

Power Moves East: China Teaches USA a Big Lesson | Chas Freeman

The US-China summit in Beijing confirms once more: US Hegemony is over. It's a multipolar world now. I'm joined today once again by Ambassador Chas Freeman to discuss the shifting balance between the United States, China, Iran, Russia, and Europe. Ambassador Freeman's HP: <https://chasfreeman.net> Ambassador Freeman's Substack: https://substack.com/@chasfreeman662157?utm_source=global-search Support us on Substack: <https://pascallottaz.substack.com> Our Shop: <https://neutralitystudies-shop.fourthwall.com> 00:00:00 Trump Meets Xi: A New Recognition of China 00:03:00 Competition, Common Interests, and Iran 00:06:16 China's Strategic Confidence and US Pressure Campaigns 00:09:03 The Strait of Hormuz and the End of Maritime Hegemony 00:12:06 Taiwan, Japan, and the Risks of Escalation 00:15:06 China Steps Out of Diplomatic Passivity 00:18:00 West Asia After the Iran War 00:21:43 Washington Debates Diplomacy or More Bombing 00:27:10 Presidential War Powers and the Collapse of Checks and Balances 00:33:00 Europe, Russia, and the Danger of Self-Fulfilling War 00:36:00 The Lost Art of Diplomacy and Closing Thoughts

#Pascal

Welcome back, everybody. We are very lucky to be joined today again by Ambassador Chas Freeman, former U.S. Ambassador to Saudi Arabia and Under Secretary of Defense. Ambassador, welcome back.

#Chas Freeman

Thank you. Glad to be with you.

#Pascal

Chas, you are also one of the people in the United States who, within the government of course, has had a lot of experience with China, among others. You translated for Nixon when he went to China back in the '70s. How are you looking at the current meeting of Trump with Mr. Xi?

#Chas Freeman

Well, I think it was not unimportant. First, it's the first time in nine years that an American president has traveled to Beijing. Second, he traveled to Beijing very much to meet Xi Jinping as an equal. There was no hierarchy. Third, I think it represented a recognition on the part of Donald Trump, if not on the part of everyone in his administration, that we can't afford not to deal with China, that

there are too many problems in the world that can't be dealt with without Chinese contributions. China is now a world power. If you define a world power as a power whose interests must be taken into account everywhere in the world on virtually every issue, then China is a weak world power, but it is yet a world power.

And so this meeting demonstrated that the two sides, who are rivals, can communicate, can meet. There will be another meeting September 24th at the White House. Presumably after that, Xi Jinping will address the UN General Assembly when it opens. And I think both sides got something useful out of it. Donald Trump got pageantry, which inflates his ego and pleases him. It's not unimportant, given the danger of him being in a bad mood. There may or may not have been some trade deals of significance. As usual with Trump, there was no effective preparation for this meeting in advance. No Sherpas climbed the summit to define what could be achieved. We have the possibility of some aircraft sales and soybean sales.

And the two sides reaffirmed a common interest in the opening of the Strait of Hormuz. After all, China is the world's largest trading power, and it has a very great interest in freedom of navigation. There was no agreement on what to do about the closure of the Strait of Hormuz or how to open it. But the two sides recognized the common interests, and Xi Jinping evidently offered to be helpful if he could be. And on the issue of non-proliferation, China reaffirmed its desire, its hope that Iran would not develop a nuclear weapon. As you know, I think that hope is now in vain. That is, Iran has no choice but to develop a nuclear weapon, and it will if it has not already.

But that's another topic. In the end, the two sides, in other words, confirmed the current status of the relationship as a competitive relationship tempered with some recognition of common interests. And on the Chinese side, Xi Jinping got the opportunity to be a statesman greeting Donald Trump on an equal basis. That affirms Chinese prestige. He had an opportunity to express China's policies, which aim at stability and peace rather than disruption, distinguishing himself from Donald Trump and the United States in that way. And of course, he had an important opportunity to educate Donald Trump directly about the importance of the Taiwan issue to China.

And evidently there was some impact there, at least on a temporary basis, because Donald Trump has now said that he doesn't see any merit in supporting independence or starting a war with China over the status of Taiwan. So he has some decisions yet to make about arms sales to Taiwan. He claims he has not made those decisions. I suspect the political atmosphere in Washington will force him to sell those weapons. But he clearly understands the risks now, that this could tip the United States into a war 9,500 miles away from Washington. So this was not an insignificant event, even if it made no real news. And its main impact was to divert attention from the Epstein files and the war in West Asia, temporarily, to a pageantry in Beijing, which of course the Chinese managed with their customary skill.

#Pascal

Right. So in a sense, we've seen a meeting that didn't go bad, right? Nothing that kind of exploded in the face of the world. But can you maybe talk about it and your interpretation of what this tells us in the context of all the other things that are going on? The unsuccessful war against Iran, also Xi Jinping's recent meeting with the leader of Taiwan, the Republic of China's KMT leader, the leader of the opposition party, which was also a big event. What's happening with Cuba, how the United States is trying to put again pressure there, and maybe also with the way the proxy war in Ukraine is going. Do you have any kind of reading from that perspective of this cordial meeting in Beijing?

#Chas Freeman

Well, certainly Xi Jinping received Donald Trump with grace, and it was a good show on his part. I think the Chinese once again demonstrated to anyone who pays attention, as opposed to looking at them with prejudice and paranoia, that they are a bulwark of the decaying global order. That is, they wish to preserve the role of the United Nations, international law, and consensus-based rulemaking rather than unilateralism. And therefore, they are not so much a revisionist power. Of course, they might choose to improve things a little bit, but they are basically a force for peace and stability. They are not engaged in foreign wars.

They have no desire to engage in them, and so forth. There are, of course, misinterpretations of the Chinese relationship with Iran. Some Americans claim that Iran is a Chinese client state, but that is basically absurd. Iran is an independent sovereign nation. It's actually a civilizational state with a history of many thousands of years and is not beholden to China or any other country in terms of its policies. It has taken decisions which the Chinese regret, as I said, this closure of the Strait of Hormuz, but the Chinese answer to this is the only appropriate one, which is diplomacy.

There is no military answer to how to open Hormuz, but you are prepared to accommodate Iranian national interests and work out an arrangement with Iran, where for a small fee you can transit the strait. In fact, ironically, in terms of holding the strait open, the principal blockader of the strait now is the United States, not Iran, because Iran is quite prepared to let the vessels of friendly nations through the strait. I think, before I go on and talk about the visit of Zheng Yiwen, who is the chairwoman of Guangdong in China's Taiwan, I should mention that the significance for international order of the Iranian action in Hormuz is becoming apparent.

Effectively, the world has been operating under rules set first by the British Navy and now the American Navy since 1763, when the Seven Years' War ended and the British overwhelmed the French in the maritime domain, something they confirmed at Trafalgar in 1805. The baton of global maritime dominance passed to the United States in March of 1943, when I was born, in the Battle of the Bismarck Sea, when the Japanese Navy reached its farthest limit in the South Pacific, having earlier defeated the British. And so, basically, the baton of global maritime hegemony passed to the United States, and we have exercised that role since then, up to now. But things have changed. In the 18th century, there was a three-mile territorial limit established by the range of cannons.

In the late 20th century, in the 1980s, there was a political compromise on a 12-mile limit, which had no empirical basis whatsoever. But now we see that missiles can attack ships out to a range of 2,000 kilometers or 1,500 miles, and drones to a range of 300 kilometers or 200 miles. This kept the US Navy at bay. And it means that land powers can now, as the Houthis—I'm sorry, Allah—demonstrated in the Red Sea, blockade straits from the land, making things of the United States that had sunk the Iranian Navy basically irrelevant in terms of its impact. This sets a precedent, and we're now hearing the Indonesians and others talk about charging fees in the Straits of Malacca or the Lombok Strait or other straits that go through the Indonesian archipelago. I think we've seen a precedent set that is likely to be followed.

And it really marks the end of 263 years of Anglo-American maritime hegemony, or perhaps not the end, but the beginning of the end. So then you asked, I think, about the significance of the Taiwan issue in the current context. I think Donald Trump clearly doesn't think it's worth it to defend Taiwan against an effort by the Chinese to complete their civil war with the reassimilation somehow of Taiwan. Taiwan has, of course, become quite a different society. It has a robust democracy. It is wealthy. It is egalitarian. It is very admirable in many respects. But Donald Trump doesn't care about ideological connections. So this is a dilemma, I think, for Japan, where you are, because the prime minister has stepped into this issue of the resolution of the Chinese Civil War in a way that has poisoned Sino-Japanese relations.

And Taiwan is strategically significant to Japan, has been historically. The Dutch launched their opening of treaty ports in Japan from Taiwan. And Taiwan, of course, became the springboard for Japanese advances in the Philippines and elsewhere in Southeast Asia in World War II. So it has an undeniable strategic significance for Japan. And that significance now has to be dealt with in a somewhat less confident context. I think, I guess the final point I'd make, since you basically piled 14 questions into one statement, is that overall, what was demonstrated was Chinese confidence. They received Donald Trump with great confidence. They even received the Secretary of State, Marco Rubio—they changed the character, the ideogram, with which they transliterate his name from a common, basically meaningless surname to one meaning rash, impatient, rude, and so forth.

#Pascal

Oh, wait, did they do that? They used a different character, didn't they?

#Chas Freeman

They changed the ideogram for his surname—a very subtle move to indicate that he's still under sanctions. But they let him in under a different Chinese character.

#Pascal

Ah, sorry, sorry, I wasn't aware of that. So there are Chinese sanctions on Marco Rubio, actually?

#Chas Freeman

Yes, he has been under sanction, I think, since 2021 for basically extreme anti-Chinese statements and advocacy and various claims that had no basis. Their money was at some point. He's still under sanction, but now apparently he's changed his name, or someone changed it for him, and that finessed the issue. Anyway, I think with regard to Ukraine, confidence is also going to be evident during the forthcoming visit of Vladimir Putin to Beijing, which I think takes place next week, is it? Wednesday, yes. And so, I guess you could say that China is emerging slowly from its traditional diplomatic passivity. I remember after 9/11, I was stuck in Beijing. I had long conversations with Jiang Zemin, with the foreign minister, Li Zhaoxing, and with various people in the intelligence community.

I said to them, you know, you have a unique knowledge of Afghanistan because during the struggle to evict the Soviets from Afghanistan, you had a relationship with the Tajik element in the northwest, and that was unique. Everyone else had to go through Pakistani ISI. You had a direct relationship, and you know where the bodies and the ammunition caches are buried, and you could be very helpful. And I advised you, now, I'm aware of your 4,000 years of masterful inactivity—you know, Wu Wei, or Wuwei—which is the Taoist philosophy: do nothing and you shall achieve everything. I said, I advise you to abandon that and take an active role.

Well, it didn't work because of opposition on the U.S. side to cooperating with China. But I think the Chinese now have emerged from their diplomatic, and we see diplomatic activity evident some years ago in the brokering of a rapprochement between the Saudis and Iran, now evident in their policies on Ukraine, on Iran, on the war in Iran, on their effort with the Russians, with the Iranians, with the Saudis and others to craft a post-Iranian war peace and security architecture in the Persian Gulf. This is something that, independently, the Chinese, the Russians, and the Iranians have all proposed in the past. The common point that they have is that this would not involve an American military presence.

That would be gone. And I see circumstantial evidence, which is all I see. You know, I can't be sure of what's happening below the surface. Since I'm just an individual reading the tea leaves, I don't have access to secret intelligence. I think there is evidence shown in the decision by Kuwait and Saudi Arabia to bar use of bases on their territory or airspace overflight by the United States that is aimed at Iran. And there is evidence from Qatari statements and behavior that the three of them, at least, are engaged in quiet talks with Iran about what to do after the war. What to do after the war will not include the continuing American presence on their territory.

UAE is a separate issue. It is very dug into its new relationship with Israel. We now know that although the UAE has denied it, the Prime Minister of Israel, Mr. Netanyahu, the head of Mossad, Mr. Barnea, the Defense Minister, Mr. Gallant, the chief of the IDF, whose name I've forgotten, but a very distinguished-looking gentleman, have all been in the UAE during the war, and we also have seen the deployment of the Iron Dome, anti-drone, anti-cruise missile system in the UAE. So the

UAE is filled with a desire for, a feckless desire, I believe, and a fantasy desire for revenge against Iran. It did participate with the United States in the assault on Iran and probably also with Israel.

And it has therefore been singled out by Iran for special punishment and will continue to be singled out for punishment unless and until it comes to terms. So we have a situation where the Gulf Cooperation Council is once again acting not as a collective body, but as individual members trying to reach their own accommodation with Iran. And, of course, as I said, in the meantime, the American blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, which is not entirely effective, is an annoyance and a problem for U.S. relations with Saudi Arabia, with Iran, with Iraq, with Qatar and Kuwait, and, of course, also with Bahrain, but not so much with the UAE, which remains in the coalition against Iran. So I don't know, since you asked 14 questions, I don't know if I answered all of them.

#Pascal

Hey, very brief intermission because I was recently banned from YouTube. And although I'm back, this can happen anytime again. So please consider subscribing not only here, but to my mailing list on Substack. That's pascallottaz.substack.com. The link's going to be in the description below. And now, back to the video.

#Pascal

That's wonderful. That's exactly what I wanted — your assessment of the bird's-eye view. Actually, the situation in West Asia is again very acute. We read today in the New York Times that now, over the weekend, Donald Trump has to weigh his options: more diplomacy or go back to the bombs again. And you know, the New York Times and the way this is discussed in mainstream media is quite bizarre, because it, of course, leaves out quite a bit of what we've learned. For instance, to the New York Times' credit, they did report that a lot of the material in Iran was actually not hidden, that they maintain a lot of missile capabilities.

But on the other hand, they left out that the United States is running out of a lot of things. And as you just said, you know, Saudi Arabia and Qatar not wanting their airspace and their land being used anymore, which to me looks like a little bit of almost a neutralization in the classic sense of those territories, and that the United States, even if it decided to hit again, would hit again from an even weaker point than where it was at the beginning of the war. So where do you think the U.S. administration actually is when it comes to this decision of how to continue the necessary negotiations with Iran?

#Chas Freeman

Well, I think we're seeing a debate. The military option is quite unrealistic for all the reasons you mentioned. That is, Iran possesses a formidable ability to renew the war and is prepared to do so. And the United States has a greatly depleted inventory of useful weaponry and defense equipment.

Israel has been essentially stripped of its self-defense capability for many purposes. And Israel, of course, has been taking advantage of this war to conduct a war in Lebanon aimed at the annexation of southern Lebanon. It has annexed parts of—informally, but annexed parts of—Syria. It now proposes to annex parts of Lebanon. And we can talk about that as a separate matter.

But I think this reflects a debate between various members of the neoconservative factions. On the one hand, we have Robert Kagan, a very prominent and serious conservative intellectual, who has concluded, correctly in my view, that the United States has lost this war and that its only feasible response to the current situation is to cut its losses by leaving and abandoning the war. And that is, I think, testimony to his realism. It's quite a break with the idea of military action. On the other hand, we have people like John Bolton and others who basically deny reality and assume that we still have the capacity to clobber Iran into submission, and therefore we should double down on the war.

They are reflecting the Israeli view. Netanyahu and company do not want this war to end. They want it to be completed with the fracture of the Iranian state, which is not going to happen in my view, but it's unrealistic. And it's part of the same fallacious reasoning that assumes you can solve the problem of the Palestinians by conducting genocide. That does not defeat Hamas. You cannot solve the problem of Lebanese nationalism, Shiite nationalism represented by Hezbollah, by decimating its leadership. And in fact, things are not going very well for Israel in Lebanon. So we have a debate, and where Donald Trump stands on this, I do not know. He probably doesn't know. And so we cannot predict what will happen.

I have felt from the beginning that it was very probable that he would understand that the war is lost and we have to get out of it, but that he would leave with a big bang and some kind of big assault on Iran that enabled him to claim that he had accomplished even more than he already claims, most of which is not true. I mean, his own intelligence community has refuted his claims on virtually every front. But he may, coming out of China in this discussion with Xi Jinping, realize that a peaceful retreat coupled with claims of victory is a better approach. So we'll see. But I think it is very significant that Kagan has, I think, reached a realistic conclusion.

#Pascal

In your view, in U.S. domestic politics, I mean, one of the most striking developments for me over the last couple of years is that, officially, within the U.S. Constitution, war-making power is, of course, with Congress, not with the president. And that has been completely abandoned. There are some, like, you know, magician's tricks, like just saying, oh, it's an operation, 60 days, it's wrapped up, it's finished. At the same time, this is the same president that renamed the Defense Department to the War Department. Actually, everybody calls it a war. Everybody knows it is a war.

Everybody discusses it as, how shall we end the war? It's just a ceasefire. I mean, the discrepancy between what your Constitution says and how everything is going is just so extremely large. Do you see a chance of this ever going back? I mean, the constraint on presidential war-making ability? Or

is this, in your view, here to stay, and that's just like, well, we basically now acknowledge that, no, the U.S. president can, with a stroke of a pen, actually, you know, attempt abducting any president. And now there are talks about, you know, trying to do this with Cuba or invade and attack any country.

#Chas Freeman

I think, first of all, this is a cease-fire with Israeli characteristics.

#Pascal

Yeah.

#Chas Freeman

Which means that the other side ceases fire and we continue shooting. Yeah. And it's not a real ceasefire. So that claim is spurious. It's like saying that the overthrow of the Muslim Brotherhood government in Egypt wasn't a coup. You know, this is a legal fiction that has no credibility at all. Second, I think there is a chance that we may recover respect for the Constitution and the congressional power because there is a real backlash at the popular level to the level of doublespeak and hypocrisy and deference to presidential power that the Congress has demonstrated. The Republican Party continues to behave almost entirely like a cult rather than a political party.

You know, it seems to celebrate things like the outrageous golden statue of Donald Trump that various Christian fundamentalists and rabbis worship, like the golden calf in the Old Testament representing Baal, that god of the Phoenicians. So I think we're in an election process. Elections are the remedy in democracy for the absence of principle and bad government. We have an absence of principle. We have a bad government. And I think there is some chance it will be corrected. I say this in part because I'm watching various candidates emerge from nowhere, arguing that the political elite is ignoring the wishes of the people and is indifferent to their welfare.

And this dovetails with the development of plutocracy in the United States, where the one-tenth of one percent basically are able to guide our politics, something that is deeply resented. In fact, this is what got Donald Trump elected, this phenomenon. So I think we're capable of change. I don't predict it. I'm not sure it will happen, but I don't think it's an impossibility. And so we are seeing, however, I would say, Pascal, a general tendency around the world, whether it's in the United States or in Europe or in India or in Israel, of the political elite operating without any checks and balances and disregarding the views of the common folk. It takes a different form in different places.

In Europe, you have the European Commission bureaucracy, which operates in a completely undemocratic fashion and is deeply resented for that reason. And in India, we have the emergence of the Bharatiya Janata, Modi's party, as almost a one-party controller of the Indian state. And

maybe you have a bit of the nationalist feeling and populism operating in Japan as well. I don't know enough about that to argue, but I think we're seeing a collapse of democracy, of constitutional government, of respect for the rule of law pretty generally and around the world. And it's encouraging to me in that regard to see people like Pedro Sanchez of Spain organizing against this, model democracies like Uruguay, which nobody ever thinks about, coming in to reaffirm the principles of constitutional democracy in a group. So I don't think it's over yet.

#Pascal

Okay, I'm glad to hear that. There's one more of these negative tendencies, which is that some of these groups that are in power openly talk about the necessity to do things like cognitive warfare and so on, which is basically the idea of not the people informing the government, not the opinion of the people that should inform the government, but the government that should be able to control the opinion of the people.

And I had a couple of scary discussions recently, first with Europeans, especially German colleagues, and then with Russian colleagues. And the Russians were saying, like, look, Germans keep saying they want a war with us, and we're starting to believe them. And the German colleagues were saying, like, the propaganda here is so thick that this belief in the inevitability of a Russian war is now overwhelming. Just to finish this discussion, what is your assessment of the... maybe, is it a self-fulfilling prophecy now that Europe must go to war with Russia? Or how do you see what the U.S. interest is in how Russia is dealt with?

#Chas Freeman

Well, I think, you know, at the mass level, which I agree is manipulated by the elite, there are formidable mechanisms now for imposing censorship, not directly by the government but through corporate structures. In Europe, you have a fair amount of censorship, some egregious. In the United States, it tends to be indirect because of the First Amendment and some Google checks on it. But there is censorship. There is media manipulation. You know, everything is plausible, nothing is true. We don't know how to distinguish truth from falsehood. And I think this is true also in Russia. And I think there is a huge issue with the rearmament of Germany, which is not being honestly discussed.

That is to say, I remember when I was synthesizing what became the Partnership for Peace and trying to figure out what to do with NATO after the Cold War, that one of the major concerns was that if we weren't, if the United States were not present in Europe, we would not balance Germany against other smaller or medium-sized states. And you'd have a German hegemony in Europe. And the Germans themselves were concerned about that. They wanted the United States to stay at that time, in part for that reason. I think this is all changing. And I don't believe there's any inevitability of a war between Russia and the rest of Europe. I think that's nonsense.

But I think we're going to see political changes in Western Europe. Maybe Eastern Europe is already a different factor. I mean, look at the German elections and what happens to Alternative für Deutschland in the eastern part of Germany. But anyway, I think we're going to see a turn away from this kind of ridiculous—not ridiculous because it's not funny—terrible fostering of military-based confrontational politics toward some kind of greater realism which involves diplomacy. Maybe Europe will discover diplomacy again. It seems to have forgotten it. And the United States is totally incompetent at it. You know that we have 115 embassies now without ambassadors, out of 182, I believe. And we just don't know.

There was no professional diplomat involved in the Trump visit to Beijing, as far as I can tell. There were no Sherpas preparing the summit. It was thrown together at the last minute. I mean, Steve Mnuchin, the Treasury Secretary, went to South Korea for a last-minute meeting with his Chinese counterpart on trade issues. This is the day before the Trump arrival in Beijing. I mean, this is amateur hour. And we've had the experience of dealing with Mnuchin and Kushner, who are anything or nothing, if not completely amateurish and ineffective. And so the world is not practicing diplomacy for the most part. Who is?

Russia. Sergei Lavrov is a formidable diplomat. China. Wang Yi is a formidable diplomat. Iran. Naragchi is a formidable diplomat. Maybe Australia. Penny Wong is in that class. But you look very hard around the rest of the world for anybody. Maybe the Indian foreign minister is similarly equipped. But you look very hard for people who are, you know, avatars of statecraft. So your program is called Neutrality Studies, with an emphasis on the non-military resolution of problems. And we've stripped ourselves of the capability to do non-military solutions to problems. And the military solutions we try to impose don't work.

So we need to have a rebirth of the diplomatic mind, I think. I mean, I've spent some time thinking about that and trying to recover the vocabulary that describes different relationships and their implications. The difference between alliances and entente, the difference between entente and client state, the differences between rivalry and hostility and enmity. I mean, these are all distinct phases of international relations, which political scientists haven't paid a lot of attention to, but which are part of the lore of diplomacy. Maybe we need to rediscover it.

#Pascal

No, you're absolutely right. And also, like, what happened to the U.S. Foreign Service? The U.S. has always historically had fantastic diplomats, right? Joseph Grew in Japan at the time, and so on. And something happened. And also in Europe, something happened that dismantled the diplomatic ability, capability, and so on. And maybe we need to figure that one out. But that's definitely a discussion for another time, because it's not before you. You more than deserve your dinner and a drink. I would like to thank you very much. People who want to follow you, I know you have a wonderful homepage, which I will link in the description below. Is there any other place where people should go to find your writings?

#Chas Freeman

Well, somehow I got onto Substack. I'm not quite sure how I did. I must have responded to someone else's posting. And so the other day I decided, well, the prepared remarks I make, I should go and put on Substack. So I put two of them on there. And people can find my Substack, I think, fairly easily. And I put two interventions on, one about peace in Europe and the requirements for it, and one about, interestingly, the open-door policy toward China invented by John Hay, the Secretary of State at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries.

He basically figured out a way to deal with a faltering China and to benefit the United States by helping China get back on its feet. We, of course, have exactly the opposite policy now. We're trying to knock China off its feet. Notwithstanding all the nice talk in Beijing the last several days, we remain more than rivals. We have a hostile relationship. So, yeah, there are ways to—if anybody's interested. But, you know, I mainly these days, despite my desire to retire and do quiet reading of science fiction and other salacious materials, end up as a talking head on shows like yours.

#Pascal

You really help us because, you know, current everyday politics actually reads like George Orwell's fiction from back in the day. And we need help from people to interpret that.

#Chas Freeman

It's all about *Animal Farm*. That's seminal reading. Some animals are more equal than others.

#Pascal

Yeah, I'll go. I need a little bit of hay now. Thank you, Ambassador Freeman, and see you next time.

#Chas Freeman

Okay, great. How about Pascal Lottaz?