

# Alex Krainer: Trump in Beijing: Cooperation or Clash?

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## #Nima

Donald Trump's visit to China. And I think it's so important in many ways when it comes to the economy, when it comes to what's going on in the Middle East, in Ukraine, and the big picture — the two basic superpowers coming together, talking, and making decisions about what the future would be. Are they going to cooperate? Are they going to confront? This is the main question right now in the minds of the Chinese. Is the United States going to, you know, make some sort of move toward having some sort of partnership or some sort of different relationship? Because what we've seen so far was some sort of confrontation — in Ukraine, in the Middle East, in Venezuela. And here is what she said about what has happened so far.

## #Guest

Today, President Trump and I had in-depth exchanges on China-U.S. relations and international and regional dynamics. We both believe that the China-U.S. relationship is the most important bilateral relationship in the world. We must make it work and never mess it up. Both China and the United States stand to gain from cooperation and lose from confrontation. Our two countries should be partners rather than rivals. President Trump and I also agreed to build a constructive China-U.S. relationship of strategic stability to promote the steady, sound, and sustainable development of China-U.S. relations and bring more peace, prosperity, and progress to the world.

## #Nima

And here is Donald Trump.

## #Speaker 03

President Xi, thank you for this beautiful welcome, and tonight it is my honor to extend an invitation to you and Madam Peng to visit us at the White House this September 24th. And we look forward to

it. I'd now like to raise a glass and propose a toast to the rich and enduring ties between the American and Chinese people. It's a very special relationship, and I want to thank you again. This has been an amazing period of time.

## **#Nima**

I think, Alex, when it comes to this, we have an official statement by the White House about the Trump-Xi talks so far. And it says the White House called it a good meeting between the two presidents. Talks covered expanded economic cooperation and U.S. market access in China, with China to increase purchases of American agricultural products. Both sides agreed the Strait of Hormuz must stay open for global energy, and Xi opposed militarization of the Strait of Hormuz. He also signaled interest in buying more U.S. oil. And in a joint position on Iran, the United States and China agreed that Iran must not obtain a nuclear weapon. And basically, what Donald Trump, in the case of Iran, wanted to achieve is that, you know, when it comes to this, nobody's having any sort of disagreement with the statement.

Everybody wants to open up the Strait of Hormuz. And when it comes to the militarization of the Strait of Hormuz, basically we have the blockade — the American blockade or the Iranian blockade. What is your understanding so far when it comes to the conflict in the Middle East? Because Donald Trump, we know what's happening in the Strait of Hormuz and what Donald Trump wants. You know, he doesn't want this situation because he's getting so desperate in the Strait of Hormuz, in my opinion. And Xi knows that, Donald Trump knows that, Japan knows that, South Korea — everybody knows what's going on there. What do you make of it?

## **#Alex**

I think, well, first of all, I think all of this is very encouraging, you know, and I think that this meeting really is probably the most important meeting of the year until September, I guess. And then my understanding is that when Trump leaves China very soon, Vladimir Putin is going to visit China. So I think that this is diplomatic footwork to transition the world to the new system of governance, to a multipolar architecture. And I think that for the United States, it makes every sense in the world. Exactly as Xi Jinping put it, you know, both sides stand to gain from cooperation and both sides stand to lose from confrontation. I think that's clear to everybody.

But, you know, Nima, I was basically saying the same thing regarding Iran — that, you know, if the United States should take the side of Israel and attack Iran, there's only downside. There's no upside to the whole boondoggle. Whereas having constructive cooperation with Iran, there's plenty of upside for both sides. So I thought, of course, nobody reasonable would go to war on the side of Israel. Israel is nothing but a burden on the United States and pretty much the rest of the world, whereas constructive cooperation lifts everybody up. But you see, I was wrong, because Trump did go to war against Iran on the side of Israel. So whatever the conclusions of these talks will be, we'll have to see whether Trump is even capable of honoring any commitments.

And I genuinely don't know what to think about this because, you know, again, Trump surprised everybody by attacking Iran — even people very close to him who thought they knew him, who thought that they, you know, like Tucker Carlson, who thought that he personally understood perfectly well how idiotic it would be to attack Iran and what the risks were, and that the people who were pushing him to do it were actually his enemies. But he did it anyway. So I have to then go back to the question: who is in charge? Who is, you know, who is deciding things at the end of the day? And then, you know, just yesterday we had Fox News report that the CIA raided the offices of Tulsi Gabbard.

Tulsi Gabbard is the Director of National Intelligence, so she's their superior. She's the boss of the CIA chief, Radcliffe. How does the CIA raid the DNI's offices? And then apparently they confiscated files that have to do with MKUltra and the assassination of JFK. Now, okay, this is what Fox News reported. It's not necessarily an accurate account, but something did happen, and the CIA did take a bunch of documents from the DNI, and apparently this was not what Tulsi Gabbard wanted, so it was done against her will, which indicates that there's something very, very strange going on in the United States where the legitimate structures of power aren't really in control.

And we can see that also in the congressional election of Thomas Massie, that he's very popular with his constituents. They want him reelected, but he's opposed by three Zionist billionaires. And then, you know, according to the last poll, we had again that situation where, you know, support for Massie is here, support for his opponent is here. And then all of a sudden, just days before the election, boom, you have an inversion. All of a sudden, as somebody who has spent his professional career in research on trends, primarily market trends, but, you know, markets... markets are just one manifestation of social trends.

This does not happen. This is impossible. Trends, you know, for that kind of a large event to happen, you need a lot of time, and you would have—okay, just not to get into the weeds of social trends—but basically, an inversion on that scale would have to span months, not just overnight. So it's obviously a fraud. It's obviously contrived somehow. I don't know how, and I don't know what he's doing, who's behind it, but we see that it's Zionist interests. And we see also that, going back to China, China has taken a pretty categorical adversarial position with regard to Israel. And I think that the consensus understanding is that Israel and Israeli interests have dragged Trump into war against Iran.

So, this is, I think, what's contaminating all the works. So everything that was said between Trump and Xi Jinping makes complete and total sense. And it's even consistent with what we heard from the administration in the beginning when they were elected, when they were saying the post-World War II global order is obsolete. It's been weaponized against the United States. The new reality is a multipolar global order, and we intend to embrace that global order. So that means having constructive relationships with other global partners like China, like Russia, like Iran, and so forth. But that's not what's happening. That's not what is happening in reality.

And I think that these same interests that are fighting Thomas Massie, that may have broken into or raided Tulsi Gabbard's office, that have coerced Trump into attacking Iran, might also derail constructive relationships between the USA and China. I think that we will have to give it a lot of time to see what happens with this. I think that business interests, commercial interests, economic interests, political interests—everything is leaning in one direction, and it's obvious. But I could have told you exactly the same thing with regard to interests between the United States and Iran, and instead we saw war. And so, you know, for Iran, there's Israel. For China, there's Taiwan.

And, you know, we might see at some point in the future that the United States will somehow try to destabilize China through Taiwan. But I think that time is running out for these schemes. I think that this imperial, neocolonial system of governance is getting weaker and weaker, and that the sensible approach, the stuff that's being overtly said now, is gaining credibility, it's gaining power, and I hope that in the end it will prevail. How the situation around... how the situation with Iran is going to be resolved, I don't know. But I do think that between Russia and China, they could engineer a face-saving exit for Trump. And I hope that they will.

## **#Nima**

You know, the most important issue for China is the situation with Taiwan, which was not mentioned in this statement by the United States. And that is not a good sign, in my opinion, as time goes by, because there has to be something about Taiwan mentioned in this statement, which wasn't. And the problem is, Alex, I don't know, because the war in Ukraine and then the war in the Middle East show that the United States is not going to be able to do anything in Taiwan. Taiwan is an island, and they're not going to be that much able, because in the case of Iran, they had a lot of bases in GCC countries, a lot of leverage. They have Israel in the region. They have the UAE in the region. They had all these bases there. But Taiwan is nothing. It's not even comparable. I literally don't believe that South Korea or Japan would be that suicidal to go against China and help the United States as GCC countries did during the conflict, during the war between Iran and the United States.

## **#Alex**

Well, you are right, and nobody has any enthusiasm for going to war against China. Well, nobody had much enthusiasm for going to war in Ukraine, and nobody had much enthusiasm for going to war against Iran, but the war still happened. That is, you know, not nobody, but, you know, maybe Israel did. Maybe a loony fringe extreme right wing of the Ukrainian political class wanted to go to war against Russia and so forth. But somehow, you know, these interests that are keeping us in forever wars, in a given moment, they end up prevailing. How they end up prevailing, we have to understand that. And I genuinely don't understand it, and I don't think that very many people do understand it.

But I think that the way the current polycrisis is advancing, I think that they're revealing themselves. And already now we can see that, oh, it has something to do with Israel, but it has something to do

also with the British Foreign Office, and it has something to do with the neocons and something to do with these Zionist billionaires in the United States. And we see that they obviously have disproportionate power over policy. And I think that it's extremely important to push back against them. And they also have disproportionate power in who gets elected to Congress and who doesn't.

You know, the situation around Taiwan has been war-gamed to death, and the Americans know that they have no chance. But they also knew that they stood no chance against Iran, and they went for it anyway. And I think that the reason is that for these neocolonialist interests in the West, they don't care about winning the war. They will exhaust their nation, their host nation, to death just for the chance to destabilize their rival. Because they don't need to defeat China militarily. They try to destabilize target nations, to make their leadership look bad, to make them unpopular, and to try to mobilize the people in their country to topple the regime.

You know, color revolution scenarios that we've seen everywhere. And I think that they have perfected this approach to social engineering to the extent that they are very confident. And so for that reason, they will not hesitate to use the United States and Japan and Singapore and the Philippines and Indonesia and Australia, whoever they can corral into this conflict, to use them to start this process. And then they will work, you know, secret diplomacy, secret intelligence, NGOs, media pressure, narrative pressure, to try to overthrow the regime. And I think this is why they are always willing and unhesitant to go into wars that they know are unwinnable.

They don't care about whether they win or not. And they absolutely actually are correct. I used to think that they don't care how many people end up dead. I think now that they do care how many people end up dead, but not in the way that you would expect. They want a lot of people to end up dead because that also diminishes social pressures at home. If you extinguish a large percentage of military-age males from your society, then you have reduced the risk of a revolution or a civil war at home. So I think that for that reason, they actually do want a lot of casualties on their own side.

## **#Nima**

When it comes to the Iranian position, Alex, I think there was nothing problematic with his statement. One of them is that the militarization of the Strait of Hormuz should be ended, and Iran has no problem with that. And the war, you know... The main reason that we have this militarization of this strait is because of the American-Israeli attack on Iran. It's not about Iran deciding to militarize the region. But on the other hand, the United States is there; it's part of this militarization with the blockade that they're putting on Iranian ports. And the second point, in my opinion, which is so important, is there was no mention of this new mechanism of the Strait of Hormuz that Iran has defined — the toll system and the way that the... Nothing of that sort was mentioned in this statement. They said they have to open up the Strait of Hormuz.

I think everybody agrees with that. And the other point, Alex, when it comes to Taiwan, we've seen the head or the CEO of NVIDIA being part of the American delegations. These are not good signs, in

my opinion. You don't need to go, don't need to bring him as part of the United States, because when you do this, it means that Taiwan is part of the United States. It's going to be close to China, it's part of China, but politically, economically, it's more important — you know, part of the United States, not part of China. These are not good signs, by the way, in my opinion. We had that with, you know, I remember the Alaska and Anchorage meeting between the two presidents — nothing of that sort. After 24 hours, everybody just forgot what had happened. Do you see, are these, when it comes to Iran, when it comes to Taiwan, what are the signs in your opinion?

## **#Alex**

To my mind, this may not go down without a fight. What you say is the composition of Trump delegations doesn't inspire a lot of confidence. You're right about that. And that indicates that there are interests in U.S. society with strong political influence who still want to impose their arrangement on China, kind of force it to submit to them. And I think that they will not give this up easily. You can talk sense to Trump, and I don't know. For all I know, Trump might understand that sense, and there may be people in his administration still who see that sense. But again, there are these other interests that see it in a different light. And these are imperial interests which are foreign to the United States.

They may have satellites and agents in the United States, and a lot of these CEOs, they know which side their toast is buttered on. But it doesn't follow that this is in the interest of the American people. Who prevails, we can see from the elections. But the other side is not naive anymore. They now understand that Trump can make his commitments, but they still have to keep their finger on the trigger, as the Iranians put it. And I think that with regard to Taiwan, the Chinese have learned very, very valuable lessons from the Iranians about how to fight and how to oppose this imperial hegemon. So I don't see the American side, the Western side, saying like, all right, we have seen the light.

We will just pack up, shut down our military bases, go back home, focus on maybe, I don't know, fixing up the Baltimore Bridge, which collapsed two years ago, and fixing up our infrastructure and doing all this. They will keep all their assets in place because they will try still, you know, their overarching imperative—and this has been restated explicitly as late as 2019 under Trump's first administration—is to maintain and defend American dominance of the Eurasian continent. Who formulated this? Who formulated this foreign policy? It sure wasn't the American people. I think those interests are still predominant in American foreign policy. They will not let go, and they will not give up on those priorities.

So packing up and leaving China to China, and the South China Sea to China, and leaving the Middle East to Iran and other nations is out of the question. They will continue doing everything they can to maintain the status quo as it is, but I think that they are on an accelerated path to defeat. And I don't see this ending until they have been completely defeated. Now, you know, they lost Ukraine, they lost Iran. I mean, these conflicts are ongoing, but there's no way—I think that there is no way—

to militarily reverse these defeats. And I think that maybe that's part of the reason why we're now getting a new pandemic, as it looks, because things are going to start to unravel very quickly.