

Matthew Hoh: US & Iran Exchange Heavy Attacks

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#Nima

Hi everybody, today is Wednesday, June 10, 2026, and our dear friend, our brother Matthew Hoh is here with us. Welcome back, Matt.

#Matthew

Hi Nima, thanks for having me back on.

#Nima

Matt, I want to start with the attacks between the two, the United States and Iran. After the attack that happened between Iran and Israel—Israel attacking Lebanon, Iran attacking Israel, tit for tat—and then the United States coming in with the excuse that they said an Apache helicopter was shot down by a drone. The two pilots are alive; they didn't have any sort of problem, they were uninjured. What is your understanding of the madness that we witnessed last night?

#Matthew

Well, I think that the headline should be that Iran is in control. I mean, the fact that the Iranians disproportionately responded to the Americans' proportional response to the Apache helicopter incident—we can get into that, what might have happened. Regardless, it happened. The president of the United States puts out a message saying that an Apache got shot down. Again, whether it was shot down or not, who knows. And he's apologizing. He's basically saying, out of necessity, I have to respond. You know, you can read between the lines. It's very clear. He's saying, I don't want to do it, but because of the political realities, because of how things work, I need to respond.

And the American response to me was very proportionate. Yes, they had a lot of targets, but the targets—you know, maybe I didn't see it today—but the targets I was reading about were air defense systems, radar systems, systems that were used to command and control drones, as well as two located in the Bandar Abbas–Qeshm Straits of Hormuz area. So very proportionate in that sense,

not seeking to expand this horizontally, not seeking to expand it vertically. And the Iranian response was to hit Bahrain, and they hit Jordan. I mean, so the Bahrainis taking this up a notch, escalating it here, saying, look, before we set the rules, and we told you the rules were going to be, you hit us, we're going to respond 150%.

How do you calculate that? I don't know. But by expanding it to Jordan and by going after an F-35 base in Jordan, you know, the Iranians are escalating. They are responding more forcefully than the Americans responded. And what have the Americans done? They've not done anything. Now, Donald Trump earlier today said he's going to launch more attacks. Yeah, who knows, right? I mean, but this understanding that we see the Iranians here controlling the terms, dictating the rules of this hot ceasefire. I mean, the same thing occurred a week or so ago when, after a skirmish where the Iranians shot down an American drone, the Americans destroyed Iranian speedboats. I'm not sure which order that was in anymore.

But the Iranian response ultimately was to hit the U.S. Fifth Fleet headquarters in Bahrain, to hit Camp Arifjan in Kuwait, and to punch holes in the roofs of the Kuwait International Airport. I mean, so again, what was the American response to that? Nothing. Right? I mean, I think the world is accustomed to the United States as the one that gets to call when this is over, the one that gets the final say, the one that gets the last chance to retaliate here and has the final order or the final say in these exchanges. And we're seeing here the Iranians have it, and the Iranians are essentially setting the rules. So just as in the air campaign, the five-week air campaign in March and April, we saw the Iranians take the initiative, set the tempo essentially, but more so establish the rules of that campaign.

We've seen the Iranians do the same thing with this ceasefire. So, you know, I mean, again, another example of the president of the United States being stuck. He launched this war. It's a war he can't win. It's a war he can't get out of either through a deal because he can't make those political concessions. He doesn't have the political space to do so here in the United States. Or he also can't just slink away. The Americans just can't leave at night, you know, or declare victory and go home because the Israelis won't let them. Right? I mean, so you have this reality for the American president where he is stuck. And not only is it just a stalemate that he can't get out of, it's essentially what I call a stalemate.

One that, again, the terms, the order, the rules are being dictated by Iran, not by the United States. With, as you know, both Israel doing whatever Israel is going to do, right, whatever wrench they're going to throw into anything, but also too with this looming economic catastrophe coming as oil inventories are drawn down, as the Iranian and Russian oil that was in millions and millions and millions of barrels that was afloat, as that dwindles down, as that is sold off, as the strategic petroleum reserves and all these, you know, dozens of countries around the globe are drawn down. And, you know, those inventories that were a cushion for the last several months evaporate. Well,

what happens then? And so there's just not the thing of Donald Trump and the United States firmly being not in control. I mean, the Iranians and the Israelis are much more in control of this than the Americans are. And then, of course, again, you have this looming economic consequence coming.

#Nima

Here is what Channel 24, I-24 in Israel, reported: that the United States is preparing a wider wave of strikes against Iranian targets in the coming hours. And just imagine what has happened. It all started with the attack on Beirut, on Dahiya. The Israeli attack, which achieved nothing, basically. You look at the attack — they bombed an empty building. Nothing. They killed civilians. They killed four, five civilians. Five casualties. Two of them were killed, three of them were wounded. But none of them were commanders or forces of Hezbollah. Then it started. Then yesterday we learned about this Apache helicopter. There is no evidence.

You know, you remember when they were talking about that rescue mission in the southern part of Isfahan. They said that there is a pilot, a colonel, a pilot there, and we have to rescue him. We're going to go there. And it's between Khuzestan and two different provinces in the other part of Iran. Then they went to the southern part of Isfahan, and nobody has ever seen that guy that they rescued. And these two pilots that Donald Trump argued yesterday, that they are alive, nothing has happened to them, nothing. There is no footage, no photo, nothing of that Apache helicopter being destroyed or disappeared somehow. What do we know about that? What is your understanding of that?

#Matthew

Yeah, I mean, it's very similar to what you just said. We just don't know. The biggest thing here is that if the Iranians had shot it down, they would have shown us the video. They would have promoted it.

#Nima

They would have celebrated it.

#Matthew

I mean, if there's one thing we can count on the Iranians doing — if they hit an American aircraft, they're going to take credit for it. And if they've got evidence, they're going to post it on Twitter. You know, and the Iranians didn't do that. In fact, the Iranians said, no, we didn't do it. You know, the Americans should be more careful when they're flying their aircraft around, essentially. You know, Araqchi said something about human error. So it's possible it got shot down. It's more likely that

something accidental happened — force majeure, an act of God occurred. The aircraft had a mechanical failure, the aircraft ran into a drone in the sky. What I saw, or what I have heard, is that it was a Shahed drone.

That can't be used to take down a plane or a helicopter. It can't be used to take down a plane, as far as I know, unless they've got some type of new guidance system on it. But those drones essentially fly from point to point. These are not the first-person-view drones that we see where you have the camera and it can be steered and directed at something. And drones in that sense can be used to attack helicopters, absolutely. But this seems to have been a Shahed drone. And I heard Donald Trump earlier today saying how the warhead didn't detonate. And that makes sense because in flight, the warhead is probably not armed or not in a condition to detonate.

And so that would make sense that in a collision like that, the warhead would not have detonated. So was the Apache trying to shoot down this drone? Because the helicopters can do that. And whatever happened, it got too close. Was it just flying through the sky at night and just, you know, the fates had it that these two objects intersected? It's a big sky, but things like this happen from time to time. You know, so we don't know. I mean, maybe in six months, a year, or however long, there'll be some investigation from the Department of Defense or Department of the Army that will come out and say this is what happened. But for right now, both sides are going to use it to their advantage.

But most especially, you're not seeing the Americans. And let me take that back. Let me take that back, because there is this talk about the Americans using this as a pretext. And again, I go back to Donald Trump's statement on Truth Social, where he is basically apologizing up front for having to use force, for having to respond. And then including a statement he made yesterday at some point where he said that it really wasn't a big deal that this got shot down. Today he's a little more aggressive with how he's talking about it. He's probably been coached, he's probably been corrected about it, but you know, yesterday in the moment, he didn't seem so concerned about it, likely because he knew that this wasn't intentional.

This was an accident, or, you know, whether it was, again, the Apache ran into the drone, the drone ran into the Apache, or the Apache had a mechanical failure. Yeah. I mean, if the Americans really wanted to use the pretext, they wouldn't have conducted a limited strike, right? They would have conducted a much larger attack. Now, they did attack those water treatment, the water tanks in the area, and they have cut off water to members of a community there. About 20,000 Iranians don't have water. That's a war crime. But it wasn't the level of infrastructure attack you would expect if this was to be used as a deliberate pretext, right? So if the Americans really wanted to make a point, if they really wanted to do something to try and pressure the Iranians, they would have hit much larger infrastructure.

Now, it's possible they're just using this as an example. You see this — we'll do more of that. But again, I don't see it. And the fact that it's been now close to 24 hours since the Iranian response, or

getting close to 24 hours, and no American response to the Iranian response — who knows? As we're talking about this, everything I could be saying is being overcome by events. But at the same time, too, I just have this understanding, this belief that the Americans don't want to restart this war. And we've seen that continually over the last weeks — the way the interactions with the Israelis, the interactions in the Gulf itself with the Iranians. Again, the attacks on Camp Arifjan and Fifth Fleet headquarters, the Kuwaiti International Airport.

No response. And now attacks again on Fifth Fleet headquarters and on the air base in Jordan. So, you know, this expansion and the Americans not following up with that. So, but we'll see. And like I said, right now, it could be happening as we speak. And, you know, what I'm saying is being overcome by events. But I think, you know, the Americans are really stuck here, and what are they going to do? And this deadline of oil inventories — the other thing that's coming too is all these secondary downstream byproducts of oil and gas, all these commodities that come out of the Persian Gulf — helium, fertilizer, aluminum, copper — these things, there's a latency in that supply shortage showing up in the markets, right?

You know, those commodities have to be turned into products that consumers then purchase. And, you know, okay, it's been a few months now. We're going to start seeing those inflationary pressures start to hit, right? From the absence of those Persian Gulf commodities that are, you know, the byproducts or downstream products, or whatever you want to call it, of oil and gas. So you're going to have that dual punch of, you know, the energy inflation, but then also commodity inflation that turns into consumer product inflation. Yeah, and that's coming. That is coming. And every day, I feel that's almost probably exponential, right?

Every day that there's a delay in ending this and getting things back to, quote, normal, unquote — although from what we understand, it's not going back to normal, there's going to be a new normal — every day that's delayed, the damage doesn't just extend by a day further out, but the damage becomes almost exponential. And the consequences, the cost, the pressure, you know, that's gonna come from this economic warfare is gonna turn into real political stress, not just in the Gulf, not just in the United States, but throughout the world. Here is what Donald Trump tweeted.

#Nima

Matt, I directed our great U.S. military to execute a secret mission to support oil tankers and other commercial ships through the Strait of Hormuz. Today, I am pleased to announce that this effort has resulted in more than 100 million barrels of oil making its way through the Strait of Hormuz and into the open market. And the other point is that the U.S.—that's 50 ships, right?

#Matthew

I mean, that's 50 ships, yeah.

#Nima

Yeah. You know, this is the argument. But the other point is that the U.S. Energy Secretary, Chris Wright, said he told a congressional hearing earlier today that he's not aware that the United States has taken millions of barrels of oil out of Iran, as President Trump told reporters it had.

#Matthew

So, I mean, Wright—Chris Wright—is a jackass, for lack of something more complicated to describe him. I wouldn't tell him we were doing an operation like this either. I mean, I could imagine, OK, only a few people know about it. Is it possible for the United States to, I guess, escort these tankers through Omani waters and the Iranians don't know about it? Maybe once or twice, but I can't see them getting 50 of these ships, these VLCCs—these very large, you know, crude containers or whatever VLCC stands for—you know, getting through like that. I don't know. I mean, at the times that we've seen American destroyers and littoral combat ships go into the Straits, the response has been very heavy from the Iranians.

So I just don't see that as possible, but who knows? Who knows? It would certainly be an amazing operation by the American Navy. And I think most of us would say that an amazing operation like that is simply something the American Navy can't pull off based on the way we've seen the American Navy conduct itself over these last several years, not just here in the Gulf of Oman and the Arabian Sea and the Persian Gulf, but also in the Red Sea and throughout the world. I just don't see the American Navy pulling that off. But, you know, maybe we'll be surprised and maybe that did happen. But I think this is just another one of Donald Trump's fantasies. You know, he just says things.

He just says things. And I heard when he had said this the other day about we're two or three days away from a deal. I heard both on Al Jazeera and on Democracy Now, one of them said he had said the same thing 37 times in the last two months, and the other said they had said it 38 times in the last two months. So he just says stuff. So I doubt very much that such an operation occurred, but I'm sure Hollywood is already making a movie. There'll be a double feature, just as they were going to make a movie about the rescuers of 15 pilots—Michael Bay supposedly doing that. They'll make another film about this secret, this top-secret nighttime convoy of oil tankers.

#Nima

Yeah. I think part of what Donald Trump is trying to do is, I don't know how successful that would be, but he's trying to make the situation as it was before the war started, where there was this case of impunity, Israeli impunity, attacking other countries without having any sort of response from other parties. And right now, as we've seen with the case of Iran, for the first time, Iran attacked Israel without being attacked by Israel. This is significant. Iran has never attacked any country.

And that's why I think that shows how the equation, how the strategy on the part of the Iranians has changed during the war. And their calculation right now is if they attack Doha, there is no way that we're not going to – we're definitely going to respond to that attack. And we're going to hit Israel. Understanding this is the new strategy on the part of the Iranians. And Donald Trump, I don't know what Donald Trump can do to demolish, to destroy this strategy with this new equation. I don't see that happening.

#Matthew

I don't know, Nima. I agree with you. I don't know what the Americans are going to do here. I mean, the best thing they can do is establish, you know, we've been saying this for a while now, establish some type of modus vivendi, some type of tacit agreement with the Iranians that, okay, you let ships through, we'll ease up on the blockade. There's going to be no resolutions on sanctions, no resolutions on the nuclear issues. We're just going to still be in this state of warfare, but we're not going to do anything about it. And we're going to slowly let things get back to normal, you know, or again, whatever the new normal is going to be. You know, that, I think, is the best way forward for the two sides.

Israel doesn't agree, of course, with that. But you're exactly right. This idea that Iran is setting the terms here, and, you know, this idea that Iran has clearly established that it will provide a defensive umbrella to parts of Lebanon, whether that will extend into southern Lebanon — the Iranians have said it would. We'll see if that does occur. You know, what are their thresholds? If, you know, an Israeli tank destroys a building, is that going to require an Iranian response, or does it have to be something that actually kills civilians and causes essentially some type of headline, or it's an atrocity? We'll see what the Iranians establish for their thresholds. But you're right, this is a major moment in this war.

But more than that, it's a major moment in the region. This is the type of deterrence, if you will. I mean, it's a conflict, so I'm not sure if deterrence actually is the right word to use. But it is, you know, a major moment, an episode that the Iranians have, as you described, been willing to attack Israel in defense of another country. Now, we'll see if the Iranians will extend this to Palestine. I've seen a couple of things that suggest that they might, including that eventually any deal they want now includes Gaza in it. Whether or not that will be what we end up seeing, I absolutely—I still don't think we're going to, I don't believe we're going to see a deal at all.

So I think that's, you know, meaningless, but, uh, you know, what will the Iranians do? I mean, they did put out a message a couple of weeks ago, uh, you know, where they essentially said our drones and missiles, our fires, are in the service of the Palestinian resistance. Um, and, uh, will the Iranians hold to that, and what will be the thresholds for them utilizing their drones and missiles to not just support Hezbollah and the Lebanese, but to support the Palestinians? I mean, this is a whole other dimension to this war that I think many people a few months ago would have found hard to believe.

I think there are many people out there who understood that this is what the axis of resistance means to eventually do.

But many people would say, no, Iran will never have that capability. They'll never be in a position where they have the leverage here, the upper hand, the dominance, if you will, to provide this type of support to Hezbollah or to the Palestinian resistance. And they certainly do. They certainly do. And so, you know, I don't believe Donald Trump has the ability to withdraw the United States from this war. But you could certainly imagine if the United States was a country that had a government that wasn't a system of legalized bribery, that the United States could withdraw from this war. And that would force the Israelis to make concessions.

That would force the Israelis to leave Lebanon and maybe even pull back a bit in Gaza and slow down their annexation of the West Bank. But because the United States is a country of legalized bribery as a government, we're not going to see that happen, no matter what. Yeah, I will say that, you know, because that's a question about would the United States, would Donald Trump do it? And Donald Trump, if there's any president who would do it, it would be Donald Trump. You know, Barack Obama, Joe Biden, George W. Bush, none of them were ever going to abandon Israel. They may not have allowed Israel to go as far as Donald Trump did, but Donald Trump's elasticity allows him as well to maybe withdraw support from Israel in a way that none of his predecessors would ever do.

Like, I don't think Biden or Harris would have gone along with this war in Iran. They would have gone along with the Israeli conquest of Lebanon because Biden certainly did. He went along with that occupation, that invasion. You know, I mean, they would have gone along with the continued occupation of southern Syria, the annexation of the West Bank. They would have gone along with this continual taking of land in Gaza, you know, going from 43% to 51% to 60% to 70%, you know, that the Israelis occupied Gaza. I believe the Biden or Harris administration would have gone along with that, but I don't think they would have gone along with this war.

At the same time, too, again, they would not have ever ended support for Israel. And so, you know, maybe with Donald Trump, there is a possibility that could happen. It's a very slim possibility, but at least it exists. And I'm not sure how the Israelis are taking that. But then, of course, we have to deal with the Israeli elections coming up. Consider how popular, particularly, the war in Lebanon is in Israel, that the political pressure on Benjamin Netanyahu, which is greater political pressure than the pressure he received for October 7th happening on his watch. I mean, the amount of political pressure he has on him about this, quote, "ceasefire," unquote, in Lebanon is great.

I mean, look at Yair Lapid and Naftali Bennett — they formed a political party, you know, essentially to oppose the ceasefire in Lebanon. And so, you know, aside from his criminality and corruption, Benjamin Netanyahu, in the last several years, hasn't received this much political pushback, this much political opposition. So what are the Israelis going to do? Well, you know, the elections are coming. Netanyahu and his government need to stay in power. They want this war in Lebanon

anyway. But their goals, in every way, shape, and form, for the Israelis, are contradictory to what the American president wants or what he needs. So these are dangerous and interesting times still to come here.

#Nima

Despite Donald Trump today arguing that he's going to attack again — today he said that we're going to attack Iran again — it seems that there's going to be some sort of coordination between the United States and Israel so far. But Israelis are reporting it's going to be just the United States attacking, not Israel.

#Matthew

Right, right, and that's, you know, why is that? Okay, why are the Israelis not taking part? We know the Israelis want this war to restart, but we also know that they want the Americans to wage this war. We know that the Israelis do not want to continue to utilize their resources. You know, they don't want to keep running through their stocks of air-launched ballistic missiles and other weaponry. They also are overextended. They have these campaigns in Lebanon, in Gaza, in the West Bank. We've seen an increase in Israeli operations in southern and western Syria. Also, too, the Houthis, Ansar Allah, are in this war. And, you know, that, I think, is a very big challenge. You know, they're coming into the war. They're saying that the Red Sea is now closed to Israeli shipping.

What that means in terms of how it affects other shipping going through the Red Sea. And again, that Red Sea traffic hasn't recovered since November of 2023, or whenever it is that the Houthis began their campaign to block Israeli shipping. You know, so commercial shipping in the Red Sea has never recovered. The Saudis export about 7 million barrels a day of oil through their Red Sea port. If about 4 million or so of that goes through the Bab al-Mandab Strait there in the south of the Red Sea, if they're cut off, that's 4 million barrels less of oil going into the global market every day. If the Houthis cut off all of the traffic in the Red Sea, that's 7 million barrels less.

Again, at the same time that all these various oil inventories around the world are starting to run out. You know, I mean, so the consequences here of the Yemenis, the Houthis, Ansar Allah coming into this war at this point are very important. You know, and the other aspect then, too, is that they bring a potent military force. They are very experienced. They have quality, capable missiles and drones — maybe not as good as the Iranian ones, but, you know, good enough. And so the Israelis then, how can they participate in this campaign against Iran when they now have this other front, this other threat to their southern flank? You know, I mean, so, you know, the Israelis really are overextended.

But we've seen throughout history when the political desires, even as crazed and as feverish as they may be, dominate military reality. We've seen that happen throughout history, so why should this be any different? The IDF Chief of Staff, you know, was in here saying, "Hey, look, we're approaching

collapse." He said that weeks ago, months ago. And, you know, okay, yeah, no worry, we're gonna actually launch another operation in Lebanon. We're gonna push north of the Litani River now, we're gonna head towards— I mean, like, yeah, that happens throughout history. And what usually ends up happening, of course, is catastrophe. So, you know, we'll see. I think this idea of the Israelis being overextended, and that overextending being their downfall, as well as, you know, a host of issues internal to Israel— I think many people point to that and say this is where Israel has to be very careful, that this isn't what ends them, you know, so to speak.

#Nima

Matt, the Iranian National Security and Foreign Policy Commission spokesperson — his name is Ebrahim Rezaei — said that during the 40-day war, the extent of Iran's territorial waters increased. In the next war, perhaps the extent of Iran's land will increase.

#Matthew

What does he mean by that?

#Nima

It could be Bahrain.

#Matthew

Do you think? Yeah, yeah.

#Nima

You know that Bahrain was part of Iran.

#Matthew

Right, right, right.

#Nima

In my opinion, he's talking about Bahrain. My understanding is this: Bahrain is so much— you look at the situation in Bahrain, it's so critical, by the way. The leadership, they tried— Saudi Arabia tried during the war, if you remember— Saudi Arabia tried to send forces to Bahrain to keep everything calm. And we know that it's majority Shia Muslim, and the majority, you know, are against the leadership, and the leadership is different. You know, this is the implication of what he said, in my opinion.

#Matthew

Yeah, because I don't think he was just talking about some of the islands that are contested there in the Persian Gulf. I know that they and the Iranians and the Emiratis disagree over who owns certain islands, and I think a lot of those islands are just basically... That could be the islands as well. It could be, but I don't think you make a statement like that just to claim a bunch of rocks in the middle of the water, you know what I mean? Particularly when you're juxtaposing it against your expansion—your sea expansion, right? Your maritime expansion is the Straits of Hormuz, right? So you're not going to juxtapose it with like a giant rock that a bunch of seagulls are hanging out on that you argue with the Emiratis over who owns it or not. You know, and I know it's more serious issues than that. But, yeah, I mean, possibly, very possibly.

You know, things are possible here, Nima, that, you know, a year ago if we had spoken about this, it would have just seemed absolutely absurd to discuss. You know, and even with, you know, our conversations, you know, over the years, our understandings of the limits of American power, right, the limits of the American empire, the changing reality of the multipolar world, the endurance of the Iranians and the Axis—all these things—still, a lot of this stuff that we just discussed here in the last 32 minutes, or whatever it's been, would have just seemed extraordinary a year ago, or six months ago, or even four months ago. And this war really is transformational in so many ways. And the thing I think that we take most about the Iranians is their sincerity, is their desire to see their plan through, is their understanding that this is—

#Nima

Sorry for interrupting you. The guy that just said this, the moment that— the exact moment that Israel attacked Dahir— he said, "Tonight we're going to hit Israel." The moment. And nobody was talking about attacking at that moment. And Iran attacked—the same guy that said that.

#Matthew

Yeah, I mean, so, I mean, but... you know, how do we get to that point then, and what's going to transpire between now and the establishment or the formalization of the new order that's coming in the Middle East? You know, this bridge that we're on now as we cross from the old American imperial order in the Middle East, that bridge that we're on right now—what's the rest of it look like? Because I think we're getting a better idea of the outline of what a new order looks like, with differing blocs in the Middle East and certainly an American presence that is greatly reduced. You know, but what does it actually look like in terms of detail or in color, we can't say. But, you know, to get there, what are we going to go through, what are we going to see, what are we going to witness happening here? And I think there's a lot of danger still to come, because when, you know, if everybody—and I've not seen anyone who's dissident in this interpretation—that the next months are going to bring in a very dystopic world economy.

You know, if that's true—which, you know, again, pretty much everyone's saying—things are going to get rough, things are going to get real difficult, that the world's going to enter into a recession, and then the pressures that come from it, and then the reality that the American president has to do something. And to use more force, even if it's futile, is a much better political option for him than to do nothing. And so now we're back to this idea of, like, OK, what can the Americans do that they haven't done already? You know, the Americans don't have any top-secret weapons that they're going to roll out that are going to vaporize the Iranians—except for possibly nuclear weapons. And, you know, we've talked about this before. And so now we're here at this juncture again where we have to speculate as to what would the Americans or the Israelis do to try to get dominance and to try and end this thing. And the idea of a nuclear weapon is not so far-fetched.

#Nima

Matt, just to wrap up this session, NBC News reported that Donald Trump is putting pressure on the U.S. defense industry to produce more arms. And he said to increase production because the stock market is declining and there has to be something, you know, they have to do something about it. The guy is somehow talking about producing weapons. It seems like it's going to be some sort of ice cream that you put in the...

#Matthew

You're talking about, there was a story a month or so ago that they approached Ford and General Motors and, you know, American auto manufacturers and maybe other industries as well, too, about producing weapons.

#Nima

It seems that he asked Ford, the manufacturer, of course, to join production. But this is not going to happen overnight. It's not going to happen during his presidency. Maybe in the future, maybe in the long run, but...

#Matthew

Yeah, you have. I mean, one, you have years and years and years of backorders with the American weapons companies—years and years of backorders. And Donald Trump likes the idea of the American arms industry as one of the great revenue suppliers to the United States. It's one of the few industries that the United States has in terms of export capacity. And in the last couple of years, last few years, the Americans actually have exported more weapons than they have food. Right? We export more missiles and drones and planes and ships than we do corn and soy and, you know, everything else. So, you know, I mean, I think that's part of it, too—it's not just to supply the

stockpiles, but also to sell weapons to generate some kind of revenue here. But yeah, it's all, you know, you opened it up talking about madness, and that's certainly where we are. But yeah, I appreciate, Nima, you adjusting your schedule and your time and everything today.

#Nima

Thank you so much for being with us today.

#Matthew

Okay, you have a good one.

#Nima

Thank you. See you soon.