we don't profit from these wars. We don't want the genocide in Gaza. We don't want the war in Ukraine. And we don't want the war in Iran. These are the three big wounds on planet Earth, so to speak. We don't want them. And so we're not happy with the information system that we've been fed for the last 40 years. Let's call it the last 40 years. And so we break free from this information system. And whenever a group of human beings has broken free of an information system and opened up new ways of looking at the world, that has always had a huge effect later. It takes time, but I think it's wrong when they tell us, "You're powerless." We're not. We're not.

#Pascal

Yeah, definitely. And just to come back to your metaphor of the party, the thing is, we need to get off the booze, and then we'll need a good aspirin to get over the hangover.

#Daniele Ganser

But there will be a morning after.

#Pascal

So we just have to get there, and maybe some of our friends will give us a couple of aspirins. I do think so.

#Daniele Ganser

Because maybe right now we're still in the headache phase.

#Pascal

Yeah. Oh, it's only beginning. It's only beginning. I mean, this is the moment when your eyes kind of open and you go like, "What happened?" We're far away from being on the other side, but we will get there. And you're one of the people who will lead us. Daniele Ganser, you're doing a fantastic job. People who want to get your book—again, it's called Fight of the Giants, Kampf der Giganten. It's currently only in German. If somebody in the English-speaking world wants to publish it, please

contact Daniele Ganser. Daniele has other books that are available in English. You can see one of them, USA: The Ruthless Empire, of course. Daniele, are there other places where people can find you?

#Daniele Ganser

Oh, just online, on my YouTube channel. Most of it is in German, but some is in English. Just generally, if people say in their hearts, “I'm not powerless,” that's very important to me. And if they say, “There are a lot of us in the peace movement,” it doesn't matter what color your skin is, what religious group you belong to, what nationality you are, or what your income level is. It doesn't matter. If we agree that we don't want wars and we don't want genocide, we're a majority. And if people have that, and if they feel that, then I'm absolutely out.

#Pascal

Yep. And we will foster that. And that's why we will talk again. Daniele Ganser, thank you so much for your time today.

#Daniele Ganser

Always a pleasure. Thanks, Pascal.