Alastair Crooke: USS Roosevelt Begins MASSIVE Iran Strike? Israel’s Blackmail Hits Trump

Renowned analyst Alastair Crooke breaks down whether the USS Roosevelt is already in strike formation as US-Iran talks collapse and Israel presses forward to all-out war with an ultimatum that could be read as blackmail. Alastair Crooke is a former British diplomat and the Founder of the Conflicts Forum based in Beirut. https://conflictsforum.substack.com/ PATREON.COM /DANNYHAIPHONG Support the channel in other ways: https://www.buymeacoffee.com/dannyhai... Substack: chroniclesofhaiphong.substack.com Cashapp: $Dhaiphong Venmo: @dannyH2020 Paypal: https://paypal.me/spiritofho Follow me on Telegram: https://t.me/dannyhaiphong #iran #trump #israel

#Danny

Welcome back to the show, everybody. As you can see, I am joined by Alastair Crooke, former diplomat and curator and contributor to the Conflicts Forum Substack. And I wanted to begin, Alastair, with your reaction to the fact that we now have three U.S. aircraft carriers in CENTCOM's so-called area of responsibility, as the USS Theodore Roosevelt has entered. That increases the United States' naval assets in the region to 150-plus warplanes, nuclear submarines, and thousands more sailors and Marines as well. This comes, Alastair—and I definitely wanted your thoughts on this—as Israel has warned Trump and his administration of plots to assassinate U.S. officials across the region, as well as Trump himself, in decapitation strikes.

There’s also talk that, in the same meeting Trump recently had with Mossad, they sent him a message, according to Israel’s Channel 13: either the U.S. will join Israel in fighting Iran, or Israel will go it alone. So, Alastair, maybe we can begin with, you know, all three of these developments seem to point to a huge pressure campaign, at least optically, to back Israel in a much bigger operation against Iran. But how do you see what’s going on, especially vis-à-vis the connection between Israel, what it has done in recent days with the United States, and this much bigger buildup? Actually, some have been saying that it’s as big as or bigger than the deployments before or during the Iraq operation in 2003. Your thoughts?

#Alastair Crooke

I don't think there's always a direct connection between the buildup of forces in the area and whether that will result in a war. I think the prospects of an escalation are high, but I don't think it's decided yet because Trump has, I believe, not yet made his mind up. He may make it up literally at

the moment when he wakes up one day and decides one way or another what he's going to do. So I don't think that's necessarily the case because, you recall, you know, Trump's methodology has always been the Roy Cohn approach to negotiations. I'm sure most of your viewers know it, but Roy Cohn was involved in these New York real estate deals. Roy Cohn was sort of the legal man who represented, if you like, the crime syndicates and the Mafia in New York, among others. And so when Trump would turn up, I mean, he didn't have to do much more than wave his hand and say, "Here's Roy Cohn with me." And people would say, "Okay, what do you want, Trump?"

#Danny

I'll do it.

#Alastair Crooke

And that was the sort of way of doing it. And you recall much earlier, when he'd assembled all this force off the coast of Iran, Trump complained bitterly to—I think it was Witkoff at the time—and he said, "You know, we've put all these carriers and these forces in the area. I mean, why haven't they capitulated? Why haven't they surrendered?" So I think he's always thought, you know, that you have to show muscle, be it Roy Cohn or aircraft carriers. Remember, he said the same thing about Cuba. You know, at one point with Cuba, "We'll just sail in an aircraft carrier, and they'll all hold up their hands in surrender." And that's it. So I think that is one aspect.

And you can say, well, it's hard on the crews, hard on the people. I don't think Mr. Trump really entertains that as a key factor, whether he's causing disruption to the lives of the crew members. They're there to serve him, and that's it, really. So I think it's not necessarily connected. And I think there are other moving parts at the moment which make it difficult to say for sure what's going to happen next. I think we can see one thing after the midterms: a weakening of Trump's power. But at the same time, we are seeing, much more overtly, if you like, an aggressive stance by those behind-the-scenes structures of the permanent security world, which are taking a different view.

I mean, they have just mounted a coup against Trump in this period. First of all, according to The Washington Post, Rubio took a CIA intelligence report about a friendship between Jensen Huang and Alice Huang—no relation—and a spy story, and he turned it into something much more aggressive. And the purpose of all this was basically to, if you like, force Trump into a humiliating retreat on this. Trump had fully supported Jensen Huang and Nvidia and their approach to AI—a sort of open AI and selling chips to China.

And there's no doubt the China hawks feel they have him on the run and are pushing for a different model of AI, a model where key American AI companies are sort of ring-fenced by a legal framework that will mean there will be an absolute, what they call a national security constraint on what they sell to whom and what they do with their compute. And so, you know, you may suddenly not be able to use DeepSeek or whatever because they're trying desperately to maintain U.S. dominance of AI.

And so they were always angry at the influence that Huang and Nvidia had over Trump, and at Huang's ability to persuade him that actually the right way of using Nvidia's unique position in AI was to sell chips to China, to get them addicted to using American chips.

And in the long run, that would mean they would turn automatically to the American tech stack, if you like. And that would be good for America, and it would be good for AI companies. Well, the deep state saw it differently. The security cabal, if you like—the hawks, the China hawks, of which there are many in both parties—see it this way: any transfer of material to China, of chips, of knowledge or the ability to use it, could allow China to advance its standing in this field at the expense of the United States. And the whole aim of this is to maintain, if you like, the primacy of American AI and to keep it into the future.

And so they seem to have arranged this spy story that came out about Alice and Jensen Huang. They share the same name, that's all. I mean, is she a spy? Almost certainly not. I mean, because if she were a spy, first of all, you would assume she was there to try and obtain advanced Nvidia chips for China. Well, actually, China, for more than a year now, has banned the use of advanced Nvidia chips in China because they prefer to have them made by Huawei or one of the other AI producers in China. And they don't want to become dependent on the United States for their chips, for fairly obvious reasons.

So it's unlikely because of that. And it's also unlikely that she's working for the Chinese because, actually, what the company she works for does is set up data centers outside China using advanced Nvidia chips sold by Nvidia to these companies. And she is an executive of this company. What they then do is sell the computing power, if you like—the work of these chips—to Alibaba. And so it's a sort of roundabout way that China gets value from the chips, not by directly importing them, but through this bypass system. But as you can imagine, I doubt that the Chinese are really very happy about this because their primary policy is self-sufficiency in tech, not to have companies using these sorts of workarounds.

So if she was anyone's agent, she was probably seen by the Chinese as an American agent, not the other way around, paradoxically. And so, if you like, who spies on whom? Well, I don't think she's a spy at all. I think she was a device used by the China hawk grouping to, if you like, force Trump to abandon Nvidia and Huang, and also to agree to what the security state wants, which is a carefully ring-fenced agreement: American AI legally ring-fenced so that they may not sell compute or chips to anyone without the authorization of the security state. Well, that's just one element, but it's an important element. You asked me about Iran and what will happen. I think what this has done, what Rubio has done, has really taken away all Trump's cards going into this meeting.

On Thursday, he's going to be meeting with Xi and with Putin—a trilateral meeting in Shenzhen, which, you know, by coincidence happens to be the tech capital of China. And, of course, the Chinese have been watching all of this. You know, they're being accused of spying on Nvidia, and Alice Huang is being accused of being their agent. And what do they see? They can see that this is,

if you like, the China hawks flexing their muscles, flexing their muscles and pushing Trump aside in favor of a closed AI system as opposed to the open system that he was advocating. Well, I don't think the Chinese will take too kindly to this. I mean, it really suggests we're going to go back at least to a tech war, but maybe a trade war too.

But it's the aggression that is striking. It is the China hawks dominating in Washington that's apparent in this case. So what are the geopolitical consequences of this? Well, I think that China will react. Rare earths will become more difficult for America to obtain. And I think both Xi and Putin will look at this and say, you know, the hardline right is sort of surfacing and becoming significant again. And what does that mean for Ukraine? Well, for Ukraine, it means, you know, particularly after January 3, when the new American Congress sits. I mean, the Democrats have always been, if you like, in the lead in their opposition to China. There are more Russophobes, I think, among the Democrats than in the Republican Party. And what does it mean for Iran?

The same. Iran has set down its lines, and there it is. It said, you know, America has to acquiesce to the seven-point plan before even negotiations can take place. So we have to wait until Thursday to see, but I think what probably comes out of this is really the prospect of more antagonism towards China, more trade war or tech war with China. Russia will read the signs very clearly about Ukraine, and it's already put down a very clear red line: no talks, no ceasefire, nothing of the sort until the West has agreed to a Eurasian security architecture, a new security architecture for Eurasia. Before that, nothing. And what is Iran's position? It's similar.

And what happened at those recent meetings with Putin in Moscow was, if you like, an agreement on a joint platform between Russia and Iran to change the balance of power in Eurasia—to move it away from American involvement and turn it into something more acceptable to what I call civilizational states, away from American dominance and primacy—economic, political, and cultural primacy. And so a very hard-line position has been taken, a very clear red line drawn. What does it mean for Iran? Very clearly, another round of conflict is probably very likely. The only thing I can say is that, at the moment, Washington is in such chaos or disorder, with the infighting taking place, that we don't know. And also, the markets are in disorder. Very obviously, the markets are.

We don't know whether, at any point, this AI system might precipitate a wider market collapse. Would that persuade Trump to say, "Look, I don't really need a war with Iran while I'm trying to save the markets and save the economy"? No one knows. I don't know what all this means. But I'm trying to say, really, that, you know, there are a lot of moving parts, and they're all moving together at the moment. So drawing a final sort of balance sheet and saying, "Oh, well, this means he's going to war. It means he isn't going to war"—I think it's just speculation. None of us knows. It'll depend, really, as I say, on how Trump wakes up one morning and on events. But, you know, there's been a significant shift in Washington, in my opinion, looking at it from afar—a significant shift.

The weakened Trump is being pushed very hard by the hardliners. And that means he'll be pushed hard on Iran, and he'll be pushed hard on Ukraine, and he will probably have to back down under

these pressures because he doesn't have the cards to play. And Putin and Xi will be able to see this very clearly. They're not stupid men. They will read the signs, and they will say, "There's a shift going on here, and that means we're going to stick absolutely to our positions. No sort of giving way. Oh, we can toss out something for the sake of, if you like, PR and the television cameras. We can have something that shows we're all friends together. But underneath it, of course, it's the opposite."

#Danny

That was a great summary, Alistair. I'm glad you brought in NVIDIA and what's happening there because, you know, you mentioned all this pressure on the Trump administration and perhaps the Trump administration's willingness to be pressured on so many of these key issues. But I'm wondering if you see Israel's eyes lighting up right now, now that there is this military buildup, this naval buildup with the USS Roosevelt. And, you know, there have been reports. I agree with you 100 percent about the China hawks. They're really circling like vultures, attempting to escalate economic war with China.

But there's also been a lot of talk about Israel hoping to gain some influence and score some points with the Jensen Huang situation, as numerous Israelis have emerged as the top potential successors for the NVIDIA post. And I'm wondering what you think about this in light of the fact that, you know, Israel has been passing intelligence to the U.S. almost every day for nearly a week now about Iran targeting Trump officials and Trump himself with drones. You have multiple U.S. officials, like Bessent, hiding on U.S. military bases. And then, of course, there was what seemed like an ultimatum from the Mossad chief to Trump: either you come with us in an attack, or we attack on our own. We've heard this before. And in the past, while these reports have been numerous, they eventually have led to some kind of joint action. Your thoughts on all of this?

#Alastair Crooke

Well, the situation in Israel is complicated. As you know, Netanyahu is now a caretaker prime minister as a result of the president nominating Eisenkot to try to form an alternative government. And he has, I think, until about the 20th of December to do that. That is the limit, the absolute limit. And if he can get 61 seats in the Knesset, then he can form a government. However, it's not proving so easy. And there are profound differences here. Among the potential members of Eisenkot's coalition are the Orthodox, whom he has threatened to make do national service by conscripting them into the army. And they don't want that.

He has 19 Arab seats. And Netanyahu is engaged in a very obvious attempt, if you like, to diminish those Arab parties and to describe them as somehow supporters of movements in Gaza, which are now regarded as terrorist groups. And so he's trying to blacken the Arab groups and say, you know, you can't be a Zionist government and have these as part of the coalition. There's going to be a meeting, as I understand it, between Eisenkot and Netanyahu. And I don't think at the moment we

can see fully what that means. Is it that Eisenkot is trying to put pressure on Netanyahu to join him by making it clear that he will not form a unity government with Netanyahu?

Or is it that he's finding it difficult to bring about a coalition and therefore is trying to get the best terms for joining a coalition government with Netanyahu? It's not plain. Even this morning when I checked, it wasn't very clear how this was working out. It's very complex because people are switching allegiance and moving between one party and another. And people are keeping their cards very close to their chest. So what Netanyahu is gambling on is a war with Iran, because that would, in his view, almost certainly produce a unity government. He would fly the flag of, you know, everyone must gather around the flag to defend Israel, the state of Israel. It's not party politics any longer.

You know, we have to have a unity government. And Israel has had unity governments in the past. That's happened even during COVID, and also on the 7th of October. So it's, you know, theoretically possible. At the same time, Eisenkot is taking action to try and change the rules in the Knesset, because in the Knesset, to change the rules as opposed to form a government, you just have to have a majority. So if the Arabs—the Arab Palestinians, that is—abstain, or some of them abstain, he can probably bring enough votes to, for example, launch an investigation into the 7th of October, which would give him great leverage over Netanyahu, because that's the last thing Netanyahu wants done.

So we don't know. The game continues, and it is not clear. But certainly that is the messaging. And this is more important because, you know, I think what has to be understood here is that even though Netanyahu didn't do well in the election, he has considerable support in the United States at the upper levels and among the big donors of the money class. Netanyahu is supported. Miriam Adelson has just been in Israel. She founded the Israel Hayom newspaper and is now a supporter of Netanyahu.

And she's been saying, "We must use the next two years of the Trump presidency." And I don't know whether she was specific about Iran. It wasn't fully reported, but I think you can grasp that that's the gist of it: finish the job. So I think we should not underestimate two things. We should not underestimate the ability of Netanyahu to sabotage Eisenkot's government. He's adept at that. And, you know, there is potential for him to do that because there are such profound differences between many of the groups. Even though there is a big element that wants Netanyahu gone, I mean, their differences are greater than their desire to see Netanyahu gone in some cases. So Netanyahu may well survive.

And then, you know, he's reportedly still ringing up the circles around Trump every day, saying, "Now is the time, now is the time. You must attack, or we'll attack." And as you probably saw, although we have no account of what happened, the head of Mossad, who used to be Netanyahu's military secretary and has very strong views on Israel's nuclear program, its protocols, its use, and its strategy, has been to Washington to meet with the head of the CIA, Ratcliffe. One can only

speculate what that means, but I think all of these pointers suggest there is still a high probability of military action of one sort or another against Iran.

The only thing, as I underline, is that, you know, the attempt to impeach Hegseth has failed because the Democrats didn't turn up for it. But there is a lot of pushback from one direction, and there's a lot of push for an attack on Iran from another direction, all within the United States. So, you know, as I say, I think an attack remains highly probable. However, you know, I mean, the infighting in Washington has begun, not just on the question of NVIDIA and AI, but on many issues—about Ukraine, about Iran. I think we only see the half of it in public, but it sounds really bitter and quite nasty. And so that must be taken into account too.

Maybe not in terms of whether it will or won't happen, but whether it will be a disaster for the United States if it does unfold, because it is so confused. Also, the inputs going to Trump when he was being briefed—I mean, we have a very clear statement by Joe Kent, who went to one of these briefings. He said to Trump at that meeting, in front of the others, "Look, Mr. President, this intelligence that you're referring to, all of it comes from Israel. It doesn't come from us. It doesn't come from within the administration." So he said that, and then on the way out, he was told—and we know by whom now because he said it—Susie Wiles told him, "Don't bother to come back to the next meeting."

So it's pretty clear there are huge pressures to go forward with the war. So I think, altogether, it may happen. It's the sort of "will it or won't it" issue, but does anyone look at what they're going to do? Do they think it through? Do they think the consequences of this through? There's no real sign of that. I don't think Trump is really open to that sort of discussion in any case. It's not his style. He likes to make decisions on whims rather than studying things, you know, and asking the experts. But as you can see, the intelligence is being stovepiped, as we saw during the Dick Cheney era, straight onto the president's desk, bypassing the checks and balances that should exist within a normally functioning intelligence structure.

#Danny

Well, Alistair, on that last point, I found it quite astounding that you had the Mossad intel chief come all the way to Washington, and then the reports we get out of it all feel exactly like that. Like there was intelligence fed, but intelligence that's so hard to believe that it almost feels like an exercise in political theater rather than serious talks, even though there are reports that those talks went on for a quarter of a day—six hours. So six hours of talking about something like, "Oh, Iran is going to launch a drone attack on you, and you have to join us in an attack." It almost doesn't feel real. But then the question is, Alistair, what is the point? And maybe you have a better understanding of why the Trump administration, in its relationship with Israel, kind of operates like this, especially in these high-stakes times. Because, as you said, a renewed major operation against Iran will have incredible consequences for both the US and the world.

#Alastair Crooke

Well, I think we've seen very clearly where the head of the CIA stands, generally, in terms of being hawkish or less hawkish. We've seen that at the same time Trump is trying to make nice with Putin to get some sort of ceasefire agreed with Moscow, the CIA is facilitating these attacks on Russian refineries and deep into Russia to send quite contrary messages back to Moscow. So I think, again, Joe Kent has called this "con ops." And, you know, this is a way of using past authorities to gloss over what the president has asked for or is looking for. And it's been used before. You remember in Syria, for example, in Trump's first term, he announced the withdrawal of troops from Syria.

And, of course, CENTCOM came in and said, "Well, I don't think that's a very good idea. We have authority already to combat ISIS there, and we're going to continue with that." And, you know, he was forced to accede to it. So you say, well, they spent a long time, and if he was just discussing whether to go to war or not, I actually don't think that would have occupied most of the conversation. You know, Mossad will have already passed the intelligence, which they expect Ratcliffe to decide on. So it wasn't that. I think they're discussing—and probably this is the mirror image of what was discussed in Moscow—the wider ramifications, which are more complicated.

Wider ramifications. What is going to happen if the Iranians were to invade Bahrain? What happens if the Iraqis were to invade, if you like, Kuwait and take part of the country? What happens if the Iraqis mount a challenge to the prime minister in Iraq? How would we respond? Would we use troops? How many troops would we use? How do we respond? Because, if you like, the Shia resistance militias in Iraq have said to the prime minister, "No, we are not going to cooperate with being disarmed. And if you try it, we will unseat you." So it's getting very tense there. What about Saudi Arabia? What are the implications of a shift in Saudi Arabia? The Houthis are really moving very fast in the south.

And it looks like they more or less have the capital port of Aden surrounded, which would be a big, if you like, geopolitical shift in Yemen. So I think the intelligence had already been passed. He may have wanted to push Ratcliffe on any doubts he had. But I think most of the discussion would have been about the nitty-gritty of perhaps, you know, what happens if this thing explodes into a much bigger war? What happens to Lebanon? What happens to Israel, and so on? But I mean, I just underline that that's just me speculating. I have no evidence for that. But from my past experience of dealing with these organizations, both of them, that's what I would expect.

#Danny

I think that's really useful analysis, Alistair, and I have to commend you for still being sane after dealing with those organizations. Well, Alistair, how about talking a little bit about what Yemen has done as we get to the last 20 or so minutes of our conversation? The Yemeni armed forces have essentially retaken all of what the so-called PLC, the Saudi-backed forces, had attempted to wrest back from them. And now, once again, we see not just the Bab al-Mandeb Strait and that entire

coastline under Ansar Allah control, but areas even further afield as well. Your thoughts on where this all fits? Because at this point, it seems like the Trump administration and Saudi Arabia are saying very little about the situation, even though it seems like it's going to be a big factor in whatever happens regionally, whether there's a bigger war with Iran or not. So, your thoughts on this?

#Alastair Crooke

Well, I think, again, you know, there are different moving parts. And one of the parts, as I indicated, is the Iran agreement. It's not a complete defense agreement that was struck between Iran and Moscow. But I think it is an agreement on how to shape the future of Eurasia and, ultimately, about the European security space. The Europeans are hugely angry about this, of course, because they're not invited to this discussion. In fact, it's fairly obvious why not. Because if we're talking about, you know, the reach of NATO, how far does NATO go? What about the nuclear umbrella, the United States nuclear umbrella? Can that be withdrawn?

Can that be curtailed? What about an arms deal? I think that will possibly come up in Shenzhen on Thursday. But I don't think the Chinese want one because they see this as an attempt by the United States to impose its larger, if you like, stock of nuclear weapons on a smaller Chinese arsenal. But all of this, I'm saying, means that the chessboard is much bigger now and much more complicated. And I think that even though you don't see it visibly, this is closely tied in with Iranian strategy. And Iranian strategy will be tied in with Russian strategy and Russian and Chinese thinking on this.

And so finally, I'd prefer to go back and just say a few last words, if that's okay, about AI. I know it seems a strangely technical issue, but nonetheless, you know, I'm not sure, and I think we will have to wait and see what's happened. But we've had a spate of these rather strange so-called cyber outages across the globe, you know, almost on the same day. The air system in the United States was grounded. Then Microsoft Outlook went out, and other elements of it collapsed. At the same time, here in Italy, there were cyber threats to all the schools in Italy, and all of them had to be evacuated because of some sort of cyber threat. And in France, the same thing happened. So all the schools were sort of shut down while the police came and checked and made sure everything was in order. Nothing was found.

Now, what are we talking about? And I'm thinking about the possible reasons why this coup—and I'm calling it a coup—has taken place against Trump and his support for Jensen Huang's view of AI, which is much more straightforward. And he was, of course, the man who pioneered AI in America, and he built up NVIDIA to be America's primary asset in this field. And so a hit operation against him is really strategically very significant, and I think the Chinese will see it. What could be behind it?

Well, one of the things that I think could be behind it is, you may recall, some time ago OpenAI announced that some of its agents had escaped what they call their sandbox and had gone into another platform, a Hugging Face platform—strange name. From there, their autonomous agents set up a sort of list, a chat group, and started communicating with one another, at times demeaning one

another and telling other autonomous agents that they were impostors and, you know, cheats, and attacking them. And so now you're seeing technology companies like Cloudflare say that more of the internet traffic is actually not human traffic, but autonomous bots or agents running it.

And that is growing, and they are communicating. When the first breach happened, which OpenAI admitted to, within a very short time there were thousands of these agents moving. Now, I don't want to sound too sort of apocalyptic about it, but I'm just saying that, you know, what's happened in America and in Europe with these strange outages—which can't really be attributed to the Iranians or Russians—does suggest that maybe they are a little bit worried about some of the American AI and want closer access and monitoring so that we don't end up with, you know, more damage to the internet.

And I think also, you know, another aspect of this may be that there is a concern in America that the hyperscalers—the people who want bigger and bigger data centers—have come to the conclusion, which is shared by many in America, that if only they hyperscale further, they will reach general intelligence, i.e., more than human intelligence. Then America will be king of AI and predominate, and the revenue from this will actually provide an alternative to the petrodollar as incoming revenue to fund the deficit and the debt, and to fund the bond market and keep it going. This whole hyperscaler thing means huge amounts of investment are now going in.

And then huge amounts of investment are going in to try to reach this sort of goal, so that, you know, the average AI agent that you might go to on your computer, whether it's Chinese like DeepSeek or whether it's something like ChatGPT, will cover the cost of this investment. Well, you know, there are people who are not sure that the revenues are going to be that large. I mean, if they're going to spend seven or eight trillion on this, then they will need, overall, about two trillion a year in revenues to justify it, to pay the interest on this sort of investment. How much are you going to pay? I mean, you may be willing to pay.

Maybe you pay $20, maybe you pay $30, and you get AI access. But would you pay $100 or $200? Well, that's a big question, and it's an unanswered question. So, you know, I'm guessing, but that's why I think that the security people want to take hold of this whole issue and control it, to make sure that the United States ends up, you know, in the prime position on AI and can overtake China and therefore contain and weaken China through its control of AI. Well, we have to see. But I just throw that out as another possibility for what's going on at the moment.

#Danny

Well, last question then, Alistair. The trilateral summit at APEC in Shenzhen is going to start, I believe, in a couple of days, on the 18th and 19th of November. What do you expect from this, broadly? And maybe rather than only talking about what you expect, what is the significance of these three leaders—Trump, Xi, and Putin—meeting at this time, given the world situation?

#Alastair Crooke

Well, I do think it's important, and it's significant because, in a sense, it's an acknowledgement by the United States that the three, if you like, great powers have to cooperate or have to work together in the future—that it's not just a unipolar world, that it does, in fact, require consultation and agreement. So I think it's important in that way. And I think it's important, too, in the sense that it's not happened before. And so Trump has come to this meeting. What do I expect to come from it? I think there will be a lot of ceremony. They all know that Trump loves, you know, parades and military people, you know, doing a presentation, and there will be fireworks and party things.

All of that to sort of make it look as if the three leaders are all, you know, together and talking well, because it's important, I think, for each of the leaders to appear to be accepted on the scene and taken seriously—very seriously—as they deserve. But behind the scenes, I don't expect there will be a row. I do expect that, in the parts we won't hear so much about, both Xi and Putin will make plain that they have drawn some red lines, that they are not about to be shifted from those red lines, and that they will stick with them.

#Danny

Well, Alistair, it was a great program today. I want to make sure everybody follows the Conflicts Forum Substack. That's in the video description below, because you do some great work following Israeli media especially, and what the Israeli regime is doing and saying about the most important developments, both within Israel and, of course, in how it interacts with the world. Alistair, do you have any final words before we end the show today?

#Alastair Crooke

I think the only thing I would say is that we are in a uniquely unstable situation at the moment. Too much is moving in different ways, and we seem to be in a sort of unstable equilibrium, if I can use two opposing concepts together. We are in a very dangerous, fragile equilibrium, which is based on, if you like, a very uncertain foundation.

#Danny

Yeah, that's well said. Alistair, I agree with you there for sure. I want to thank everyone who became a member today. Thank you so much. Thanks for the super chat, Spirit Girl. Sorry we didn't get to your question. Everyone, hit the like button before you go. That helps boost the show in YouTube's algorithm. Of course, the Conflicts Forum Substack is in the video description below, so you should subscribe there and support all the work that Alistair is doing. And in the video description below are the places you can support this show: Patreon, Substack, and much more. All right, tomorrow I am on at 1:15 p.m. Eastern Time, November 17th. I'll let you know what is happening soon. Until then, take care. Bye-bye.