

# Seyed M. Marandi: Israel Breaks Ceasefire, Iran Retaliates With Missile Strikes

Seyed Mohammad Marandi discusses the ceasefire - what was agreed and how it is broken. Marandi is a professor at Tehran University and a former advisor to Iran's Nuclear Negotiation Team. (Recorded 08 April 2026) Follow Prof. Glenn Diesen: Substack: <https://glennndiesen.substack.com/> X /Twitter: [https://x.com/Glenn\\_Diesen](https://x.com/Glenn_Diesen) Patreon: <https://www.patreon.com/glenndiesen> Support the research by Prof. Glenn Diesen: PayPal: <https://www.paypal.com/paypalme/glenndiesen> Buy me a Coffee: [buymeacoffee.com/gdieseng](https://buymeacoffee.com/gdieseng) Go Fund Me: <https://gofund.me/09ea012f> Books by Prof. Glenn Diesen: <https://www.amazon.com/stores/author/B09FPQ4MDL>

## #Glenn

Welcome back. We're joined today by Saeed Mohammed Marandi, a professor at Tehran University and former advisor to Iran's nuclear negotiation team. It's good to see you again, and I'm glad to hear Tehran is quieter today.

## #Seyed M. Marandi

Thank you very much for inviting me, Glenn. It's always a pleasure to be on your show. Yes, I'm at home, and things are quiet, but the Israeli regime has been slaughtering Lebanese today. They've been carpet-bombing all sorts of different cities, in violation of the ceasefire agreement—although Trump says it's not part of the ceasefire. But the Pakistani Prime Minister has said very clearly, and he tweeted, that Lebanon is part of the ceasefire. Since the regime is continuing its slaughter and targeting ordinary people, the Iranians have fired missiles and shut down the Strait of Hormuz again. So it's unclear where things are going to go—whether we're going to have continued airstrikes against us by the Israeli regime or not. I think that probably will continue, and we'll have to see what the Americans do.

## #Glenn

Yeah, I should have said we're recording this today, on the 8th of April. And you were just saying before we started recording that, as we speak, Iranian missiles are now flying toward Israel in response to Israel's breach of the ceasefire agreement. But I guess a good place to start would be: what are the actual terms? Because I find it quite extraordinary—it's such an important issue. I mean, the whole world is, you know, caught up in this war against Iran. And we're getting, you know, the Wall Street Journal saying one thing, Reuters saying another. I mean, what are the actual terms, and why is it so difficult to get a clear-cut answer to this?

## **#Seyed M. Marandi**

Well, first, the United States said that Iran must surrender—unconditional surrender, at least Trump did, like in the previous 12-day war. Then gradually that evolved into the 15-point plan, which Iran rejected. After that, Iran began to develop its own plan, which the Supreme National Security Council gave to the leader, Ayatollah Sayyid Mujtaba al-Khamenei, and he made some changes. They finalized a plan and sent it to Pakistan. Ultimately, Trump agreed that this would be the framework for negotiations. Now, that doesn't mean we're going to have peace. It doesn't mean the United States will agree to these 10 points, even though they're very reasonable. But the United States, being an empire—and an extremely arrogant one—it's very difficult to imagine them capitulating and accepting the rights of a nation.

So my personal view is that either we're going to go back to war, or—well, it would be difficult for the United States for a number of reasons. One is that there's a lot of internal pressure in the United States. That's why Trump accepted this in the first place—the Iranian framework. And there's also a lot of international pressure on the United States. And remember, the Strait of Hormuz, right now as we speak, is closed. In addition to that, I was in the war many years ago, so I can't say I'm an expert on military affairs. I thought back to the 1980s, when I was a volunteer—but that was a long time ago. U.S. equipment has to remain in the region, and the Persian Gulf gets very humid and hot. They also have sandstorms across the Arabian Peninsula.

If I recall correctly, in the past wars against Iraq, the U.S. military suffered a lot of damage and had to spend literally hundreds of billions of dollars to repair all the trucks, planes, and everything else. This time around, they're not even well protected because their bases have been destroyed, and they were rushed into the region. It was supposed to be a very short war where they would easily defeat Iran. So I think it's going to be very difficult for the United States to maintain this force in the region without it becoming a larger and more difficult burden as each day goes by. Still, the Iranians are preparing themselves for the worst, because we already negotiated with the Americans twice, and we saw how both of those attempts to negotiate turned out.

As we were negotiating, they launched a 12-day war—a blitzkrieg attack. Then last month, again, we were negotiating, making progress, and they launched another war. So it's not as if the Iranians are going to have any faith in the upcoming negotiations. And as I speak, the Israelis are doing whatever they can to prevent peace from spreading. These vicious attacks on Lebanon—just slaughtering women and children. Hundreds have been murdered in the last few hours. It's just unbelievable. This is being done to prevent the ceasefire from working. And Trump, by changing his position, by saying that Lebanon is not part of it, is showing both his own weakness and showing us that we should be prepared for renewed war, despite the difficulties that would bring for the United States.

## **#Glenn**

Yeah, so Joe Kent was tweeting out a recording of himself where he was making the argument that if the U.S. wants this peace deal to work, then they have to find a way to restrain Israel. His argument was that Israel will do anything possible to disrupt or prevent this peace. And again, that's not really delving into conspiracy theories, because if you follow the Israeli media today, they're almost devastated. I also saw a video of people like Mark Levin—not in Israel, of course—but almost shaking with frustration that the ceasefire could have been accepted. I'm sure they're taking a lot of...

## **#Seyed M. Marandi**

I'm sure they're taking a lot of pleasure in the bombing of Lebanese cities and the massacre of women and children, because that's how they really are. And that's really what Netanyahu is doing—he's trying to destroy the ceasefire, but he also wants to kill people so that the Israeli public will give him more leeway, because this is a genocidal society, as we've seen in the polls.

## **#Glenn**

I've been watching those videos out of Lebanon today as well. Apparently, it's been bombed non-stop the whole day. And the videos are coming out of residential areas—just men, women, and children slaughtered. For all the people who say they're relieved there's a ceasefire, it's very strange that more of them aren't speaking out against this, because this is—well, predictably, this is destroying the ceasefire. It's a violation of the ceasefire. Well, Glenn, I'm sorry for interrupting you for the second time, but why would they say anything?

## **#Seyed M. Marandi**

I mean, Trump has been saying that he's going to obliterate Iran for a few weeks now. Recently, he's been saying he'll take Iran back to the Stone Age, and just—less than, what, 48 hours ago?—he said he's going to erase Iranian civilization from the earth. Have you seen any major Western journalists speak up in outrage about the threat to carry out the greatest Holocaust in human history, by far? Have you seen any Westerners, even opponents of Trump? Have you seen the Washington Post, the Guardian, or any of these progressive mainstream outlets—or, you know, liberals or conservatives, anyone in the mainstream?

Have any of them expressed outrage, saying, "You want to commit—" you know, "Have you seen the New York Times put out a big piece shaming Trump and calling him a war criminal?" No, because for the empire, we are all worthless. We are all Amalek, just like with the Zionists. We are all Amalek. We are subhuman—subhuman to those journalists who have two, three million followers, hundreds of thousands of followers, but have said nothing. So why should they be outraged by the slaughter of Lebanese women and children? In fact, what they'll try to do is justify it. You'll see in Western reports that these are Hezbollah strongholds or Hezbollah bases, even though they've known all along that the Israeli regime carries out the Dahiya Doctrine.

In other words, flattening the city—just like “mowing the lawn” in Gaza. Dahiya is southern Beirut; they mean, you know, destroy it. And “mowing the lawn” means flattening Gaza. That’s open policy. But none of these Western journals say anything because they have no moral compass. When I say the West is governed by the Epstein class, that’s exactly what I mean. The media is owned by the Epstein class. These are just media workers for the oligarchy. And the governments are owned by the Epstein class. Otherwise, what sane person would watch this slaughter and not be outraged?

## **#Glenn**

I think that's a fair point. I saw this news report from the BBC where they allegedly interviewed an Iranian in Tehran who argued that, well, you know, if the U.S. were to destroy all the power plants, bridges, and even drop a nuclear bomb on Tehran and wipe out everything, I guess, you know, it would be better than living under this government—sorry, regime. And this is kind of the... yeah, you know, it's the... I think it's important because it's not as if this genocidal mindset is limited to Trump alone. It's very much something you see beyond, which is kind of frightening.

And also, it's very self-destructive for the West, you could say, because the whole political West bases its legitimacy on this humanitarian, liberal, democratic narrative. So when you, on the other hand, go and provide legitimacy for actions against Iranian civilization, you spark a legitimacy crisis within as well. But I did want to ask: this ceasefire is supposed to set the terms over the next two weeks. During those two weeks, negotiations have to persist toward something more concrete—something where Trump can't just tweet something out twenty minutes from now and essentially pull Lebanon out of the deal. Are two weeks enough? Do you think anything can actually come out of it at the end of those two weeks?

## **#Seyed M. Marandi**

I think if things go very well, the two weeks will be extended, and maybe they'll agree on some minor or easier issues to deal with. I don't believe we're going to have an agreement with the United States over the ten points that Iran has put in the plan, because that's not how the United States works. It is an empire—an arrogant empire—and Trump is the most arrogant of the arrogant emperors of empire. And on top of that, Trump is... he's all over the place. He'll say something today and something else tomorrow. He'll say one thing in the morning and the opposite in the afternoon. He'll say something in one sentence and then contradict himself in the next.

So I do not envy those who are going to be negotiating with the United States—directly, indirectly, or passing messages back and forth. But what I think right now is that the big question is whether we're going to see renewed fighting between Iran and the United States in the coming weeks. Again, I'm sure the Iranians are preparing themselves as we speak for further bloodshed and further

attacks. But I think it will be, as I said earlier, difficult for Trump to restart this war because it's already very unpopular. It has gone nowhere, and there's absolutely no sign that Iran has grown any weaker.

For 40 days, the Iranians have been firing missiles day and night at the Israeli regime, at the U.S.—missiles and drones—at U.S. assets in the Persian Gulf, and at proxies that are complicit in the war. There's no end to Iran's capabilities in the months to come. My understanding is that Iran has far more missiles and drones than anyone can imagine. We've discussed this before. Iran has been preparing for this war for 25 years, and it's very confident about its capabilities and the failure of that operation that was meant to steal Iran's uranium. I think that also adds to the pressure on Trump. So, for a host of reasons, I think it's going to be difficult for him to restart it. But again, Iran is not going to take any chances—it's going to prepare itself.

## **#Glenn**

Well, is it possible that the war takes on a different form if the U.S. wants to exit and essentially hand it over to the Gulf states or to Israel? Is it possible that it will transition into only an Iranian–Israeli war? They might say, “Well, Lebanon's not part of the ceasefire,” and Iran says, “Well, then Israel's not part of the ceasefire,” and it just takes on a different format. Because I also saw a report right before we logged on that a Mirage fighter from the United Arab Emirates was apparently attacking an Iranian target—petrochemical facilities on, I guess, Lavan Island. And yeah, so... I also saw some statements coming out of the UAE saying they wanted reparations from Iran. I'm not sure why they'd want to keep this war going. They're very vulnerable, especially if the U.S. doesn't want to have a leading role anymore. But is it possible that this becomes the U.S. excusing itself and handing things over to the Gulf states and the Israelis?

## **#Seyed M. Marandi**

Well, the Persian Gulf regimes are not in a position to fight Iran. And if they do—well, as I said earlier—we're heading toward warm weather. You've been to Tehran; we have mountains full of snow right now. But if you have no electricity, it'll get very hot in the summer, and it'll be difficult to sleep at night in that heat if you don't have your cooler, the AC on. In the Emirates, if they lose electricity, if they lose their critical infrastructure, everyone will have to leave. The same is true for Kuwait and Qatar. All the assets of these regimes are right along the coast—they're deserts. In fact, Yemen, Iran, Iraq, and Lebanon have forests.

They have forests in some seasons, but these countries are deserts. All they have is oil and gas, and they're totally dependent on that for their economy. All of their installations are right in front of Iran—they're not deep inside. These countries are small, except for the Saudis. So if they want to get into a conflict with Iran, I think that would be the end of these regimes. It would end very swiftly. The Emirates should remember that they're not that important and should know their place. Iran will control the Strait of Hormuz. So if the Emirates wants to fight, Iran will hit it and won't

allow it to use the Strait of Hormuz, and probably the ruling family would be gone within a few days. The same is true for the others.

So I don't see them in any position to confront Iran. Regarding the Israeli regime, that's quite possible. If Iran strikes because of the violations and the slaughter of women and children in Lebanon, the Israeli regime may retaliate. And since the Israeli regime uses American support—the Americans help them refuel Israeli jets—we'll have to see what role the United States will want to play in all this. That could again lead to an Iran–U.S. confrontation. But we've had Iran and the Israeli regime strike at each other before—that was the 12-day war—and we've been seeing that over the past 40 days. The Iranians are more than prepared to keep doing this, to strike them time and time again until they stop. But then the Strait of Hormuz will remain closed.

And then the world will recognize that it's the Israeli regime that is leading its people, their societies, and their countries toward catastrophe. Netanyahu and the Zionists are pushing the world toward a global depression. By violating the ceasefire, slaughtering people in Lebanon, and restarting the fight, they're blocking the normalization of the flow of oil, LNG, and fertilizers. So the pressure will build on Trump and the Israeli regime. For example, India—whose government has been close to the Israeli regime—I think they know quite well where their economy is heading and who is responsible. So will the Indians continue to show the kind of support they did after all the Israeli regime has done to their economy? Who knows?

## **#Glenn**

Well, I saw Pete Hegseth giving a speech—well, he gives a lot of speeches—but it seemed to me like a big effort to sell this war as a victory. He said the Iranians were begging for this deal and went on listing all the people they had killed as a way of portraying it as a victory. But it did make me think about the pressure Trump must be under, because he has to sell this as a victory, as you said. He initially argued that the only acceptable outcome was the unconditional surrender of Iran, but now suddenly the Iranians and Americans will meet again to negotiate.

But instead of negotiating enrichment—Iranian enrichment, ballistic missiles, regional partnerships—they'll start negotiating Iran's control of Hormuz. It's like setting up a toll booth, essentially, to charge ships for transit. They're going to negotiate removing all sanctions on Iran. It's going to be very difficult for Trump, I think, to sell this as a victory, when, you know, this is not what you'd negotiate with an adversary that just capitulated. It doesn't really make much sense. So, you know, I don't mean to demean his skill at BS, but this goes far beyond that, I think.

## **#Seyed M. Marandi**

Yes, we've reached new heights in BS when it comes to Trump. But I think the important thing right now is that until we have a real ceasefire, I don't see the normalization of energy flow from the Persian Gulf region happening. And on the other hand, if these Arab regimes in the Persian Gulf

want to behave in a confrontational manner toward Iran, I mean, they're going to have to pay compensation. They're going to have to pay reparations for what they've done. But if they want to push, then they'll definitely be on the losing end.

I think after forty days, when the superpower and its Israeli ally—which, of course, has all the same weapons the superpower has—along with all its proxies in the region who directly supported them, and other regimes that indirectly supported them, like Turkey and the Republic of Azerbaijan, who helped the Israelis and Americans in their own way, the governments... If the United States couldn't defeat Iran under those conditions and was seeking a ceasefire, then what in the world do the United Arab Emirates or Kuwait think they're going to do to Iran? So they should stand down, stay calm, and accept the fact that they lost this war.

They were complicit. They helped Iran carry out this war. But again, I think the big question is what's going to happen in Lebanon. Iran is now hitting the Israeli regime—so is the Israeli regime going to keep striking Lebanon? Is it going to start striking Iran again? It's not at all clear that we're even going to get to negotiations. And if we do get to negotiations, with the Strait of Hormuz being closed, it's not clear how much progress we can make. Because if the United States is not willing or capable of reining in their mad dog in Tel Aviv, then I think there will be no purpose to those talks.

## **#Glenn**

How do you unpack the deal now for the ceasefire? Because they said no more strikes on Lebanon, but the Israelis are already occupying Lebanon—they're in Lebanon. Under this deal, are they withdrawing, or are they holding their positions? What exactly is expected from each side here?

## **#Seyed M. Marandi**

I don't know those specific details. That's a very good point. Actually, I asked someone about this, and he didn't know either. So I guess that'll come out in the days ahead. If I get any news on that, I'll send it to you so you can use it for your next programs. But I don't know. That's a very good question because the way Hezbollah has been fighting this time around is very different from the previous war. Hezbollah has been much more fluid this time, fighting less like a conventional force and more like a commando force. They've been hitting the Israeli regime very hard. So where exactly are the lines?

That's an open question. Last time, Hezbollah held them back, and the only reason the Israelis came in was after the ceasefire—when the Israeli regime violated it—and the government in Beirut was under pressure from the United States. Because of the lack of a strong army in the South, the regime moved forward after that. This time around, since the battlefield is, as I said, a different kind of war and Hezbollah has been very successful, it's unclear to me what a ceasefire would even mean—unless, of course, it means the Israelis would have to return to the borders, which are clear, or to where they were before this war, which is more or less clear. But I don't know.

## **#Glenn**

It just seems extraordinary that this is what's disrupting the entire ceasefire. Because, again, if the Pakistani prime minister—who, you know, was the go-between—argues that Lebanon is part of the deal, and now we hear from President Trump that no, it's not part of the deal, he called it a, quote, "separate skirmish." I mean, it is quite extraordinary. There must be some document. It's just shocking to me that there's nothing to be said there. But also, even if it was or wasn't, either way, one would have to explain why this intense bombing began exactly today, on the first day of the ceasefire. Why this brutal carpet bombing of Beirut? I mean, one can only interpret it as an effort to disrupt the ceasefire. But if the U.S. wants the ceasefire, why no pushback then against the Israelis for doing this? I mean, at least wait a week until the ceasefire seems to be settling. It just seems an obvious effort to disrupt the whole thing.

## **#Seyed M. Marandi**

And, you know, again, it's repetitive what I'm saying, and I apologize. But is there any condemnation coming from Europe or the United States for the carpet bombing? Is anyone outraged? Are there any sanctions going to be put in place? No. So the Israeli regime can do whatever it wants. And that is basically why the Iranians are going to have to meet force with force—because the United States and the West allow the Israeli regime to get away with everything. I mean, they've gotten away with genocide for two and a half years. True, the world has turned against it. Public opinion has turned against it. Ordinary Americans are turning against it. But still, the elites in Washington and across Europe fully support the genocide and the genocidal acts.

So for Iran, how can you negotiate with a regime—a Trump regime—where the president changes his position? As you said, the Pakistani prime minister very clearly says it's part of the agreement. And this is the Pakistani prime minister who listens carefully to what the Americans say. I don't want to be insulting or anything, but I think you saw his tweet where he basically copied and pasted the American tweet, posted it as his own, and then they had to change it. It was clear that the text was an American text. So when the Pakistanis are so deeply influenced by the United States, when they say that Lebanon is part of the ceasefire, then it is definitely part of the ceasefire.

## **#Glenn**

Well, let's just move one step further—that is, into the actual deal that's being made. What shocked much of the American media was that Trump accepted that the Strait of Hormuz would be controlled by Iran. Or more specifically, was it supposed to be both the Iranians and Oman co-managing it? Or at least both being able to collect some fees for using the Strait? Is this an effort to set up some kind of collective security or economic arrangement, as opposed to only having Iran do it? Or was this

part of a compromise? Because I can see why Iran would claim it, if it wants reparations for what was done against it. But Oman— is it more about geography, or is it about collective security? How do you make sense of this?

## **#Seyed M. Marandi**

Well, first of all, Oman has had a much more reasonable relationship with Iran. And during the last 40 days, I'm sure you've seen—and your viewers have noticed—that Iran has left Oman untouched, even though it also hosts American bases. Iran has done that because Oman has behaved better than the others; it's treated it differently. And Oman, of course, is the country that owns the other side of the Strait of Hormuz. It would be easier for Iran if Oman were cooperating with it regarding the status and management of the Strait of Hormuz. Now, what exactly would that relationship be? What would Oman get out of this? What would Iran get out of this?

That, I think, is something that will have to come out of negotiations. But those negotiations have already been taking place, and the Iranian parliament is preparing a law regarding the management of the Strait of Hormuz. The interesting thing is, we would never have moved in this direction if the United States hadn't launched this war. We had no plans to take control of the Strait of Hormuz, but the United States basically pushed us that way. And I must say, Glenn, that by controlling the Strait of Hormuz, Iran becomes a much more powerful country than it was before—especially by really winning the war. And I'm not saying the war is over.

By winning the war, the Iranians, I think, have become a much more powerful country. This is something we discussed earlier—maybe a couple of weeks ago. Iran is much more powerful today, and in my opinion, the United States is a much weaker entity than it was before. I think countries across the Global South will see this as a major sign of U.S. weakness. These are countries that, almost universally—except for China—used to back down whenever the United States bullied them about trade and tariffs. Now, perhaps they'll be a bit more assertive in defending their rights: the Indians, the Pakistanis, the Bangladeshis—across the world, across the global majority.

They've been bullied, and now Iran has basically told the Americans no. The Americans committed the worst crimes against the country, along with their allies—and they failed. So I think Iran becomes much more powerful. The United States, relatively speaking, becomes much weaker. The Israeli regime loses because it did not succeed in this war, and its main supporter has lost a lot of credibility and authority. That's bad for the regime itself. But the big losers are also these five family dictatorships in the Persian Gulf. They wanted to have their cake and eat it too—and now they're hungry and have no cake.

## **#Glenn**

I interviewed yesterday a common friend of ours, Alistair Crooke, who was making the same point—that Iran's seeming victory in this war is quite transformative for the entire international system. It's

not just a military victory over the former global hegemon, but also, uh, the economic aspect of it. You can argue that only controlling a share of oil exports—some say it could amount to up to a hundred billion a year—I'm not sure, I haven't, you know, checked the numbers, but anyway, it's quite significant. Yeah, it's not just the money, but also, as you said, the ability to stand up to the United States. This trade can then be organized in other currencies, which puts the petrodollar under stress.

It would also essentially raise the cost of being an American frontline state—vassal, ally, whatever one wants to call it. And this, again, would have ramifications even beyond the Middle East—Europe, East Asia. So this is going to have a huge impact. But it's quite extraordinary what has happened, and how foolish it was for Trump to actually get into this war. I mean, when he saw all the former presidents who were under great pressure to attack Iran but never did, the idea that this was just because they weren't as strong as him, not as decisive—as opposed to not being as foolish—is quite amazing. But there have been some reports that it was China that called Iran and asked them to accept a ceasefire deal to end the war. Do you have any information on this, or...?

## **#Seyed M. Marandi**

I doubt that's true, because what was important for Iran was for Trump to give up his 15-point plan and recognize Iran's 10-point plan. Iran is under no illusion that Trump is going to come to the negotiating table and say, "Okay, I accept," and everything is finished and we just move on. But that, I think, was important. It was a very symbolic moment for the entire world. I think it marks a major shift in global affairs—perhaps, and again, we could still have war—but perhaps, in a way, if not the most significant, then one of the most significant moments since the Second World War. I personally think it may be the most significant in the last 40 days. But for Trump to make that transition, to accept that—that's a humiliation. There's no other way to look at it. And that was important for Iran.

But at the same time, Iran is, again, under no illusions. Right now, it briefly opened the Strait of Hormuz and then closed it again because of what the Israeli regime did. It's firing missiles at the Israeli regime, and it's also fired missiles and drones at these Arab regimes after that strike was carried out against Iran. So Iran is going to prepare itself in case Trump wants to go back to war, or feels that he has to go back to war. But I should also point out that Iran is going to treat friendly countries differently from those that have cooperated with the Americans in this aggression. So I think Chinese, Russian, and Iraqi ships will be treated differently from Saudi, British, American, Canadian, or Australian ships.

## **#Glenn**

Well, just a last question. Given that this war has already spread, and it's not merely a war between the United States and Iran—as is obvious with Israel attacking Lebanon—you mentioned previously that some borders could be changed in this war. For example, Iraq might seize Kuwait. Well, I mean,

it's not as if Iran is this puppet master controlling everything in the region. It has regional partners and allies, but they have some autonomy and their own interests. How much can we expect things to die down as a result of this? I know this is the driving force, but do you see other parts of this conflict continuing—for example, Kuwait ending up as Iraqi territory?

## **#Seyed M. Marandi**

Well, the strength of Iran—part of it lies in the fact that it has these alliances. There's no doubt about that. Iraq has played an enormous role in this war, and it has, to a degree, liberated itself from American occupation—not fully, but it has achieved major results. Yemen too, and of course Hezbollah, are taking this opportunity to hit back at the Israeli regime so they can reclaim their countries, the occupied territories, and have a real ceasefire, because the Israeli regime has been killing Lebanese civilians every day since the so-called ceasefire, just like they do in Gaza. So this is a collective strength. But the future depends on these Arab family regimes. If these regimes did not allow the United States to use their airspace, their territory, their seas, and their shorelines, we would not have had this war.

Americans could not carry out a war under those circumstances—it would have been much more difficult. And I don't think they would have launched the war in the first place. If these regimes rethink their foreign policy and behave like normal countries, instead of conspiring and bringing in foreign powers to create a platform for invasions, if they discontinue that policy, they will be safe. It will never be like it was before. Those Epstein-class billionaires are not ever going to come back to the Emirates and Qatar, with all that corruption they're well known for. That's not going to return—fortunately, for them and for their own people. They can live normally. But if they choose a different path, I don't think their countries will exist in the future. And then the borders will change.

## **#Glenn**

Yeah, no, that's a great point. I mean, even if the ceasefire would hold and a permanent peace deal came through after this, the damage has already been done. I mean, people focus on the global economy, with the energy and the...

## **#Glenn**

The fertilizers, all of this. But for the Gulf states, it's going to be very hard—especially for Qatar and the United Arab Emirates—to recover from this, it seems. Still, I feel like even if peace is reached, the repercussions are something we'll have to deal with for many years to come. Yeah, "interesting" is one word for it, but it's quite disruptive, and I keep going back to that point. It's pretty amazing, given how predictable a lot of this should have been, that they still chose this war. But yeah, let's hope the ceasefire holds—though I share your pessimism.

## **#Seyed M. Marandi**

Thank you very much for taking the time. Just one final point—and I've said this in a couple of other places, if not more—you know, it didn't have to be this way. If the Americans hadn't listened to the Zionists, we wouldn't be in this situation at all, and the global economy would be much better. It's the Zionists who brought this about. And you know, two American authors I mentioned earlier—I said to Flint and Hillary Leverett, I don't know if you know them—have you read their book *\*Going to Tehran\**? No? It's a very good book, and I advise people to read it. They worked in the White House under George W. Bush, and Flint Leverett resigned over Iraq. But they were people in power, and they wrote a very good book on Iran. I don't agree with everything in it, but it's called *\*Going to Tehran\**.

They were attacked by both the Republicans and the Democrats, and by all the think tankers. They were demonized and marginalized. But if they had been listened to—if that book had been read and people had paid attention to them—we wouldn't be where we are today. By now, Iran and the United States would have had normal relations. But the Zionists wouldn't have it. And even though Hillary Leverett is Jewish, she was demonized for this book. Two very, very decent people—very principled people. But, you know, this is what Zionism does. It's destructive, just like when they carpet-bombed Beirut. They carpet-bomb everything in our region, and they carpet-bomb the prospects for peace, stability, and prosperity for people across the world. The energy crisis that's now beginning to show itself is a result of this.

## **#Glenn**

Well, it's an important historical fact that, especially after the September 11 attacks, Iran was working very hard to improve and even normalize relations with the U.S.—to actually work with the United States—and tried many times to do so. And Russia too, by the way. It's often pointed out that Putin was the first one who called after the attacks, and he saw this as an opportunity to move beyond the whole Cold War legacy, to find himself on the same page and work together. But sometimes they don't take "yes" as an answer.

## **#Seyed M. Marandi**

Yeah, and also because Iran at that time—and I, at that time—believed the official narrative of 9/11. We thought the United States had learned its lesson. Only years later did I realize I'd ignored a lot of people and probably done injustice to some. For many years, I accepted the 9/11 story as it was. But in the last couple of years, my views have evolved very drastically. I've seen Tucker Carlson's documentary and other evidence. Back then, Iran really thought the United States had learned a lesson—that using extremists, terrorists, and takfiris had caused such damage that they would change. But soon we saw Wesley Clark tell us that the plan was to invade seven countries in five years. And now, when you look at it, I think it becomes clear what all that was about. The only difference is that instead of five years, it took twenty-five—and the last country didn't work out as planned.

## **#Glenn**

Now we've installed an al-Qaeda leader in Syria. I just feel like we've seen this movie before. Didn't care for it, but here we are again. So no—lessons not learned, it seems. Well, I know you're quite busy there in Tehran, so as always, thank you very much for taking the time.

## **#Seyed M. Marandi**

Thank you, Glenn Diesen.

## **#Seyed M. Marandi**

It's always a great honor to be mentioned.