

Seyed M. Marandi: Iran-Israel Strikes, Trump Humiliated & Yemen Restricts Red Sea Access

Prof. Seyed Mohammad Marandi is a former advisor to Iran's nuclear negotiation team. Prof. Marandi discusses Iran extending its deterrence to Lebanon, the subsequent strikes by Iran on Israel, and Israel's retaliation against Iran that humiliated Trump, while Yemen bans access to the Red Sea for Israeli ships. RECORDED June 8, 2026. Follow Prof. Glenn Diesen: Substack: <https://glennDiesen.substack.com/> X/Twitter: https://x.com/Glenn_Diesen Patreon: <https://www.patreon.com/glennDiesen> Support the research by Prof. Glenn Diesen: PayPal: <https://www.paypal.com/paypalme/glennDiesen> Buy me a Coffee: buymeacoffee.com/gdieseng Go Fund Me: <https://gofund.me/09ea012f> Books by Prof. Glenn Diesen: <https://www.amazon.com/stores/author/B09FPQ4MDL>

#Glenn

Welcome back. We have the great privilege of being joined today by Seyed Mohammad Marandi, a professor at Tehran University and also a former advisor to Iran's nuclear negotiation team. So thank you very much for taking the time to come on today. As I understand, it's been a bit of a chaotic day. We see now in the last few days that Israel has escalated its attacks on Lebanon, which was supposed to be under a ceasefire. Iran seemingly retaliated by striking Israel. Trump then promised that he would talk to Netanyahu, asking him not to retaliate against Iran.

Israel has appeared to ignore this, if it was true to begin with, as Israel has now attacked Iran. As a result, we also see now that Yemen has announced it will shut down Israel's access to the Red Sea. Again, this appears to be spiraling very quickly back to what could be an all-out war, except it could be much worse or much greater this time than the 39-day war, given that access to the Red Sea and other arenas of escalation could happen. Again, you are there in Tehran, I'm not. I was wondering, can you, I guess, unpack what is going on? Because this appears to be quite dramatic.

#Seyed M. Marandi

Just so that you get a notion of what the mood is like in Tehran, Glenn, and thank you very much for inviting me. This morning, I've been busy with my colleagues in my department interviewing prospective PhD students. And the city is huge, and I did not hear any of the airstrikes that took place. There were, I think, two or three airstrikes that have taken place in Tehran — maybe three or four, I don't know. But I didn't hear any of it, and we were just busy doing our interviews, which finished about an hour ago. So now I'm not really up to speed on the news. On my way here, I read a bit, but my understanding from my discussions with friends who are better informed than I am is

that Iran has the upper hand, and the Israeli regime is not doing well, and the Iranian missile strikes have been very effective. And last night, of course, Iran fired, I think, five waves of missiles.

And since then, they've been firing large numbers of missiles. I think it's probably approaching 100 by now, 2:30 in the afternoon Tehran time. So, the situation, I think, is not going well for the Americans, and I think even for the Israeli regime. And that's, I think, made pretty clear by Trump's tweet or his post on Truth Social to end this immediately because his allies are not doing well. But this, I think, was an important event, since the United States, obviously, in its negotiations with the Israeli regime and its proxies in the Lebanese government, clearly had no intention of bringing about a ceasefire in Lebanon.

And it just wanted to dismantle the resistance and allow the Israeli regime to maintain its presence in the country. And the Lebanese president and the Lebanese prime minister were both unpopular figures. In the last parliamentary elections, where the Hezbollah allies did the best, the president, his people, I think, got one-third of the votes of the Hezbollah coalition. It doesn't have a popular mandate. And the negotiations with the Israeli regime, which are illegal according to Lebanese law, the only fruit that they bore is the bitter fruit of death.

Because hours after the meeting, shortly after the meeting, and just hours after an interview that the president of Lebanon gave on CNN attacking Iran, the Israelis bombed a convoy of the Lebanese military, murdering a lieutenant general and his companions. So it just shows that appeasing the regime does you no good. Even when you do what they want, you give the concessions that they want, the very fact that the Lebanese regime, the Lebanese government-installed president and prime minister, the very fact that they carried out these negotiations against Lebanese law was a concession to the Israelis.

But they got nothing in return except for the death of their soldiers. And of course, the Israelis have no intention of walking away. So in that interview where he attacked Iran, it was ironic because the only country that is supporting Lebanon in the face of these violations of the ceasefire and this mass slaughter in Lebanon is Iran. What the Lebanese government is doing in Lebanon is basically preventing the refugees from traveling around the country. They won't let them go to different parts of their own country. They're cornering them, and they're trying to make this sectarian.

So Western NGOs in Lebanon, Western embassies, are encouraging their people not to allow the refugees. Refugees are predominantly Shia, but the supporters of the resistance are from all religious backgrounds and from all walks of life. But they're telling them not to allow them into your neighborhoods. And the Qataris and the Saudis, through their proxies, are doing the same. So they're trying to prevent the supporters of the resistance who lost their homes from finding refuge. And as a result, some people have died because they were forced to go back to their villages in the south, and then they were bombed and killed. So the Lebanese president and the prime minister have a lot of blood on their hands.

And so the Takfiris, the Al-Qaeda government in Damascus, they are working with the Israelis to keep the border closed so that the resistance can't get assistance. The installed regime in Beirut is trying to corner them, and it's preventing any aid from coming from Iran or Iraq. So people in Iran and Iraq, they're gathering people, food, canned food, blankets, tents, money, but they're not allowed to send them because what the government of Lebanon wants to do is to crush the resistance. They want to humiliate their supporters, they want to humiliate really the majority of the Lebanese people. Why? Because they're proxies of the United States, because that's what they were installed to do in the first place.

But despite that, Hezbollah has been striking back, and we've seen how effective they've been in such an environment, which I think is very extraordinary. And so the Iranians saw that when the Israelis wanted to start bombing Dahiya, that was the last place where these refugees could go. The people in southern Beirut, of course, in large numbers—they're large in number. And then all sorts of refugees from across the south went to Beirut. And what the Israeli regime was planning to do was to level the city. And, you know, it's quite stunning.

We live in a day and age where, since I was a kid, I remember how Western governments always pretended to support human rights. The last two and a half, three years, of course, have been—every day has been an eye-opener. But Western media, Western governments say nothing about the Israelis wanting to carpet bomb Beirut and level the city, as they would say themselves. So the Iranians saw that the West supported this, and that the Lebanese government was supporting this, and that the Al-Qaeda government in Syria was supporting this. They said, no, we can't let this happen.

And so they said that if the Israelis bomb Beirut, we will strike the Israeli regime. And the interesting thing is that for three or four days, I guess—I don't know the exact timing, the exact amount of time—but the Israelis refrained from striking Beirut. But as soon as the Pakistani Minister of Interior came to Iran with a message, and of course Pakistan is the mediator, the Israelis struck Beirut. So it's clear that the Israelis do not want to see any progress at the negotiating table between Iran and the United States. But in any case, in response, the Iranians felt that they had to retaliate, that they had to strike the regime.

And I'm surprised that some people inside the regime thought that Iran wouldn't retaliate, that Iran wouldn't strike. And again, it just shows how ignorant they are, how the Mossad doesn't really have a grasp of reality and doesn't have an understanding of how the political leadership in Iran thinks and works. Because it's evident, just like I've been saying for years, that Iran will shut down the Strait of Hormuz, cut off oil. I've said it on your show many times. You know, I thought it was quite evident that Iran would do that. They didn't see it. And now they thought Iran wouldn't strike.

And then when Iran struck, Iran struck in a very big way. The Iranian strike far outweighed the Israeli regime's strike. And this is now sort of a pattern, because during the last week or so, or two weeks, during the last two times the United States violated the ceasefire and attacked Iran, Iran did

the same thing then too. Iran's counter-strikes were disproportionate; they were much more severe in magnitude. On the last three occasions, the Iranian responses against the United States, U.S. aggression, and this against the bombing of Beirut, the Iranian response has been far larger than the original strike. So I think there's a lot that can be read into that.

#Glenn

Well, it seems that this is a well-thought-out Iranian strategy, because it appears that the U.S. position is that they would like to avoid a high-intensity war since they don't have the resources for it. Also, they would like to maintain some escalation control. But during all these peace talks, one often gets the impression that the key objective isn't necessarily to put an end to this, but to bring it down to a lower level. That is, yeah, get the fighting to an end and then gradually go a little bit up the escalation ladder on favorable terms.

So, you know, put a little bit of a blockade on Iran, maybe strike a port here and there. And, you know, all the while trying to minimize the opponent's—well, which would be Iran's—retaliation. But again, with the closure now of Bab al-Mandeb, that is a strait leading into the Red Sea, how do you see—do you see Iran essentially countering these efforts to do a low-intensity war, gradually bleeding out Iranians, or responding to this with the threat essentially of a high-intensity war, which the Americans can't afford?

#Seyed M. Marandi

Yes, I think that the Iranians have basically done what you've said. The Americans think that through the siege they can starve Iranians and bring them to their knees. But that obviously is a double-edged sword because they're starving the whole global economy and doing immense damage. And the stock markets have gone sharply down since Friday. I think that the energy crisis and the shortages that we see—the lack of helium and the shortage of fertilizers and all other petrochemicals—this situation, with the booming stock market suddenly not doing so well and the real economy in serious difficulty, is going to make the challenges much greater for the United States in the weeks ahead and its allies.

So this double-edged sword is not necessarily going to bear the sort of fruit that Trump wants it to bear. And on the other hand, as you rightly point out, they've been trying to carry out low-intensity strikes for a host of purposes—to discover Iran's capabilities, to weaken Iran, to intimidate Iran. But I think Iran's responses in the last two, three weeks have been to intimidate the other side, to intimidate the Trump regime and the Netanyahu regime. And I think the Iranians have made it clear that they're fully prepared to restart the hot war. And this time around, it's going to be far more explosive. The Red Sea, as you rightly pointed out, is partially closed now.

But this is sending a signal that if you push harder, then the Red Sea will be fully closed. The Persian Gulf is now closed because, as you know, every day the Iranians would allow roughly 25 to 30 ships

to pass through. And for the last two, three days now, no ships are going through. This intensifies the ongoing crisis and creates greater pressure on the United States. And, of course, Iran's military actions, as I said, send a very strong message. I think this is just a series of miscalculations by the United States and its allies, and they still can't come to the recognition that they just can't defeat Iran.

#Glenn

Well, about the stock market, I see that Trump took to Twitter and reassured everyone that he's mediating an end to the conflict between Israel and Iran. It's almost a parallel to the Ukraine war, where the U.S. is trying to mediate now between the Ukrainians and the Russians. Again, it's been the main actor. It's the one who initiated the wars. And now, of course, it's seeking to mediate. I'm just wondering if this is just a good cop, bad cop role he's playing vis-à-vis Netanyahu, or if these are real divisions emerging, because, again, the actions taken now against Lebanon—again, a lot of destruction we see.

It's making it impossible for the U.S., even if it doesn't want peace, just to lower the tensions. It makes it very difficult for the U.S. to try to control the escalation ladder if the Israelis are going all out, seeking to destroy not just Lebanon but even going after the capital, Beirut. How do you see this relationship now between the U.S. and Israel? Is it just theater, or do you think there's something substantial happening here?

#Seyed M. Marandi

You know, Glenn, I think maybe I mentioned this last time, or maybe I haven't, but what Axios, which is completely unreliable, put out—the comments attributed to Trump about when he spoke with Netanyahu and effectively said, “The world hates Israel, the world hates you,” and all that, “Are you crazy, or are you F-ing crazy,” and all that—whether it was theater or not, I think it was sending a message. Because we are nearing the anniversary of the 12-Day War. And right before that war, we also had another Axios account of Trump and Netanyahu having differences and Trump wanting to pursue a peaceful, unnegotiated settlement.

And then immediately afterwards, they struck Iran. So obviously it was a lie. So nothing that Axios says should be taken at face value. But either he did say it or he didn't. To me, it's not really important. What is important is that this was published. And this was not a publication or an announcement of some sort of split between Netanyahu and Trump about what to do. This was a statement saying Netanyahu is despised, and because of him, Israel is despised, and that he's crazy. And Netanyahu took a big hit in Israel because of that. His opponents attacked him, his political allies attacked him.

And I think he was damaged in the United States and elsewhere too because many people saw the Axios report. I think that this is, in a sense, an attempt to weaken Netanyahu, not Israel. I don't see

any space between the Trump regime and the Israeli regime. But I do think that since the elections are approaching, maybe some Zionists in the United States—the Epstein class, the Zionists, the Israel-firsters—I think maybe some people among them want to get rid of Netanyahu because they see that the image of Israel is being destroyed. They see that Israel is being delegitimized in the eyes of the world and that they need a facelift.

And perhaps if someone comes and takes over and Netanyahu loses the election, they can give the... I mean, Netanyahu's opponents are just as genocidal. It's a genocidal country according to their own polls. But, you know, someone else comes, they can give a facelift, and all the media outlets could blame Netanyahu for all the ills and wrongs. They won't say genocide, but whatever. And then they could try to create a new image for a new leader. All right, that's what I was thinking. I mean, I think the only useful thing for the political regime in the United States and in Israel to come out of such a report, especially since apparently multiple sources gave this information to Axios.

The only useful thing that can come out of this, from my understanding, is that sort of agenda. Now here again, we're seeing that Trump is saying, I'm telling him not to attack, he's wrecking the peace, the peace agreement. Why would he do that? Netanyahu strikes—maybe Trump is fine with that if he strikes. Maybe he is, and the U.S. is supporting him as we speak. I mean, U.S. tankers are refueling Israeli mission jets. The United States is helping, trying to stop Iranian missiles. U.S. radar installations in Turkey, AWACS jets in Turkey and in Jordan, and in the Persian Gulf, what remains of them, are attempting to help the Israeli regime. They're helping. But why would he say that Netanyahu is wrecking a peace agreement?

I think, again, this goes back to what I was saying earlier, that maybe they want to say that Netanyahu is part of the problem, and that we need to remove the problem for a solution. Again, this is just speculation. I've said it elsewhere, and no one else has said it, so maybe I'm just talking nonsense, and I don't consider myself to be an expert on these issues. But I can't figure out any other meaningful explanation. For Trump to say, I'm going to tell Netanyahu not to attack, and then he says, I was about to have a peace agreement, and then this happens—what does anyone conclude but that Netanyahu is wrecking the peace, so the global crisis that we're experiencing is his fault? And I think the purpose is to ultimately get rid of Netanyahu. Maybe. Maybe.

#Glenn

Well, as we now seemingly know...

#Seyed M. Marandi

But, sorry, just one thing. It still weakens Trump because it just shows that Trump is ineffective. For Trump to come out and say, I told him not to do this, and then he does, even though all the funding

comes from the United States, and now they want to merge the U.S. armed forces with the Israelis, it doesn't look good for Trump. For him to say, I told him not to do it, he can't do anything without my permission, and he does, it just makes Trump look like a nobody.

#Glenn

Yeah, that's the thing. When he announces, "I told Netanyahu not to attack him," either he's deceitful or he is weak. Well, it's and/or. I guess it could be both. But you're right, none of this makes him look good in any way.

#Seyed M. Marandi

And when I say that there is an attempt to weaken Netanyahu, I'm not saying that necessarily he is the one behind it. But the people who published the information on Axios, whoever they may be, I think that is something they may be seeking.

#Glenn

But what do you see Iran possibly doing now? Because Iran and Israel are now going back up the escalation ladder. We see some strikes today on some Iranian airports as well. But then, of course, a message has come out in which Israel—well, allegedly Israel and the United States—sent a message to Iran that there won't be any more attacks on Iran if Iran doesn't launch another attack on Israel. This new ceasefire, of which there have been quite a few by now, is premised kind of on the conditions of the U.S. and Israel. That is, it doesn't mention that the Iranians won't continue their onslaught in Lebanon. And also, the U.S. insists they will step up the blockade on Iran.

Again, this is a targeting of Iranian ships. So are they essentially reshaping now what a ceasefire should look like? Because, again, that's what I get from this kind of communication. Okay, we're not going to bomb Iran unless you bomb Israel. But all these other variables that you added on top—the destruction of Lebanon, the blockade—all of this will, of course, remain in place. But to what extent would this be acceptable to Iran? Because it looks as if this is an effort to, again, have escalation control. They escalate the tensions, and they allow themselves to set the conditions for how the tensions should be lowered again.

#Seyed M. Marandi

Well, Iran has changed the rules of the game by saying that you are not permitted to strike Lebanon. From now on, the Israeli regime knows that Iran is dead serious. And if the Iranians say tomorrow—first of all, I'm sure that if the regime attacks Beirut again, Iran will strike Israel hard. I have no doubt about that. Whether there's a ceasefire now or not, that's another thing altogether. If

the Israeli regime does, they know what will happen now. And it won't be like one or two—like they fired two or three rockets into Beirut. Iran fired 20 missiles, and they fired heavy missiles, and almost all of them hit their targets.

I think they fired mostly Khorramshahr missiles, and almost every one of them hit their targets. So it must have been a devastating night last night. The Iranians are definitely going to change the way in which the Israeli regime functions in Lebanon. And that makes it much more difficult because they're not doing well on the battlefield, as you know. With regards to the Strait of Hormuz, Iran has shut down all trade now, and that is going to increase the pace of the global crisis. We're moving forward towards the cliff—the world is, the world economy—and now it's just going to be faster.

And what Yemen has done in the Red Sea raises the stakes, as they say, in the West. So... I mean, Trump, he's not a... Trump, you know, it doesn't matter to Iran what Trump says. What matters to Iran is what Trump and his regime do. And for Iran, the agreement that we were very close to implementing with the United States a couple of weeks ago won't change. Iran won't give any concessions. There has to be an end to the war in Lebanon. The regime has to retreat. There has to be an end to the slaughter in Gaza. And the siege has to be lifted. Sanctions on Iran's oil and energy exports have to be waived for the duration of the agreement.

And the United States has to give up the stolen assets of Iran that it has. And Iran will open the Strait of Hormuz and allow traffic to return to the numbers that we saw before the war. That was what was agreed upon, and that is what Iran will accept. So Trump can say all he wants, that I won't lift the siege until whenever, then there's no agreement. Or if he says, I won't remove the sanctions until Iran does something, then Iran will say, OK, then we'll just continue with the current status quo, whether it's with violence or without. But Iran believes it will outlast the United States, no matter how difficult it becomes.

#Glenn

Well, again, now I think the whole world is watching whether or not this new rapid escalation will freeze or if it will continue to spiral out of control. But essentially, what Iran, as you say, has done now is to extend its deterrence to Lebanon. And I think this surprised many because Iran responded not simply to an attack on itself, but to an attack on Iran's ally. And if you follow the Israeli commentators in the media, they're essentially making the point that this is unacceptable for Israel—to have a new situation where Iran's deterrence is essentially extended to Lebanon.

So they see this as a necessity to essentially categorically reject by continuing to destroy Lebanon. So given this, plus Netanyahu essentially undermining the authority now of Trump, where do you think this is going to go now? Because if the U.S. decides, well, we're going to just enter the fight on Israel's side now, the whole Yemen blockade of the Red Sea could then, of course, be dramatically expanded—not simply Israel, but now over to the U.S., and possibly even Europe. I see that the Europeans now are pushing sanctions on Iran, and also the French are in talks with Cyprus to set up

some security arrangement there. So again, it appears that they want to play a bigger role without possibly considering where this war might be going.

#Seyed M. Marandi

Well, I don't think Iran takes anything that the French do seriously. But the Israelis now know that the rules of the game have changed. And Iran will not allow Lebanon to fall under any circumstances. So the longer this war lasts in Lebanon, the worse it is going to be for the regime because Hezbollah is using ambushes and it's using drones to severely hurt the regime. And the regime wants to slaughter people and to destroy cities and towns. And now they want to destroy the biggest prize of all, and that's Beirut. And Iran says, no, you can't touch Beirut.

So that hampers the regime's offensive capabilities because on the battlefield, they don't know how to deal with the resistance. And the only thing they know is to slaughter ordinary people. And now Iran has blocked that, at least in the case of Beirut. And not only has Iran responded, but Iran has responded in a very, very heavy-handed way, as I said in the beginning. I mean, the Israeli regime struck one building, and apparently they just killed two ordinary people on the streets. They didn't murder anyone from Hezbollah. But the Iranians fired 20 heavy missiles, four arms shots, four missiles, or 24 or 20, I'm not quite sure of the number, last night.

#Glenn

Now, as I said, the number of missiles fired is approaching one hundred.

#Seyed M. Marandi

But so it's not just like they fired a couple of them and then Iran fires a couple. Iran hit them much harder. So that sends a message, and that, I think, will make the Israeli regime wary about the future of its operations across Lebanon for that very same reason, because Iran has shown that it is more than willing to get itself involved, and that in this exchange it has the upper hand. From my understanding, until our discussion, just like until a bit before our discussion, Iran has the upper hand in these exchanges, and the Israelis haven't been able to do much, and the Iranians have been pretty effective in their strikes. And then the Iranians have also been more insistent on Gaza ever since the regime decided to attack Beirut a few days ago. So Iran is becoming more assertive, and they've changed the rules of the game.

And Yemen has entered the battlefield, and for now it hasn't escalated too far, or very far to be more precise, but what they've done clearly indicates that they have the ability or the will to go further. So I don't see a good ending for this, for the United States or for the Israeli regime. And I think we'll have to see about the stock markets. I'm not an economist, and I should be wary. Maybe you'll see a rally in New York today, I have no idea. But I have a feeling that things are going to go downhill for the United States increasingly in the days and weeks ahead. And what Netanyahu has

done is that he—I think we've already reached the end of Trump's presidency—what Netanyahu has done, not just through the war but even over the last 24 hours, is that by humiliating Trump and showing him to be a nobody, he's helped destroy what very little is left of Trump's credibility.

#Glenn

What I was going to say before was that Iran has allegedly made a point that they're not going to strike Israel now, that they're finished—unless, of course, Israel continues hitting Lebanon. Then Iran will continue. And again, this is the problem, because as the Lebanese prime minister says, Israel has bombed Lebanon about 3,500 times during the ceasefire, which kind of dilutes the whole concept of a ceasefire. But given that Israel will push hard against the idea of accepting extended deterrence over Lebanon by Iran, it just isn't clear.

Yeah, how this could be the end of it. It just seems like it's going to spiral out of control. But at least this is one area where Iran has now put down a powerful deterrent. But I was wondering also, do you see this being extended to the blockade? Because if Iran would push back against this, it wouldn't be merely Israel. It would be more of an Iran-U.S. fight. But so far, Iran has seemed more, well, let's say tolerant or accepting, essentially accepting the U.S. blockade as a reality. Do you think this will be contested, or will Iran essentially push back against this as well?

#Seyed M. Marandi

That's a very important question. Let me put it this way: the rules of the game in Lebanon have changed. And in order for there to be a ceasefire, the Israeli regime has to end the fighting and has to retreat back to where it was before the war. And Lebanon and Hezbollah are never again going to accept the ceasefire that we had before the war, where between ceasefires—I mean during the ceasefire period, after the first ceasefire last year, when was it, a year and a half ago or so—every day the Israelis would assassinate people and murder people in Lebanon. That's over. That's not going to happen. From now on, if there's a ceasefire, if the Israeli regime goes back to the borders, if they strike Lebanon, Hezbollah will strike back from now on. So that era, which ended three months ago, where the Israelis would just every day kill one or two people, that's finished.

So as I said, Hezbollah and Iran together have changed the rules of the game. And then another thing happened. Today, this morning, the Iranians said that Iran threatened the Israeli regime and its helpers. And then later, in another statement, the Iranians said that because the Israelis struck an Iranian petrochemical plant, Iran hit back and struck an Israeli plant. But then the Iranians said that if the regime continues, Iran is going to strike all of those energy installations in the Persian Gulf that are in any way or form affiliated with the United States or the Israeli regime. So that means that Iran will go further than just striking Tel Aviv or any other area inside Palestine — that the Iranians can go and strike in the Persian Gulf.

And that means that the Iranians can go and strike the Americans too. So the threats that the Iranians are making now go far beyond the Israeli regime. And they're saying, we're prepared to fully destroy all the critical infrastructure in the region if this continues. So it doesn't matter if it's not the United States. If the Israeli regime does it, because these regimes are affiliated with the United States, which is assisting the Israeli regime, they're fair game. And the Iranians have been saying anything that belongs to the United States — the sea, those ships — they're U.S. ships. So now the previous assumptions have to be thrown out the window. And there's no doubt that Iran is going to be much more assertive. And at the same time, the global economy continues, as every time you and I speak, it's just that much closer to the cliff.

#Glenn

Well, for lack of a better word, it's interesting how this war is developing. That is, the efforts to control the escalation — where or not the deterrence is extended to. Because each side seems to have a lot to lose and a lot to gain. So it's... no, it's... it looks as if the U.S. is not able to assert its escalation dominance. I think they did this quite well against the Russians. That is, any Russian response is quite predictable. They're able to escalate just enough without getting a proper retaliation. But against the Iranians, it appears to have become quite difficult. As you said, the willingness of Iran to retaliate disproportionately is, of course, something that puts the U.S. in a very difficult position if it just wants to put this war on the low burner as opposed to escalating and going back to all-out war. So, yeah, we can wrap up the video there unless you have any final thoughts.

#Seyed M. Marandi

Well, just one small footnote that I think is interesting — that Iran carried out an operation on the border with Pakistan. And they killed like five of these Takfiri, these Wahhabi Salafi terrorists, and captured, I think, 19 others. They were planning to carry out suicide attacks and other attacks inside Iran during this period. And it just, again, shows that ISIS and Al-Qaeda and these Takfiri groups, whether in Syria or Iraq or in Pakistan or Iran, they never strike Israel. They strike Israel's enemies. And, you know, so... this news just came out a couple of hours ago.

So I just find all this fascinating — that the Kurdish terrorists in northern Iraq, the Wahhabi terrorists on the border with Pakistan, and the armed uprising, the people who tried to carry out an armed uprising earlier this year on January the 8th and 9th in Iran — all of them, with all their very differing backgrounds: Kurdish secular separatists, Wahhabi, Salafi, Takfiri terrorists, and then liberal arms, liberal terrorists who behead police officers and kill them, hundreds of them — all of them are attacking simultaneously, and all of them are linked to the same source. The same source funds and supports a plurality of terrorist organizations with a plurality of ideologies.

#Glenn

Yeah, I remember when making the claim that the U.S. was using different Al-Qaeda, ISIS as proxies with the Israelis, that this was dismissed as a conspiracy theory. But I guess now that their politicians are, you know, shaking hands with Jolani and, well... praying for a funeral, I think all of this is now very well established. Anyways, I hope you stay safe, and let's hope things get a little bit under control. So thanks again.

#Seyed M. Marandi

Thank you for having me, Glenn Diesen. It's always a great pleasure.