

# Seyed M. Marandi: BREAKING: US & Iran on Brink of FINAL Deal – Here's What We Know

Follow me: Substack: [https://substack.com/@dialogueworks?](https://substack.com/@dialogueworks?utm_campaign=profile&utm_medium=profile-page)

utm\_campaign=profile&utm\_medium=profile-page X (Twitter): [https://x.com/Dialogue\\_NRA](https://x.com/Dialogue_NRA)

Patreon: [https://patreon.com/Dialogueworks?](https://patreon.com/Dialogueworks?utm_medium=unknown&utm_source=join_link&utm_campaign=creatorshare_creator&utm_content=)

utm\_medium=unknown&utm\_source=join\_link&utm\_campaign=creatorshare\_creator&utm\_content=

## #Nima

Hi, everybody. Today's Saturday, June 13, 2026, and our dear friend, our brother, Professor Marandi, is here with us. Welcome back.

## #Seyed

Hi, Nima. Thank you very much for inviting me. It's always a great honor to be on your show.

## #Nima

I want to start with what's going on between Iran and the United States, because yesterday we had some reports from the Iranian media. Later on, we had news in Iran about that 14-point plan. And then we had the tweet from the Iranian foreign minister, Araghchi, saying no, that wasn't the case, that it doesn't reflect the reality of what's going on between Iran and the United States, which was retweeted by Donald Trump, confirming what Araghchi said. And what we know right now in the case of the Strait of Hormuz — last night there was some sort of firing. CENTCOM reported that they shot down two or three Iranian drones. It seems that the Strait is open as usual since day one, and they're trying to do their best. I think it's better to start with the Strait of Hormuz, because CENTCOM last night said the Strait is open. The day before they said the same thing. What is the situation in the Strait of Hormuz?

## #Seyed

Well, it's open for fish, I'm sure. But for ships, I'm not quite sure. And in fact, you know how Trump a few days ago said that they had this secret project where they helped ships get out of the Strait of Hormuz? That was all nonsense. They have not been able to sneak a single ship out of the Strait during this period. And if they could—if they were really serious, if it was true—all they'd have to do is just give the names of the ships, because the ships in the Persian Gulf are all known entities. They have names, they have captains, they have crews, they have cargo. They departed from a particular port, they are going to another port. It's clear which ship is where and where they're bound. So if

the Americans have facilitated two ships, three ships, ten ships, or a hundred ships, or two hundred ships, they all have names.

They could say, well, yes, such-and-such ship, which we've helped escape through the Strait of Hormuz, is now on its way to such-and-such port in such-and-such country. But they won't do that because they know it's fake. And last night, apparently, they again tried to encourage a ship—at least one—to go through, and the Iranians again blocked it. And by the way, every time the Americans shoot down a cheap drone, they spend maybe 30 or 40 times as much money as the Iranians do using those missiles. So, nothing has changed. What I can say, though, is that the statements made by the foreign minister on television last night are pretty accurate. I mean, they're accurate. Someone told me that he meant that in his tweet, he was referring to the Mehr News report.

He was speaking in general terms. And it wasn't necessarily to say that Mehr News or anyone else was wrong. But if you look at the comments that he made on television himself, even though he said, as we were discussing before the show, he's not going to talk about the details, he gave us some details. Those, as you could see, were pretty similar to what Mehr News had put out. So in general, I would say that what happened was that two, three weeks ago, we were pretty close to a deal. And we've discussed this before, and we discussed what the Iranians would get and what the Americans wanted and that. So your viewers aren't as well versed as I, so I won't go into that. But then the Americans put in new demands.

And the Iranians said, we're not touching this. And then the Americans started trying to put pressure on Iran. Netanyahu threatened to bomb Dahiya, then he bombed Dahiya. We know what happened then. And Iran hit Israel hard. The Israeli regime retaliated. And I heard from someone—I think I was on another show—and the host told me that, I don't remember who, but the host told me that the Israelis hit Iran hard. They didn't hit Iran hard at all. But in any case, the fact that they refrained from bombing Dahiya again, I think shows who had the upper hand in the exchange between Iran and Israel. But the Americans then also started attacking Iran at night on numerous occasions, which we all remember. And the Iranians would strike back very hard on each occasion.

So then on, I think it was Wednesday—I'm very terrible at these things, I always, yeah, I always forget these things—but Wednesday, I'm pretty sure, the Qatari delegation came to Iran and they informed the Iranians that those extra demands were withdrawn. So basically, we went back to where we were two, three weeks ago. In other words, the Americans tried to impose something new, the Iranians said no, the Americans applied pressure through the Zionist regime, through their assault on the Strait of Hormuz and on islands and on the Iranian mainland, and they got no results. But after the United States withdrew those demands, that was when Trump said he's going to hammer Iran and exit.

He looked, he seemed drunk, and he was talking all sorts of nonsense. And then that night was the last attack, and Iran hit back hard as well. And for the first time, they also hit Oman—for the first

time since the war, since the 1939 days of war. This is still the same war. But anyway, the Iranians hit back hard, but it appears to be pretty clear what happened, and that is that Trump withdrew those demands, but he didn't want to look weak. So he came in and said, I'm going to destroy Iran, so that after the attack, whatever deal potentially comes out, he'll say, I got it from a position of strength and they are weak. The Iranians were weak. And that, of course, didn't work. The Iranian response was very tough.

But in any case, the content of the deal is pretty clear. I mean, if anyone wants to follow the news in Iran, the Fars News Agency, the Tasnim News Agency—they cover this stuff pretty well. And these two news agencies, Tasnim and Fars, both have English, but I follow the Persian. I follow other news outlets too, but these two, when it comes to these sorts of issues, they're pretty clear. So now we are where we are. It's not clear if there will be a deal, but I would say for the first time that, in my opinion, the chances are better than 50%. Until now, I would never think that way, I think. Maybe there were times when I was more optimistic for a deal, but I think I never believed the chances were this high.

But some things that Trump said, of course, are not true. Everything is finished? No. There are still issues to be resolved. And as far as I understand, I actually didn't see Dr. Adhami's interview. You did, I think, because I was on live television for Al Mayadeen, and I only had my cell phone in front of me. So as I was on television, I was constantly checking his interview, which was almost one hour long. That program was one hour, so the whole time I was on TV, I only saw the summary. But there will not be a signing ceremony. This will be done through electronic signatures. The two sides won't gather, and I think that's the right thing to do. I don't see any necessity to be standing in the same room with these people.

## **#Nima**

What he said last night is that, in terms of the American attacks on Iran, he said the Trump administration tried to force zero enrichment on the Iranians. Then Iran said, no, that's not going to happen. Then they attacked Iran. That's right.

## **#Seyed**

Someone told me that in a Telegram channel, an English-language Telegram channel, Dr. Araghchi was saying it in a way as if this was our fault. And again, I haven't watched it, but I called a friend who watched it and also a family member who watched it, and they said, no, that's not at all what he was implying.

And that it's Iran's sovereign right, and to bomb a country because they're unwilling to give up their sovereign rights doesn't make—there's nothing for the country to be blamed about. So, no, whatever Telegram channel said that, it's wrong. What he said is basically that the United States carried out an act of aggression because we were unwilling to forsake our sovereignty, which is, of course, the

right thing to do. The Islamic Republic of Iran is the most fiercely independent country on this planet, with an extraordinarily resilient people. And I think by now everyone knows that. And like Hezbollah, people should learn more about the resistance and why they're so resilient and resistant. Why is it that, except for Hezbollah and Ansarullah and Iran and so on, we see nothing? We see no movement in our region.

## **#Nima**

Yeah, I think the most important points that he mentioned, one of them was Lebanon, and we know Lebanon and acts of resistance were, since day one, part of the first point in the 10-point plan, 14-point plan, and right now it's the same. And you mentioned how Iran, you know, issued some sort of ultimatum to Israel not to attack Dahia, which worked after all. Just to mention what has happened between Iran and Lebanon, I think what happened between Iran and Israel is so important because Israel attacked Dahia. Then Iran responded to Israel in the northern part of Israel. Then we had an Israeli attack on Iran and Iranian retaliation from the north to the south of Israel. That's right. There was no retaliation after the Iranian attack—two attacks on Israel, one attack on Iran, on the part of the Israelis.

That was the reality. If you assume, I think the second attack by Iran, which we've seen some footage coming out of Israel, they hit some important targets in Israel. That's why they decided not to escalate it. Then you see the United States coming in, which, from what we've seen, from what we've heard from the Iranian foreign minister last night, he said that it was because the Trump administration wanted to force this term of zero enrichment on Iran. I think that could be some sort of reality. I don't know if that case of the Apache helicopter has anything to do with the American attack on Iran. But what I'm sure, somehow sure about, is that the Iranian attack, the second Iranian attack on Israel, was so hard that the United States decided to respond because Israel was not capable of responding to Iran.

## **#Seyed**

What came out of this is that if there's any one-on-one war between Iran and the Israeli regime, it won't last 12 days like last time. The Israelis will be on their knees pretty quickly. And they know that. The Iranians know that. But also the Americans are not in a position to fight. We saw during these last few nights, every time a construct—Iran was very heavy-handed in its response. And the Americans are running out of time. They are truly running out of time. The crisis is about to hit, and we are very close. And people are, you know, those who are pessimistic say it's going to be in June. Those who are optimistic say it's by the end of July. And even if there is an agreement, there will still be a crisis, and it will affect the world for a very, very long time.

So Trump needs a deal, and Trump's military is not nearly as capable as he would like us to believe, and Iran has shown that. If Iran downed the helicopter, that again shows weakness on behalf of the United States. But what we do know is that the Iranians never took credit for downing the

helicopter, and they always do when they strike American planes or drones or targets anywhere. So perhaps it was a mechanical failure. Perhaps it was hit by a drone, because there are Iranian drones monitoring the Strait of Hormuz. It's Iranian territorial water, after all. So that helicopter may have had an accident with a drone. We don't know. But at the end of the day, Trump did use it as an excuse to show his strength because of his retreat at the negotiating table. But that didn't work either. The Iranian response was very hard-hitting, and from my understanding, important U.S. assets were destroyed.

## **#Nima**

The case of Lebanon, Professor Marandi, what can we learn? Because last night, the Iranian foreign minister said, after all, Israel has to withdraw totally from Lebanon. This is the final goal. And I don't know how far they can reach that conclusion during the talks or in the aftermath of the talks. Because last time we had Israel attacking Nabatieh in the southern part of Lebanon. And they're attacking, destroying, but the attack is not getting to Beirut so far from what we've seen.

## **#Seyed**

They're bombing homes. They're bombing cities. Because on the battlefield, they're not doing well. They're not doing well on the battlefield. And because of that, they're getting revenge on people. We've discussed this before. So when you say Nabatieh, it's a city. I've been to Nabatieh more than once. It's a beautiful city, large population in the context of a country like Lebanon. And what they're doing is just bombing the city and bringing about death and destruction out of anger and rage because of the fact that they're losing. Of course, even if they were winning, they'd do it too because they're just ruthless monsters. But it is because of their anger and rage. But the Iranians have said very clearly, there will be no deal if the regime does not withdraw.

It doesn't go back to where it was three months ago. For this period, at the end of the day, it has to leave Lebanon completely. But it has to go back to before this war began. And that's, you know, there are, like, I think, five points where they occupied Lebanon. They have to withdraw completely, and they will no longer be allowed to bomb Lebanon. And if they don't do that, there's no deal. If the Americans don't release the Iranian assets, there's no deal. If the Americans don't lift the siege, there's no deal. If the Americans don't lift the sanctions on Iranian energy exports, there's no deal. And what leverage does Iran have? It has its missiles. It has its drones. It has its military capability that we've seen used in the last couple of weeks. And it has, of course, control over the Strait of Hormuz. And the Americans are in deep trouble.

## **#Nima**

The Strait of Hormuz was mentioned last night. The Iranian foreign minister said that we're not going to, because the toll system would be against international law. So we have something else. We have a fee to be charged — I don't know, an environmental fee or an administrative fee.

## **#Seyed**

Whatever. They're going to take the money. That's the point.

## **#Nima**

You can call it a toll.

## **#Seyed**

You can call it a fee. Since a toll is not acceptable in accordance with international law, they'll take a fee. That's how it works. But also they'll have control. In other words, Israeli ships won't be getting through. American naval ships won't be getting through. Iranians will prevent that sort of thing. So it will be controlled to make sure that the enemy doesn't militarize the Persian Gulf again and to make it very costly for it to bring anything to those bases, because since they won't be able to use their ships, everything will have to be brought in by plane. And that makes the cost much, much greater and much more problematic to sustain it. So they will have control, and they will get their reparations through environmental fees or insurance fees or security fees, or a combination of all these fees. Yeah, the world has changed.

## **#Nima**

Yeah. There are reports on CNN and in the Financial Times about the Iranian underground cities. And the United States and Israel, these new reports are showing they tried various times, more than 40 times, to attack one of the sites in Yazd, and they were not able to somehow destroy the base, that underground city. Then, till the last moment before the announcement of the ceasefire, Iran was firing from that particular base at American bases in the GCC countries and at targets in Israel.

So do you think today, with what's happening in Iran in terms of the military, in terms of the geopolitical analysis that is happening within the Iranian community—I'm sure that many people are talking about this—how does Iran find itself in the aftermath of, not in the aftermath of, in the aftermath of the second round of war, 40 days of war? I think as time goes by, the assessment is going to be better and better because they keep receiving information. They understand what the capabilities of the United States are, what has happened during the war. They're gathering information. What is that?

## **#Seyed**

Well, a strong majority of Iranians believe that they won the war, and a small minority believe that they did not win. And a percentage is sort of like, I don't know, somewhere in the middle. But a strong majority believes they won the war, and it makes them much more confident about the future because they know that all the threats that the Americans have been making over the last 47 years—

not just threats, all the hostility and the attempted coups and color revolutions and terrorist acts and the maximum pressure sanctions and the murders through assassinations—all that has ultimately led to a war where the Americans thought that Iran would collapse.

And during the 12-day war, it didn't happen. And during the 39-day war, it didn't happen either. And on both occasions, Iran won the war decisively. Iran inflicted heavy damage on the Americans— heavy damage. It wasn't just a war where Iran was badly battered but managed to survive and thus it wins. No, it inflicted huge damage on U.S. assets across the region. It destroyed all their bases. And then, when Iranian infrastructure was targeted, they destroyed infrastructure from the Israeli regime and U.S. proxies in the Persian Gulf. Iran won the war and, of course, preserved the Strait of Hormuz, and its key military structures are very much intact.

Those underground bases host factories, which host much of Iran's air force and air defenses. In other words, before this war, Iran moved around not just military but a lot of civilian infrastructure to prevent major damage. So there are lots of places where things are being stored right now for after the war. For example, even radio and television—they've emptied them. I went to a studio to record a program in Iran, and they showed me that they'd removed all the computers and the machines they were using. And whenever the war is over, they'll bring them back because they're very expensive and costly and so on. So they won the war.

So Iranians feel confident. Of course, the economy is not doing well at all, obviously. They destroyed factories. They destroyed schools, hospitals. They destroyed pharmaceutical factories, as you know. They targeted people's homes, apartment blocks. So of course, there's damage. And because of the siege, of course, we have lots of inflation. But people are confident about the future and they're resilient. And they know that the global economic crisis, more or less, is becoming a bigger and bigger issue. So they're optimistic about the future. And they demand that this government keep the Strait of Hormuz. And some people are not happy because they expect Iran to do more.

And I meet them on the streets. And when I'm on the streets, some people are very concerned about any agreement. But I think that this agreement is a decent agreement. I think Iran wins in this agreement. And the important thing is that Iran continues to control the Strait of Hormuz. If the Zionists insist on slaughtering babies, which they love doing, then the Strait will be closed. If Trump says, I can't do anything about it, then it's okay, fine. The Strait is closed, though. And so on. So controlling the Strait of Hormuz will continue to be an insurance policy to make sure that the United States abides by its commitments. If it doesn't, fine, they'll shut it down.

## **#Nima**

I think two things happened.

## **#Seyed**

In other words, we won't tolerate genocide. And the West, of course, supports genocide. The West supports the extermination of Lebanese and Palestinian children. We won't accept it. And Iran will make sure that the United States feels the pain if it doesn't accept it, if it doesn't accept Iran's terms.

## **#Nima**

When it comes to the— I remember, Professor, you know that I was in Iran before this war started. And I saw what had happened with the protests, riots, and what was going on in Iran. And when I was leaving Iran, many people were concerned about the war. If the war happens, what would be the result of that war? I think that was a huge change. This war was a huge change for the Iranian people psychologically because they thought that the United States is not anymore the United States it was before the war started. They know their capabilities.

They're more confident. They know how capable they are of fighting back. It's not going to be about bringing those aircraft carriers, two, three of them. That doesn't mean that you're going to be defeated. So the war, psychologically, has a huge impact on Iranian society and the way they see themselves. I'm not talking about the military part. I'm not talking about the IRGC or the army. I'm talking about ordinary people. That is, I think, a huge defeat for the United States because the people are not afraid of the United States. What is your assessment of that?

## **#Seyed**

Oh, absolutely. And although there were many people who believed we would win the war, and I believed we would win the war, although I am very pleasantly surprised that we did better than I thought, I thought we'd win. I thought it would be more difficult. Not that it was easy—I thought it would be more difficult. But Iran's victory being so clear-cut and decisive, where the entire world can see clearly for sure that Iran won, that is a big thing. And the siege, of course, failed too. They were supposed to starve us, and they were gloating about starving us. Remember, senators would go on television in the United States saying we have no food, that we're hungry, and taking pleasure—just like they take pleasure in killing Palestinians and Japanese, or starving Cubans. You know, they're sick people, Epstein-class people.

But a lot of people thought that we'd win. But I think that you're absolutely correct, that at least half the population—I don't know, I'm just guessing, I don't have any statistics—but a lot of people were very concerned. And I think it was very interesting that even on day one and day two, after Ayatollah Khamenei was martyred—he's the great man of our era—he changed the world. He changed the course of history like no one else has. And as, you know, the neocon godfather himself has admitted. But after he was martyred, the calmness in Tehran—I was only in Tehran during that period. Of course, I sent my family to live in another part of the city away from me—but I didn't see it outside of Tehran, but in Tehran, there was always calm.

A lot of people left, but the city was always calm. And if you went to a supermarket, there were no crowds, no shortage of bread or gasoline or anything like that. So even after it was announced that Ayatollah Khamenei was martyred, there was a certain calmness that I found stunning. And then I think we've gone over this, so I'm boring your viewers. But I think after maybe a week, people felt that we were winning. And then it just went on and on, and they were more and more confident that we were going to win this war. And I think gradually it was dawning upon people across the world—how are they doing this? And, you know, the resilience of the Iranian people and, of course, the resilience of Hezbollah. I mean, whenever I think about what Iran did, I also, you know, look at Hezbollah.

And people across the world should learn about Hezbollah, should learn about Iran and what makes them like this. If they became like them, then the empire would fall, would run away from wherever they are, you know, very swiftly. So, yeah, I think that by the end of the war, a lot of people were saying, why did we accept the ceasefire? A lot of people were saying, why did we accept the ceasefire? We should have continued. A lot of people, not like a few, not like a fringe. I personally think it was a good time. The Americans were forced to accept our 10-point plan.

That was a very symbolic defeat, and Trump was attacked for it, and then later on his spokeswoman said, no, no, no, he threw it in the bin or whatever. But it was very humiliating for him. And, you know, they only made it worse for themselves. True, they took this opportunity to slaughter lots of women and children in Lebanon. I'm sure they take great pleasure in that. But the fact that the Israeli regime broke the ceasefire has kept the Strait of Hormuz closed for much longer than it was supposed to be. And that has really pushed the world towards the brink. So if this fool, Netanyahu, had committed himself to the ceasefire back then, the world wouldn't be in the situation it is now.

So he and Trump's weakness have brought this situation upon the United States. And this is a defeat much bigger, or at least when combined with the 39 days of fighting, this defeat gets bigger and bigger by the day. And that's the reason why Trump is accepting a ceasefire agreement that's to Iran's favor, not to his favor. And the nuclear issue and the sanctions will be dealt with later. I'm not saying we're even going to get to the second phase. No one trusts the United States. The United States is an untrustworthy regime. It always has been. But under Trump, it's just a madhouse. But in any case, the deal, I think, is good enough.

## **#Nima**

And the second point is how those red lines, which we had before all these rounds of wars started... we had some sort of red lines between Iran and Israel. No one would attack the other. But those red lines are not there anymore. That's why Iran attacked Israel. For the first time, Iran attacked Israel without being attacked by Israelis. So this is the new calculation in the region. I don't know what the assessment is on the part of Iranians, because it doesn't seem that Donald Trump would be able to change the new calculation that Iran put out — the new equation of the region — which is, Israel

has to understand that they cannot... because for decades, I would say for two decades, three decades, they're attacking other countries, destroying, killing people without having any sort of response from those people, because they're not capable. They don't have fighter jets. They don't have missiles, ballistic missiles. And Israel was so capable because of all those big powers.

## **#Seyed**

Most importantly, they don't have the will. They don't have the resistance and resilience. I mean, Hezbollah doesn't have many of these things, but they stand up to the regime. I mean, there's a difference between Hezbollah and what we see in Jordan. There's a difference between Hezbollah and what we see in its opponents in Lebanon. There's a difference between them and the Al-Qaeda regime in Syria. They have an ideological framework and belief that gives them a resilience and strength that allows them to stand up in this way. But others... they don't have that. That's why I think people across the world should be looking to Hezbollah, to Iran, to the Axis of Resistance, to learn from them and see what it is that makes them what they are.

## **#Nima**

Here is what the Prime Minister of Pakistan just tweeted: We are closer to a peace deal than ever before, with finalization likely expected in the next 24 hours. Pakistan is preparing for the electronic signing of the peace deal immediately after, followed by technical-level talks next week. We would like to thank the United States of America and the Islamic Republic of Iran for their ongoing commitment during the negotiations, and we extend our sincere appreciation to our brothers in the region for their support. We are confident that this historic peace deal will form a strong foundation for lasting peace. Are we that close?

## **#Seyed**

It is not impossible, although when Trump spoke about a meeting on Sunday, that was definitely not going to happen. And, of course, I tweeted that. And last night the foreign minister said the signatures will be made while the two sides are very far apart physically. So, we'll see. I don't know if it'll be tomorrow. I don't know the exact timing, but I know that they have been working on it ever since Trump backed down on Biden. When was that? I said Wednesday, right? When the Qatari delegation came to Iran to inform the Iranians that Trump backed down from those new demands, then things began rolling. Because we were close. I mean, you and I went over this a few times. We were close already. And the reason why there's so much skepticism is because we were close, and then Trump walked away.

He said, no, no, I'm not going to give Iranian assets. No, I'm not going to lift the sanctions. No, all that nonsense. And one interesting point is that that's not what she said. If Iran agrees to resolve the enrichment at 60%, it will be done in Iran. What does that mean? That means that they'll have to use enrichment facilities to reverse the process, to bring it down to 20% or 3.67%. So effectively,

the Americans are going to have to deal with that. They'll have to deal with enrichment in Iran. And remember, some people may say, well, why would Iran get rid of enriched uranium at 60%? Iran only enriched in the first place to get leverage. And remember, we had the JCPOA. Obama cheated Iran. It was never executed properly. Then Trump tore up the deal. And then the Europeans, being the cowards that they are and the useless diplomats that they are, they obeyed Trump.

First, they said, no, we'll find a solution, but they just obeyed Trump. So they imposed maximum pressure sanctions while Iran was committed to the deal. And Iran continued to remain committed to the deal for two years after they tore up the deal. And so after that, Iran restarted the nuclear program. And then after a while, Iran enriched uranium to 60% as leverage at the negotiating table. That is leverage. So from the beginning, that was the Iranian calculation. So if Iran does bring that uranium back to 20% or 3%, it has to do it through enrichment facilities. And as far as I know, this is how it works. And they have, you know, that was the whole point from the very beginning—to get concessions through enrichment of uranium at 60%.

## **#Nima**

I think yesterday I talked with Ambassador Chas Freeman.

## **#Seyed**

And remember, sorry, Nima, sorry for interrupting. Remember, the next phase—in the West, they keep talking about how the nuclear program will be discussed then. Well, all the sanctions will be discussed then. If they want, it's not just, you know, sit down and say, okay, what are you going to do with that? The Iranians are going to say, what are you going to do with all those sanctions? So it's not going to be pleasant for the United States at the negotiating table. And remember, the Strait of Hormuz is controlled by Iran.

## **#Nima**

The frozen Iranian assets as well, they're going to be in the first round as they sign this memorandum of understanding.

## **#Seyed**

Half of those assets.

## **#Nima**

So then later on, because what is so confusing, Professor Marandi, is that after signing the memorandum of understanding, they're going to have something like 60 days of negotiations to reach the final deal. Is that the calculation on the part of the Iranians and the United States?

## **#Seyed**

Yeah, but no one knows what's going to happen, Nima. We don't even know if the deal is going to be signed. Nothing is for sure. This is Donald Trump. This is, you know, the madhouse president—the White House madhouse, you know. So who knows? And then after it's signed, who knows if it's going to last a week, maybe two weeks, three weeks. Then, you know, some people come up—last night I was on the streets and people would come up to me and say, well, what if, you know, they're not going to abide by the deal?

## **#Nima**

They don't. Then the Strait of Hormuz isn't going to be open.

## **#Seyed**

And the evidence is that when the Nazi regime—the Netanyahu regime—carpet bombed Lebanon, just to, you know, he just carpet bombed the country just to wreck the ceasefire, Iran said, fine, those ships are not going through the Strait of Hormuz. And that's where, and look, you know, it's been, what, two months since then, almost. So thanks to Netanyahu. So if he does not obey, if Trump does not pull hard on Netanyahu's leash, then we're not going to have a deal. Those ships are not going through. And if they start going through, they'll be stopped. And if after a week of ships going through they wreck the deal, they'll stop further ships from going through.

## **#Nima**

Iran controls the Strait.

## **#Seyed**

So the Americans, if they don't want their economy to crash, they should. And they should start thinking about stopping Netanyahu from slaughtering all those kids.

## **#Nima**

There were some reports then that one of the GCC countries, with the Israeli attack on Iran, banned their airspace for Israel. Is that country Saudi Arabia?

## **#Seyed**

For Israel?

## **#Nima**

Yeah, because the latest Israeli attack on Iran, after the Iranian attack on Israel in the northern part of Israel, Israel responded. Then one of these GCC countries was mentioned in the media, that the country banned its airspace to Israel. Do you think that was Saudi Arabia? Because I don't see—Iraq doesn't have the capabilities to ban the airspace, and so they can use the Iraqi airspace.

## **#Seyed**

Iraq, unfortunately, is not independent. The Americans control its central bank. They control its funding. But you mean Israel or the United States? Because the Saudis and the others would never openly allow the Israelis to use their airspace. The Americans would use their airspace. The Americans would use their airspace to fuel Israeli jets at most, but the Israelis would not fly over these countries to attack Iran. I mean, they would allow the Americans to fly over and bomb Iran, but not the Israelis. So I don't see how that's an important report. I don't think the Saudis or the Kuwaitis ever allowed the Israelis to use their airspace to bomb Iran. But they would allow the Americans.

## **#Nima**

I think that's the key point for Iran, because without the United States facilitating, participating, and helping Israel, they're not going to be able to come with their fighter jets to attack Iran. Oh yes, no doubt, no doubt. They're using the refueling tankers in the air to refuel.

## **#Seyed**

And the radar systems in Turkey and the AWACS jets in Turkey and whatever. But what I can say is that the Iranians have had some progress in their negotiations with countries in the Persian Gulf. And Iran is speaking to them on a one-to-one basis. And so the Saudis and the Qataris right now are in one place, the Emirates are in another, Kuwait and Bahrain are in yet another. I think right now the two countries that Iran is particularly unhappy with are Bahrain and Kuwait.

But the Emirates have shifted somewhat, and the Saudis and the Qataris have shifted more than the others. But if the United States attacks Iran, and if Iran's critical infrastructure is attacked in the future, you know, Iran will retaliate against all of these countries and the Israeli regime. So, you know, the improvements are a good thing. Hopefully, they'll continue to move forward, but we're not at a point where they are going to remove U.S. assets from their territory and behave like normal countries do. They're not there yet.

## **#Nima**

There was a meeting between al-Jolani, Syria, and the prime minister of Lebanon in which, surprisingly, al-Jolani is suggesting to the Lebanese prime minister not to negotiate with the Israelis because there is no point in negotiating. You know, with the case of Turkey and Syria, I think Israel,

as time goes by, is perceiving what's going on there as not going to benefit them. Because you remember, after the fall of Bashar al-Assad, they thought that everything was going to be in their favor. But I think, as we've seen in the latest meeting, that he's not... From his experience, by the way, he was negotiating and giving everything to Israel, and Israel was attacking Syria at the same time. I think this is the mere outcome of his experience in negotiating with the Israelis and with the Americans, with the Trump administration. That's why he's suggesting that to Lebanon.

## **#Seyed**

Few people have helped the Israeli regime more than the ruler of Qatar and the current president of Turkey. Few have done more to help Netanyahu than this. And through the destruction of Syria, it's been much more difficult for the resistance. And al-Jolani, the al-Qaeda or former ISIS head of Syria, he blocked the border between Syria and Lebanon just to make sure that Iran would not be able to smuggle in aid. That's been his job during this war.

And yet he, being the proxy and fool that he is, instead of using this opportunity, these three months of war where Hezbollah was fighting and drawing off the Israeli regime forces, and much of the forces were in the West Bank crushing the Palestinian population and strangling the people of Gaza, he could have deployed all those ISIS and al-Qaeda madmen to fight against Israel and to create their own resistance and overwhelm the Israelis, who are already having more than enough difficulty in Lebanon. The amount of territory taken in Syria and the importance of the territory taken in Syria is enormous. But he wouldn't do that, and if he did, Iran would help him. If he chose to resist against the Israeli regime, regardless of his sinister past, Iran would help him, no doubt. But Turkey wouldn't under Erdogan. But Iran would, Hezbollah would, the resistance in Iraq would. But he, yeah, he does not have any.

Well, yes, we hear that the report you're speaking about is, of course, an Al-Akhbar newspaper report. Al-Akhbar is close to the resistance. They have very good sources. It's a very good newspaper. I encourage, if people want news about Lebanon—there's more than one Al-Akhbar, I mean the Lebanese Al-Akhbar—it is a good source of information. But yes, he basically told the Lebanese prime minister that the Israelis destroyed, you know, they wrecked us at the negotiating table. And if you go down that route, that's what you'll get. And that's what they did get. So, you know, once you join the American camp, you are subordinate to the empire. And yeah.

## **#Nima**

Professor Marandi, one question. I think one of the objectives of the Qatari delegation in the recent visit to Iran—you mentioned how they were trying to bridge the gap between Iran and the United States. But the other important issue would be how they are willing to see Iran's new position in the Middle East, in West Asia. Because this is a new era, in my opinion. This is a new era. Yesterday I talked with Ambassador Chas Freeman.

He said this is literally the new era of West Asia because the United States, together with Israel, were enjoying their impunity in their wars—attacking and not having any sort of response from other countries—in Iraq, in Afghanistan, in Libya, going to Lebanon, Gaza, Palestine. Those days are gone. This is the new equation in the Middle East. And how is that going to be perceived by GCC countries? I think it's important as well. Iran knows what its capabilities are when it comes to geopolitical issues, when it comes to military aspects. But what is the perception on the part of the Qatari government or the government in Saudi Arabia? And what are the communications between the two parties—the Iranian party and the GCC country party?

## **#Seyed**

Well, Iran doesn't see them as a group. Iran does one-on-one negotiations. And there are big differences between... And the GCC, the so-called GCC, is a joke, really. And we've seen that they have no capabilities. The smart country was Oman, and the other five were all fools. But they should be thankful to Iran. Everyone in the region and beyond should be thankful, because if it wasn't for Iran, the Greater Israel Project would be well on its way to achieving its desired results, at least at this stage. But Iran has no territorial ambitions against these countries, and that's all a part of their whole propaganda model that they've been using against Iran.

Iran is expansionist, Iran is Shia, creating a Shia empire. The Iranians in the Axis of Resistance, as Shia, have sacrificed more for Sunnis than any Sunni. When some would say, oh, look at Syria, they killed hundreds of thousands of people — that's, of course, nonsense. It's like the numbers that they give about, you know, the protesters, peaceful protesters in Tehran being slaughtered. But no, in Syria, Iran stood up against ISIS and al-Qaeda, which was the right thing to do. And it was against the policies of the empire, which was the right thing to do. Just like in Afghanistan. In Afghanistan, Iran — you know, who created the Taliban? Western intelligence agencies, Pakistan, Saudi money, Emirati money.

And initially, they were murderous, they massacred people. But then gradually Iran began to establish ties with segments of the Taliban. And a new generation came up that, although we have huge disagreements with them — they don't allow women to go to school, go to work, we reject that utterly — and they're intolerant towards other languages and other ethnic groups and other sects and so on, but not like before. So Iran helped the Taliban expel the United States. Without Iran, the Taliban would not have been able to expel the United States. When General Soleimani was murdered by the Americans, a huge Taliban delegation came to Tehran and went to his home.

So, and, you know, just like in Iraq, it was Iran that was the force behind the expulsion of the United States. So, if someone is going to say, well, Iran was sectarian in Syria, well, then why, you know, in Syria, these Takfiri people who attack Iran all the time, they are complemented by Shias and Uzbeks and Tajiks, some Shias, Uzbeks and Tajiks, who were affiliated with the previous government in

Afghanistan. Because they were saying that Iran helped to trump the Taliban. So in Afghanistan, they're saying the exact opposite, that the Iranians support the Taliban and they're against the Persian language speakers, the Uzbek speakers, the Shias. The issue for Iran is the empire.

The empire is the root of our problem in this part of the world. When the empire is gone, many things will improve. It's not going to become a utopia. But the empire uses sectarianism like Wahhabism and Salafism and all these other criminal gangster groups that come out of these, you know, with this Takfiri ideology, just like they do in Europe, just like they do in Latin America and elsewhere in Africa, Boko Haram and so on. These are all tools. So once the empire is gone, a lot of this extremism will die down, because they use the extremism to turn people against each other — one race against another, one nation against another, one sect, one religion against another. That's how the empire is able to remain in place: divide and rule. So in Afghanistan, Iran did not want to hurt the Shias.

It did not want to hurt the Tajiks. It did not want to hurt the Uzbeks or the liberal Pashtun. No, but the priority was to get rid of the empire. The same as Syria. Look at Bosnia, a Sunni country. Which country prevented them from being exterminated? Iran. No one else did anything. Of course, all of these sacrifices are being made for the Palestinian people. Iranians are not Arabs. They're overwhelmingly Shia. Through decades of propaganda, even many Palestinians believe the propaganda about Iran and the disinformation and the lies that Qatar and the Saudis and the Emiratis and unfortunately the people in power in Turkey promoted about the Shias in Iran — that we believe in a different prophet, we believe in a different Quran, and we believe in all sorts of ridiculous nonsense.

They were constantly promoting this. Why? Because of two reasons. One was they were concerned about the spread of resistance, and second of all, they wanted to justify their own complicity with the empire. When people are saying, "Well, look at Hezbollah," you know, they have to say that Hezbollah is evil, Hezbollah is corrupt, they're not like you. So that people, instead of saying, "Why aren't you behaving like Hezbollah? Why aren't you behaving like the resistance?" they'll say, "Oh, the resistance is evil and corrupt and whatever."

And that would lead to their continued inaction and indifference. And these despots would remain in power. And it has been effective. It has been effective for a very long time. But we saw during this war how Western media has lost its credibility, and across the world, people were rooting for Iran and continue to do so. And in the Arab world, despite all this huge media apparatus with hundreds, if not thousands, of media outlets being funded by these regimes, people were cheering for the Iranians when they were striking U.S. targets and affiliated targets in the Israeli regime and also in the Persian Gulf. So the empire is indeed collapsing at multiple levels.

**#Nima**

Thank you. Thank you so much, Professor Marandi, for being with us today. A great pleasure, as always.

**#Seyed**

The pleasure is mine. Thank you very much for inviting me, and I thank your audience for their tolerance.