

Col. Jacques Baud: Iran HAMMERS Israel AND GCC Countries After Attacks

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#Nima

Hi, everybody. Today's Monday, April 6th, 2026, and our dear friend, our brother, Col. Jacques Baud, is here with us. Welcome back, all.

#Jacques

Thank you. Thank you for having me back on your show, and hi to everybody.

#Nima

Colonel, let me start with what happened in the latest operation the United States carried out in Iran. It was reported as a victory—at least from what Donald Trump understood of the operation—because he said they saved the second pilot in Iran. What happened is actually a bit strange, because they were trying to find the pilot in Yasuj, which is in the southeast of Iran, near the Persian Gulf. But then they carried out this operation in Isfahan, which is much more central. So, looking at the equipment being used in this operation—based on what we've learned so far from ABC, NBC, and The New York Times—what were the reports?

One F-15E, one A-10 Warthog, four Little Birds—as they call them—two Black Hawks, two C-130 Hercules, and four MQ-9 drones were somehow destroyed or damaged during this operation. Looking at the scene in Iran, it shows the level of destruction of this equipment. It was a huge operation, by the way, just judging from the scene. And many people are asking, was this really an operation to save one of these pilots? Or was it a raid—maybe a raid on Natanz, for example, one of the nuclear power plants? They wanted to achieve something. I don't know, maybe to... to extract something from the nuclear power plant in Natanz, which is located in Isfahan, close to the site of this incident, this attack. What's your understanding of that?

#Jacques

Well, thank you for the question. I mean, the first reaction I have—especially looking at those pictures—is that it reminds me of the ones we saw in 1980 after the U.S. attempt to rescue hostages at the Tehran embassy, Operation Eagle Claw. There, too, you had, I think, two C-130s that were destroyed and left in the desert, exactly as we see here today. So for me, this is very reminiscent of that operation, which failed miserably—mostly because of the lack of coordination and too much secrecy. There was so much secrecy that the right hand didn't know what the left hand was doing. And as a result, you had problems within the operation itself. That's the reason it failed. Well, here we're probably in a different situation.

However, the two aircraft we've just seen in the pictures are HC-130Js, which are basically search-and-rescue—specialized planes equipped with advanced electronics, countermeasures, special armament, and so on, to perform search and rescue in the enemy's rear area. So this was clearly a search-and-rescue operation, at least at the beginning. Now, about the number of assets that were used—I mean, I'm not familiar with this kind of operation. I'm a man of the ground, not a man of the air. But nevertheless, as far as I know from these kinds of special operations, they require a lot of equipment, a lot of air support, a lot of electronic countermeasures, and a lot of redundancy to avoid having the rescue team itself caught in enemy territory.

Therefore, it's not surprising that so many assets were used to rescue a single pilot. These kinds of operations were heavily conducted during the Vietnam War and later in the Balkan War, based on the idea that if you don't make every effort to rescue pilots who've been downed in enemy territory—facing detention, maybe torture, or things like that—then pilots would no longer fight with the same confidence. So far, we've seen that the U.S. and the Israelis have avoided fighting over Iranian territory, I mean, in Iranian airspace. They've tried to stay outside that airspace and operate with standoff weapons. But because they probably felt that Iranian air defenses weren't effective, they tried to enter that airspace—and we've had several examples of that, especially with the F-15E and the one that was shot down, by the way.

They tried to enter that airspace, and eventually they had a problem. So the second observation I can make—or rather, the third—is that Iranian air defense, although it's probably not as developed as we might expect in Western Europe, is likely very effective, but only in specific areas. I'm not an expert in that field, and again, my assessment is based on what I've seen, which isn't much, by the way. But the Iranians probably have a limited number of air defense assets, concentrated in certain parts of the country, and they're likely not able to counter attacks from outside their airspace. They probably have to wait until the enemy is inside their airspace to engage them. That's probably the main difference compared to some of the air defense systems we have.

We thought we had in Europe. In any case, whether the operation was a success or not is very difficult to assess. For me, I've seen so much contradictory information. I mean, we know that the pilot of this F-15 was rescued quite early after being downed. But the navigator—apparently there's very contradictory information about him. From Iran's side, we hear that he's been captured. Some

say he's been killed. The Americans say they rescued him. And you have back-and-forth allegations on both sides. So I'm not able to say exactly what happened. The problem is probably—and one issue you raised in your question—is the matter of the locations that prompted the idea that Iran somehow managed to emulate, or maybe use, the beacon of one of those pilots. Because when a pilot is downed, he has a beacon on him that operates on secret frequencies, with frequency-hopping systems and things like that.

It's very hard to detect, but in any case, this system allows the U.S. to locate their pilot in enemy territory in order to pinpoint his position and task the rescue team. The fact that we have different reported locations for this rescue operation may suggest that the Iranians were able to emulate the beacon signal to lure the Americans into an area where they were somehow ambushed. To be honest, with the level of information I have—and probably most people have at this stage—it's very difficult to assess that and to say definitively whether it was the case or not. But I would suggest that it's something that's not completely impossible, because we know the Iranians have very sophisticated electronic countermeasures and electronic warfare capabilities.

And it would be quite a significant success if they had been able to do that. Now, the result of the whole operation—because obviously, as you mentioned, if you add up all these aircraft that have been downed—you have something like nine aircraft, including the UAVs, I mean the reconnaissance role, the MQ-9 Reaper that's been used. But these are probably not specifically related to this operation, because earlier in the war, Iran was able to down several of those Reapers, as did the Houthis, by the way, in 2024 and 2025. They were able to down a couple of them, and I think Hezbollah was able to down one as well.

In any case, this is quite a number of aircraft that have been downed. Some say that the crews of those HC-130Js that were destroyed were killed. I have no indication—I cannot confirm that. What we see, and the pictures you've shown, suggest that these aircraft were, let's say, intentionally sabotaged and destroyed to prevent the electronic equipment from falling into the hands of the Iranian forces. Because when you look at the pictures, everything is flat—I mean, there's no recognizable structure of the aircraft.

So, meaning that they were probably destroyed completely intentionally. I don't know. In any case, it shows that the problem of a single pilot can destabilize the whole U.S. system somehow. Because to devote so much energy to rescuing one person suggests that rescuing that person has political significance. And that shows this, I would say, kind of asymmetry you have between Iran—and not just Iran, by the way, because it's something we've also seen with Hezbollah and with Hamas in Palestine. The West is much more reluctant to suffer casualties than those for whom this conflict is existential. And that applies to Palestine, to South Lebanon, and to Iran.

Those forces that attack these countries are not fighting for existential reasons, while those who are ready to sacrifice their lives do so because they feel what they're doing has existential meaning for them. And that also shows something we're extremely reluctant to understand in Europe: attacking

Iran is not existential for us, despite the disinformation spread by our governments. Recently, you've seen this in France and the UK, with claims that attacking Iran is somehow for the defense of all of us. And that includes, by the way, the same rhetoric we use regarding Russia. So we try to make those conflicts existential for us, when in reality, they're existential for others.

And that's the reason why others are ready to take casualties, even fatalities—because for them it has meaning, while for us it doesn't. That's why we're not ready to let even a single pilot die, because it has no meaning for us. And therefore, we can't pay so much for nothing. You see, I think that's a good indication of this asymmetric understanding of what kind of war we're fighting. It shows exactly what we've said many times on your show and others: that this Iran war—this war started by Israel and the U.S.—is in fact a war of choice, not a war of necessity. It's a war driven by obsession rather than by reason.

That's exactly what we have here—the demonstration of that. Again, I don't know exactly what the result of this operation is. I'm not able to assess whether it was a success or a failure. It's logical that the failure of an operation is always dictated by the nature of the objective you want to reach. If the objective is very important, then even if you lose a lot of assets to reach it, it's not a failure—provided you reach the objective, obviously. So it's very hard to say it was a failure, but certainly, the amount of destruction required to achieve that objective shows that the U.S. is not waging an existential war. And that, I think, is the main message of the whole thing.

#Nima

Yeah, Carl, here's what Donald Trump posted right after announcing that it was a victory—a successful operation in Iran.

#Jacques

And here you can see the language being used in this post.

#Nima

He's basically talking about war crimes—attacking power plants and bridges in Iran. And he goes beyond that. He's, you know, openly saying “straight up force,” like, “you crazy bastard.” The language is just amazing—how the President of the United States tries to intimidate Iranians this way. For many people, it's unbelievable. Why is he doing this with that kind of rhetoric? It doesn't work. It hasn't worked so far. But he continues; he's doubling down and even changing tone. It seems that somebody—I don't know—you can accept someone on the street, someone who doesn't have any responsibility, using those kinds of words, but the President of the United States speaking this way? What's your understanding of how he's trying to intimidate Iranians?

#Jacques

Well, there's something deeper than that, because as you rightly said, it's very strange to hear this kind of language from someone who's supposedly so high in the hierarchy—like the President of the United States. When you call people “crazy bastards” and things like that, we're talking about the kind of language you'd hear at a schoolyard level. You know, it's uneducated kids who use those kinds of words, not people who should have the strategic mindset the President of the United States ought to have. However, I've noticed that in Europe we have exactly the same kind of language. In France and in Belgium, I've heard several politicians using the word *salopard*, which is basically the translation of “bastard,” referring to Iran.

So we see that this kind of language isn't just used by Trump, but also by those who, in principle, agree with him regarding the Iranian government. Now, this is an indication of a profound intellectual, moral, and overall weakness of leadership. You know, in the end, when you can't manage to achieve a clear success, you start using bad words and things like that. You hide your incapability behind your words. And that's exactly what we're seeing here. It applies, as I said, obviously to Trump, but also to European politicians. And that's very telling, because this is something we weren't used to hearing decades ago.

And today, because we have people who make bad decisions, who are not able to anticipate the consequences of those decisions, who can't foresee the future, they end up being surprised by their own actions. They're extremely weak in decision-making, and that's why they resort to using those words. By the way, it's also very interesting to see that those who use that kind of language—I'm talking about the European politicians—are the same ones criticizing Trump because they think he's intellectually not up to the mark. Meaning, those who criticize Trump use exactly the same language. So we see that we have the same kind of weakness here. It's not just a weakness limited to Trump. I mean, Trump is simply the tip of the iceberg, but the whole leadership in the West is more or less aligned with him.

It's also interesting that everybody criticized Trump in Europe, but nobody condemned, for instance, what he did with Maduro in Venezuela. They didn't even condemn Trump's attempt to take over Greenland. So we see that Western politicians—and probably it goes beyond the West to some extent—are extremely afraid of the United States. They don't like Trump because it's fashionable to be against him, but they don't really know why, because otherwise they approve everything he does and even use the same language he does. So we have here an extremely corrupt political leadership in Europe, and I think that's what this whole issue reflects. Now, in the tweet—or the post—you showed...

There's also this idea about the bridges and the power plants, because that's part of the threats announced by Donald Trump. And that goes in the same direction, by the way, because when you don't have a real, solid strategy to win the war, the only way out is to escalate the conflict and threaten destruction—including war crimes, by the way. So Trump is in a very similar situation to

Netanyahu in 2023, when he wanted to deal with the Hamas issue in Palestine. We're exactly in the same situation: people without any strategy, people who understand only force and blackmail to achieve their objectives. They don't have an elaborate strategy to solve the problem.

They just try to pressure people, even force them into a decision that suits them. And when those people don't want to do that, they're simply lost. The only way they see to solve the problem is to escalate. That's exactly what we have with Donald Trump and Benjamin Netanyahu. So that's what this tweet shows me. And that's not in favor of the political leadership—the Western political leadership at large. Obviously, it's certainly not a demonstration of the strength or ability of the leadership in the U.S. If you add to this that he had to fire a number of generals and officials from his own government to maintain some kind of political discipline, it shows exactly how weak this government is.

#Nima

Colonel, Reuters reported that Pakistani Army Chief, Field Marshal Asim Munir, has been in contact all night with U.S. Vice President J.D. Vance, along with Steve Wojtkow and Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, to work on a settlement deal. Under the proposal, a ceasefire would take effect immediately, reopening the Strait of Hormuz, with 15 to 20 days to finalize the border settlement. Now, the problem is on the Iranian side—it's mentioned that Iran doesn't agree to any of these terms.

They don't want to accept any demand from the United States. They want to make this conflict permanent—to end it permanently, not just have a ceasefire for 15 days, 20 days, a month, or two months, and then start again. The whole reason for this rush, this desperation from the United States, is because of Israel. Israel is running out of interceptors, running out of everything. That's why they're getting hit by rockets, missiles—everything.

The United States is trying to find some sort of solution to produce more missiles and interceptors for Israel to continue this fight. And that's totally understood on the part of the Iranians—that's why they don't accept these terms. What's your understanding of the way they're trying to talk? They're sending messages to the Iranians—by the way, it's been confirmed that they are receiving messages from the United States—but Iran doesn't see any sign in those messages that suggests a political settlement for what's going on. What's your understanding of that?

#Jacques

Well, first of all, when we talk about negotiation, we have to understand—and I think the foreign minister actually said this in an interview we gave last week or so—he explained exactly what Iran understands as a negotiation. Because Donald Trump bragged that he was negotiating with Iran, that things were going the right way, and so on. But Foreign Minister Araghchi said, well, there is no negotiation. There are simply notes exchanged between Iran and the United States, but that's not a

negotiation. And again, the problem here is that we have two different understandings of the word “negotiation.”

This is something we’ve already talked about regarding the Ukraine conflict, because, in fact, it’s a similar situation. The U.S. tries to impose its own solution. That’s exactly what they’ve done with Palestine, for example—and probably with others. That old conflict that Donald Trump allegedly solved was probably handled the same way. He put his own proposal on the table—his vision of how to resolve the conflict—and with the other hand, he had his gun, put it on the table, and said, “Well, guys, you have to choose: you take my proposal, or I use the gun.” It’s exactly like in those mafia movies—the offer you can’t refuse. But that’s not a negotiation.

A negotiation, as I’ve explained many times—and as Foreign Minister Araghchi also explains, by the way—is when both sides sit at a table, each with their own proposal. The whole purpose of negotiation is to bring those two proposals closer and closer to each other. It’s an iterative process in which you give and take on both sides until you reach a point where both of you are, as we used to say in Switzerland in the foreign affairs service, equally unsatisfied. A good agreement is reached when both parties are unsatisfied—and equally so, of course. That’s how you reach an agreement. So that’s the first part about negotiation.

The second thing is, as you rightly said, the experience of the Iranians so far is that when they reach an agreement or negotiate with the U.S., either the U.S. withdraws from the agreement afterward—as they did with the JCPOA, by the way. That was an agreement made between Iran, the European Union, France, Germany, the U.K., and the U.S., and even Russia, I think, was also part of it. But in any case, after it was done and verified many times by the IAEA that Iran had complied with the provisions of the agreement—and it was confirmed, I think, 15 or 17 times by the IAEA—then Trump decided to withdraw from the treaty. So this experience shows exactly what the problem is: what’s the point of having an agreement with a partner who withdraws when things don’t go their way? The Americans had hoped that Iran would not comply, so they could impose much stronger sanctions.

That was the thing. But they were disappointed because Iran did comply. That’s the whole issue. Now, in the last two years, we’ve had several occasions when the Iranians were talking to the Americans—and with the Israelis, by the way—and on several occasions, particularly early this year, the Israelis and the Americans broke off these negotiations. I mean, they used those negotiations to hide their preparation for war. So here again, Iran said once more, “Well, what’s the point? We’re not sure these partners or actors negotiate in good faith. We are in good faith—we try to do our best—but they don’t. So we don’t want to have this kind of agreement.”

They want what the Iranians want today, and they have no other exit strategy. They can’t have another, and that’s very important to understand. There is no other way for Iran than achieving a decisive victory. A decisive victory doesn’t mean everything is destroyed; it means that this victory should lead the U.S. and Israel to the conclusion that they cannot and should not attack Iran in the

future—period. In other words, what Iran wants is not simply a ceasefire, but a cessation of hostilities once and for all. And that means there must not only be a commitment from the U.S. and Israel that they will not resume any war activity or attack against Iran, but also safeguards to ensure that.

It may be confidence-building measures. It may be—I don't know what. That's a matter to be negotiated. But there must be some kind of security guarantees for Iran that those two countries will not resume their attacks. I remind you, it's the third time—or the fourth time, in fact. I mean, combined, it's the third time they've attacked. But both the U.S. and the Israelis have, for decades, been willing to attack Iran. They just didn't find the right opportunity to do it. This time they did. And this is something Iran doesn't want to see happen again. Therefore, they cannot start a discussion about a ceasefire, a temporary cessation of hostilities, or something like that. It's not just about the Strait of Hormuz—it was free before the attack by Israel and the United States.

Well, if they settle the conflict, then it will be free. This is not something that comes out of the blue from Iran. I would say it's not blocked, it's not closed, by the way. But let's say this: a limitation on the use of the Strait of Hormuz is a consequence of the conflict, not the cause of the conflict. That's very important to understand, especially from the Iranian perspective. Therefore, they say, well, if you don't attack, there is no risk. We haven't done that so far, so there's no reason for us to do it in the future if you behave properly. Now they are using the Strait of Hormuz as leverage to bring both Israel and the U.S. to a negotiation, and probably to a settlement of the conflict.

So here we have to be very careful not to confuse things. The problem with the Strait of Hormuz, the energy crisis, and all that—these are consequences of the conflict, not the cause of it. And that's something the U.S. and Israel have to understand. The issue here is also that, in the West—especially coming from Israel and then taken up by the U.S.—there's this idea that Iran is threatening the rest of the world, for which there isn't the slightest indication. Just last week, I was watching a debate among Belgian politicians, and they repeated that Iran is a threat to the rest of the world. What's the evidence for that?

What is the proof? What is the evidence of that? There's absolutely none. So this is just rhetoric—just blunt allegations thrown into the air. In fact, those politicians are war criminals because they create the conditions for more conflict. They actually propagate war, which is, by the way, something that is legally criminal. You could sue them for that. So we have to be extremely careful about this. Iran is in a position where it cannot have a half-solution; it has to be a hundred-percent solution. And for that, it will need to bring the U.S. to the point where they have no other choice but to simply accept—and that's the same for Israel. I remember, even before the conflict erupted at the end of February, I said on your channel that Israel would be the pawn of the Iranians in this conflict.

Because at the end of the day, since Iran cannot reach the U.S. physically with missiles or whatever, they will destroy Israel. And that's the situation Israel has put itself in, because obviously, to some extent, you see the same thing with the Arab states in the Middle East—I mean, the Arab

monarchies around the Gulf. But more importantly, this is about Israel. And Israel, again, because of this arrogant posture—meaning that even if they had not completely replenished their anti-missile defense and things like that—they thought they could afford to attack Iran again. And today they pay the price for that mistake. That mistake has become a weakness. It's the stone in Donald Trump's shoe, because it's something he cannot ignore.

And this is where you see that it's absolutely on both sides. I mean, both on the Israeli side and on the American side, there's absolutely no strategic thinking whatsoever. This is simply emotional—it's a gut reaction, not a brain-driven reaction. And that's exactly the weakness. In fact, it very clearly symbolizes the weakness of the West in waging wars. We're used to fighting easy wars, if you will, because for the last 30 years or so, we've fought against countries or entities that didn't have the technological or technical level to counter our armies. That applies to Israel, but it also applies to the U.S. And today, they're fighting, to some extent, a peer—and that's the first time that's happened.

And you see almost the same evolution today in Lebanon between Israel and Hezbollah. Hezbollah, over the last year—or even before that, in fact—has developed its technological arsenal, if you will. And now Israel is fighting more and more against adversaries who are equal, if not superior, in certain areas. That's the new aspect of the war. Because so far, it was easy to fight against a "weaker" adversary. Today, they're fighting an adversary with almost the same capabilities. And that's the big difference. That's something the West hasn't understood yet—and something Israel and the U.S. especially haven't understood yet.

#Nima

Carl, the United States has been at war with Iran, I would say, since the revolution in Iran. It wasn't always a military operation—it was through sanctions, tremendous economic pressure on the Iranian economy. They wanted to destroy, to diminish, to decimate the Iranian economy for such a long time. We all know that. But recently—you remember when I was in Iran in December and January—we had protests, which later on we learned from the American Treasury Secretary, Scott Besson, that they did everything to bring people into the streets to spark those kinds of protests.

Later on, we learned from Mike Pompeo that Mossad agents were there with the protesters to create some kind of chaos in Iran. The protests had started calmly, but then they turned into riots, killing many people—ordinary citizens and security forces alike. Many people at the time were asking, "What happened?" Then we started seeing weapons appear. People were being killed. Who was doing the killing? Where were these weapons coming from? And yesterday, we learned from Fox News that the Trump administration in the United States had provided many arms to the Kurdish people at the border with Iran—in Iraqi Kurdistan—to be sent to the protesters. And here's what they said in that report.

#Speaker 03

He provided new details on what happened earlier this year, as the Iranian regime took to the streets and slaughtered what the president tells me were 45,000 civilians in their own country. After that took place, President Trump told me the United States sent guns to the Iranian protesters. He said we sent them a lot of guns, through the Kurds—and the president thinks the Kurds kept them. He went on to say we sent guns to the protesters, a lot of them. So, a number of headlines here from my conversation with President Trump.

#Nima

Yeah, this was just yesterday, you know, kind of confirming it. You can see the total cooperation of the United States in creating chaos—turning the protests into riots, sending arms. This is the worst kind of animosity a country can face. It's not just about stirring turmoil inside the country, creating instability, and then attacking from outside. What do you make of that? Because, after all, for Iran, this is so important. Then you see Putin and them involved in the conflict permanently. It means that on every front—sanctions, sending weapons to these terrorists at the border—you have to consider the big picture, not just focus on the war and what's happening right now on the battlefield.

#Jacques

Well, first of all, I think all of that is not new. We're just bringing it up again. I mean, what you saw in the first reports is something that only appeared yesterday or so. But I think I already mentioned on your channel a few weeks ago that, in January, the Iranian security forces intercepted more than 60,000 weapons that were being smuggled into Iran. You might remember they also disabled and intercepted several thousand—more than 10,000, I think—Starlink terminals that were being used to create insurgent networks, to set up a kind of parallel Internet, if you will, in order to establish those networks.

And we've seen several moves in Iraqi Kurdistan, where the US and the French, by the way, were training combatants—militants they pay to cross the border and create some guerrilla warfare in northern Iran. By the way, there's a base—I don't remember the exact location—but about two weeks ago, the Iraqi resistance attacked a base where French military were training those Kurdish militants, and one French NCO was killed. Those French forces are, in fact, training terrorists who are then sent to carry out terror activities in Iran. So all of that is not new. It's very telling that you have several militant groups, such as the IMI-K and the Mujahideen-e-Khalq, which was listed as a terrorist organization in the 1990s by the US, who...

#Jacques

...by surprise, were suddenly removed from the terrorist list in 2012 in order to have the US helping, arming, and training those militants in Iran. So all that is not new. There have been many, many reports over the last 20 years. And you may or may not know that I've written an encyclopedia of all the political violence in the world, including all the militant groups. It's a 1,500-page book, so it's

quite a big thing. I've monitored all these groups that are supported by the West in Iran and elsewhere. And here I just mentioned those movements in the north, but you have movements that are equally supported by the US—especially the US—in the south of the country, in the Balochistan region, and among the Ahwazi community, who are supported by the US. And you regularly have terrorist acts carried out by those militants.

And in fact, they are paid and armed by the U.S. So you have a lot of subversion happening in Iran. It's not new. But the example you mentioned about January is a case in point. Those demonstrations we saw in January didn't happen by chance—they were engineered by the U.S. And as you rightly said, Scott Besant himself was questioned by a Senate committee, if I'm not mistaken, where he explained that the U.S. created an economic situation in Iran that would trigger demonstrations, and then they would take advantage of those protests by using armed militants among the demonstrators to create a situation—and probably even provoke a heavy reaction from the Iranian forces. By the way, the numbers that have been reported vary: sometimes you hear 50,000, and sometimes Oussaf al-Alyan mentioned 17,000.

#Nima

And Donald Trump mentioned 45,000.

#Jacques

I mean, everybody has their own figure. The official one is quite high—we have to acknowledge that. But according to the Iranian government, it's around 3,000 casualties or fatalities.

#Nima

I'm not able to verify this, but it's clear that one of the reasons the government did that this time around was because they wanted to publish all the information about the people who were killed during the operation. When you put out the names, the identities, everything, you can confirm it. And if there are some other cases not on that list, you can object—you can say, "This person isn't on the list," and then it shows they're cheating or putting out false information. That's why they published a full list of about 3,000 people—the 3,000 who died during this period of chaos in Iran.

#Jacques

Yes, I don't make any judgment here. The thing is, by European standards, it's a very high figure, to be frank. But we also have to acknowledge that the design behind this demonstration was to have an armed uprising. It was not simply a peaceful or spontaneous movement. It was something that was definitely engineered by some entities—most probably the U.S., most probably the Mossad, or

whoever. And by the way, you recently had someone on one of the Israeli channels who said exactly the same thing. So it's not something that comes from my imagination. This is definitely something we've heard in Israel itself.

So there was this idea to engineer an armed uprising and create a situation where the Iranian government had to react with force. And by using force, this would probably create the conditions to then label them as "bastards" or something like that, and to justify an operation. By the way, these demonstrations in January have been used by some—especially in Europe, but also in the United States—to justify the attack in January, which is essentially false, because in law, whether criminal law at the individual level or international law, you cannot justify one crime by another crime.

So it's not because someone committed a crime—even if it was a crime. I mean, we can discuss whether it was proportionate and things like that. There are lots of issues we can discuss about the reaction of the Iranian government. But regardless of how we assess it, even if Iran had reacted disproportionately to this demonstration, it cannot be a justification for attacking a country. And that's exactly the same thing we've discussed many times regarding Palestine. Even if you consider that Hamas carried out a terrorist attack on the 7th of October—which, technically speaking, doesn't really fit that definition.

But that's another question. Even if we admit that, it cannot justify the bombing of civilians. You see, otherwise it's a blank check to do whatever you want. I mean, imagine you have a guy—you're killing someone on the street—then you destroy the whole neighborhood and say, "Well, there was a criminal there, so we destroyed everybody. Now there's no criminal anymore." But you cannot justify one crime with another. It's simply common sense. Yet that's exactly how international law works today—or rather, not international law, but the so-called international rules-based order.

#Nima

Thank you, Carl. It was a great pleasure. I think what's happening right now—it seems to me this war is going to continue. Donald Trump, the way they're trying to communicate, there's no solution for what's going on, as far as we've learned from the analysis. Because Donald Trump is trying to intimidate on one side, and on the other hand, you see the Iranians refusing, rejecting a ceasefire. I think we're going to have this war as long as Donald Trump is in office in Washington.

#Jacques

Well, the problem is that Donald Trump has such a big ego that he will never accept defeat. So the only way to get him to solve the conflict is to make him accept the idea that defeat is actually a victory for him. And that's a challenge.

#Nima

Exactly.

#Jacques

Thank you, Carl. My pleasure. Thanks very much for inviting me. Thank you.

#Nima

You.