

# Is Iran Now a World Power? Chas Freeman on Ceasefire

Is the US–Iran ceasefire a genuine step toward peace—or just a strategic pause? Support Independent media to remain bold: <https://patreon.com/IndiaGlobalLeft> Link for donation: <https://paypal.me/sankymudiar> In this in-depth conversation, veteran diplomat Chas Freeman breaks down the real forces behind the US-Iran ceasefire negotiations and what they reveal about shifting power dynamics in West Asia. We explore: What led to the US-Iran ceasefire Whether Washington actually wants to end the war—or is buying time The future of US-Israel relations amid rising tensions The debate over Iran’s global status—responding to Robert Pape’s claim that Iran is now a world power How Iran’s resistance is reshaping regional politics in West Asia The impact on Palestine, as global attention shifts away from ongoing occupation and settlement expansion Freeman offers a sharp, historically grounded perspective on imperial strategy, regional resistance, and the emerging geopolitical order. Follow us on Substack: <https://substack.com/@indiagloballeft> Twitter: <https://twitter.com/Indiagloballeft> Instagram <https://www.instagram.com/indiagloballeft/> Facebook: <https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61559411353392> Spotify: <https://open.spotify.com/show/69Y9iCWUv8ha3ATsPWtWk0?si=ee1f0de3de094f17> Telegram: <https://t.me/+WNIqoiv1Rhg5NjEx> Key Themes: US foreign policy, Iran war, Israel strategy, West Asia geopolitics, Palestine, global power shifts, imperialism US Iran ceasefire, Chas Freeman interview, Iran war analysis, US Israel relations, Iran global power, Robert Pape Iran, West Asia geopolitics, Palestine Israel conflict, Iran resistance, US foreign policy, Middle East analysis, imperialism, geopolitics 2026

## #Mudiar

Hello and welcome to another episode of \*India and the Global Left\*. If you’re new to the show, please smash that subscribe button. Also, consider becoming a YouTube member, a patron, or donating a small amount using the link in the description box. Without further ado, let me welcome our guest tonight, Ambassador Chas Freeman. Ambassador Freeman is a retired American diplomat and writer. Ambassador Freeman, welcome back to \*India and the Global Left\*.

## #Chas

I’m glad to join you, Jyotishman.

## #Mudiar

The American and Iranian officials have already met with the Pakistani mediators as we speak. Before we go deeper, could you tell us your sense of what led to the ceasefire between the U.S. and Iran?

## **#Chas**

Well, I think basically the problem in the talks illustrates what happened. Iran knows it did not win the war, but it knows the United States and Israel lost the war. The United States does not accept that it has been defeated. The Trump administration is populated with people who foolishly believe that the outcome of a war is decided by how many bombs you drop, not by the transformation of military pressure into a political result. So the two sides are in Islamabad with no meeting of the minds. They can't agree about what they agreed about. So that is essentially the issue. But if you stand back a bit, I mean, it's quite clear.

Iran has achieved some of its objectives. It has gotten sanctions relief. It has now doubled its income from oil since the war began, which is the opposite of what you might expect. It's now selling oil for \$110 or \$120 a barrel, whereas before the war it sold at a discount from the world price, about \$47 or so. So that's one objective achieved. Another is that it has demonstrated, through its fortitude and its ability to take punishment, that it is prepared to accept a very high price for maintaining its independence and national integrity. And third, it has seized control of the Strait of Hormuz—something Iranian nationalists have talked about but never really contemplated seriously.

And it is, in effect, operating a toll road through the Strait of Hormuz, charging about \$2 million—not in dollars, but in Chinese currency or cryptocurrency—to any ship it decides should be permitted to transit the Strait. The transit is limited to those countries or vessels associated with countries, and with cargoes from or to countries, that are not hostile to Iran. In other words, Iran is deciding whether to let its friends through, but it will not let its foes through. This has put the world, including countries in the region, in a real bind. They have to court Iran now if they wish to survive economically. So we see South Korea and Japan going to Tehran on bended knee because they're so dependent on Persian Gulf oil.

We see countries like your own—India and Turkey—and China, of course, having worked out arrangements with the Iranians to meet their requirements, pay the fee, and get through. All this was working quite well until Donald Trump's eruption of threats at Iran, which he believes brought Iran to the negotiating table. I don't think that's accurate. But when he did that, and the ceasefire agreement—or I should say the make-believe ceasefire agreement—emerged, because it isn't a ceasefire, it's only a lull in the fighting, it could have been transformed into a real ceasefire if the parties in the talks in Islamabad were serious. But I don't think they're prepared to compromise. Anyway, the Strait is essentially shut down now.

And there have been many instances of collateral damage. I think one of the great sufferers from this has been India, which has lost the discount on Russian oil that it had. Of course, the Russians, as a result of the war now, do not have sanctions on their oil exports. But India is paying a very high price for oil, either from the Persian Gulf or from Russia. And the rest of the world is about to experience a shockwave as the ships that left the Gulf prior to the February 28th initiation of this war by Israel and the United States unload their cargoes. Then there will be no further cargoes following them. So we're talking about oil prices, which are, what, about \$110 a barrel or so now, going up to maybe \$200 a barrel in fairly short order.

All of this goes back to who won, who lost, and why they're in Islamabad. On the American side, the midterm elections are coming up, despite Trump's efforts to manipulate or prevent them. The price of gasoline at the pump is very important to American voters, and Trump's popularity is sinking. Really, that's all he cares about—the domestic political element. On the Iranian side, one can only imagine that getting Al-Aribaf, the Speaker of the Parliament, to Islamabad must have involved very contentious arguments within the government. Hardliners are in charge. Their question is, "What's in it for us? Why should we deal again with people who are known to be deceitful, incapable, amateurish, unable to deliver an agreement—like Steven Witkoff and Jared Kushner?"

They are in Islamabad with J.D. Vance, in my opinion, primarily to watch him and report back to Donald Trump. At this point, the only person in the world who trusts either of them is Trump. In fact, Foreign Minister Araghchi of Iran asked the United States not to send them because they're toxic. So you could also say that if you look for a broader solution here, it will probably have to be crafted between Iran and the Gulf Arab states—not just Oman, which is already engaged in joint management of the Strait of Hormuz under an arrangement with Iran, but the others as well. Israel isn't part of this package, but it is, in effect, represented in Islamabad by Witkoff and Kushner, who are ardent Zionists and will tend to Israeli interests.

Who isn't there? Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Turkey—the three countries that joined Pakistan in promoting a Chinese peace proposal, or a set of principles, and who backed the Pakistani foreign minister in flying to Beijing and in his mediation efforts. So all that's happened so far, as we know, is that the two delegations have met Shabazz Sharif, the Pakistani prime minister, separately. They're not going to meet directly. And I wish Pakistan good luck, because I don't think there's any common ground at all between the positions of the two sides. So let me stop. I haven't mentioned Lebanon yet—but let me do that, actually, before I stop, if I may. The importance of Lebanon to Iran is twofold.

First, of course, Iran has been the traditional protector of Lebanon and the sponsor or supporter of Hezbollah, a movement that grew out of opposition to the Israeli invasion and occupation of 1982. Therefore, Iran is very inclined to do what it can to support Lebanon against Israeli aggression. But the other reason—the more important one—is that Iran has seen the Israeli aggression against Lebanon in two ways. First, it's an obvious attempt to sabotage the ceasefire. Israel doesn't want a

ceasefire; Israel wants to destroy Iran. Second, and more important for the Iranians, it's a test of whether the United States can, in fact, rein Israel in.

It appears that the White House is sufficiently eager to exit this war that they did two things: one, sending J.D. Vance, the vice president, to Islamabad as a symbol of their intent and seriousness of purpose; and second, putting pressure on Israel to halt the invasion and aggression in Lebanon—still going on, by the way. There's supposed to be some sort of meeting in Washington between the Lebanese government and the Israelis, but the Lebanese government is not the master of its own house and has no power to disarm Hezbollah, as Israel demands. In fact, it would be anomalous indeed for Hezbollah to be disarmed while Israel invades and attempts to annex part of Lebanon. Hezbollah will not do that, and the Lebanese government cannot force them to. So the so-called negotiations in Washington are yet another performative act with no prospect of success. I'm very pessimistic about how this is going to turn out, so I'll end there, having gone on quite a bit.

## **#Mudiar**

You mentioned the lack of common ground between the two sides. I've been thinking about this 15-point proposal put forward by the United States, which, let's say, can be summed up as maximalist U.S. demands on Iran, and the 10-point proposal from the Iranian side, which are, of course, very reasonable—things like ending sanctions, establishing permanent peace, and the right to enrichment under the NPT. But demands such as ending U.S. bases can be read as, quote-unquote, Iranian maximalist positions.

Now, the very fact that Trump agreed to open negotiations based on the ten points indicates that he's somewhat desperate for a ceasefire, or at least an end to the war. Of course, people should be asking whether this is a genuine attempt to reach a ceasefire and a negotiated settlement, or just another bluff to regroup and launch another attack, given what we've seen over the past year since June. What's your sense—does the U.S. administration actually want to end the war, or is it just another bluff?

## **#Chas**

No, I think the administration is definitely desperate to end this war. They imagined it would be an in-and-out, four-day operation. They imagined all kinds of things that their own intelligence agencies told them were wrong. Their military told them they were wrong, but they went ahead anyway. So I think the way to think of these negotiations is as the war after the war. That is, the war is still going on, but now it's happening in meetings in Islamabad, at least for the time being. You know, Clausewitz famously said that war is the continuation of policy by military means. I'd say diplomacy is the continuation of war by rhetorical means at this point. So the real question is not whether the talks in Islamabad are going to end the war—because clearly they will not. The war will continue. The real question is whether the war resumes with the firing of missiles and so forth.

That is, does it go kinetic? You know, Iran apparently still has quite a trove of usable missiles left. It's not out of them at all. The United States and Israel, on the other hand, have run out of interception capability. So we're in a strange position where each side can clobber the other, and neither side can defend against those clobberings. What happens in this situation, usually, I would say, is determined by what I call the balance of fervor—that is, how intensely committed you are to the objectives at stake in a war. We've seen this balance of fervor at work, for example, in Vietnam, where the Vietnamese seriousness of purpose about reunifying the country was far stronger than the will of the United States to prevent that. So here, I think the balance of fervor is very definitely with Iran.

And that should count for something. The wild card in this is Israel, because Israel's objective is, as it's demonstrating in Lebanon, to establish a Greater Israel. The principal—indeed, the only real—obstacle to that has been Iran. So Israel's determination to destroy Iran is directly linked to its own vision of the future. And Benjamin Netanyahu has wanted to go down in history as the man who brought Greater Israel into existence. Greater Israel, in its farthest extension, is of course the entire expanse of territory between the Euphrates and the Nile—that is, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, parts of Saudi Arabia and Egypt, as well as Jordan—all under the control of Zionism. I don't think that's ever going to happen, but it remains a dream of conquest by Israel that is very real.

Now, we're watching polls in Israel that suggest many Israelis have had enough of this war. It began with about 80% of Israelis supporting it, and now that's down to about 50%. Mr. Netanyahu has never been popular in all quarters, and it's very possible that the results of this war will mean regime change—not in Iran, but in the United States and Israel—as Donald Trump loses authority and legitimacy with voters, and Benjamin Netanyahu finally meets defeat at the polls in Israel. Of course, we don't know what will happen then, because the people around Netanyahu are essentially fascist fanatics—religious fanatics. Anyway, another unfortunate result of this war has been the complete trashing of international law.

And we've seen further evidence of that in the British sellout over the Chagos Islands decision, which was portrayed as ceding sovereignty to Mauritius but was, in fact, a decision by the British government driven by legal reasoning and judicial pressure—both of which Britain has now brushed aside. So much for international law. It's ironic, in that regard, to hear American spokespeople describe Iran's control of the Strait of Hormuz as contrary to international law. International law has been reduced to a pretense you can invoke to justify your position if it happens to favor you, but otherwise ignore—or, in fact, openly violate—at will.

## **#Mudiar**

If the Trump administration is desperate to end at least the kinetic component of the war—and I'm making a distinction based on what you said, between the war that's been going on for so long and the kinetic part of it—then the question comes up: what is the relationship between the United States and Israel? From what I've been reading, it seemed to me that sentiment in Israel as a whole

is still in favor of the war. You said it's down to 50%. I haven't read that report. Does that report say that 50% don't want the war, or that 50% just don't like the way Netanyahu is conducting it? I'm not sure if you can clarify that. But my question is, how do you see the relationship between the Trump administration and the Zionists in Israel—or the Israel lobby, which includes the Zionists in the United States—going forward?

## **#Chas**

Well, I would characterize the U.S.–Israeli relationship now as a marriage in which both sides would prefer divorce to continuing the bond. But there are many reasons why that's not easy. On the Israeli side, Benjamin Netanyahu has talked about turning Israel into a sort of Sparta—a militarized society that has broken its bonds of dependence on the United States. This means he understands he doesn't have the assured support of the United States anymore, even if he does have Donald Trump's support. On the American side, everything really depends on Donald Trump, for several reasons. Of course, he has a base of about one-third of American voters who are followers of his personality cult and for whom he can do no wrong.

So he has a margin built on the loyalty of that group, which prevents him from being impeached or otherwise removed from office. But in dealing with Israel, he's got two problems. One is, of course, that his principal donations have come from plutocratic Zionists—that is, he's dependent on the Zionist donor class for his continuation in politics. But second, and perhaps more important, there's obviously some sort of dirt in the Epstein files that's been successfully used to blackmail him. So he really can't move. I know that his wife, Melania, has separated herself from him over the Epstein file issue. And there are...

## **#Chas**

To the extent that Donald Trump's base is evangelical Christian, the revelations of what he appears to have done—or is rumored to have done—with Epstein could be quite devastating to him politically. So I think he's caught both by the donors and by the scandal of the Epstein issue. And so this means that divorce is not going to happen anytime soon.

## **#Mudiar**

You froze for a moment. Yeah, as I said, my signal's been down today, but it seems to be working again now. I wanted to ask you about—well, I knew when you... Go on. Go ahead. OK. Ambassador Freeman, I wanted to ask you about an article I read this morning in The New York Times by University of Chicago professor Robert Pape. He argues that this war has transformed Iran into one of the four major powers. His argument is that control over the strait would give Iran leverage over 20% of the world's oil and natural gas. And if that's coupled with 11% of Russia's oil and gas, and China's ability to consume them, then it would bypass a significant amount of economic trade and other power from the West. What's your response to that line of argument?

## #Chas

Well, I don't agree with him that Iran has emerged as one of the great powers in the same sense as China, the U.S., the Russian Federation, and potentially India. I mean, I don't see that. I think, however, that this is an illustration of something we've discussed before—namely, the emerging multilevel order. And it illustrates, as the example of Chinese control over rare earths does, the power of a defense based on control of natural resources or geography. So... it is true, I mean, I think he's got a serious point. As I mentioned earlier, people are going to Iran on bended knee, trying to work out arrangements for their energy supplies to be restored. And Iran has the ability to determine whether their economies are sound or decaying.

So we've seen Spain, for example, establish an embassy in Tehran, clearly understanding that the world has changed. You know, the Spanish prime minister has been in Beijing four times, I think, and is going again. But he's also reached out to Iran. So have the French. So have others—the Italians. You know, it's not insignificant that the Sigonella base in Sicily, from which the United States operates in the Mediterranean, has been denied to us by the Italian government. So what we're seeing is, in power terms—not military terms—the denial of a natural resource passageway like the Strait of Hormuz can, in fact, enable a middle-ranking power to checkmate a much greater power.

In a way, we already saw this in Ukraine. Ukraine, of course, was buttressed by NATO forces—retraining, re-equipment, and economic and other support against Russia. But the fact is, Russia is a vastly larger, more powerful country, and yet Ukraine has been able to stand it off. And it's done so not in the same way as Iran, but by participating in what is essentially a proxy war. So what we're seeing is a very new pattern of international relations emerging. The power of the U.S. Navy is limited—kept 500 to 700 miles away from Iranian missiles because of its vulnerability. This has meant, for example, that the U.S. can't project power in the same way without risking destruction. And we've also seen a dramatic illustration of the limits of the use of force.

There's no way to open the Strait of Hormuz except through diplomacy. And some countries, like your own, have used diplomacy to open it—at least in part—in the long run. This means, again going back to the professor's thesis, that every country in the world with an interest in the price of oil and gas is going to have to deal with Iran and try to, well, make their case to Iran, whatever they may think of the Islamic Republic's internal politics. So again, I go back to this: I think Iran knows it hasn't won this war. It's at the negotiating table to win it. And the United States doesn't understand that we've lost this war.

And we are there under the delusion that somehow we have a lot of leverage, which we don't. Of course, I have to say that a lot of the messaging about this, on both sides, is directed at domestic audiences. Trump is determined to prove that he's a tough guy, that he won the war, that it wasn't a mistake, and so forth. I think the limits of gullibility in the United States have, however, been

exceeded, and he won't be able to convince people of that. On the Iranian side, as I indicated earlier, there has been not regime change but regime consolidation around a hard line. And again, I think for Ali Baf to go to Islamabad must have been quite contentious within the government and religious establishment in Tehran.

## **#Mudiar**

What would be the impact of this elevation of Iran's status—certainly at the global level, but more definitively at the level of West Asia? I'm thinking about domestic nationalist politics in several parts of the region because, since the Second World War, there have been nationalist movements or forces here of different varieties. And since the fall of the Soviet Union, at least, the idea was that if you could somehow be a vessel for, or seek the blessing of, the United States, then you could probably trade off a lot of undesired factors. Those things have gone for a toss. So I wonder, in the long history of West Asian national movements, what is your sense of the impact of this on domestic politics?

## **#Chas**

Well, in West Asia, starting with Israel—of course, Israeli strategy has involved its direct domination of the Palestinians and others in its immediate neighborhood. It has also involved ensuring that more powerful, more distant countries remain under American tutelage and therefore subject to indirect manipulation by Israel. That second element is now in jeopardy because Israel has learned that the United States, in fact, no longer has the will to perform the protective role in the region that it once did. So U.S.-Israeli relations are on an uncertain trajectory. In Saudi Arabia, a major country, I think we've seen over the decades the Saudis seek multiple affirmations of different identities.

There really wasn't any Saudi nationalism. The Saudis responded to pan-Arabist challenges by identifying themselves as religious—in other words, an affirmation of Islam rather than nationality. Mohammed bin Salman—well, they've gone through various phases, but Mohammed bin Salman is about Saudi Arabia. It's no longer seen as a religious entity but now as a nation. And I know that the foreign minister of Saudi Arabia has already called his counterpart in Tehran. So, in the Gulf, I think the control of the Strait of Hormuz leaves the Gulf Arabs with no alternative but to swallow their anger, their distress, and, in the long run, make peace with Iran.

And that will require them to readjust their global position in geopolitics. They will have to attenuate, if not remove, the American presence from their territory because it invites Iranian attack, and that reality cannot be overcome. So they've learned that the United States not only lacks the capacity to defend them, but also lacks the will to do so—it doesn't assign them the priority they believe they should have. And here, too, I'll mention another factor that's not unimportant.

We're talking about two countries—the United States and Saudi Arabia—that are essentially under the control of strongmen. Our strongman, Donald Trump, told Mohammed bin Salman, the

strongman in Saudi Arabia, that he should kiss Trump's ass. Mohammed bin Salman apparently responded by saying they're not buying any more American weapons. Whether he can actually do that or not is another issue, but the level of anger and distrust is at an all-time high. We've already seen the fissure in the Gulf Cooperation Council, with Oman basically agreeing with Iran to split the toll fees in the waterway.

We don't know what the split is, but we do understand now that there's been some mining of the strait close to Oman, meaning ships have to pass near Iran. Presumably, they'll have to work that out. If you look to the long term, Iran has a big incentive to have good relations with the Gulf Arabs. Therefore, I think there's a basis for bargaining between them over the transit of oil from the Gulf Arabs through the Strait of Hormuz. I could see something like a major discount for countries in the Persian Gulf that had severed their dependence on the United States or dropped out of the Abraham Accords.

Or it's even conceivable that the joint management of the strait that Iran has offered to Oman might be offered more widely. So if there's to be a long-term resolution of the control of the strait—which has emerged as the central issue for the global economy—it will have to be crafted locally. Now, there are also, of course, interested parties who might aid and abet a negotiation, the negotiation of a regional settlement over control of the strait. And I'm thinking of China, India, and Europe—if there is a Europe. I mean, it depends on whether Europe exists or not as an actor.

But all three of those countries—great markets and societies—have a strong stake in how the Strait of Hormuz is managed. So there will be an effort to patch things up between Iran and the Gulf Arabs. That may have the support of external actors other than the United States. We'll see what happens. Finally, the geopolitical status of Iran, as the good professor from your alma mater, the University of Chicago, indicated—he's correct. People will be flocking to Tehran. Tehran's influence globally has just skyrocketed. I don't think that makes it a global power, but it's certainly not unimportant.

## **#Mudiar**

My final question, Ambassador Freeman, is about Palestine in light of all this. It might be a bit far-fetched to say it all began with Operation Al-Aqsa Flood on October 7th, but that was a massive point of rupture. What we're seeing now is, directly or indirectly, linked to that. Many Palestinian scholars are saying that all the attention Palestine was getting has fizzled out because of the war with Iran—and that was probably another of Netanyahu's goals in starting that war. We're not hearing as much, even in many alternative media outlets, about the death penalty law, the expansion of 32 more settlements in the past few days or weeks, the continued occupation of not just the West Bank but also Gaza, and the killings of Palestinians. So my question to you is: what could be the impact of this Iranian resistance on the resistance in Palestine?

## **#Chas**

Well, the West Asian war—the war with Iran—which has now spread quite a bit through the region, is a distraction, a diversion of attention from the underlying cause of instability in the region, which is Israeli expansionism, ethnic cleansing, and the denial of self-determination to Palestinians. There's no question about that. There's also no question that the war has been a useful distraction from the Epstein files, as well as from the charges against Netanyahu for corruption and the opposition to him within Israel.

He's a wartime prime minister. As someone said, you know, he wanted to be Churchill. He thought of Churchill in World War II, but he reenacted Churchill at Gallipoli. So anyway, since you mentioned it—namely, persuading the region that it can live with the indefinite confrontation between Palestinians and Israelis—I don't think that's anything but a passing phase. I think the Palestinian issue has now been recognized by the entire Arab world, certainly, as the key to solving it.

## **#Chas**

An absolutely essential ingredient in any peace. Views of the United States and views of Israel have never been as negative as they are now. So I think the United States is losing influence. Israel has lost acceptability—not just globally, but in the region. Countries like the United Arab Emirates, which practiced realpolitik and recognized Israel, and have stuck to that, will now find it hard to suppress public opinion. I mean, the place has fewer Filipinos, and the native population is tribal and, you know, stands behind the rulers. But they will have to, as practitioners of realpolitik, recognize the rearrangement of geopolitics and regional relationships that this war has produced.

I mean, after all, war in the end is something you resort to when you can't adjust relationships or policies by peaceful means. So war results in rearrangements—adjustments of relationships, territorial limits, and other things. And the question then is—and this is what is confronted, or actually evaded but rhetorically confronted, performatively confronted in Islamabad—the real question is: how do you reconcile the parties to a conflict with the results of the conflict? And, you know, we've learned—many of us already knew—but we've been reminded constantly that wars do not end until the defeated admit defeat.

We have nobody admitting defeat in this context. So, I don't know—I don't think the Palestinians have admitted defeat, and I don't think that conflict is going to end. I don't think that... The Arabs, you know, there are—well, I should end by saying that, as horrible as what has happened is, there are worse things that could happen. For example, Ben-Gvir wants to blow up the Al-Aqsa Mosque, destroy it, in order to rebuild the alleged temple that was there. Something like that would energize the entire two billion Muslims in the world in a way they have not been energized before. So Israel introduces all sorts of uncertainties.

And at this point, of course, we have to remind ourselves that we don't know whether, at the end of the two-week hiatus, Iran will resume bombarding Israel—and vice versa. I think the question on

the American and Israeli side is that we're running out of munitions. And that, for the United States, is very debilitating because it deprives us of the ability to respond to all sorts of contingencies, whether they're in Taiwan, Korea, or Europe. So the events that Donald Trump was persuaded by Benjamin Netanyahu to set in motion are having all kinds of domestic and international effects that some anticipated but most didn't.

## **#Mudiar**

As you said, war leads to rearrangement. I was thinking about the last 500 years of map drawing, and how a lot of geopolitical or political maps around the globe have been redrawn by wars over that time. We'll leave it there, Ambassador Freeman. Thank you so much for your time, and since it's your morning, have a wonderful rest of the day ahead.

## **#Chas**

Thank you, Mudiar. Keep well.

## **#Ayushman**

Hi, my name is Ayushman. I, along with Jyotishman, have started this platform. Over the last two years, we've tried to build content for the left and progressive forces. So far, we've interviewed economists, historians, political commentators, and activists. If you've liked our content and want us to build an archive for the left, I have two requests for you. Please consider donating to the cause—the link is in the description below. And if you're not able to, don't feel bad; you can always like and share our videos with your comrades. Finally, don't forget to hit the subscribe button.