

# Iran ATTACKS, China's Surprise STUNS Trump | Stoker & Xenophontos

Former US Army Ranger Greg Stoker and geopolitical analyst Elina Xenophontos join to discuss the latest developments in the war on Iran including Tehran's actions against ships in the Strait of Hormuz which have challenged Trump's delusion about "reopening" the waterway. We also review the shock the US empire just experienced during the Trump-Xi summit plus much more! SUPPORT THE CHANNEL ON PATREON: <https://www.patreon.com/dannyhaiphong> Colonial Outcasts: <https://www.youtube.com/@UCWUyY44cHSYW16ykKeZDXfw> [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cQJhUnI\\_zZQ&t=1182s](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cQJhUnI_zZQ&t=1182s) Follow Elina: <https://www.instagram.com/elina.xenophontos/> [https://substack.com/@UCNIX5AsBW7QCFicQh\\_BTZGg](https://substack.com/@UCNIX5AsBW7QCFicQh_BTZGg) [https://www.youtube.com/@UCNIX5AsBW7QCFicQh\\_BTZGg](https://www.youtube.com/@UCNIX5AsBW7QCFicQh_BTZGg) Follow Greg: <https://x.com/gregjstoker> IG: <https://www.instagram.com/greg.j.stoker> YouTube: [https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLFwIK85EKBXL0SvlgKawwPqld\\_kH0s0p\\_](https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLFwIK85EKBXL0SvlgKawwPqld_kH0s0p_) Support the channel in other ways: <https://www.buymeacoffee.com/dannyhaiphong> Substack: [chroniclesofhaiphong.substack.com](https://chroniclesofhaiphong.substack.com) Cashapp: \$Dhaiphong Venmo: @dannyH2020 Paypal: <https://paypal.me/spiritofho> Follow me on Telegram: <https://t.me/dannyhaiphong> #iranwar #trump #trump

## #Danny

Welcome, everyone. Welcome back to the show. It's your host, Danny Haiphong. As you can see, I am joined by friends of the show. We have a former U.S. Army Ranger, right now Green Party candidate for – or no, independent candidate for – or are you a Green Party candidate?

## #Greg Stoker

We're technically in the Green Party, but we're doing our own thing.

## #Danny

All right. So, congressional candidate and geopolitical analyst Greg Stoker, and we have geopolitical analyst Alino Sinofantos. Welcome back to the show. Thanks for coming on.

## #Greg Stoker

Good to be here.

## #Elina Xenophontos

Thanks for having us. Good to be back. Yeah.

## **#Danny**

Okay. Well, let's get into the latest developments, shall we? So first off, we know that Donald Trump is at any moment touching down back from China. A big push, Greg, for this trip was to pressure China on Iran. Iran is still taking a very hard stance on its positions in this ongoing war during the ceasefire. It has said that it's not going to discuss the nuclear file anymore with the United States in any talks, should they come about, because right now there are no talks happening.

But they're also still continuing to enforce their control over the Strait of Hormuz, which they say is going to be permanent alongside Oman. They seized a ship yesterday as well as sinking another one in the last 24 hours. And so, Greg, what I wanted to ask you is, what are your impressions of what's happening right now? We're hearing reports that Israel is clamoring for immediate strikes on Iran once Trump touches down and, I guess, gets settled. But what's your take on what's happening here and where all of this fits in the developments of the last 24 or 48 hours, or however long you've been following it?

## **#Greg Stoker**

Well, I've been looking less at the military aspect because it's pretty much at a stalemate. There's some tit-for-tat going on. Of course, Israel is always going to be clamoring for more strikes. First of all, they didn't want to do it while he was over during the trade delegation. And next week's Memorial Day weekend — that's not going to be very popular among the U.S. citizenry. But yeah, so what I've been looking at more has been this weird budget play within the Pentagon, getting in front of the Senate this week to discuss how much the Iran war has cost. They say \$25 billion. Sure, no actual respectable analyst thinks that this has only cost \$25 billion.

And the brass that went in front of the Senate this week, they also claimed that they hadn't factored in the damage done to the bases across the Gulf. And now we're getting reports that they're having to cancel mass training exercises involving all continental U.S. forces stationed in the U.S. in order to save money and costs. But they have an unprecedented budget, and the war is not costing that much. But now they need \$1.5 trillion for the coming fiscal year. It's just really not making sense. And of course, the Pentagon has never really passed an audit. None of this really bodes well. And so, yeah, Israel may be clamoring for another attack.

The U.S. Navy still has to keep a standoff distance because now that there's been a couple of weeks of breathing room, people have been able to take a step back and look at the new democratization of warfare that has occurred over this conflict. And of course, you know, we saw that in 2025 during Operation True Promise 3.0, when the Iranians were able to break through Israeli, U.S., and

Jordanian ADA systems and put rounds on target, like in the Tavam Air Force Base. But now we're seeing another critical vulnerability. And so over the past couple of weeks, I've been focusing more on the domestic side — what this means militarily for the United States.

And when I mention that, I'm talking specifically about AWS, the Amazon Web Services cloud data centers, which have a dual function of civilian use and military functionality, getting hit in Qatar enough that Larry Fink went in front of the Milken Institute Summit and said, hey, this real drone warfare from lone actors is a significant domestic terrorist threat — enough where a \$3,000 drone could put out of commission a \$5 billion data center. And so we can't just talk about ships and drones and munitions anymore, because this AI cloudware architecture is basically the new platform for how the Pentagon is trying to wage military operations across the globe. And they're not just centered in the United States — they're in the Gulf, they're in Europe, and stuff.

And, like, because it's cloud-based, all of these things are integrated together. And so if you lose one, it kind of affects a lot of others as well. So there's this massive vulnerability, not just within, like, conventional third-generation warfare — aircraft carriers, large naval command ships — but also this tech infrastructure that is completely unsecurable. It's so unsecurable that here in the congressional district where I'm running, which has Fort Hood, the third-largest military base in the continental United States, they're building a civilian-run commercial data center. Of course, there's no such thing as a commercial data center anymore. All of them are dual-use and have military functions because all these tech companies have defense contracts. Even if they're not doing a lot in defense, they get subsidies and R&D tax breaks and stuff like that.

But they're building these data centers on four different military installations now across the country — two in Texas and, I think, one in North Carolina around Fort Bragg and stuff. Because these data centers are unsecurable. And even though they're civilian-run and have commercial functions, they are absolutely vulnerable to, as Larry Fink was talking about, a \$3,000 DJI drone, which can drop ammunition in a critical place and shut the entire thing down for however long. So... yes, of course, you know, Israel may attack again. Our ships are still not going to be able to engage the Iranian coastline safely. And we have a whole new vulnerability that we didn't even know we had before. And that's the AI war-fighting architecture, as Pete Hegseth would call it.

So, no, not only have the talks gone nowhere and the off-ramp for the Trump administration to gracefully exit this conflict is gone. No, we've seen an escalation of more critical vulnerabilities than we ever knew before. And, of course, theoretically, we always knew that they existed, but the extent to which they really undermine profits and investments in certain sectors — it's just a completely full-spectrum problem from a military and economic standpoint. So, yeah, nothing improved. The trade mission, which looked more like an 1800s trade mission where the monarch and a bunch of capitalists and oligarchs go to plunder wealth from the Orient, is completely reversed in this case. Like, nothing is going well for the Trump administration at this point, including the Iran war. And I'm sure you'll get into the China stuff later.

## **#Danny**

Yeah, well, I think everything you just said, Greg, also demonstrates that – because Pete Hegseth, he's been this big champion of AI-powered military hardware and might. And a big vulnerability of that is that it's got to come from somewhere. This AI-powered tech has to come from – sorry, it's not – the cloud is still based somewhere.

## **#Greg Stoker**

And I think that's one of the most distracting things when people talk about it. It's like this nebulous cloud that just exists in the ether or some sort of fantasy pocket dimension. No, it requires physical hardware to run it. And that's kind of why a lot of people, especially where I'm living in rural areas, fundamentally, on a material level, do not understand why we're actually losing this and why the United States is so vulnerable. As someone who's trying to do community work, it's actually really frustrating. But I think we also need to do more education about just very simple stuff — hey, the cloud is not vapor, it's solids in the form of data centers and other infrastructure as well.

## **#Danny**

Right, and if it's located in the Gulf, an Iranian drone or missile can definitely hit it. Alina, I wanted to, before I get your reaction, just show you the current state of Donald Trump and his administration when they're questioned, because there's a lot of questions about the war and, of course, the larger global situation that it fits in. But here he is on Air Force One when he was asked about it.

## **#Fox News 1**

What's next? Is the threat of the bombing starting again? How realistic is that? I don't want to say that. I mean, I'd like to tell you. I'd like to say on a certain hour, a certain day, the bombing is going to start. I don't want to say that. I can only say that Iran — I can say this with very, very strong conviction — Iran will never have a nuclear weapon. Not going to happen. There's no chance. What would the use be of repeating the bombing you did for 38 days? Well, no, we did. And you did not get the political changes in Iran. I had a total military victory. But the fake news, guys like you write indirectly. You're a fake guy. Guys like you write about it indirectly. We had a total military victory. We knocked out their entire Navy. We knocked out their...

## **#Danny**

So you get the picture, Alina. This is the narrative right now. But what are you looking at? What's your assessment of the overall situation and the global implications?

## **#Elina Xenophontos**

Right. So this is the situation the way I see it. Recently, there was a CIA report that was well published and obviously got insider information. And it was published through, you know, the Wall Street Journal, The New York Times. And they had actually concluded that apparently, according to the CIA report, Iran won't actually even be affected by the blockade, not for at least another three to four months. And this was considered to be a conservative estimate. More so, the same report actually found that even with regards to the bombings, because we're going to talk about the bombings that, you know, Israel is stating that they want to start directly hitting Iran again. And then we obviously have Trump playing around with the concept of, obviously, you know, restarting the war in Iran again.

Even with months' worth of military activity against Iran and direct hits against Iran, it was found that around 90% of Iran's military capacity, 75% of its missiles, vital ballistic missiles as well, are still intact. Ninety percent of its capacity and underground storages have basically been completely either rebuilt or are fully functional again. So what are we looking at here? We're looking at the fact that after an extensive amount of operations against Iran, the amount of damage to Iran militarily has actually been rather weak. So the other angle behind this is the economic aspect. And obviously, again, according to that CIA report, you would need another three to four months on — and again, this is a minimum — to actually see any implications of the imperialist war in Iran, whether it's through the blockade or through direct military action.

So at most, what we could see, what we could expect from the United States, is to try to start targeting Iran again, just primarily in order to inflict, again, as much damage and harm to Iran as possible while sustaining the blockade for as long as it can. But this is the problem. And I think even The Atlantic—and I'd referenced it in some of my other work—but even The Atlantic published an article, and this is quite big when you think it's coming from mainstream media outlets, and they're discussing, and the title of the article was "Iran Has Checkmated," basically "Iran Checkmate for the United States." And this is really interesting because when you break down this article, it becomes very clear that the United States has effectively lost this war, militarily and politically, but more so geostrategically.

Because the basic premise of what the United States is trying to accomplish at present is to try to coerce Iran through economic strength, through the blockade, through possibly targeting them again to capitulate to America's demands. However, the reality is, because Iran is able to sustain the blockade—and this is in large part, you know, in response to the fact that Iran has created an economy that has become very self-sufficient as a consequence of 47 years of sanctions—becoming rather food independent and having, obviously, its own energy resources, its own fertilizers, it's far better equipped to withstand a blockade because it's been living under an economic siege for decades.

Not to mention, in a small little parenthesis, that Iran has currently around 70 million barrels of oil, which are currently floating around the seas, which therefore means it's still continuing to sell oil,

right, and at higher prices. It's also been able to continue to sell oil through Central Asia, through, you know, mainland routes, which is obviously working in their favor. But we are seeing countries that are still basically paying, like Japan, China, and India are paying Iran, you know, the toll to pass through the Strait of Hormuz, which is also giving Iran the ability to buffer some of the economic hardships that, you know, the United States is trying to impose on Iran.

But this is the thing: to what extent will the United States be able to sustain that? The answer is not very long, because the reality is that it's actually the U.S. allies—whether it's the GCC states or its allies in Southeast Asia, East Asia more broadly, the European Union, and itself—that are far more economically vulnerable to the closing down of the Strait of Hormuz. And this creates a problem for the United States and how long it's able to actually continue this operation, which, again, according to the CIA, requires at least four months to be able to secure any capitulation from Iran. And that won't happen. So what we're looking at, what we're looking at effectively, is that Iran has been successful.

And this is what, going back to the article as well, that was published by The Atlantic, to completely change the geostrategic reality of the region. And it's done so by essentially asserting control over the Strait of Hormuz, stating that from now on, yes, Iran will have complete control, tolls will be paid. And their demands are: we want sanctions lifted and also all military activity within the region, U.S. military activity within the region, to essentially withdraw. This is something that the United States can no longer change. And had the United States not actually gone to war with Iran, had it not pulled off this gamble, this wouldn't have actually occurred.

So to quote what that article had actually said, and I would agree with this, the United States has effectively lost a very significant control within its own geostrategic ability to project power. It's lost, essentially, you know, the Strait of Hormuz, the control over a very important trade route. And with all that, you know, it's also significantly weakened its own allies. And I think this is another aspect behind this, because when you're looking at the GCC states, for example, there was an interesting report that was published by the Council on Foreign Relations recently, and it was talking specifically about how the war with Iran has weakened the GCC states economically. It's seeing, obviously, civilian infrastructure and energy infrastructure significantly damaged in some countries more so than others.

And now what they're looking at when it comes to the GCC states is probably all that wealth that they were planning to invest, for example, in the United States in order to build the data centers that Greg was referencing just now, and all that infrastructure that the United States is trying to push forward aggressively, even though it actually doesn't have the industrial capacity to do so, but it's trying to do so to compete with China. All that money, all those funds, a lot of those funds, not all of them, but a substantial amount, is not going to be refunded back locally into the States, which means less money into the data centers that the United States is trying to build and all the infrastructure that it needs in order to establish its goal of building an additional 1,500 data centers in the next year. And this is a problem.

This is a problem for the United States because, as the report states there, you know, from the Council on Foreign Relations, this creates a problem because we've already seen in the last year that due to a limited amount, well, not enough funds going into building the infrastructure and the need for the injection of external capital, especially from the GCC states, that could actually mean, and this is what the report had found, that a lot of these tech companies that are focused on building this infrastructure in the U.S. will now have to rely more on debt, therefore actually causing investors to lose confidence, which could risk the entire tech-heavy equity market of the U.S., and that is a problem for the U.S. So we're seeing how... to conclude on this point, at most, the United States is going to try to exert a bit more pressure on Iran by bombing them some more.

But even then, by their own intelligence reports, it's not going to bring about the kind of economic strangulation that the United States is hoping to impose on Iran to cause them to capitulate. So this is a lost war that, at this point, the United States simply just can't seem to pull away from because it will be a defeat from whatever angle you look at it.

## **#Danny**

Yeah, and I believe you're referencing The Atlantic. That article was written by Robert Kagan. Real OG neocon. Yeah, maybe the OG, maybe the Tony Soprano of neocons. The Project for the New American Century, that was his, co-founded with Bill Kristol, their brainchild of neoconservatism. Uh, and Greg, you know, you often talk about your history, you know, with the war on terror, how you kind of got into analysis. Yeah, how you got into analysis and community work and all of that because of this anti-war work.

But, um, when Alina was talking, it made me think about these remarks about the war that Trump just gave to Sean Hannity post-China trip. And they strike me as—oh, this is breaking right now? Yeah, yeah. This happened probably within the last 12 hours. Okay. It reminded me of the Kissinger quote everyone talks about, where it's, you know, to be an enemy—or to be a friend—of the United States is fatal. Here's what Trump said about why the United States is at war with Iran.

## **#Donald Trump**

We don't need it at all. We don't need it at all. Fair enough. So, I mean, you could make the case, you know, like, why are we even doing it? We're doing it to help Israel and to help Saudi Arabia and to help Qatar and the UAE and, you know, Kuwait and other countries. It also helps China. Actually, I told him today, I said, you know, we're helping you, and we're helping you in another way.

## **#Danny**

So anyway, you know, it's all about—and a lot of people have argued that this war has been all about Israel. But Donald Trump is saying he's helping the entire region. This was a benevolent

action by the United States to help them with Iran. But the results, as Alina just stated, are quite damning. What are your thoughts on this?

## **#Greg Stoker**

Specifically, like, we went to war. We began this war solely for Israel's interests.

## **#Danny**

Yeah. Oh, no. Well, to Trump's comments, that's what a lot of—there's a narrative that argues this. And Donald Trump here is saying, no, we were here to help Israel and all the Gulf states, the entire region, with Iran.

## **#Greg Stoker**

Yeah, I mean, I guess you could frame it that way. A lot of these Gulf states and authoritarian monarchies are in lockstep with Israel. Israel and them have the same security interests, foreign policy objectives, and similar spheres of influence. And the people might not like the Israeli government or the Zionist ideology. But then again, since the Arab Spring, Israel's big insurance policy throughout the Gulf has been to export spyware, security apparatus, and intelligence sharing with all of these like-minded monarchical governments. But to say that we went to war strictly for them or for Israeli interests is absolutely kind of naive.

This is kind of a reversal of the language of the global war on terror, where America is the world police. So now we have to coalition-build, right? We have to bring in NATO into Iraq. We had to have soldiers from the Czech Republic and Mongolia come here to build a global consensus for this illegal, unjust, completely immoral war that we're fighting, or occupation that we're sustaining in Iraq. So we see coalition building. And then, you know, we even saw the last vestiges of this with Operation Prosperity Guardian. Yeah, it's where the joint naval task force between the United States and a bunch of European countries tried to reopen the Gulf of Aden after the Houthis began attacking shipping in solidarity with Iraq.

And so that was an unsuccessful maritime naval operation. And they still had to do coalition building to build consensus because they are still—at least the Biden administration and their kind of neoliberal imagination of foreign policy—still believed in that old consensus building, cultivation and protection of soft power, and presenting America as the one who can keep the trade lanes open. So everybody has to support us now. It's kind of this bizarre reversal in terms of a narrative going forward that, no, no, we're going in to help all of our allies and Israel. Even though this war has been self-destructive both for the U.S. military and for the Gulf states, it's been an absolute nightmare. We're talking about Iran developing a nuclear weapon to threaten the Gulf.

They don't have to. They just have to hit all their desalination facilities. All the elites will flee, and their indentured labor force will die of dehydration or something crazy. So, um, it's an absolutely absurd statement from, like, it's, it's like multifaceted absurdity going forward, that, like, this war was to help anybody else except for, like, the transnational capitalist class, you know, associated a lot with American and Israeli interests, but also these seven imperial states. But they were given, you know, like, when we're talking about a transnational class, all of these Gulf magnates were given assurances that, you know, we're going to protect you.

You have a U.S. military base, okay, that assures our protection. Our interests are aligned. We're going to attack Iran. We gave them all these assurances, and we absolutely screwed them over. And so they're not happy. So Trump can go on to Sean Hannity and other sycophantic news outlets and be like, yeah, you know, we're doing this to help the Gulf States. First of all, they didn't want it in the first place.

You know, there was a perfectly fine, uh, thing going on with Iran before, without a bunch of agents of chaos moving throughout the region. But now we're stuck with an intractable situation where we've given Iran essentially a Suez Canal in some ways and made them like a kind of fourth world, like fourth center of world power around this incredibly strategic location. And this makes it even more of a geostrategic nightmare because their axis of resistance attaches to the shipping through the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. So, like, if they want to expand, and if the U.S. wants to bring bombing back into this and start another high-intensity bombing campaign, bearing in mind that we gave them everything we had in the first two weeks—everything.

It can't get worse or be more devastating or effective than it was during the first two weeks. It's not possible. Stockpiles aren't there. The target set isn't there. That's a big thing. All the thousands of targets we hit no longer exist. So what's next? Secondary importance targets, tertiary importance targets. And if they open this up again, as I mentioned, data centers vulnerable, desalination sites vulnerable, closing down shipping via the Houthis potentially or other actors via the Red Sea. There's no way that resuming this conflict ends in a way that's more strategically advantageous to the United States or Israel or the Gulf States. It's an absolutely absurd thing to say in an interview, but of course he's not accountable to his base for anything he says.

## **#Danny**

Yeah, yeah. And we also have a mess now. Iran confronted the UAE at the BRICS foreign ministers' summit. And the UAE seems to now be, you know, it's not an island, although they claim they have some jurisdiction over some islands near Iran, but... they are now seemingly all alone, where Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, all of these countries are now saying that they don't really want to do any more military interventionist adventures. And the UAE is the one, as the conduit of the U.S. and Israel, trying to persuade them. That's the latest reports. It's quite something. But Alina—sorry, Greg, did you want to say something?

## **#Greg Stoker**

I just want to say, too, another thing that I don't hear a lot of people talking about — the old post-World War II guarantees of a SOFA agreement, a Status of Forces Agreement — where the U.S. would sign a contract to open up a military base in a country, and it would give them strategic or political or diplomatic leverage over their neighbors or competitors and stuff. That era is coming to an end. And we're not just seeing — I don't think we're just going to see — requests in the Sahel region or demands in the Sahel region or West Asia for the shutting down of U.S. military bases. But it's going to become, over the next few years, more and more of a rapid thing, because, like, what now? What now is the benefit of having U.S. imperial presence in your home country? Of course, this is not going to go away overnight. But over the next decade, I think we're going to see a massive, massive drawdown of U.S. global force presence across the globe. That's it.

## **#Danny**

Well, Alina, I wanted to now spend the second half of the show on the summit that occurred in China. Of course, you're free to comment on anything that we just spoke about. But I wanted to begin just by showing Donald Trump's reaction. He's calling it a historic summit. And then Reuters and a lot of the Western mainstream media are actually pouring water on that positive spin for the United States, at least when it comes to the U.S. empire's perspective. But this is what Donald Trump had to say about the results of this three-day summit with Xi Jinping in China.

## **#Fox News 1**

So we had a great stay. It was an amazing period of time. President Xi is an incredible guy. We got along, made a lot of great trade deals, including over 200 planes for Boeing, with the promise of 750 planes, which will be by far the largest order ever if they do a good job with the 200, which I'm sure they will. And then General Electric also, the engines. So they're buying from General Electric — it's approximately 400, 450 engines, 200 planes.

## **#Danny**

So very, very positive, Alina. But then Reuters — this is a summary of it because there's a massive paywall; they're even getting through the paywall breakers on Reuters now. But essentially what Reuters is saying is that Trump left China with little to show for it, while Xi Jinping and China walked away with several wins. China was able to assert its warning about Taiwan. These business wins that Trump is claiming are not really set in stone, and they're not really impressing major Wall Street investors and the monopolies. There's also a term that Xi Jinping and China came out with, which is "constructive strategic stability," essentially dictating terms over what the U.S.-China relationship will be, while Trump had absolutely no vision for what that should be like.

And then, of course, on Iran, China was very much not wanting to talk about this at all and didn't make any comment that changed its position whatsoever, even though Marco Rubio, Donald Trump, and all of them were saying that they were coming in to talk about Iran and get China's support. Trump claims that China now agrees with everything the United States is doing. But Alina, what did you make of this summit? I'll pull up a picture that I think is really funny about maybe how it's actually going for the United States empire at this time. But your thoughts?

## **#Elina Xenophontos**

Yeah, so my thoughts were it actually went pretty poorly because the number one issue that the United States really wanted to go there and discuss and gain some sort of significant win on is the rare earth minerals issue. And this is the number one issue for the United States for multiple reasons. Obviously, rare earths are the fundamental kind of means to produce military weapons, and they've currently depleted about half their stockpiles, according to a report by the CSIS. In addition to that, obviously, the vast majority of the data centers that they're trying to build and are investing very heavily in again require the same amount of rare earth minerals.

And according to reports that have come out from Chinese media, but also through Reuters itself, the United States, as it currently stands, is facing a shortage of rare earth minerals. In fact, Reuters reported—this was back in February—that the shortage in supply of rare earths in the United States has actually caused suppliers to have to turn away contracts, or buyers within the United States, simply because they had to ration how they're able to deliver on their rare earth minerals. So this is a very fundamental problem for the United States, and it actually, again, really brings up the question: how are they supposed to meet the industrial demand, too?

And this is the other aspect that I wanted to bring up a little earlier when Greg also spoke about Larry Fink. Larry Fink, at the Milken Institute, when he was speaking, spoke specifically about how the Iran war is generating opportunities. He said the chaos that has been created shouldn't be viewed in a negative way, but we should be viewing it as an opportunity. And the opportunities are obviously the rebuilding of the GCC states, more money into the military infrastructure of the GCC states, but also, of course, building underground, placing more things underground and establishing these underground kind of bunkers, so to speak, to be able to better protect themselves, but also data centers and so forth.

So he was talking about that in the context of, you know, an opportunity, and then redirecting that military activity and anti-drones, et cetera, to domestic terrorism in the United States, which Greg already spoke about when you're looking at what's happening in the United States. And there's a massive upheaval right now occurring throughout multiple different states with regards to, obviously, the data centers, the impacts that they're having on the local communities, the fact that they've been established in multiple areas that are suffering with water crises, and the US has both a water crisis and an energy crisis.

But going back to this particular issue with the concept of opportunities, you have the United States right now that's claiming this is a massive opportunity for US capital, but they have to basically find ways to meet the military demands of NATO. They have to meet the military demands of their East Asian allies, because let's not forget that they actually had to redirect a lot of their weapons shipments to West Asia in order to deal with the Iran war, because they were depleting their own stockpiles. They have to meet their own military sort of quotas. And then now also the GCC states — where are they going to find the industrial capacity to do that? They don't have the industrial capacity within the US. They don't have the rare earth minerals, which they're relying on from China to be able to do so. And at the same time, they're somehow trying to also build, you know, ramp up data centers all over the United States. And again, how are they supposed to actually do this?

And we had Marco Rubio, who I think was on the way to China. I'm not quite sure — he was speaking on one of the private jets, but I can't remember where exactly he was heading to in China. Just in the last 24 hours, he had come out and really doubled down on this idea that the United States has to invest in its own rare earth mining and refining and so forth. And this is the interesting aspect about that.

I think it was Bloomberg today that published a report saying it would take 10 years — I think a decade minimum — and over 1.2 trillion to actually be able to even so much as catch up to China. And that's, again, speculative. And, you know, if you look at countries like Japan, they've been stating for the better part of the last 10 to 15 years that they want to basically diversify rare earth minerals processing away from China, and they have failed. So these aren't easy. These aren't easy to actually just say, "Okay, we're going to be establishing rare earth mining and processing centers in the United States," when you don't have the capital, you don't have the expertise, you don't have the infrastructure, and then how the United States is planning on meeting the demands that it has globally at this point.

And so what we're seeing is this clash between what people like Larry Fink are saying, who are, you know, finance capitalists, and they're looking at it purely, you know, they're trying to sell a narrative to people like, you know, keep investing. This is an opportunity. And now we're going to make more money because we have to, you know, we have contracts in the GCC states and so forth in order to bring more money into these industries, increasing their stock market value for a lot of these companies, whether it's defense, aerospace, or tech.

But the reality of the situation is that the United States is going to find itself in a very difficult position because it just can't simply meet that demand. And so when Trump was in China, the fact that he failed to deliver on that, and the only thing he was able to boast about is 200 Boeing planes and soybeans — I mean, I think this is pretty poor. And we did see the CEO of Nvidia, he has stayed behind to engage in some negotiations. We don't know what's happening there. There hasn't been a lot reported on that. But in terms of tech, business, rare earth minerals, none of this actually — he wasn't able to score anything of any value.

And if anything, Xi Jinping also — the threat of even military confrontation with the United States in the case of Taiwan — was quite a first for Xi Jinping to actually say. So we're seeing China as well kind of becoming far more stoic and very direct in its approach, even using military language, which is something it tends to shy away from. But, you know, he was very direct. So if anything, I think this was quite a sad outcome for Trump, but he's obviously going to try to present it in whatever way makes him look better and a win — you know, he made the deal.

## **#Greg Stoker**

It wasn't even set up to be successful though. Like, when these trade missions happen, you have very visibly tons of envoys going overseas, and their envoys come over here, and you're like working together to flesh out the details. So when the heads of state get together, it's kind of like, you know, get a read on the other person. Then you finalize it, or at least move to a more serious phase where you're actually fleshing things out. Nothing was put in place beyond bringing a bunch of tech CEOs across and everything he claimed. Let's start with Boeing. All right, so like, American export trade doctrine to China is called Boeing, beef, and beans.

We give them Boeing aircraft, beef, and then the beans aspect. China said they're going to buy more soybeans. Okay, well, first of all, this is absurd on its face because one of the reasons that farmers are under such a pinch right now is because of the tariffs on fertilizer. So that, in conjunction with not having as much access to nitrogen for planting season here in the United States. It's May — this is when a lot of the stuff goes in the ground. So a lot of the farmers who were supposed to be growing corn are now growing soybeans. So we're probably going to, in the near future, have an overproduction of soybeans, but China's going to buy that. So I guess that's a win somehow.

It's absolutely absurd. And then, like, of course, the talk with Iran — of course, China just gave stock answers, didn't want to discuss it. Obviously, they don't need to. But one of the things that Xi Jinping said, and Trump was nodding along like he actually knew what he was talking about, is Xi Jinping — he talked about the Thucydides Trap. So for an administration that likes to champion Western culture, it's basically a very interesting choice of commentary to make, because Thucydides was, during the Peloponnesian War between Athens and Sparta, a really disgraced and terrible Athenian general, but a really good historian for the time.

Thucydides' Trap was basically the premise that this established mercantile, kind of failing military power, which was the Athenian Empire, coming into conflict with the rising military and trade state of Sparta, would attack each other to the denigration of both states. But once they're in it, in actual military conflict, they can't get out. So that's what he was referring to. And I think that comment also redounds to their stance on Taiwan and the talks and what's going on with that as well. So I just wanted to bring that up as well.

## **#Danny**

Good points. And I wanted actually to pull up that because a lot of people are commenting on the commentary that the White House has made and Donald Trump has made regarding the Thucydides Trap, and how a lot of commentators are talking about how this indicates that China, publicly in this very meeting—because this happened during Xi Jinping's remarks at the opening welcome ceremony—was talking about the Thucydides Trap. And a lot has been made about, has Xi Jinping, has China, to Trump's face, said that the U.S. is a declining empire? Now, that's not necessarily what Thucydides' Trap is. No, no, no.

## **#Greg Stoker**

The Athenian Empire was still way more powerful than Sparta at the time. Just saying.

## **#Danny**

Right. And Thucydides' Trap is really about how China views it as an established power having to contend with now a rising one, and whether that means the inevitability of conflict. But nonetheless, this is the narrative now, and the reason why it's a narrative is because Donald Trump himself said when President Xi very elegantly referred to the U.S. as perhaps being a declining nation, he was referring to the tremendous damage we suffered under four years of Sleepy Joe Biden, and then goes on and on to talk about how Xi Jinping congratulated him on all these successes, meaning that the decline is only during the Biden period. But this is really, Alina, the United States, Donald Trump talking about almost being so insecure that they had to bring up the fact that despite China not even saying it, the U.S. has been at one time a declining nation. But Alina, your reaction, any thoughts that you have about anything else?

## **#Elina Xenophontos**

Yeah, I actually wanted to—my commentary on this is, it's basically China's way of highlighting the fact that the United States is no longer a superpower, that itself is incredibly dependent and reliant on the Global South, and its allies all around the world, in order to be able to sustain its own economy and its own relevance, generally speaking. And China is a very big player there. I mean, we even remember when the, you know, the trade tariffs actually occurred—you know, Trump had, you know, imposed tariffs, I think, what was it, something like 110, 120? I've even lost exactly what percentage point of tariffs those were.

But he actually purposely excluded technology, smartphones, laptops, and other aspects of the supply chain that obviously the United States relies on China for. In addition to that as well, I mean, beyond just China on its own, you have countries like Japan and you've got countries like South Korea or even Taiwan, which de facto acts, you know, economically speaking, independently with regards to its economic relationship with the United States. Again, going back to the idea that the entire equity market of the United States is incredibly tech-heavy.

It relies—that tech-heavy industry relies so strongly on, and I keep saying this—the machinery that's necessary for the manufacturing of AI technologies that come from Japan, the memory chips that come from South Korea, and the semiconductors in Taiwan. And right now, even the war, even the Iran war and the blockade on the Strait of Hormuz, is impacting the productive capacity and the ability of these economies to produce in areas that they excel in, in that tech industry, as well as the supply chains that the United States needs for its own industries. So this war, we can see these kinds of contradictions within the actions of the United States, is actually negatively impacting the US itself.

And so there's this realization that the United States really is not only just a declining power, but a power that is so heavily dependent and reliant on the rest of the world. And this is the consequence, obviously, of its, you know, the way it moved out from being an industrial capitalist economy to becoming a financialized economy. And obviously, you know, exporting all its supply chains elsewhere is part of globalization. But also the other angle, you know, when we talk about the soybeans, I actually want to, you know, make a little comment about that, because, you know, again, going back to this idea about, you know, the farming industry in the United States at the moment is facing a massive crisis of its own.

And over the last how many years, we've seen a lot of agricultural, a lot of, you know, farmers and members of the agricultural sector being hounded and almost harassed by the tech giants in order to essentially buy away their property to establish the data centers. And obviously, there's also another argument that can be made about the idea of digitalizing farming in the United States. And a lot of the farmers have actually pushed back against this. But now this economic squeeze that has been imposed on farmers throughout the United States is becoming an opportunity. There are increasing reports now where, you know, they're not able to make ends meet. And so, you know, you've got things like corn—farmers are looking at losing around six billion in terms of surplus revenue. And that's just, obviously, one aspect of farming.

And so that's why, as you know, Greg said, they're looking at, you know—Bill, I'm sorry—you know, producing soybeans because of lack of access to fertilizers, which, again, China is the number one country that produces fertilizers, alongside, obviously, Russia—that's a close second. Then, obviously, lack of access to jet fuel and the fact that they have to ration how they're using that. So we're seeing that war in the agricultural sector in the United States, and this is going to create that kind of political chaos within the U.S. So how does Trump try to deal with it? It's basically what Greg said here.

Get China to try to purchase this oversupply now of soybeans to keep the economy somewhat—to soften the blow of what the United States is effectively doing. And it's going to have, again, this disastrous kind of impact on the United States. So again, this idea that the United States, which is all, you know, the superpower—it's not, it's not—it relies on and it needed China to buy the

soybeans to provide a pushback, because also the United States is at a point that it can't provide the sort of social security policies anymore to try to, you know, or like just any sort of policies to help buffer the economic implications that this war is going to have on the American working-class people.

Inflation is causing people's real income to completely deteriorate. Small to medium-sized businesses are struggling to make ends meet. All of these aspects are going to play into the political turmoil within the U.S., and they don't even have the ability, based on the fact that the U.S. is currently facing a massive debt crisis, a fiscal crisis, to buffer any of that. And we even saw Elon Musk come out and say, you know, we should cut Social Security and Medicare spending because that's, you know—and I think we even had this conversation last time I was on—because there's 88 trillion dollars in unfunded amounts with regards to Social Security and Medicare.

So how is the United States supposed to deal with that? So these are the little things that he's trying to plaster as a win to try to buffer the impact this is having on the agricultural sector in the United States and the negative impact that U.S. imperial overreach abroad is having within the U.S. itself. But, you know, Xi Jinping's comment makes it clear: you're not the power. That's why you depend on the Global South and the global majority to be able to even uphold your own economy. And it's a sort of reminder to, I guess, humble yourself. But I don't really think that the Trump administration got that memo.

## **#Danny**

Yeah, no, I don't think so. Greg, do you want to add anything? And then I have a bit of a blooper reel, because you really can't take Americans anywhere.

## **#Greg Stoker**

I just want to add a couple of things before we get to the comedic moment of Zenz here at the end. But like, one thing when we talk about war and stuff, especially in these spaces, people focus on what's the tactical or strategic environment in theater, what's the stockpiles, what's the logistical stuff. But not a lot of time is spent on how bad things are about to get here and that Americans are absolutely, absolutely not prepared for it. So first of all, about 400,000 small to medium family farms are going to go out of business. They're going to lose their mortgage or not be able to pay property taxes, and they're going to be bought out for pennies on the dollar by big agricultural corporations, just like big real estate bought up basically all these historic neighborhoods in California during the wildfires for cents on the dollar.

This is how it operates. They're going to be displaced, and there's going to be supply chain issues. Grocery prices are going to... I mean, they're just awful already. They're awful already. But if there's one thing we've learned since we were kids, it's that once grocery prices go up, they do not go back

down. So it's not only supply chain issues. It's actually like the Costco CEO is going out and talking about how people aren't buying beef anymore—they're buying canned chicken across the board. And so, absolutely not prepared for what's coming or the social upheaval.

And there's going to be no more, like, even if the Democrats sweep the midterms, there's going to be no real stopgap measures that can be implemented in time to relieve the financial burden and the pain of what's going on. And we've passed the time, based off of where we're at in our political and economic system, where we can re-implement sweeping social welfare programs as a quote-unquote stopgap reform measure to keep people from revolting or causing mass crime or political disturbances. That's gone. So we're entering a brave new era where we're just going to see massive disruption. I don't think it's going to get crazy this year or next year, but the 2028 election, I think, is going to be absolutely wild.

### **#Danny**

Yeah, I do believe there is kind of a sleepwalking into a recession, depression that, you know, in the logic of the system, that's inevitable anyway. But I think it's really intense in terms of how bad the contradictions are.

### **#Greg Stoker**

It reminds me of Ernest Hemingway's quote. It's about bankruptcy: it happens slowly, then suddenly. That's kind of what we're going to be looking at, at least from a consumer perspective.

### **#Elina Xenophontos**

I just wanted to add, the difference in the past is that we've seen the United States have multiple crises, right?

### **#Greg Stoker**

Mm-hmm.

### **#Elina Xenophontos**

And then neoliberalism came, the 80s and the 90s, and they were able to export abroad, you know, obviously providing them with a kind of super profit. So then they were able to bring that back into the U.S. to soften the blow. And it's kind of pushing the crisis—yeah, it's been pushing the crisis a little further down the line. But now we have reached this critical point where that's no longer possible. And we've also seen how globalization has had this contradictory effect whereby exporting those supply lines has actually created, you know, a dependence. And we're also seeing the rise of China, the rise of BRICS, the rise of multipolarity, in a way that now the United States can no longer

find a way to buffer. And this is what I was trying to say before—to buffer the crisis that's coming back home.

And, you know, actually earlier on in the discussion, we were talking about why the United States had even gone to, you know, engaged in this operation against Iran. And, you know, it boils down to their desperate attempt to prevent the rise of the multipolar world and to obviously, you know, encircle, contain, and control China. And it was desperate. It was a desperate attempt because, you know, when you look at a piece of paper that's obviously always referenced—and I see that a lot on social media—and a lot of these analysts will always reference, it's *\*The Path to Persia\**, which was written in 2009. There are chapters and chapters of different game plans and different strategies that were put forward.

And they've tried every single one—make a deal that they can't refuse, sanctions, warfare, secondary sanctions, and so forth. And then, obviously, using Bibi Netanyahu and Israel as a means to initiate war with Iran. We saw that happen. That didn't really bring about the results. And that sort of final aspect behind it was direct military confrontation with Iran. But it had pros and cons, and the negatives were that it was going to be a gamble from the very beginning—you know, risking energy, risking its allies in the region, and causing economic crisis, and possibly losing control of Australia. This was listed in that document from 2009. And the material realities today are even worse for the United States. So they went along with this primarily because it's their last attempt at this point to prevent the inevitable.

And that is, in doing so, it's actually accelerating its own, I guess, decline because it's exerting so much of itself to maintain hegemony that it's going to bring about that chaos back home. And, you know, they don't have the economic leverage around the world anymore in the way that they used to. I mean, they still do, but it's not what it used to be to try to impose their will on everyone else. And I think that, you know, the latest trip to China is a classic example. The United States can't get what it wants. It can't get what it wants, even in negotiations with Iran, in negotiations with Russia, or anyone, because they essentially don't have the military, economic, or political power to do so. So, you know, that's just the situation now.

## **#Greg Stoker**

And that is a historic and relevant document or artifact today because if you look at all these ways that the Brookings Institution and the people who came up with it—it was the Saban Institute, Haim Saban, the Zionist billionaire, the Institute for Foreign Studies—put it together. And even they were like, con, con, con. Even in 2009, military intervention was so intolerably bad that they advised against it. And that was before the structural vulnerabilities of all these—in the GCC states. So it's even gotten worse. They didn't even... This was like in 2009, when I was in the military, we weren't even really talking about drone warfare.

That was more like 2011, 2012. People started getting nervous about it, wondering if it was going to get tested in Syria. It didn't. It really didn't get tested on the battlefield until the Ukraine war. So we weren't even looking at the democratization of warfare. We couldn't even get our ships into the Persian Gulf. So even in the last... In 2009, the last chapter is "Isolation and Containment: Tolerating the Intolerable." But we've come to a certain place in our politics and economy where we could no longer tolerate the intolerable. It was too intolerable, so we had to attack anyway. It's absolutely absurd.

## **#Danny**

And here we are. Yeah, here we are. And to both your points, and Alina, your point about the U.S. and its declining power projection and its overall imperial decline. I think the behavior of the Trump administration on this trip to China is very notable. Not just the strikingly kiss-ass tone of Donald Trump to Xi Jinping—I mean, just absolutely groveling the entire trip—but I think it's worth noting that there were moments that the Western mainstream media, especially the U.S. corporate media, demonstrated, as well as the Trump administration itself, which showed—and I'll just give a little highlight reel here—just how backwards things have gotten, to say the least. During the opening ceremony, there was a moment where there was such a rush—this is what happens when you bring a bunch of corporate media outlets to China to try to cover this thing—there was such a logjam and rush to try to cover this. There was a humiliating moment where there was a hot mic that caught some expletives.

## **#Danny**

So this is in China, where this kind of behavior is looked very, very, very down upon there. And then Brett Baier, the Fox News number one anchor, he complained about cameras all over China and that Fox News got a \$40 US dollar ticket. And then he ends up filming in the middle of a busy Beijing street—a clip in a segment that someone caught him doing—which just goes to show, just absolutely. Some people surmise that Fox News was actually trying to get the police to intervene here and try to make a scene so they could make some narrative about how the Chinese police are repressing them. Then there was this one that I don't know if you guys caught, but very interesting. Supposedly, the U.S. Secret Service had gotten into a major clash with Chinese police themselves. Here's the report on that on Fox News.

## **#Fox News 2**

It's worth pointing out there have been some heated and physical clashes between the Secret Service and the Chinese police, basically at the back doors of these events, including one very physical standoff where a Secret Service officer was being prevented from taking his weapon in as part of the protective detail. But things have all been ironed out, and as far as we know, the schedule has not been changed because of that.

## **#Danny**

So there was this. And then what a lot of people—the last one here—a lot of people have been sharing this. They went to the Temple of Heaven, which is a very special place for China and its history. Xi Jinping took him there. And then Donald Trump had total, what the kids say these days, “main character syndrome,” where he had to ask Xi Jinping if any other leader had been there before. And the Telegraph is saying Trump was a bit humiliated because Xi Jinping essentially said, “No, not really, except for Vladimir Putin.” And here is just a video on that. So, for example, Putin.

## **#Donald Trump**

Yes.

## **#Danny**

So that's just a few highlights of what happened on the trip that I think demonstrate a bit of the U.S.'s, I guess, true face as they try to navigate these relations with China. But I want to pass it to you guys, maybe first to Alina and then Greg, on reactions and anything else you want to say before we end the show here.

## **#Elina Xenophontos**

I mean, that's just more so reflective of Trump and the Trump administration as a whole, which is kind of built on this, you know, male bravado, but also this American arrogant attitude. It's kind of the whole persona that they have going on. So, you know, what we're seeing there is not really surprising. It's not very shocking. It both, unfortunately, is reflective of, yes, his current administration, but also of the U.S. imperial arrogance more broadly, especially towards China and all those of the Global South who are now essentially, yeah, you know, becoming the ones that were the backbone that held together American capitalism for so long.

And now we're seeing these countries becoming powers of their own, and you know, the U.S. can't seem to tolerate that very well. But yeah, it is sort of like a reflection of imperial arrogance in that context. But you know what, I guess a way to finish this off is, yeah, the trip for me—and I'll just conclude on this point—I think was suggestive, or actually not even suggestive, I think it's very clear that the U.S. is a declining power. I think it's, like I said, in its inability to actually, you know, reach any sort of agreements or any substance with China in the same way that it's failing in its negotiations with Iran.

In the fact that, you know, Iran and China in these instances are the ones that have the upper hand in the negotiations, that the U.S. industry in itself is fast-pacing towards something that it can't even produce, whether it's its AI data centers or its, you know, supposedly it's going to militarize the world and establish, you know, cloud infrastructure all over the world. All of these are ambitions that

it cannot meet. It's trying to sell a narrative. As I said, I think in an episode we had with Greg yesterday, they're trying to fake it until they make it. They're selling a narrative to the public in order to keep investment high. But ultimately, this entire project is going to collapse.

And I think China is very well aware of that, as are all the adversaries, let's just say, of the United States, which is why they don't really need to do a good deal very much, because the United States is bringing about its own decline on its own merit. And so, yeah, I think, because I've already, you know, said all these points, the central theme is the United States, whether it's in China or Iran, whether it's its proxy operations against, you know, Russia and Ukraine, it's failing on all fronts. And I think something that's worthy of noting is, I would say this—and obviously it could be a conversation for another time—to see what the United States plans on doing with Cuba as an off-ramp to claim some sort of victory inside of Cuba.

We're seeing increased military activity now around Cuba, in the same sort of format as that which occurred against Iran prior to the strikes, and obviously against Venezuela prior to the kidnapping of President Maduro. So this is going to be interesting to watch, because if it's losing in a very abysmal way within West Asia, this could be an opportunity for them to try to save face or to at least secure their control over Latin America as part of their Monroe Doctrine, because Cuba is actually a very material threat to the United States. And so, yeah, that's kind of where I would, I guess, leave it off.

## **#Danny**

And before you go, Greg, I just want to say there are Republicans that are very worried about this, actually. There were a few of them who are trying to lobby against a military strike on Cuba, given their fragile situation in the midterms coming up. And these are Republicans that are about to come up in the midterms. But, yeah, continue.

## **#Greg Stoker**

Yeah, well, they have kind of ceded their congressional power and let the Trump administration do a complete end run around them. They waited too long to do anything on Iran, and that's going to have effects when they try to curb U.S. militarism in Latin America. And I will just say, for the Cuba thing, that's a real possibility. It might be low-vis, kind of like Venezuela. We know that 7th Special Forces Group, Green Berets, are in Haiti right now on a FID mission—Foreign Internal Defense mission. Port-au-Prince Airport also has a part of it completely seconded to U.S. military use.

And that's a two-hour flight time from Port-au-Prince Airport to Havana as well. And, you know, that's not the only theater we're actively fighting in just because the Iran war has, like, global ramifications. We're still dropping bombs in Ecuador under the total FASH operational name, Operation Total Extermination II. So that's something to be looking forward to. Like, if we're

humiliated—and I completely agree with Alina—you know, geo, like, halfway across the world, we're going to definitely try to reassert absolute, uncontested dominance in our own backyard as a way to be like, OK, well, now we can counter China here, and now we can get Cuba here.

## **#Danny**

So, well, yeah, it seems like that's what the national security strategy, that so-called document, kind of leaves open in a big way. This idea that at any time we want, we can kind of just slap around Latin America and the so-called Western Hemisphere, you know, if things are going poorly elsewhere. But I can't believe I forgot, because I think this is one of the funniest moments on the trip, is when Donald Trump—I just saw this today—took a peek in Xi Jinping's private notebook, which probably says very little about anything, even if it is in Chinese and you can't read it. But there is Donald Trump at the state banquet taking a peek. Dude's been doing that since elementary school.

## **#Elina Xenophontos**

Yeah, I was going to say the same thing, actually.

## **#Greg Stoker**

I was actually thinking the exact same thing. The art of the deal is actually stealing the test results. Yeah, basically.

## **#Elina Xenophontos**

I was actually thinking the same thing.

## **#Greg Stoker**

Why did he think it would be in English?

## **#Elina Xenophontos**

I don't know.

## **#Danny**

He's just, he's something else. And I think it's a pure reflection of this declining U.S. empire, but still a dangerous one, as we noted here—not just with Iran, Cuba. Of course, it's Nakba Day, so Palestine is still facing the brunt of U.S. support for Israel and Israel's onslaught, even as Hezbollah and the resistance make their move. So we got a lot left, everybody, to cover. This kind of doesn't sleep. So I want to thank Alina and Greg for joining. We're going to head out together. I want to make sure everybody knows in the video description you can find Colonial Outcasts, you can find all

the places to find Greg and Alina's work in the video description below—their social media handles, etc. Anything you want to say here before we leave? I'll just pull up the super chats that were already up. Anything else you want to promote, plug, anything?

## **#Greg Stoker**

Yeah, based off the Fox News reporting, I really don't want to hear anything about China being a surveillance state. First of all, there's a completely different social contract in China than there is in the United States. There's a completely different history, one of absolute violence and instability and coloniality in China that didn't really exist here. Also, I have to go on the 21st to an anti-Flock city council meeting in Temple, where they're pulling cops from Dallas, San Antonio, Georgetown to just intimidate everybody to just accept Flock surveillance. So let's not throw stones, okay, Fox News, because you are definitely not covering that.

## **#Elina Xenophontos**

It's like what we said earlier with the anti-Jurassic. When Larry Fink is talking about defensive operations for domestic counterterrorist operations, what is he talking about? He's talking about, you know, targeting American citizens who are going to become all the more disgruntled at the fact that they're losing their homes and their land and, you know, data centers. I think there was an article today, like, yeah, like in Lake Tahoe, I think 50,000 residents were told that, effectively, they're not going to have enough electricity, to find somewhere else to get their electricity because of data centers. Basically, this is happening throughout the United States. So what do you do when people become angry? Domestic counterterrorism, you know, military action. So this is the state of the U.S., and it's going to get worse.

## **#Greg Stoker**

Wait, you don't like your land being seized via eminent domain for power lines feeding data centers? What are you, antifa?

## **#Danny**

China is doing it. Trump just approved of China taking up all the farmland. What are you talking about? Anyway, sometimes you gotta laugh. Sometimes you gotta laugh, everybody. All right, so without further ado, I think this is a great way to end it. Everybody hit the like button before you go. Check out all the places to support Alina and Greg's work, to find what they're doing in the video description below, and also all the places to support this channel. I'll be back tomorrow, 11 a.m. Eastern time. I'll let you know who is coming on very soon. Without further ado, take care, see you then.