

Nima R. Alkhorshid: Iran's Response to Beirut Bombing

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#Nima

Hi, everybody. Today is Sunday, June 7th, 2026, and I'm here to talk about what's going on with the ongoing war between the United States and Iran. Before coming to this live, moments ago, I think about 30 minutes ago, we learned about a new attack in the southern part of Beirut, which was the main concern for the Iranians. They said, if you attack Dahia, we're going to attack you. "You" means Israel, because Israel wanted to just destroy everything, to level everything in Dahia. They announced some sort of evacuation plan, a warning to the people in Dahia to leave their homes because they wanted to—because they're desperate in the southern part of Lebanon.

So what has happened so far, they really wanted to do something in Dahia because they're not capable of fighting Hezbollah in the southern part of Lebanon. So we had the Iranian response saying that if you attack Dahia, we're going to attack the northern part of Israel the same way you attack Dahia. Then we had the phone call between Benjamin Netanyahu and Donald Trump. Donald Trump said that they're not going to do this. I talked with Benjamin Netanyahu. I talked with Hezbollah. Nobody knows who talked with him, if he talked with Sheikh Naeem Qasem, the Deputy Secretary General of Hezbollah, or someone else. I think nothing of that sort has happened. He basically was talking about the communication he had with the Iranians, maybe, because there is no communication between the United States and Hezbollah.

Then today we've learned that Israel attacked a building. They call it a Hezbollah headquarters. I don't know what that means. They hit a building and said they wanted to hit some of Hezbollah's commanders in Dahia, in the southern suburbs of Beirut. And then, no one was killed—no Hezbollah forces were killed, based on the reports so far. It seems that the attack had about five casualties, mostly ordinary people who were close to the building. One of them was killed, and four of them were wounded. This is the outcome, and this is the Israeli attempt because they see something.

I think they're feeling something is happening between Iran and the United States, or maybe they're getting closer to Iran. You know, they're close to getting some sort of deal, maybe. My understanding is not that, but maybe they're feeling it this way. That's why they need to do that. By the way, Israelis told us on Israeli Channel 12 or 14, they said that they had the green light from the

Trump administration before this attack happened. So the question would be, why would they need to do that? What is the main reason? You may say that they want to see what the Iranian response would be if they attack Beirut. What would that be? So what was the outcome? If they're not killing any Hezbollah fighters or Hezbollah forces or... It was an empty building. Nobody was in that building.

And so what is the point of that? I think they thought maybe they had some sort of false intelligence. They thought that there would be some Hezbollah forces there—the commanders, important figures within Hezbollah—that they could hit them, assassinate them, create new repercussions, new problems between Iran and the United States, between Israel and Lebanon. They assassinated just yesterday—remember what happened yesterday—they assassinated one of these generals in Lebanon, a general of the Lebanese army, connected with the Lebanese government. A soldier, one of the soldiers, one of the commanders, if I'm not mistaken, one of the mid-rank commanders.

And so three of these soldiers—a general and a middle-rank commander—were killed yesterday by an Israeli drone attack. And they said it was an accident. It came shortly after the Lebanese president came out and said Iran is using Lebanon as a bargaining chip. So Iran is benefiting from the position they're taking concerning Hezbollah and acts of resistance. I don't know what sort of benefit comes out of that for Iran. For Iran, somehow it's different, I don't see, because I see the acts of resistance all connected. It's not about Iran. It's about Yemen, Iran, Iraq, and Lebanon, and Gaza, Palestine, all together. I don't see that separately. But the government in Lebanon is trying to say, no, they're different. There is no difference. That's why, you know, I don't see that they're representing the people in Lebanon.

They're representing the government in Israel, and they're representing those decision-makers of the Trump administration who are basically Zionists. So this is what's going on with the case of Lebanon. What is the Iranian reaction? Many people are asking, so what is the assessment? Many people in Iran, by the way, are arguing Iran has to respond to this. Iran has to hit some targets in Israel. But the other problem is that Iran is somehow talking with the United States—ongoing talks. You see, we had the interior minister of Pakistan going to Iran, back and forth, these messages are getting in and out. So I think the smart response on the part of the Iranians and the part of the Axis of Resistance, which may happen as we talk, could be a response from Yemen.

Iran is not going to get there because, you remember, it wasn't just Iran saying, if you level, if you attack and destroy Dahieh, we're going to respond. We're going to hit the northern part of Israel. We had Yemenis as well talking the same way. They said that they're going to hit Israel. So it's going to be something like that—something Iran just keeping or maintaining its position in this sort of fake ceasefire they have between Iran and the United States, which there is no ceasefire happening. But let's talk a fake or Israeli type, as Ambassador Chas Freeman puts it perfectly, in my opinion—it's the Israeli type of ceasefire. So they have their own ceasefire. Let's do it. Let's maintain that same sort of conditions they have. So Yemen comes in and attacks Israel.

That may happen as we talk. I think this is what is happening considering the Axis of Resistance. But when it comes to the negotiations between Iran and the United States, the main problem still is the case of Lebanon. Iran is not using Lebanon as a bargaining chip. Lebanon is part of the Axis of Resistance, and Iran doesn't see itself outside of the Axis of Resistance. Iran sees itself as part of the Axis of Resistance. So you cannot separate one from another. You cannot separate the Iraqi resistance from the Yemeni resistance. I think they are all considering the same sort of mindset. They are resistant. They're prepared to fight back.

And that's why I don't get it. Maybe in Israel, that's not—maybe even in Lebanon, with the president of Lebanon, he doesn't understand what's going on. He doesn't understand the mindset of the people. He's talking about "my people." Who are your people in Lebanon? These are not your people. These are the residents of Lebanon. These are citizens of Lebanon, Lebanese people. They're not your people. And you're a representative of the Lebanese people, but you're not representing them. You actually represent the Israeli government. And that's the problem. You're making it—literally, what the government in Lebanon is doing these days is inching, little by little, moving the society towards some sort of civil war.

And if that didn't happen so far, it's because Hezbollah is so smart. What they're trying to do is diminish the tensions within society and focus on Israel in the southern part of Lebanon. You remember the agreement, that fake agreement between the government in Lebanon and the Israelis. They said Hezbollah is not going to attack Israel south of the Litani River, which is part of Lebanon. They're occupying Lebanon, and the Lebanese government is saying, no, we're not going to defend ourselves against your occupation of our land. We're going to limit our society. This is just amazing, what's going on with the government. So they said that Hezbollah is the enemy of the state in Lebanon.

But you don't see that sort of, you know, attacks coming from Hezbollah toward the government. You see the government is attacking Hezbollah, but Hezbollah is controlling the tensions. They don't want the tensions to grow within the society. Their main focus is on Israel, and they're doing this perfectly. Just today we've seen one of these air defenses—they're using missiles to hit the targets. And today we've seen one of the footages that came out just moments before coming to this live, and Hezbollah launched a surface-to-air missile. Hezbollah knows what the main objective is on their part. They don't want to confuse everything.

#Nima

They understand the differences within Lebanese society. They know how influential the United States together with Israel is. And unfortunately, the new government, which is supported by Turkey and Syria, is trying to manipulate Lebanese society, putting a lot of pressure. Many of these people who were in the southern part of Lebanon are going to the north or the central part of Lebanon, and they're putting a lot of pressure, mostly because these people have to go somewhere, and the

government is not providing them with anything important to help them, to facilitate this process of forced immigration by the Israelis.

Just imagine what Israel is doing to your people in the southern part of Lebanon, and instead of supporting them, you're attacking the only force in Lebanon that is fighting back. This is beyond just—it's fantasy on the part of the government in Lebanon. I don't see them being a viable sort of choice or option for the Lebanese people as time goes by. They're going to topple this government sooner or later. That will happen. But Hezbollah doesn't want that at this particular moment. They want to see what is happening between Iran and the United States. That's the big picture that is happening. So I think this is the first part, the first line of the Iranian argument to have some sort of agreement with the United States, which is that Lebanon is so complicated, as we've been witnessing so far.

Then coming to Iran and what's going on between Iran and the United States, there are two stories coming out of that. One of them is what Donald Trump is talking about. He had an interview just moments ago or hours ago. He said that they're not going to release Iranian frozen assets or lift any sanctions on the Iranian economy. And when he's talking about lifting the sanctions, he's not talking about those sanctions that are related to the American Congress. Because there are a lot of sanctions. For 46 years of sanctions, you can imagine how many sanctions they have on the Iranian economy. But basically, he has some sort of power to reduce the sanctions there on the Iranian energy sector. This is the main target for Iran in these sorts of messages that are going back and forth between the two sides.

But Donald Trump came just hours ago and said he's not going to release the Iranian frozen assets, nor lift the sanctions on the Iranian energy sector. We had Scott Besant yesterday talking about how we're going to release those frozen assets, but we're going to give them to the Arab states, the GCC countries, because of the Iranian attacks on them and the damage these attacks have caused to these countries. And looking at what has happened during the war, what were the damages to these countries? Basically, Iran has hit each and every American base in these countries. And somehow, in some countries like Qatar, they leveled everything. Nothing is there—some buildings are there that are not anymore in use. So they want to rebuild, they want to reconstruct their bases using Iranian frozen assets?

That's the meaning of what Scott Besant is talking about. All those big, beautiful bases that were destroyed during the war were constructed, were built by Arab states' money. They paid for everything on their soil. Right now they're destroyed, and they want to reconstruct the bases using Iranian frozen assets by giving them—we're going to give it to Saudi Arabia, we're going to give it to Qatar. And because Iran attacked them? Or what would be the use of those frozen assets? Oh, they're going to build American bases again on their soil. So this is the rhetoric. And coming back to—I think there is an important interview. I don't know if you watched that interview.

We had one of the main military advisors to the Iranian Supreme Leaders—the former Iranian Supreme Leader and the new Iranian Supreme Leader. He was the advisor to Ayatollah Khamenei, who was the former Supreme Leader of Iran and the new Supreme Leader of Iran. He still has the same position. And he said in his interview on CNN, Iran is not going to—you know, the first step for Iran, the very first step for Iran, would be \$24 billion of frozen Iranian assets. If the United States is serious to start with these negotiations—these talks, these are not negotiations, by the way, but these sorts of messaging—they have to show some sort of seriousness. That's the first step. Let's start with that.

These are not American, you know, these are not American assets. These are Iranian assets. And the United States has to release them. Then we had Scott Besant saying that. So is there any sort of sign for us, a positive sign? No. To be honest, I don't see any sort of positive sign happening. Is Lebanon—do you see any positive sign in Lebanon between Israel and Lebanon? No. Is there any sort of sign with the case of frozen assets or sanctions or anything, any sort of willingness on the part of the Trump administration to concede or to decide about something substantial for the Iranian side? That hasn't happened so far. So, the other point is, what are we learning from the Pakistanis?

I don't know, these leaks are coming from Pakistan recently. They're talking about Iranian nuclear weapons. And right now, some sources—there are some leaks coming out of negotiators. Basically, in Pakistan, they're talking about a huge difference between what Donald Trump is saying, telling, or trying to sell to the American people or to the international community, and the way he's talking about frozen assets, sanctions, everything, and what Donald Trump is asking Iran behind the scenes, or those letters that he's sending, those documents that he's sending to the Iranians. If that's the case, that could bring some sort of, you know, change to the scene, or maybe there could be some sort of deal.

I don't know how credible these sorts of reports are. My opinion is, if nobody's talking about it officially in Iran, nobody's talking about it officially in the United States, then they don't exist. It doesn't matter what Pakistan is talking about, because these are not important. It's not a Pakistani official officially talking about it; it's some rumors talking about Donald Trump. There is a huge difference between what Donald Trump is talking about and what he's communicating with Iranians. So, that possibility is in the background. We have to consider that could be the case, but it's not. I would argue today, if I were to mention how likely that is, I would say maybe 4%, 3%, 2%, less than 10%, that possibility.

And coming back to the war, what are the options for Donald Trump? The only way for me to understand what's going on between Iran and the United States is to look at the reality of the war today between Iran and the United States. Because the Trump administration was so capable of manipulating the oil market. This manipulation—you look at the price of oil going down, up, going

down—and people are saying these are fake numbers. It seems that the market is somehow getting tricked by Trump's attitude or the way he's trying to manipulate the market. The market is so sensitive to what Donald Trump is talking about.

But there is a point that was mentioned, I would say, four weeks ago by the head of the Iranian parliament. He said, don't look at the numbers that you see they're putting out when it comes to the oil price and all of this. He said the price of oil is beyond what has been reported on the market—the real price of oil he's talking about. It's not in the documents. He said, you know, the paper sort of price of oil. But the real price of oil, the price of oil that everybody's getting per barrel, is far greater than what is reported on the market. And here is what Robert Kagan said about that in his interview two days ago.

#Guest

If you needed to buy a barrel of oil today, it costs something like \$150 or \$140, because that's what the actual price of oil is. The oil prices we're looking at are oil futures. And I'll tell you one thing that Donald Trump has been an absolute genius at—and he gets an A-plus for it—is manipulating the market, and manipulating market expectations, and watching oil future prices go up and down based on whether Donald Trump says there's going to be an agreement or not has been pretty amusing. Because Donald Trump has now pulled the, you know, Lucy and Charlie Brown football trick about seven times, and the market goes for it every single time. So these prices are not reflective of the reality. And now you even see major figures like Exxon, the top executives, warning that the inventory levels—the world oil inventory levels—which have been basically keeping supply going, there was a lot of oil out there in the system, and there were, of course, the strategic oil reserves of various countries, including the United States, which have been drawn down heavily.

I think Japan's is drawn down as far as it's ever been. And what the energy experts are warning is that we're going to hit a point in the next two or three weeks where the inventory is really gone, and that's the point at which they're anticipating oil price shocks. Some people say 150, some people say 200 a barrel, and we're definitely talking, in any case, about gas prices in the United States potentially hitting six dollars a gallon. Yeah, this is the reality that Donald Trump is facing, and this guy is not making things up for his sort of—because we know that he's the main supporter of what's going on in the Middle East, and he's...

#Nima

I would say the ultra-Zionists in the United States who are making this sort of argument that you have to go to war, we have to do something in the case of Iran because they're getting so dangerous in West Asia. But right now he sees the reality of what's going on. And Donald Trump's position—it doesn't matter how big he goes out to manipulate the market—the price is not what is reported on the market on these sorts of boards. Then the other point that he mentioned, it is so important: the oil reserves in the United States and Europe, they're running out. And the United

States is using its oil reserves to balance the market. How long is Donald Trump going to continue with what he has been doing since the war started? This is the main question right now.

And he, in my opinion, is getting a lot of problems because of the American economy, because of what's going on with the global economy. And the economy of the United States is totally connected with the global economy, a big chunk of the global economy. It's not about Donald Trump's argument about "we are independent, we don't need the oil, we don't need the gas coming to the United States because we produce everything here." He said we don't need anything, but basically that's a big lie. The United States needs it because there are a variety of sorts of oil in the market—the heavy, the light—and each one of them has its sort of use. And the diesel comes out of the heavy oil, which the United States doesn't have. That's why they have to buy it from outside.

It could come from Venezuela. The complexity of the oil from Venezuela is that it's too heavy or so thick that the process of refining this sort of oil—they may not have the process, the systems to do this. That's why you remember when the United States tried to put pressure on China. One of the main problems in the case of China was that they wanted to put pressure on China not to buy Iranian oil. If they want to shift to other countries like Venezuela or others, they have to redefine the whole system of the refinery. And it's not going to happen overnight. It takes time to do that. So you cannot do these sorts of modifications overnight. That's why the United States is trying to do this. That's why Europe is running out of energy.

The situation in Europe is so dire. I don't know what the communications are between the United States and Europe. There has to be something. And for the United States, the option of getting back to the war is going to be a larger war. Because so far... Two things, when it comes to the Iranian capabilities, I think, are so important. What are they? These two things are so important for the continuation of the war if the United States decides to go in that direction. One of them is the capabilities of Iran in terms of conventional weapons. Conventional weapons—we're talking about drones and missiles. And again, with the air defense systems in Iran. What is the situation with those weapons? Iran has improved drastically in the case of missiles.

Short-range missiles, mid-range missiles, and long-range missiles. You, I think, if you have access to Iran, to Persian media, you can go back 10 years, 12 years, 16 years ago, you can see that the reason that Iran doesn't have, you know, missiles, or at least officially doesn't have the missiles that can hit the targets, for example, in Diego Garcia or maybe in Greece, that they're using to attack Iran, is because Iran has defined by choice—they have defined the range of their missiles. If they decide tomorrow to change that policy, they can do it overnight. They have the capabilities. I can confirm to you that they have the capabilities of increasing the range of their missiles. The range of their missiles—they can hit the target today with the capabilities they have.

They have the capabilities to hit the target in Pine Gap, for example, in Australia? It's an American-Australian base, mostly gathering information, gathering intelligence, and using radars. What is the distance between Iran and that base, Pine Gap, for example, in Australia? It's something like 10,400

kilometers, right? The same distance between Iran and Washington. The same distance. Iran has chosen so far not to go that far. But if the United States decides to increase—because many people, for those people who are, I remember when, you know, when there were two missiles or three missiles that were fired at Diego Garcia, and Iran said, it wasn't us, but it was someone else.

And they said maybe Iran is using the same sort of missiles with, somehow, 2,000 kilometers of range. Then, by removing the warhead and reducing the weight of the missile, the missile can go as far as Diego Garcia. Iran doesn't need to do that. They have the capabilities. They have the knowledge. They have the technology. They have the base. They have the production. They have everything if they decide to go that far. It was designed by Iranian policy not to go, not to—because they don't want Europeans to be, you know, worried. I don't see any sort of point for Europeans to be worried about Iran, because there is no point for Iran to attack Europe. What is the main difference between Iran and Europe?

Okay, Europe is just part of this campaign. I know that Europe was part of this war. They facilitated the United States' attack on Iran. But Iran doesn't see things this way. They don't want any sort of conflict with Europe. And Europe is not the enemy of Iran. Europe has never been the enemy of Iran. They don't, but Iran has the capability. In the case of ballistic missiles, they have the capability to increase the range to hit targets as far as Washington. The distance between Iran and Washington is something like 10,200 kilometers. It's less than the distance between Iran and Australia, for example, that base in Australia. That's why I think Iran has the capabilities.

You know, if they decide, they have the knowledge, they have the capabilities, they have everything. But the other point is the drone production. Iran is so good at producing these drones, and they can produce a lot of them. And they have been doing this since the war, since the ceasefire started. And they reproduced everything. They replaced all of those drones that were used during the war. And they have more drones compared to what they had before this war started. This is the drones. When it comes to the nuclear capabilities of Iran, which we had many discussions about on this podcast and another podcast in the alternative media, they were talking about two of our friends, our dear friends, Larry Johnson and Pepe Escobar, who reported what they had received, or the leaks coming from some officials within the Pakistani government.

They sent some sort of information to Larry and Pepe Escobar. They told them that Iran is prepared. Iran has the bomb, if they decide to use that bomb. And this is what Larry has reported. When I was talking with Professor Marandi on this podcast, he said Iran has had the capability of producing nuclear bombs since a long, long time ago. It's not something new. They have the knowledge. They have everything there. But they didn't do this because they're not pursuing nuclear weapons. The policy under the previous Supreme Leader of Iran was not to produce weapons. The fatwa he issued is still there. Nothing has changed since then. And the new Supreme Leader still... he didn't talk.

He didn't mention anything about nuclear weapons. Since there are no talks, there is no sort of... then Iran didn't change its policy toward nuclear bombs. This is the main point right now. And Iran

doesn't have, doesn't need it, in my opinion, right now to go that far. They know how Israel, the government in Israel, is. They know how desperate they are. And they may use a nuclear bomb against Iran. If they use it, if they use that sort of bomb against Iranians, it's going to be a huge reaction on the part of Iranians. I can guarantee that. And there may be, you know, I don't want to go in that direction, but I would say that would be the end for Israel if they do that.

And then, when it comes to the policy right now, I think, let's assume Donald Trump wants to expand the war. Let's assume that Donald Trump does not want to expand the war. He wants to continue with the blockade on Iranian ports, what is going on in the Strait of Hormuz. It's impossible to keep the blockade the way it is today because we had the Iranian general that I mentioned, Rezaei, who said that if the United States continues with this sort of attitude, the war would expand. It's not going to be the United States deciding to expand the war, but Iran would do that. Here is what he said on CNN.

#Speaker 03

If the war continues and the naval blockade is not lifted, we will drag the war to the Indian Ocean, the Bab al-Mandab Strait, the Red Sea, and the Mediterranean, and we will give another dimension to the war by attacking those other American bases that we have been attacking so far. America will definitely suffer much more losses. America's losses will be very heavy.

#Nima

He's basically mentioning how the war can continue. Just imagine, considering what's going on in the Strait of Hormuz, bringing in Bab al-Mandab and the control over the Bab al-Mandab, and there would be no—right now we know that Saudi Arabia is using that pipeline that goes to the Red Sea to export their oil. That's not going to happen anymore. And it's going to be more pressure on the global economy. And the war, and the United States is not going to be able to fight on both fronts. You remember what happened with the Houthis when Donald Trump came in 2025, when he came in January 2025.

#Nima

When he literally felt that he's going to do something to the Yemenis in the Red Sea, then Pete Hegseth came out and said, we're going to go there, we're going to teach them a lesson, and they're going to find out that this is a new administration. They're going to do something different, and we're going to hit them hard. And it's not the Biden administration. Biden, he was so weak. Look at what has happened in Afghanistan. Look at what they did in Afghanistan. We're going to be tough. We're different. And they went to the Red Sea. They saw what has happened with aircraft carriers going to the Red Sea, trying to do something with the Yemenis.

They ran out of targets. They started killing civilians, if you remember those days. And then it came to a moment when the Yemenis were shooting down two or three drones a week. They were hit by the Yemeni air defense system or somehow by their missiles. They hit the American drones, MQ-9 drones, and that was a huge loss. And it came to a moment when they were hitting the American fighter jets on these aircraft carriers, and one or two of them were hit or somehow, you know, something happened to the aircraft carrier. They said they were trying to make some sort of move, then these aircraft carriers were hit or were damaged or something like that.

They were making these sorts of stories to sell to the American people, to the international community, that the Yemenis are not capable of doing that. That was a huge mistake on the part of our military. But the basic, the main reason what happened was the Yemenis, as time went by during the war between Yemen and the United States, were learning. It was a learning process for Yemen. They learned how to hit the American drones. They learned how to hit aircraft carriers, how to put pressure on the United States. That's why, at the end, it came to what I would call the Yemeni version of a deal.

I just call the Yemeni version of a deal equal to Trump's capitulation and getting out of the Red Sea. He said the Yemenis capitulated. Why? He capitulated before leaving the Red Sea. And he said, they're not going to do anything, they're not going to attack our people, our ships. And so, if they're not attacking us, we're not attacking them. We have a deal. There was no paper signed between the two sides, something like, you know, just amazing what's going on with the Trump administration. He said that they're not going to attack us, we're not going to attack them. We are out of this, and we're going to get back.

Just imagine right now you have a country that is so powerful, like Iran. Even Robert Kagan mentioned what has happened so far with the war against Iran in the Middle East and how the whole of West Asia has changed during this war. Looking at West Asia today, it's totally different from what it was before. And considering Iran coming with Yemen and the United States getting back to war, you have to be totally out of your mind to start this war, to go with a new round of war. I think, I don't see that happening.

Maybe I can be naive because I literally thought that Donald Trump would never start this war against Iran, because we knew what would happen if they started this war. But it happened. Is that a guarantee that the United States is not going to do it again? No. Maybe tomorrow, the day after tomorrow, two hours from now, you may see the war starting again. There is no logic. I think rational thinking doesn't exist within the Trump administration. And we don't have to be logical or rational to think of the Trump administration. That's why we have to follow what he's talking about each and every time, which doesn't make any sort of sense.

But we have to, you know, hit our soul. It's something like you're somehow trying to hurt yourself when you're hearing, trying to listen to Donald Trump. But you have to do this. Unfortunately, he's

the president of the United States. He's the commander in chief. And no one else is credible in the Trump administration. Just imagine who's credible, who's talking to the media, who's putting out the policies of the United States. Nobody other than Donald Trump, and everything he's talking about is... he's talking about everything but the foreign policy of the United States. But unfortunately, this is the only option. This is the only option on the menu today. Look at Marco Rubio today.

Do you think that Marco Rubio is going to give you any sort of understanding? Scott Basset? Nothing. Pete Hegseth? He feels like he's playing in a movie, in my opinion. He's so good in that movie, and he's so big, he's so strong, he's doing everything. He's preparing the American people to send American soldiers to the Middle East to get killed by the enemy, the enemy, the Iranian enemy, because we have to do this for Israel. So the only option, I think, right now is Donald Trump. We have to understand. We know that he's talking—most of the time he's talking nonsense—but we have to listen to him, unfortunately. And here is what he said just today about what's going on between the United States and Iran.

#Speaker 04

Are we talking about days, weeks, or months, Mr. President?

#Speaker 05

I think we're very close. We have a couple of points. They don't even seem like big points. They've conceded the fact that they will not have nuclear weapons. We had a clause in there that they will not develop nuclear weapons, and everybody was very happy with it except me. And I said, well, what happens if they—not develop, but they go out and purchase, they acquire? I want to put the word, if they buy or purchase or acquire, you've got to have that in there too, because that's not developing. So they don't have the right to develop or purchase, acquire, or buy.

#Speaker 06

Have they pushed back against that? Is that one of the sticking points?

#Speaker 05

A little bit, and then they didn't.

#Nima

I feel what he just said is somehow a positive sign to somehow getting closer to understanding what the Pakistani sources were telling us. Rumors were telling us that Donald Trump's position is somehow different, drastically different from what Scott Basset or Marco Rubio or Pete Hegseth said, or what he himself is talking or posting through social. It's totally different from what they're talking

about when it comes to the real communications or messages that they're sending to the Iranian part. I don't know what they want to call it. Maybe they want to release Iranian frozen assets and call it some sort of loan from Arab states to Iranians. That could happen again. It's a loan from the Arab states to Iranians, and so it's not frozen Iranian assets.

Then the loan is—everybody knows that it's not a loan, it's frozen Iranian assets—but he doesn't want to, because he was hitting Barack Obama over and over. You remember, JCPOA was a disastrous sort of agreement with Iran. They released a lot of money, they gave a lot of money to Iran, and you know, they empowered the Iranian government. So he is right now in the same sort of position, and he has to release—if the rumors are right, if the rumors are close to the reality of what's going on—there is no way for him to hide what he's doing. Because you can call it a loan, you can call it whatever you want to call it, as they call it in this trade or form. They don't want to call it at all.

It's called a fee, or environmental fee, administrative fee, whatever you call it. That doesn't change the reality. I think, after all, my understanding is that Iran knows that they have the upper hand. Iran knows that they defeated physically the United States on the battlefield. They defeated physically. And that's why they're not going to back down. It was a huge cost for the Iranian people. It wasn't just something to be ignored. Looking at the casualties, the war—39 days of war, you know—has caused something like 3,500 people to be killed in Iran. And the society was so much influenced. They hit many targets, you know—pharmaceutical plants, bridges, hospitals, you name it—universities, police stations, infrastructure.

They basically were hitting the infrastructure in Iran. Since day one, they started this war. It has failed, in my opinion. They had no targets. That's why you look at the—I think later on, later on we're going to learn it was a disastrous war for the United States. They hit none of those targets that they had in their mind, they thought, because the agenda was not targeting them. Iranians, they didn't have any sort of information, intelligence about the arms production, missile production, that much. They had some sort of information because they hit some places that were these sort of underground cities in Iran, underground missile cities in Iran.

But that didn't touch even the bombs in those cities. They targeted some parts, but they were totally blind because Israel—you remember, before this war started, they said Israel knows everything in Iran. They know everything. That's why they assassinated many of the Iranian leadership. So if they get in, if they start the war, they're going to destroy everything. That's why Donald Trump right now, he's talking about Iran: no Navy, no missile production, no drone production, no Air Force, nothing. They're naked right now. If they're naked, then continue the war. Why did you need to start talking about the ceasefire?

By the way, the first round of the war and the second round of wars, you know, have come to some sort of end, some sort of, you know, the so-called ceasefire. Because the Trump administration, Americans were asking or begging for the ceasefire. In June 2025, when the Israelis started

attacking Iran, then the United States came in after 12 days of war. And then, because they were begging, you know, the Israelis started the attack. It took a 12-day, 12-day war. But by day four or five, the vice president of the United States, J.D. Vance, was calling over and over to talk with Iranian officials to put an end to the war, to come to some sort of ceasefire.

Then they attacked Iran because they thought that the protests and everything, the economy and everything, were prepared for their attack. The attack was not to defeat the Iranian military. They knew how capable it was. Somehow, I don't say that they knew completely what would happen to them if they went with that, but they thought that this attack was going to bring a huge sort of shock, an internal shock in Iran. Because when you kill the leadership, the commanders, the head of the military, then the people come out, as Benjamin Netanyahu tried to sell it to the United States. The people are going to come out. Those people close to the son of the former Shah of Iran, those people are there. They're going to come out.

They're going to join with the Israeli Mossad forces, and then they're going to convince the people in Iran that this is the time to come out to topple the government in Iran. This is what they were selling to Donald Trump. I am not convinced that Donald Trump has ever thought that there would be a military solution for Iran or that they were going to be able to defeat Iran militarily. But they thought that the situation, the government, or the structure is so fragile that an American attack together with the riots, together with the pressure on the Iranian economy, would break down the whole system, the whole structure. But they don't understand the resilience of the Iranian people.

This is, I don't know how many of you know Iran and have learned about what Iran is today. This is a totally sophisticated society. This is, you know, for everything we have here—for example, I live in Brazil—for everything we have here, Amazon, Uber, you know, you call it Uber Eats, we call it iFood, something like iFood, something. These applications—for everything we have here—they have an alternative in Iran. Because of the sanctions, for many years, they're not able to be connected with these applications. They cannot use them. So they reproduce, they produce their own sort of Amazon. And believe me, much better than Amazon.

They have the same sort of Uber that we use here. They have something called Snap—far, far better than what we have. Here in Brazil, we have Uber, we have 99, we have many applications, but none of them even get close to what Iran has. They call it Snap, far better, far, far better than what we have here. This is a complicated, this is a sophisticated society, mostly educated, mostly educated people. They know how to produce their own things. The technology is there, the knowledge is there, and they do it by themselves. That's why the way you're putting pressure on the Iranian economy, that's not going to help you.

And the delusion you have, you know, every time—one of my main problems with Iranian experts who have lived basically in the United States for many years—they were trying to explain to American people, largely to mainstream media or in alternative media, what is going on in Iran. And it's all about, every time they're talking about Iran, they say "Iranian regime, Iranian regime." Who's

the Iranian regime? How can you diminish a country to something like "Iranian regime"? You're living in the United States, you're living under the Trump regime, and you're calling a country a regime? Is that the way you describe a country? This is the problem with these Iranian experts.

They're selling what the Western audience would want them to say, because they have this sort of perception, this sort of understanding of Iranian society. So these people who are in the West, many of them, you know, these Iranian experts—we have some of them who are coming to CNN, who are close to the son of the Shah of Iran—who were educated, who got their bachelor's degree, their master's degree, their PhD in Iran, and they came out and turned into something, you know, as though they have no clue about Iranian society, the Iranian people, the technology, everything there. And they're coming out and saying, "This is the regime."

They don't know. These are little, you know, when they want to describe Iran as a government, IRGC, they don't know anything. These people are just robbing people. It's just corruption, all about corruption. It's about nothing. They're just stealing from people. I was amazed to see these people for years. What are they talking about? How can you talk about the IRGC, the effective forces, the army of a country? Iran has two parts of the army. The IRGC—I can go on and on about the IRGC—because the IRGC is the product of the Iranian Revolution. The IRGC came to exist after the revolution of Iran as a product, I would say, basically of the Iran-Iraq War. The engine or the main forces or the main concept of the IRGC were created during the Iran-Iraq War. What was that?

It was Iraq, because there was a revolution happening in Iran in 1979. Then we had the Iraqi attack on the Iranian people, which was supported by the United States, which was supported by East and West—everybody was supporting Saddam Hussein in those days. So the IRGC basically are those people, ordinary people, who went to fight on the battlefield without having any sort of training or understanding of the battlefield or of fighting—going to the battlefield to fight against the Iraqi army. Their training process was created during the fight on the battlefield. They learned how to fight on the battlefield. That is the main core, the basis, the foundation of the IRGC. It's a huge force in Iran. Basically, 80% of the Iranian power, the Iranian army, is the IRGC. We have the Iranian army as well.

They're so powerful. They're so good as well. But we have some sort of division between the IRGC and the army in Iran. They have their own duties, the army. Basically, ground forces are from the army. They're so powerful. They're so capable. And when it comes to the Air Force, we have the Air Force from the army, the Air Force from the IRGC, but they're basically the same. They cooperate, they're basically the same. It's like your body—you have two hands, they're working for you. The concept is this in Iran. And you see, you single out the IRGC, they're just diminishing the IRGC as if they're stealing from the Iranian people. The Iranian economy is the problem with Iran, and the economy with this corruption—basically, 99% comes from this corruption, which we know. Iran knows that. The IRGC knows that.

Iranian leadership knows that. If something with the case of corruption is happening, it's because of the American sanctions. Because Iran has to do something about these sanctions. For many years, by the way. It's not something new. So when you try to deal with these sanctions, then you have the middle guy to pay. This is the problem with that. It's not related to the IRGC, as if the IRGC is creating these sorts of problems. Look at how capable they were during this war. The only reason that Iran was capable of fighting back, that Iran was so much prepared for this war, was what has happened—the policies in the IRGC, what they have done, what they studied, what they have produced: drones, missiles. They knew that they didn't want to go produce fighter jets and these sorts of weapons.

That's why they decided by design, because they had the experience of the Iran-Iraq war. They saw what had happened during those days. So what can they do against, you know, a country like the United States? Because they were preparing for this war for many years—20 years, two decades—preparing for the war against the United States. They knew this war was going to, sooner or later, this Zionist entity in Israel was going to convince any one of these American presidents to attack Iran. And that happened with the Trump administration. So they were prepared for that. The technology is coming from what the IRGC has created in Iran. They prepared everything. And it's not just about the IRGC alone.

There is full cooperation between the IRGC and the army. They're so unified. Because there are people out there saying, no, the army is better. No, they're totally unified. And I did my military service in the Navy, in the Navy of the Army in Iran. So I wasn't in the IRGC, but in the Navy of the Army of Iran. So I know how, I learned how these two are working together. They're basically the same, in my opinion. They're basically the same when it comes to defending Iran. And even with the internal economy of Iran, with the internal policies of Iran, there is no difference between the two. But some people try to single out the IRGC—IRGC is different, they're not good.

They're not part of their—as though the IRGC is coming from outside. It's not Iranian. The same way they're trying to single out Hezbollah in Lebanon. They're trying to say Hezbollah as though Hezbollah is not coming from Lebanon. It's the people of Lebanon. These are people of Lebanon trying to defend themselves. And the same trick goes to the IRGC. So every time you see one of these Iranian experts say "Iranian regime, IRGC," these are closer to what is happening right now. The IRGC is in a stronger position because of what has happened in Iran, and this is far right—no, I argue today in Iran. Before this war started, we had the Supreme Leader of Iran, Ayatollah Khamenei, who was the same as his son.

He is going to be the same way that his father was. And the connections are the same. The policies are the same. The people may change because many of those commanders were killed, but the policy, the structure is the same. I think the concept is the same. Because the son of the former Supreme Leader of Iran, he's not going to be different from his father. And he knows that; he was helping him for many years. Many of these people were in direct contact with him for many years.

That's why he knows the system. He knows how to run the system. He's so familiar with everything, with the complexity of the structure. And he's so good at it, I would argue.

And he's not going to be that much—you know, there is no difference between him, the new Supreme Leader, and the former one. That's why I think the United States has not achieved anything. It doesn't matter what Donald Trump is talking about. The new regime, the third and the second and the fourth, is coming, and these people are smarter. No, they're the same people. They're the same people. Their position has not changed. And it depends on the United States. Let me come to this conclusion: it depends on the United States. If they decide to release Iranian frozen assets, they call it a loan or something, or whatever they want to call it.

If they decide to go there or to stop Israel from attacking Lebanon, which is so important—without that, nothing, any sort of agreement, would happen. Or the United States can—this is the option—reach a deal on all fronts: Lebanon, Israel, Palestine, Israel, and Iran and the United States. Or not reach any sort of deal, which would be, I would argue, finally, we're going to get to that point. The economy is putting a lot of pressure on the United States, on the Trump administration. And the possibility of getting back to a new round of war for Donald Trump, as time goes by, is going to be more difficult. And they're producing weapons, as we know, both sides—the United States and Iran.

How viable is a new sort of decision—would it be a new sort of decision on the part of Donald Trump to, again, start a new attack on Iran? I don't see that happening logically. Again, logically, but Donald Trump is not a logical person or a rational sort of guy to understand him. Just putting that aside, my understanding is finally Donald Trump is not going to get any sort of deal or contract or any sort of thing with Iran or agreement. He's going to get out of the region the way he got out of the Red Sea. They're not going to attack us. We're not going to use—you know, we're not dependent on the Strait of Hormuz. So we don't have that much of a problem.

We're going to get out, and they're not going to attack us. He's going to say the same thing as he said against the Yemenis in the Red Sea. And the problem for Israel is growing, in my opinion. Israel is facing tremendous pressure in the southern part of Lebanon. And every time they're talking about going to the northern, you know, passing, crossing the Litani River, going to the other side of the Litani River and capturing more land. This is pure fantasy. Israel today—what Israel is today—is not even comparable to what it was before the war started. Look at the air defense system. Look at the missiles, cruise missiles, interceptors, THAAD, Patriot system, PAC-3, all of them together.

They're not even close. They don't have it. The air defense system has collapsed, in my opinion. That's why Hezbollah's rockets are getting to the targets in the northern part of Israel. And the drones—there would be no solution for the drones that Hezbollah is using against Israelis. They can stay there. The casualties are gonna grow and grow and drastically grow because this is a learning process for Hezbollah—how to hit the targets, how to hit the gathering of Israeli soldiers. And you see how it happened during this war. And they're getting better, looking at the footage that's coming out of Lebanon. And they're getting better and better as time goes by.

And when it comes to the Persian Gulf, a huge shift is happening right now. Huge shift. Because those Arab states who were part of the Israeli-American operations, who thought that the United States was gonna, you know, bring a new government in Iran or a new sort of, you know, regime change in Iran that would benefit them—they're not there anymore. The war has hit their economy so hard, so hard. And I don't know what would be the policy on their part. Are they going to be rational, or are they going to behave the same way that it was before the war started? It's a huge question, in my understanding. Because on one hand, they're totally dependent on the Strait of Hormuz. We had the UAE yesterday talking about how they want to build a new pipeline just to get rid of the difficulties they have in the Strait of Hormuz.

But go ahead and do it. Go ahead and do it. Good luck with that. And the Strait of Hormuz has totally changed the whole situation in West Asia. Iran is calling the shots right now, in my opinion. And they know, the Arab states know. They may not confess that, but they know that. They're communicating. They're talking with Iranians. We don't know about the nature of these talks and what is happening in reality. But they're talking. They're behind the scenes. Those talks are happening. Let's see what would come out of it. But whatever comes out of it is going to diminish, isolate Israel. Israel. The only state in the Persian Gulf that is getting closer to Israel is the UAE. The UAE is fake. It's all fake. Nothing real is in the UAE. That's why the only country that was running out of cash during the war was the UAE. It wasn't Qatar.

The situation for Qatar was worse, but they were not running out of cash. It was the UAE running out of cash. So this is the situation in the Persian Gulf, and nobody's going to be able to change it anytime soon. Let's see what would happen. Two sides again. Let me bring the two. One of them, maybe Donald Trump can get some sort of deal with Iran. Some sort of superficial deal, in my opinion. Nothing deep. Or nothing of any sort of deal. No frozen assets being released, no sanctions, nothing. And the attacks, the same sort of ceasefire between Lebanon and Israel as we had in 2024. And they're going to get out of the Persian Gulf. They're going to get back to the United States. They may attack Cuba, unfortunately. They may attack Cuba, but Cuba—before coming to this, I learned that Cuba, they're giving arms to the ordinary people.

They are getting prepared. If the United States attacks Cuba, Cuba is different from Venezuela. Believe me, it's totally different. And you're gonna see, they're gonna have a lot of difficulties in Cuba if they go that far to attack Cuba. But in the Middle East, I think finally what's coming to an end is that Iran is going to put pressure on these Arab states to make their policies when it comes to the American bases in their countries. Iran is not going to accept American bases anymore. If they bring it on, they're going to get hit again and again. But let's assume Donald Trump is not reaching any sort of deal and getting out of the region. What is different from what we've seen so far between Israel and Lebanon, which is, in my opinion, the most important battlefield right now?

The battlefield between Iran and the United States has come to some sort of end, and the United States knows that. If they attack Iran, Iran can respond to that. But let's put that aside. I think the

main battlefield is between Israel and Lebanon. Let's assume Donald Trump gets out of the region the same way that he did in the Red Sea, and the fight between Israel and Lebanon is happening. Israel is not going to be able to do it the same way they hit Gaza, the same way they hit the West Bank. Because if they do that right now, this is, in my opinion, the game changer of this war. Two points. One of them is Israel foremost. The second point is if Israel attacks Dahiya or Beirut, they're going to level the northern part of Israel. And they said that to the American president.

These are the two huge achievements of this war, in my opinion, for the axis of resistance. What were the achievements for Israel? I don't see any sort of achievement for Israel. It was a disastrous sort of strategic defeat for Israel. Not only a strategic defeat, but a military defeat for Israel. And they exposed the limits of American forces in the Middle East because they forced the United States into this trap. And everybody knows what has happened with that. This is my understanding of what's going on. I tried to be as brief as possible, but it takes time because there are a lot of angles, there are a lot of dimensions to what's going on. And we have to talk about each and every side of this battlefield. And let's see what would happen.

We have two options. Again, none of them is good for the United States or Israel. If the United States decides to go with any of these, they're going to accept that they have been defeated by Iran. Since Benjamin Netanyahu is not going to accept that, he's going to continue the war. But this time around, the Iranian policy is different. You hit, we're going to hit you. You hit, the axis of resistance is going to hit you hard. You remember again, the change is that there is no red line right now for Iran to hit Israel. They can hit Israel at any time, and they can hit Israel hard. This is the outcome for Israel — huge, huge, a disastrous defeat for Israel. And this is a huge collapse of their strategy because they wanted some sort of deterrent.

That's not there anymore.

They crossed all red lines. And this is it — you cross the red line, this is the disaster you bring upon yourself, and that is what's happening to Israel. Thank you so much for being with me today. Great pleasure, as always.