Pepe Escobar: Putin, Xi & Trump Meet as New World Order Is Born

Pepe Escobar is a journalist, a political analyst, and author. Follow Prof. Glenn Diesen: Substack: https://glenndiesen.substack.com/ X/Twitter: https://x.com/Glenn_Diesen Patreon: https://www.patreon.com/glenndiesen Support the research by Prof. Glenn Diesen: PayPal: https://www.paypal.com/paypalme/glenndiesen Buy me a Coffee: buymeacoffee.com/gdieseng Go Fund Me: https://gofund.me/09ea012f Buy Diesen merchandise: https://diesen-shop.fourthwall.com/en-nok Books by Prof. Glenn Diesen: https://www.amazon.com/stores/author/B09FPQ4MDL 00:00 The Significance of Shenzhen in Global Geoeconomics 10:31 The Dynamics of the Trilateral Meeting 19:57 The Misconceptions of Yalta and Modern Power Structures 30:03 The Role of Business in Geopolitical Relations 38:59 The Future of Global Institutions and Power Dynamics

#Glenn

Welcome back to the program, everyone. We are joined today by Pepe Escobar, a journalist and political analyst. Today is the 19th of November, 2026. Thank you for coming back on the program.

#Pepe Escobar

Glenn, come on, man. I'm talking to you from Shenzhen, in the heart of history. Come on, let's shake it up.

#Glenn

I was going to say, you are there in China, also at the heart of the world's geoeconomic changes, where, as you said, history is being made. And what has just wrapped up as we speak is the 33rd Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation meeting. And it is, again, quite remarkable when you see the world leaders meeting there. You kind of know this is the center of gravity of world events these days. So, if we jump into it, what exactly has happened, or how do you interpret events over the past few days?

#Pepe Escobar

Okay, you have to give me six hours so I can go over this and do justice to what just happened here on so many levels. It's beyond extraordinary. Of course, it's a date for the history books. Let's say the real 21st century of Asia and Eurasia starts here in Shenzhen, in China. We had, let's say, a few rehearsals before, a few dates: the BRICS summit in Kazan two years ago, the SCO summit in Tianjin last year, those meetings between Putin and Xi over the past few years.

#Glenn

But today was something very, very special, very, very special.

#Pepe Escobar

Starting with the setting, what you have right behind me is one of the three or four central business districts of Shenzhen, one of Shenzhen's downtowns. This is the technological capital of China. It's the AI capital of China. Several world-leading companies come from here: Huawei, BYD, Tencent, you name it. This was the proverbial fishing village 40 years ago or so. And, of course, everything that we are witnessing today—in China, nothing is by accident. This location was picked explicitly for this year's Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit. And, of course, when the Chinese were working on it these past few months, the possibility of having a trilateral summit was always in the cards. And in the end, it happens here.

This is the epitome of the famous Chinese miracle, which is not a miracle. If you allow me a little personal recollection, when I came to live in Asia 32 years ago, in 1994, that was the time of the Asian miracle, not yet the Chinese miracle. It was the Four Tigers miracle. It was one year after the famous World Bank report, which was called exactly "The East Asian Miracle." And I was among some of the foreigners who relocated to Asia at that time because we wanted to learn everything about this miracle from the inside. And of course, I used to be a neighbor of Shenzhen. I was living between Thailand and Hong Kong for most of that time. So when I was in Hong Kong, I was literally across the border, which is not far from here.

So over the years, from the '90s to the 2000s to the 2010s, we could follow Shenzhen's boom in every aspect. But we could never have imagined that now, in 2026, it would literally be one of the high-tech capitals of the planet, if not the high-tech capital of the planet. And everything is interconnected with everything around us in Guangdong province through a Chinese government concept called the Greater Bay Area. This is the organic interconnection—in industry, electronics, and services—of the key cities in Guangdong province that are basically into productive capitalism at the highest level: Shenzhen here, Dongguan nearby, and, of course, the big city, Guangzhou, which is only half an hour from here by high-speed rail. Macau and Zhuhai, of course.

And of course, on the other side of the bay, Hong Kong itself, which is one of the turbo-capitalist capitals of the planet, with extensive know-how in everything: marketing, services, port services, one of the best airports in the world—you name it. And of course, it used to be the middleman for a lot of foreign investment between the West and China. Capital flowed into Hong Kong. Now capital flows directly into China. So you have this as the venue for what was being advertised erroneously as a G3. What happened here today, only a few hours before I'm talking to you, was not the start of the G3. It was, most of all, the end of the G1. Trump came here essentially quite enfeebled vis-à-vis the Russia-China strategic partnership.

And this was obvious, Glenn, from the start, considering how the whole thing developed over these past few days, especially between yesterday, the first day of the summit, Wednesday, and today, Thursday. The first big, big meeting of APEC was the Xi-Putin bilateral. This was the fifth time that Putin and Xi met in 2026 alone. They meet several times a year, year after year. In 2026, this was the fifth time. So they're always discussing everything about the Russia-China strategic partnership face-to-face, in detail. So first they had the bilateral, where they were coordinating their roles during the summit and, of course, previewing the trilateral, which ended, what, like two hours ago.

Then Trump arrived. So when Trump arrived, the Russia-China strategic partnership was already very well coordinated. Then today we had two other bilaterals. We had Trump-Xi and Trump-Putin before the trilateral. So they had talked among themselves before the trilateral. Obviously, they were ironing out differences. For instance, Ushakov said yesterday, "Look, we're not going to discuss Ukraine at the trilateral." In fact, they did, because the Americans pushed to have discussions on Ukraine. The Chinese were not very keen on discussing nuclear proliferation because their nuclear arsenal, compared to those of Russia and the United States, is much smaller. It's almost 10 times smaller.

But this was also pressure from the White House. And on Iran, of course, the agenda was basically set by Russia and China. Because, as you know, and our audience knows, the Russia-China strategic partnership backs Iran, even though Russia and China have slightly different positions on Iran. For instance, China is very explicit that there's got to be free flow for everyone through the Strait of Hormuz. Okay, but the Chinese consider not only Iran's sovereign position and the fact that the Strait of Hormuz is going to have a completely new mode of operation from now on, but they also want security for their clients and commercial partners in the Gulf petromonarchies.

And Russia and Iran, as we saw recently with the visit of Mohsen Rezaei to the Kremlin, have a much, much closer relationship. He was received personally by Putin, with a letter from the Supreme Leader written specifically for Putin. And they talked for two and a half hours at the Kremlin. And he's not even a head of state. But they discussed that before the trilateral. Okay, I would like to open it up for your questions before we get to the substance of the trilateral: what they discussed and what they did not discuss. Go ahead, Glenn, please.

#Glenn

Well, no, I'm glad you mentioned that it was not a G3 meeting. I mean, that's how it's portrayed. And I think especially the European media got stuck on this idea that this is simply another Yalta: the three great powers meeting to carve up the world between them. First of all, I think that's a bit of a perverse way of remembering what Yalta did in terms of formulating a post-World War II order. But even putting that aside, it doesn't really encapsulate what these leaders would talk about. As you said, you mentioned the nuclear issue, and they have three very different positions on this, and the Ukraine issue. But what were the other main themes that they tried to iron out? Because, again, it's great that the great powers meet and try to sort things out between them. From what I

understand, it wasn't a great breakthrough, but nonetheless, this was quite an important meeting. So what was achieved, in your opinion?

#Pepe Escobar

Well, there was no breakthrough, but none of us here were expecting any breakthroughs. And, you know, the really interesting conversations are the ones you can have with delegates in the corridors or on the sidelines. Nobody was expecting a breakthrough. And when you read the final declaration, Glenn—let me see if I have it. Yeah, I have it here. This is the final declaration, which is quite short. It has only four items. And I would say "underwhelming" puts it quite correctly, in fact. Item number one: the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council are committed to the reform of the UN. They don't specify how.

Is this a full reform of the whole of the UN? Is this a reform that will include reform of the UN Security Council? Is this a reform that would even include, you know, sending the UN somewhere else? Because in New York, obviously, it's not working. But they commit to reforming the UN. Very, very vague. Number two: they plan to increase the production and supply of refined petroleum products. This is completely nuts. This is completely absurd. This means that the U.S. needs to end its war on Iran. Period. And obviously, that's not acknowledged in the declaration. Number three: the principle of state consent and respect for the immunities of state officials. And basically, they criticize the International Criminal Court.

Well, that's more than obvious because the International Criminal Court is extremely politicized. And they don't make any decisions that are not politicized. So it's no wonder. Nowadays, practically nobody respects the International Criminal Court. And number four: they reaffirmed that a nuclear war cannot be won. Okay, great. Excellent. Only a few days ago, the President of the United States was still asking his generals, "Can we launch a nuclear weapon or tactical nuclear weapons against Pickaxe Mountain in Iran?" Once again, it doesn't make sense at all. The three countries will conduct a dialogue on reducing nuclear risks. Very, very, very vague.

The Chinese can say, "Look, your arsenals are gigantic. Our arsenal is much smaller. Are you willing to reduce your nuclear arsenals from 5,500 or whatever to less than 1,000? We only have 600 or so. How are we going to organize this nuclear reduction?" And, of course, the same old blah, blah, blah, which is obviously, I would say, American-directed towards Iran: "Iran cannot have a nuclear weapon." Well, Iran does not have a nuclear weapon. And Iran is not pursuing a nuclear weapon. So when you look at these four items, they are very, very vague. And let's say, if we are being very optimistic, maybe this could be the beginning of a framework for a dialogue. Well, Putin said that this could be the beginning of what could happen later on. Another thing.

On Russia-Ukraine—and this came only a few minutes ago, Glenn—this was in Putin's Q&A after the trilateral. I'm quoting Putin directly: "After the strikes on the Crimean Bridge, there will be no peace. There will be retaliation. Our response will be much more painful." So that's it. And now everybody,

the whole planet, knows that this war will be decided on the battlefield, as even Lavrov has been saying these past few months, and it's going to be ruthless. Did they discuss this in detail during the trilateral? We don't know. There were no leaks from the Russian side, and so far, no leaks from the Americans either. But we can assume with a degree of certainty that Putin explained, especially to Trump, that after this attack on Russia, on the Kerch Bridge, all bets are off.

They are going for the kill, and possibly soon, which would tie in with Trump saying that the war is going to be resolved soon. If we look at a military resolution, this is something that could happen soon. No question about that. The Chinese position is much more circumspect. They never liked the special military operation from the beginning. Putin knows it. The Russians know it because they talked about it from the beginning. And it's hard to see, Glenn, how this could evolve in terms of the three of them finding a solution to, basically, the American war on Russia, with NATO and with Ukraine as cannon fodder. There's no evidence that these two days produced anything substantial toward a resolution.

#Glenn

Yeah, no. Well, I find the American position to be a bit absurd. They keep presenting themselves as mediators, but we saw another strike on the Crimean Bridge, and immediately before that, we had American drones, as always, flying and observing. And, you know, everyone knows it's their weapons, it's their intelligence, it's their targeting. It just becomes nonsense. But from what I understand, the nuclear issue is a bit difficult because, historically, it's been the two major nuclear powers, the United States and Russia, which both still have over 5,200 nuclear weapons or something. The Americans would like to shift this to a trilateral arrangement because the U.S. has two adversaries. They don't want a deal with Russia to restrict the U.S. while China can continue to increase its stockpile. Meanwhile, the Russians have a comparable stockpile to the U.S.—a little bit bigger.

But, you know, if you can bring China in, why not bring France and the UK in? After all, NATO is essentially one big vassal club of the United States. So it doesn't make any sense. And for China, I guess I can understand their position as well. Yes, they have, what, 600-something nuclear weapons?

#Pepe Escobar

Six hundred-something, yeah, yeah.

#Glenn

Yeah, you know, surely if the Americans bring it down to 2,000, China can increase it to 1,000. The Americans will still have twice as many. You know, so there's this idea: how many do we have? And so it was always obvious this would be difficult, just because of who should be in it and how many

nuclear weapons each should have. Even talking about it was seen as being problematic. But in terms of how people perceive the Yalta thing, though, I mean, do they misunderstand how the world order is changing? Because they seem to be expecting a post-World War II carving up of the world into exclusive spheres of influence. But if we look at BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, they're talking about a very different world.

#Pepe Escobar

Exactly. Well, when you talk to Chinese businessmen here, it's much more interesting than talking to politicians, in fact. They are very pragmatic. For instance, probably the best conversation that I had here was with a super-hardcore businesswoman who coordinates corporate strategy for an ultra-high-luxury hotel chain all across Asia, with hotels also in the West. And these people are extremely pragmatic. They are the epitome of the Shenzhen business class, you know, the can-do mentality. And, of course, these intricate geopolitical issues, they sideline them as, well...

#Glenn

Our political leadership will know how to deal with it.

#Pepe Escobar

So they place their trust in Xi Jinping and the Politburo to solve it. For instance, the Chinese position on the Strait of Hormuz is very, very sound: "We want free flow for everybody, respecting Iran and Oman coordinating navigation, and also respecting the security of our partners." For instance, on the AI technological race, they did not discuss this at the trilateral. And this was part of the manual. Once again, I think the White House applied a lot of pressure: "No, we don't want to talk about it." So they didn't talk about Jensen Huang. They didn't talk about NVIDIA exports to China. Do the Chinese mind? No, they don't. If you talk to Huawei executives here, for instance, they tell you, "We don't care because, with our new generation of Ascend semiconductors, we're going to replace NVIDIA anyway."

It's a matter of, okay, one year, maximum two. So if we cannot have NVIDIA chips, it's not a big deal for us. So it's very, very pragmatic, right? It's really the Shenzhen spirit. They do it. So the most interesting discussions here, for instance, were not about politics or geopolitics, or even what could have been discussed at the trilateral. They were about business decisions. I'll give an example. In his keynote address yesterday, on the first day, Xi made a proposal that is apparently completely nuts. He proposed, in fact, the interconnection of three Bay Areas in terms of business. The Greater Bay Area here, which is this absolute monster, includes Guangzhou, Shenzhen, Dongguan, Zhuhai, Macau, and Hong Kong on the other side.

The San Francisco Bay Area, which obviously includes Silicon Valley, and Tokyo Bay. Considering the relationship between China and Japan at the moment, when you talk, for instance, with some of the

best Chinese intellectuals, they say, "Our big problem is not Taiwan. Our big problem is Japan." And Glenn, when you look at the way the Japanese leader, that crazy woman, was treated here, she was snubbed by the Chinese. And in fact, she was snubbed by everybody else in Asia. There's absolutely outstanding footage of the president of Vietnam. And who else was with him? Maybe Malaysia's leader. With their wives. They are, you know, sharing tea and talking.

And at the far end of the room, by herself, completely isolated, is the Japanese woman. So nobody paid attention to her, starting with the Chinese, but the others as well. So for the Chinese, the problem is how we're going to deal with Japan. But the president of China proposes interconnecting, in terms of business, the Greater Bay Area here with the Tokyo Bay Area as well. Total pragmatism. It's the mentality of this former fishing village, which is now something absolutely extraordinary. And this goes way beyond the clichés, like robots serving cappuccino, food being delivered by drones, and all that. It's normal here and in other parts of China as well.

But foreigners coming here, when they see that, they are like, "Ah," you know? And the beautiful dance of towers—the illuminated towers every night, literally dancing, you know? But they are pragmatic. Coming back to a more sociological angle, today I was trying to get a break before the trilateral. I went into a side alley, and it took me back to Shenzhen 40 years ago. You go into a side alley, and people are living mostly like they were living 40 years ago. It's like the lower middle class, the lumpenproletariat, with wonderful local restaurants serving traditional Shenzhen hot pot and all that. Fascinating.

And you see this side by side with the latest high tech, imaginable and unimaginable. So it's great to see these contrasts in China and, at the same time, why they do not pay too much attention to big-power politics. Essentially, they trust the Politburo's decisions, and they trust Xi as a leader and as an articulator. The way Xi dealt with the protocol of this summit was immensely interesting. Obviously, it was totally misunderstood in the West because these stupid idiots in the West don't know anything about Chinese protocol. You know, who speaks first, who goes first, how you pose for photos, how you arrange your tables at the banquet, etc.

You know, who stays in which hotel, why, etc. The Chinese are masters of ceremony and, of course, of creating business opportunities at the same time. So that's why, in many respects, the most important discussions and decisions here were business-related. They were not about, I would say, the pomp and circumstance of the trilateral. And the most important session was the CEOs of APEC countries discussing business interconnection. No question. This is the session where our friend Jeffrey Sachs was, you know. And Jeffrey was a huge success, of course. He went to talk to Putin afterwards. And Putin and Jeffrey talked for, you know, 15 or 20 minutes at least.

#Glenn

Fascinating. Absolutely fascinating, you know.

#Pepe Escobar

So these details were wonderful to follow. But what really struck me was that, when I was living in Hong Kong, people looked at Shenzhen and said, "Those mainlanders, you know, a bunch of hicks." And now they come here to buy products that are created and developed in Shenzhen itself. So obviously, compared to all that, big-power politics is a side issue.

#Glenn

Yeah, no, that's a good point. But what I find interesting, though, is how the U.S. and China are able to work out some of their economic rivalry, because that seems to be at the heart or the core of this current shift in world order. It's quite obvious now that the U.S. is doing whatever it can to try to restore the unipolar world. They think they can recapture it. But to do this, of course, they have to deal with three independent poles of power that reject the hegemon. First, obviously, is Russia. And, you know, they've been trying to knock Russia out of the ranks of the great powers using Ukrainians. Iran, obviously—they're also trying to knock out the Iranians, and that's also not working.

But whenever they try to knock out the Russians and Iran, their political leaders almost always mention or reference how it will weaken China. I mean, that seems to be the kingpin here. That is the main rival of the United States. Indeed, not just a rival, I would say. Since 2014, China's been the largest economy in the world in terms of purchasing power parity. And even looking at the real economy, China is so far ahead now. But if we recognize that the economic rivalry between the United States and China is really at the center of the instability of our time, did you get any impression that, in the meetings between Trump and Xi, they were able to come to accept some new status quo, you know, something to stabilize the situation?

#Pepe Escobar

No, not at all. The really interesting discussions, Glenn, were between businessmen. You know who was here these two days? Elon Musk. Yeah, I saw him. And he said on the record, "I came here because I love China." Well, of course, he has a Tesla factory in Shanghai. He's probably going to visit tomorrow, after the summit here. And he comes here to learn. And he comes here to discuss business as well, of course. So this is what really matters, way beyond whatever agenda Trump might have had before he arrived. Of course, he had an agenda. The agenda was to pull off a reverse Nixon, which is always the same thing: let's try to seduce Russia away from China. Can you try to pull that off on Chinese territory, knowing that the Russia-China strategic partnership, as defined by Xi Jinping himself on the first day of the APEC summit, is like a mountain?

His words, translated directly from Mandarin: "The relationship between us is like a mountain that cannot be influenced by rain or waves." There you go. That's it. It's a mountain. So Trump comes here and he thinks that he can break or bomb the mountain, applying good old divide and rule, reverse Nixon. But the Russians and Chinese are masters at identifying this. So obviously it didn't

work. That's why this was more like the end of G1 than the beginning of G3. We cannot expect that this G3, even if they start meeting regularly—well, Putin said that they might start meeting regularly—even if that happens, they're not going to solve everything. And they're not going to delineate spheres of influence, Yalta-style. The Chinese hate this idea.

First of all, in Chinese scholarly terms, and in terms of how they see political science and international relations, they still see themselves as members of the Global South. So they cannot delineate spheres of influence with themselves at the top, influencing the behavior of a lot of Global South countries. This is not the way the Chinese think. Once again, this is something that Xi said in his mini-address. They had a 10-minute open session before the start of the trilateral, before everybody had to leave the room. So they had more or less 10 minutes, three minutes each, for their mini-addresses. And Xi was basically saying that the most important thing is peace.

The three big powers need to meet regularly to maintain peace. And if they don't, what happens is chaos. And in the Chinese mindset, the notion of chaos, "luan" in Mandarin Chinese, is their ultimate nightmare. So this message was explicitly directed at Trump and was explicitly linked to the forever wars, and specifically the war against Iran. The Chinese know how to deliver something so complex with just, you know, a metaphor and, of course, very, very diplomatically. But the message is quite clear. I'm not sure those xenophobes around Trump, Glenn, will understand that. Definitely not. Certainly not that stupid Miller, now his chief of staff. But Xi delivered the message directly.

And obviously, if he did that in public, can you imagine what happened during the trilateral? Because during the trilateral, it's practically certain that Russia and China together explained to Trump what continuing the war against Iran would entail, not only for West Asia, but for relations with both of them, Russia and China. Will he understand, Glenn? Nobody's betting on it. And he looked enfeebled. Physically, Trump looked enfeebled. Like, you know, almost suffering on most of these occasions. He didn't look well. He was not at the top of his powers. And he was visibly overwhelmed in front of these two partners, both as solid as a mountain.

#Glenn

I assume that he wanted to arrive there under different circumstances. The Iranians should be on their knees pleading for a deal. The Russians should also be pleading for a deal. And I think that's been kind of the thought here. That is, you know, throw everything at the Russians and Iranians. And America has thrown everything at them. And, you know, if they can't knock them out, at least leave them in such a difficult situation that they would have to accept whatever deal Trump would put in front of them. But that's not the case. We see that with Iran. They don't want to give up any of their core demands. We also see that with Russia. They no longer see any need to seek reconciliation with the West on American terms. They're all saying, "No, that's the old world. We're not going to fall back into this."

Well, it does beg another question, though. You mentioned before that the United Nations does need some reforms. Obviously, the Chinese and the Russians are for this. The Americans are not. But there need to be some changes to the main institutions of the world because, in my opinion, institutions that no longer reflect reality in terms of the distribution of power will no longer be relevant. I mean, why would India accept not having a veto while, you know, some small country like France should have it? It doesn't really make any sense. So, for these institutions to survive, the great powers have to have an interest in them. And so they do need reform. But do you see any pathway forward, or will the whole system essentially begin to fall apart without anything to replace it?

#Pepe Escobar

It looks more and more like the system will continue to fall apart very, very fast, especially because the president of the United States is basically a powerless president at the moment. And he's going to be more powerless domestically. And internationally, this trilateral system was a graphic reminder to the whole planet that nothing can be decided on anything affecting lives all across the planet without discussing, consulting, and debating with both Russia and China. Once again, I come back to my point that this is the end of the G1. Of course, the G3 is not going to decide everything. But the most important thing is that without Russia and China, nothing consequential can be done in terms of international relations and geopolitics, not to mention geoeconomics.

Even though, for instance, the Americans refused to put the tech war on the table for discussion. There is a technological war between the US and China. They refuse to address it, essentially. For the Chinese, it's not a problem, especially because, in terms of AI, they have their own AI trajectories, completely different from the speculative American AI trajectory, which is Silicon Valley and Wall Street. And here, they don't care. They have that. Okay, by 2030, according to the five-year plan, 70% of the Chinese economy—which is enormous, we cannot even imagine—is going to be fully AI. At least 70% of the economy, if not more. So this is going to happen in less than four years. And when this target is in a five-year plan, everybody has to work toward it because, okay, what is our target?

And coming back to something I think I haven't finished, we were talking a while ago about the integration of the Bay Areas. During his speech, Xi Jinping said he wants China to integrate these three Bay Areas—in the US, Japan, and China—technically, technologically, electronically, and in terms of artificial intelligence, in line with the five-year plan. And he mentioned specifically that this has to be integrated with our targets for the five-year plan, which are essentially that China is going to be an ultra-technological society in four years. And most things—the Internet of Things and everyday life for the overwhelming majority of Chinese people—are going to be organized via AI. So this is a target coming from the president himself. So obviously, everybody's going to work on it.

#Glenn

It's like turning China into a hundred Shenzhens or a thousand Shenzhens.

#Pepe Escobar

And they have the capital to do it. They have the talent. They have the expertise. They have the tech connections. They have the universities. They have everything it takes. And if somebody wants to invest in it, welcome. And Xi actually said, "Come and invest in our technological future. You're going to have rewards, all of you, all over the world. And we will export our AI savvy to the rest of the planet." This is completely different from the American model. Once again, the can-do mentality and productive capitalism, once again.

#Glenn

We spoke before we turned on the recording here, and we were talking about how fast everything is changing in China. For me, the shocking part is that people should go there and see what's actually happening, because it's so massive. It's massive. And everything is changing so incredibly fast. It's mind-boggling, the scale of everything. But that's why I also think that we always look to the past for references. When we look at the G3, we start to talk about, "Oh, Yalta, they're going to trade. Russia will get Ukraine, and the U.S. gets Venezuela." You know, this kind of nonsense. And it doesn't make any sense.

And also, of course, one of the things is they would like to, as we said before, reverse that Henry Kissinger arrangement of the '70s by reaching out to the weaker of the two, which is now Russia. But again, this is going to be a difficult thing to sell because the Russians have already reoriented their economy to the East. They don't want to go back to the West. And so I was just wondering, given that this Russia-China strategic partnership has become Washington's main problem if it wants to restore the unipolar order, what options do you see for the U.S. now?

#Pepe Escobar

They don't have any, Glenn. Their fallback position will be to control the Western Hemisphere. And even with that, they are in big, big trouble because the cherry on the cake, Brazil, didn't fall. So, you know, there's a lot of work ahead to turn things around in Brazil. And I'm sure they will be able to do it. That toxic coalition in Brazil will continue because everybody is on the same page. You know, the United States government, the techno-feudalists, Wall Street, the comprador elites in Brazil, etc. Of course, they will continue to undermine the next Lula government. And we still don't know how long Lula is going to last. His health is not what it was before and all that.

And if the vice president steps in, this guy is essentially, I would say, an ersatz social democrat, a centrist and all that. And, of course, he will be more aligned with the U.S. at several levels. But for the moment, their control of the Western Hemisphere is just—you know, Brazil's GDP is larger than that of the rest of Latin America. So what matters for the U.S. is Brazil, not the rest of Latin America.

So that's what's left. And of course, they're being expelled from West Asia. It's absolutely impossible for the empire to realize the extent of what Iran is developing. It's a concerted campaign to expel the West from West Asia. We are right in the middle of it. In Central Asia, they are minor players.

Northeast Asia, of course, depends on how Japan and South Korea are going to evolve. South Korea is seriously working on its relationship with both Russia and China. So there's going to be what? An enfeebled and resentful Japan, of course. The way the Japanese woman was treated here these past two days—wow. The Chinese sent a very, very stern message. And it's true. The number one foreign policy issue in China is and will continue to be Japan. So for the West, there's not much left. And of course, in terms of Eurasia, with the Russia-China strategic partnership solid as a mountain, in the words of Comrade Xi, what are they going to get?

#Glenn

I think, again, if the idea was to weaken the Russians and Iranians so that this would weaken China, then these two wars against Russia and Iran must be the two most disastrous strategic mistakes for the United States in modern times. And I know, if you look at it, they got some oil cut off to China temporarily. Whatever little victory laps the Americans can take on this, it's the larger picture that matters. The Chinese will come out on top in a big way. I mean, if you listen to the Iranians and the Russians, from now on, it's not possible anymore. The Americans are not trustworthy, or, as Lavrov would say, they are "agreement-incapable." From now on, it's just looking east. It is a new world. Pepe, you've had a long day there in China, so I'll let you go. Thank you so much.

#Pepe Escobar

And I'm still going for another few hours. Thank you, Glenn. Thank you. And, you know, greetings from the tech capital of China and probably the tech capital of the whole of Asia—and on a historic day. It was quite something to be here today. Wow.