

Iran Just Hit Trump SO HARD, Major Concessions WON | Dr. Hassan Ahmadian

Special guest Dr. Hassan Ahmadian joins for the first time to discuss the truth behind the western media spin on the concessions currently Iran has received from the US in ongoing MoU talks. The prolific Iranian commentator also gives his view on the most controversial questions surrounding the war and its outcome. Dr. Hassan Ahmadian is an Assistant Professor at the University of Tehran specializing in Iran's regional policy and political change in West Asia. He previously held research positions at Harvard University. Follow on X <https://x.com/hasanahmadian> LIKE the video and Subscribe for more in-depth geopolitical analysis Leave your thoughts in the comments below! Support the Channel: Patreon: <https://www.patreon.com/dannyhaiphong> SUBSCRIBE ON RUMBLE: Rumble: <https://rumble.com/c/DannyHaiphong> Follow Me on Social Media: Twitter: <https://twitter.com/DannyHaiphong> Telegram: <https://t.me/DannyHaiphong> Support the channel in other ways: <https://www.buymeacoffee.com/dannyhaiphong> Substack: chroniclesofhaiphong.substack.com Cashapp: \$Dhaiphong Venmo: @dannyH2020 Paypal: <https://paypal.me/spiritho> #iran #iranwar #trump

#Danny

Welcome back to the program, everyone. Danny Haiphong. As you can see, I am joined by Dr. Hassan Ahmadian. He is an associate professor at the University of Tehran, a very prolific speaker and commentator on all things Iran and the region. And I'm very honored for him to be here. Professor and Dr. Ahmadian, thanks so much for joining today. Thank you. It's good to be with you. Great. Everyone hit the like button. That helps ensure that this stream gets far and wide as we get started here. So, Dr. Ahmadian, I wanted to begin with the news that Iran is reporting that they have secured a major concession from the United States — \$12 billion in frozen assets to be released immediately.

The United States has framed this as, not a concession, but a guarantee that these assets are going to be used on U.S. products, essentially. And Iran has actually called this out, saying that J.D. Vance and Donald Trump are not telling the truth on this matter. They said that they have no plans to allow the United States to determine how they use their own assets that were illegally frozen. And I wanted your view on this and just your overall view on how these negotiations have gone and what they signify as this war morphs into what seems to be a battle of narratives, especially on the U.S. side, framing these negotiations as an Iranian defeat.

#Hassan Ahmadian

I think we have to go to the war and the military option that was pursued to understand what's happening on the table in negotiations. The war started with goals that weren't achieved, and that's why the failure in the war has been translating into concessions. It's not that weird of a position for the United States, after failing to achieve what it wanted on the battlefield, to give concessions. That's only a matter of the natural course of events. You can't achieve, you fail, then you have to find a remedy for it. Now, the United States and the Trump administration specifically, I think they can't just accept that they have failed. And that's why you hear a lot of selling — selling of the concessions as wins.

Whereas the Memorandum of Understanding has been very much clear to many who have followed this conflict for years now, or even decades. It gives Iran what it wanted as the economic outcome of the war. The Iranians performed well during the war. They basically went for strategic proportionality as opposed to their previous strategy, strategic patience, and that gained them a lot on the battlefield. And now they're translating those gains into economic gains. Now, sanctions relief when it comes to Iran's oil exports and also the frozen assets gradually being released. And, of course, the stop of the war, the blockade that the United States imposed, you know, contradicting the ceasefire agreement two months ago — they're lifting it now.

And in exchange, Iran is to open the Strait of Hormuz in a matter of 30 days to basically get it back to where it was before the war in terms of the level of transit into and outside the Persian Gulf. To me and to many observers and strategists who have been following this matter, it seems that it's a big win for Iran, at least in the first stage of engagement with the United States. The framework itself, Danny, I think has been clear. Iranians insisted on two stages of negotiations. The United States was not okay with it initially, but over time they realized that that's the way they have to go about it because the Iranians are not willing to engage them on their own agenda.

And so we see that there's a memorandum of understanding as a first step. It's way more than a memorandum of understanding if you look at the preconditions within it. Five articles within this MOU have to be implemented for the negotiations to go to the second phase that is related to the nuclear file and more sanctions relief. And so it's not only a framework for negotiations, it's way more than that. And that's why the Iranians went to Switzerland to say that we are not willing to negotiate about the nuclear file without you implementing what you have already signed to be implemented. And that's the war in Lebanon.

That's sanctions relief in terms of Iran's oil exports, and that's the blockade and also the frozen assets. When they found a way to basically implement those and guarantee their implementation, they went ahead and entered the second phase. So I think it's clear to everybody following that it's not a win for the United States at this stage, at least. And I think I don't blame the administration for trying to sell the deal or the MOU as a win for the United States, because they cannot just say we lost, we failed militarily, and now that failure is bound to translate into diplomatic failure as well.

#Danny

Yeah, and we see Donald Trump and the administration continuously promote the idea that Iran has been militarily defeated, despite the fact that such a reality would maybe negate the whole purpose of these talks or the United States even engaging in them in the first place. But I wanted to ask you now about the impact. How significant is it that the United States is making at least some steps to reverse its policies around sanctions on Iran and these frozen assets? What kind of impact will it have for Iran in the immediate sense? Because I don't know that it's so clear how big and significant this is for those who don't live in Iran, for those who don't understand what kind of impact it has had on Iranian society for these assets to be frozen, for these sanctions to have been leveled on Iran for so many years.

#Hassan Ahmadian

Yeah, I think it will have an impact on Iran's economy. Of course, this is the first stage. It's not going to be a big change. But since 2018, when the Trump administration reneged on the U.S. commitment to the JCPOA, that is, the nuclear deal, there has been a maximum pressure campaign that sanctioned pretty much everything in Iran's economic, financial, and business-related sectors. Now, sanctions relief in the form of oil, which is the bulk of Iran's exports at this point, is a big change, at least temporarily, while the negotiations are ongoing for two months. The release of Iran's frozen assets by the Treasury Department is also a big step that can impact Iran's economy, I think, bigly, because, you know, Iran's economy has shrunk due to the maximum pressure over the years, and now this liquidity coming into it would add a lot to its movement within the economy.

And so we are to see, I think, a lot of changes within Iran, at least in the short term. But also the Iranians are eyeing a bigger change in U.S. policies. Because I think, again, the military option that has always been on the table—every administration would repeat, every president would repeat in the States that all options are on the table—I think from now on that sentence has lost much of its weight, not only in Iran but also within the United States, because it has been used and it hasn't achieved what it promised, at least in the eyes of those who promoted it, what it wanted to achieve or what it was bound to achieve. Quite the contrary, it brought a failed policy into exposure.

I think that is very much what is impacting U.S. policies. Now, Bibi Netanyahu has lost much of his weight in Washington due to his policy toward Iran that brought the United States eventually into this war. And so I think that picture is to impact much of the policies moving forward. And the bottom line is that there's no military way out of this. Uh, understanding that in Washington is very important. I think they have understood it. And so if we are to go for a more comprehensive deal that includes the nuclear file but also sanctions relief, uh, from all sanctions, uh, primary and secondary sanctions as it is in the MOU, I think that will be the biggest change in Iran's economic situation and Iranians' daily life, basically.

#Danny

Dr. Ahmadian, why are people like the Secretary of the Treasury in the United States, Scott Besant, talking like this? You said that the nuclear file won't even be discussed at all until phase two of these talks. And now Treasury Secretary Scott Besant reported today on his X account, or in the last day, that Iran is committed to not only free and open transit of the Strait of Hormuz, but also to permit the IAEA inspectors into their country. And that is why they've instituted this temporary 60-day general license authorizing the sale of Iranian oil.

Why do you believe that the United States is framed in this way? They don't ever, when talking to the general public, talking to, obviously, U.S. audiences and audiences elsewhere, they never actually cite the specific clauses, these time frames, or anything like that. But truthfully, what they're saying is that, no, Iran has agreed to essentially allow inspectors and to essentially talk about the nuclear problem right now. Why is there such a gap in understanding between both parties involved?

#Hassan Ahmadian

I don't think there's a big gap in understanding. There's a big gap in promoting it.

#Danny

Oh, Dr. Ahmadian, I think we might have lost you. I don't know if you can hear me, but your video has gone black. I can't hear you anymore. So hopefully we can get you back very soon. We were talking just now about the... I'm just going to message him really quickly. Um... Yes. So just waiting for Dr. Ahmadian to return. And we were talking about this potential gap in his understanding, which appears to be more of a gap maybe in how this is promoted. Actually, let me bring him back in now. Here you go. Here we go. Hi, Dr. Ahmadian. It seems like we had a bit of a disconnect. I'm sorry for this. No, it's okay. It is perfectly fine.

#Hassan Ahmadian

Continue. As I was saying, there is a big selling of the agreement. There is not much of a difference when it comes to understanding because the MOU is, to a large extent, clear in what it wants to achieve and where to go from now on. I think within the Hormuz as well, talking about free transit is clearly not what the MOU is saying. Secondly, I think when it comes to the second phase, also the MOU is clear, and the Iranian position is clear that we will have negotiations in the second phase on Iran's nuclear file and on sanctions relief. There's nothing more.

You can't just expect change in the policy, the nuclear policy, because there haven't been any negotiations until now. I think it's clear that negotiations are to start. There are reports that they started yesterday, and they are to continue for the next two months. So to jump to the conclusion that inspectors will be in Iran and that people will be talking to inspectors within Iran, I think that's not going to happen before an agreement on the nuclear file. So I think that's part of the selling.

The entire administration in the United States is selling the deal as a success, which I don't blame them for because they have talked about Iran being successful.

Out of power, its ballistic missile program is gone, its Navy is gone, its Air Force is gone, its regional presence and influence are gone. And they can't just say, well, we're giving these concessions to a country that has no power whatsoever. They're saying, well, we are extracting concessions. We're not giving them that much. And so that's the difference between the reality of what is happening in negotiations and what the United States is accepting as a result of the military failure. And the difference between the two is to be filled with rhetoric, such as what you just mentioned of Scott Besant and before him, I think, President Trump and others who spoke on the matter.

#Danny

Now I'd like your assessment of another concession that's been made, and this does include the Israeli side, even though Israel is not a party to the MOU. The situation in Lebanon and the number one, the top clause, or at least in the MOU, that talks about Lebanon and the war on all fronts. There's been this deconfliction zone that Iran and the United States announced as being part of a way to enforce a ceasefire in Lebanon and to prevent further Israeli attacks. Now, there are Israeli attacks still happening, even in the last 24 hours in south Lebanon. There were two killed overnight.

There were airstrikes in certain areas. There were, of course, Israeli troops there, because they're trying to occupy the region, firing small arms and other kinds of ammunition still. And I'm curious about your thoughts on what this might do to a deal, because there's been a lot of talk about how Israel doesn't really have an interest in allowing a final agreement to go through. And Iran has said that this is a make-or-break type of situation, that there will be no abandonment of Lebanon and the other fronts. So, your thoughts on this?

#Hassan Ahmadian

I think also what has been achieved in the MOU is very clear in the 13th clause. It says clauses 1, 4, 5, 10, and 11 are to be implemented immediately after the MOU is signed for the negotiations to enter into the second phase. What are those clauses? The first one, number one, is Lebanon and all fronts, deconfliction and stopping of Israeli aggression, not only against Lebanon but also against other Iranian allies, right? It is clear in that sense. Now, the United States tried to say, well, we cannot do that for two days. Israelis really went hard against the Lebanese, killed roughly 100 Lebanese, and demolished many private and public properties in the south.

They are, as we speak, occupying 10% of Lebanon's territory. The Iranians said, well, the MOU is clear. Five clauses are to be implemented for us to move to negotiations on other matters, on top of them the nuclear file. If that is not achieved, then we cannot negotiate with you. And if that is not achieved, we will backtrack as well because you are obviously renegeing right after signing the deal. Renegeing on Lebanon and the stop of the war, we will stop also implementing what the MOU says

about the Strait of Hormuz. And so that's when the United States weighed in and pushed Netanyahu to stop his aggression temporarily, at least in southern Lebanon.

There are movements of withdrawal of forces from southern Lebanon that are happening. There are reports on them. We don't know to what extent they are true, but in any case, the MOU is clear that the territorial integrity of Lebanon is to be preserved. That is, the Israeli army has to withdraw from Lebanon and its territories. And so we have a very clear text on that, but also it relates to other fronts because it talks about all fronts, not only Iran and Lebanon, all fronts in the region. It talks about Iran's allies and U.S. allies, which includes all in the Middle East.

And so Israeli aggression against whomever is considered an Iranian ally would be perceived as a violation of the MOU and would affect the second phase of the negotiations negatively. And so for the Iranians, the war was about four parties: Iran, Lebanon, Israel, and the United States. And the stopping of the war would include these four, but they pushed even further to include all fronts and Iran's allies generally in the region. And for them, that is part and parcel of the agreement. Without it, they cannot just move on with what the United States wants in terms of negotiations over the nuclear file.

They know their leverage, both in Hormuz and the nuclear file. They are using them to extract more concessions moving forward. But to do that, you need to basically make sure that what you have extracted already is being implemented, and the war in Lebanon is part of it. Of course, the Israelis have started talking about their independence. They cannot just do what the United States wants, but we know that's rhetoric. Israel cannot basically move a muscle without a green light from the United States against Iran and its allies. Without U.S. support, they couldn't have carried out the genocide in Gaza.

We know for three weeks their ammunition was out. They needed ammunition from the United States to continue the genocide in Gaza. The same goes for Iran. The same goes for Lebanon. And so when you are that reliant on a patron state that is the United States, you cannot say you are independent, and the United States cannot say we have no say in this. And based on this logic, they accepted and signed the MOU that says clearly that they will be the guarantors of Israel not violating this MOU, which suggests that the United States knows its place. And Israel, I think, primarily knows its place when it comes to relations with the United States.

#Danny

And, you know, there have been some who watch this program who are concerned. You know, you mentioned the "on all fronts," and there were some who were even angry that Palestine, Gaza, and this front were not explicitly mentioned in the MOU. There have been some comments made by Iranian officials that Gaza and, of course, these other fronts will become more explicit as talks go down the line. But I'm wondering your reaction to this, because Iran has been a steadfast supporter of Palestine. And I think that has led some to be concerned that there might not be efforts to stop

the carnage there, which does in some respects continue despite maybe a quote-unquote falloff since the absolutely horrific period that occurred for two-plus years starting on October 7th.

#Hassan Ahmadian

I think I myself would have liked to see Palestine included by name in this memorandum of understanding. But what Iranian officials are saying is that this memorandum of understanding was about this specific war that has had four parties involved in it, and it mentions them by name. But also, we pushed for the inclusion of all fronts and Iran's allies. That includes the Palestinians, that includes the Yemenis, that includes the Iraqis, very clearly. And so they're talking about if an Israeli escalation in any of these fronts is to happen moving forward, this will be a very clear violation of the MOU. And so, with or without their names there, they are part of the MOU as per Iranian officials.

I think it's quite clear that there are two parties. There are those who are very concerned with not mentioning the name of Gaza in this MOU, which I think the officials have made very clear why that was, because this war was about four parties and they were included by name, but also by mentioning all fronts. There is another group of people who have been silent about Gaza, but now that the deal did not include it, they're basically demonizing Iran, saying that Iran left the Palestinians. For the Israelis, they basically threw them under the bus, which is clearly not the case. I think if the MOU and then the more sort of comprehensive deal is to be achieved and implemented, I think Lebanon's territory will be freed from Israeli occupation.

And, of course, the focus will return back to the Palestinian territories being brutalized by Israel. That, I think, is very much in the minds of Iranian strategists and is not to leave their strategic planning. And that's why they basically focused on inclusion of all fronts in this MOU, because this gives them a very clear, you know, opening moving forward if there's an escalation for them to weigh in and put pressure on the United States and, through them, on the Israelis to stop whatever they want to do in the Palestinian territories. I think this MOU will have a lot of weight moving forward when it comes to the Palestinian territories as well.

#Danny

And I've had people on the show, Dr. Armani, talk about the significance for Iran of getting to this point and talking about Iran. And there are even some in the mainstream media in the West talking about Iran as now a superpower, even a fourth global power in the world after the United States, China, and Russia. What is your assessment and opinion on how Iran has made out of this war and its current position in the world now that it is negotiating and talking with the United States on matters that indeed affect the entire world economically and otherwise?

#Hassan Ahmadian

I think the Iranians have had this self-perception way before the war, but it was about this war that the world came to realize that this is a formidable force that can withstand the United States and Israel altogether, with means that it is producing internally under sanctions for roughly 50 years. Still, they were capable of pushing back and increasing their leverage, not only in Hormuz but against U.S. military presence in the region. I talked about this elsewhere. U.S. military bases have lost their strategic sense when it comes to their positioning around Iran because Iran turned them into attack magnets rather than capabilities to be used against the Iranians or others in the region.

And so they have lost their strategic sense, and it's about time for U.S. military presence in the region to shrink even further. But that aside, I think the capabilities that the Iranians have shown expose two things. One is that Iran has built really strong military means to shield itself with, and it's a very capable middle power. And second, that the U.S. military capabilities have limits. Actually, the war exposed much of what the United States was hiding. It showed that the United States is not capable of doing what it wants to do, using its very sophisticated armaments and capabilities.

And so the exposure of U.S. military capabilities is, I think, the main outcome of this war internationally today. And secondly, Iran's capabilities being very much shown in this war also is a second outcome. And so this elevates Iran's position naturally, and this diminishes the U.S. position globally as well. I'm not saying, as people suggest, Iran is a superpower. I think, you know, Iran has a lot of potential to move up the ladder in terms of regional and international power. But I think we are still at the beginning. There are changes that are to happen internationally.

All literature in international relations is now focused on the transitional period in international relations — that power and how it flows is basically what it's about, what transition is about — power moving away from the United States to other competitors like China, Russia, India, the BRICS, and, you know, other organizations. Now, you can place Iran within this camp, a rising power. Now, to what extent it can rise into being an international force, we are yet to see that. I think if the entirety of sanctions are lifted and Iran becomes free of all these sanctions, it has great potential due to its human resources, internal resources, and natural resources.

It has one of the unique positions when it comes to the potential of moving really up the ladder very fast. We saw back in 2015, 2016, 2017, 15% of economic growth after the signing of the JCPOA, which speaks volumes about what potential Iran has moving forward. I mean, you know, we have to be modest at this point. Iran fought a war. It fought it really well. It denied the United States and Israel any achievement, and it basically accumulated strategic points in the Strait of Hormuz and in Iraq against U.S. military presence in the region, in terms of the unity of fronts, with it protecting Lebanon against Israeli aggression. These are strategic levers that are to be there moving forward. I think a deal can only help Iran grow even further.

#Danny

And do you see the ultimate trajectory of this as the United States not only losing power regionally and globally, but also perhaps even losing assets in the region, meaning the United States has to leave the region? There is... of course, this has been a conversation in the United States for a long time, even policy-wise. The U.S. has flirted for years with actually withdrawing from Iraq, but really never has. The United States has done the same with Syria, for example, saying that they're going to remove troops here and there, but still has an occupation in the eastern part of that country. Do you find that the region itself may eventually be free of the U.S. military presence? Or is this just talk, and Iran should be prepared for a restart of the war if the U.S. stays? These bases now, of course, have taken significant damage. Your thoughts on this?

#Hassan Ahmadian

Yeah, well, I think there are two parts to this to answer your question. The first is related to the results of the war. The war obviously showed that the U.S. military presence in the form of bases is not really an effective rival, does not affect or give the U.S. leverage, actually gives it weight and bogs it down when it comes to receiving attacks. I think that is very clear. If there's a base you cannot use against your foe and it's out of service in a week or 10 days due to heavy bombardment, that doesn't make any military or strategic sense to basically rebuild and keep. And so I think that's part of the discussions in Iran, but I think in the United States as well.

There are 800 military bases around the world that belong to the United States. I think those that are close to U.S. foes, including China, Russia, Iran, and other powers, have lost their strategic sense when it comes to being effective in a military conflict moving forward. And so maybe the United States would reposition its troops out of those bases. You know, the Washington Post reported, based on satellite images, that more than 220 U.S. assets within those bases were demolished, basically, and they are not usable anymore. CNN said 16 bases were attacked. Most of them are out of service. And so that's very clear in what it means militarily.

It doesn't make any sense to keep digging in based on the same logic that those bases were built on. And so we might be moving towards more sort of covert repositioning of U.S. troops in the region. But also, the other part of this story is how the region perceives U.S. presence. Now, GCC countries have been, you know, complaining about Iran attacks, as they put it, on their countries. But they know that the Iranians' main targets were U.S. assets in their countries, with exceptions. The systematic campaign was focused on U.S. bases and assets in those countries. And so the result is that Iranians—what do these bases do in terms of GCC countries' security?

Do they bring security, or do they put their security at stake, placing them in the middle of a conflict that they don't have much to do with? I mean, some of them might, but the majority of them don't. And so this strategic debate within these countries is to push back against U.S. presence. Israeli presence—some of them went to normalization with Israel, thinking that they were adding another layer of defense, in addition to the American one, to their security. But we saw that those countries

with Israeli assets were actually hit more than others. And so their security is further damaged when it comes to shielding these assets against Iranian attacks.

And so these dynamics create much space for debates related to the merits of clinging to U.S. presence and Israeli presence in their countries. I think that's the other side of the story, which is to push against U.S. presence moving forward. Now, of course, Iran's relations with these countries are front and center moving forward. The way these countries deal with Iran, and Iran deals with them, will have a lot of impact on U.S. presence in this region. But I think gone are the days of a very clear and, you know, under-the-sun U.S. presence in bases around the region. That cannot be in the future, because, as I said, it doesn't make any sense.

Now, of course, as you said, the United States might think about attacking Iran once more. I personally don't believe that to be the case, because what more can the United States achieve out of a future war that it couldn't achieve in the previous one? Pretty much nothing. You know, if you are doing the same thing and expecting a different result, that only tells us how wise or unwise you are. It's not about, you know, hoping for a better result moving forward. I mean, any strategist with a sane assessment would tell you, no, the United States logically won't attack Iran anymore. But I mean, logic has its limits in the minds of many. And so we might see that, but I give it really a short percentage of potentiality.

#Danny

Yeah, well, in the United States, the mood definitely is, well, in the past, a lot of times wars could be ignored, at least in the last couple of decades, because it wasn't directly affecting people in the United States, and they would just go about living their lives and focusing on other issues. This war, though, did impact gravely the economic situation, even harsher than prior to the war. And so now, every time the United States attacks, that level of anxiety is going to come back up if it attacks again. People are going to say, oh, here we go again — you know, gas prices, oil prices, threats of recession, all of this. But from the Iranian side, Dr. Ahmadi, I want to get your thoughts on what you are witnessing in terms of the mood now that this war has entered this phase of negotiations and talks around essentially Iranian terms. How have you seen Iranian people react to the current situation?

#Hassan Ahmadian

Well, I think there's hope in this space, very much more than before the war. You know, when the war started, it was the first time that Iran went head to head with a superpower. It tried to evade such a war. Hope was limited. The Iranians, you know, had military means, but you don't know how it will perform when it comes to confronting two powers together — one being a global one and the second being a regional one with nuclear warheads, both of them. And so it was really concerning to the majority of Iranians. That's why you saw the rally around the flag kicking in and bringing many millions of Iranians to the streets to demonstrate and support the resistance of the country against

the United States and the aggressors. But there was, you know, the hope was limited when it comes to the future.

Now, with the performance of Iran in the war and the resulting realities regionally and globally, hope is there once more. And the majority of Iranians are viewing these negotiations through that prism — that Iran, for the first time, is mirroring what President Trump was once very much focused on: peace through strength. They are going into negotiations with strategic assets in their hands, with capabilities that they didn't have when they talked to U.S. administrations before. Now, they discussed for two months through mediators with the United States a first phase, and they got to a first phase, and the only thing they had to give up — and they're not quite giving it up — because as per the memorandum of understanding, the Strait of Hormuz is to be managed.

Still, Iran is to guarantee safe passage, and that the passage is only for commercial ships. And moving forward, it is to implement a protocol with Oman in the Strait of Hormuz for them to make sure that it is not to be used by aggressors against Iran or Oman. Things have changed, but be it as it may, I think the only thing that the Iranians had to trade for all the concessions they got out of the United States was returning the level of shipment in the Strait to where it was before the war. And so that's a big leverage. The second leverage is, of course, Iran's highly enriched uranium. Thirdly, its presence in the region. And more importantly, I think the picture of Iran, the image of Iran — a country that can basically fight back and do well in military means. These are things that the Iranians didn't have.

They had an idea of it, but now they have it as an example — that even if repeated, they would know that their country is capable of shielding itself against the greatest foes and doing well, and then translating those exchanges on the battlefield into diplomatic achievements. That creates hope, and I've seen this hope, I think, in the Iranian streets, among ordinary Iranians, and you see it on social media. And I think it's very much based on how Iran performed in the war and where the negotiations went. You know, the increase in the value of the Iranian currency right after the announcement of the MOU, I think, speaks volumes about what the mood is, because that obviously doesn't have anything to do with markets. It has to do with the psychological effect of the MOU on Iranian markets. And so I think that gives us a good indicator or example of where and how the Iranians are seeing themselves.

#Danny

How about your students? I know that you are a professor as well. Have they given their view to you and to others that you witnessed? Because a lot of the concern, I think, really in any context where there's been sanctions and war on a country like Iran, there's always concern about, generationally, what kind of impact that has over time in society. You mentioned the word hope, and maybe muting hope and diminishing hope, and then potentially leading to conditions which, I think, we saw tried to be sparked — didn't succeed — before the war, in, you know, instituting some kind of color revolution from the outside in. What's your... any thoughts on this? Any? Yeah, please.

#Hassan Ahmadian

Yeah, this semester I wasn't teaching, actually. I was mostly traveling and didn't teach. But generally, you know, before the war, I was teaching in the first semester in the Iranian educational calendar. You know, the mood, as I said, was not that hopeful, and many people were saying that Iran's— I mean, I had a student whom I can't forget his argument— he was saying that, well, Iran's strategic patience has rendered us being attacked by Israel and moving forward. This is before the war, moving forward by the United States. What stops them from attacking us if they don't want us to be here?

And so he had this perception of the country being under imminent threat. And moving forward, we saw that happen. That perception of being under imminent threat, with the biggest foe, that is the United States, was really shadowing the majority of people in the country. But with the war and after the war, you know, a country whose leadership was assassinated in the first hour, being capable of fighting back and achieving strategic points when it comes to its performance in the war, that gave a lot of sense of nationalism. The country being attacked by two foes that wanted to bring down not only the system but weaken Iran.

Obviously, the attacks on civilian infrastructure rallied society to a large extent in the opposite direction from what the Israelis and the Americans wanted. And so, as I said, the rally-around-the-flag effect kicked in quite soon and increased by the day with the ongoing war. Now, after the war, that mood changed. Not only can one defend itself, but it can also push back against the United States and force it to give concessions. You can see how perceptions are changing now. I'm not sure how the students and my students would think about it, but I'm sure this general atmosphere is affecting their mindset as well.

#Danny

In the last 10 minutes or so, what are your thoughts on the precedent of Iran and Oman now? They're meeting to come up with a solid framework for the regulation and maintenance of the Strait of Hormuz. What kind of precedent does this set globally? You know, I think there are smaller examples where certain kinds of territorial waterways or trade routes are regulated, but this one is so significant to the world's economy. I'm curious what kind of precedent you think it sets globally as this war moves further and further into the phase it's in.

#Hassan Ahmadian

I don't think it will set a precedent. I think, you see, if you look at the Strait of Hormuz, it's so narrow. There's no international waterway in between. It's either Iranian territorial waters or Omani territorial waters. So to speak about it as only an international waterway is not quite showing what it really is. It doesn't have any free water in between. There's a borderline between Iran and Oman,

and all the waters are either on the Omani side or on the Iranian side. So that is a bit of a difference when it comes to comparing it to other international waterways. And based on this, the Iranians and the Omanis are talking about how to manage it as territorial waters. Ships cannot go through without crossing through Omani territory or Iranian territory.

And now, with the war being fought, the Iranians are like, why should we allow the United States to bring in military equipment to be most probably used against us moving forward, or other forces for that matter? And so that logic is resonating very deeply within Iranian society, but also many in the region are seeing Iran's logic as well. And moving forward, I think Oman and Iran—Oman is a very close country to the United States—and Oman and Iran, if they get into a deal with the United States, will have a lot of say about how to manage and maintain this waterway. You know, as it is said, lots of things are taken for granted when they are usually there without talks about them.

The Strait of Hormuz was there, secured by Iran's presence around it, with the Iranian Navy patrolling it. But because the Iranians did not want to manage it or did not demand the management and maintenance or any sort of services there or pay for services there, it was taken for granted. This is a waterway, an international waterway, and the Iranians don't have a right to access or want to change it. But now I think the war has changed that perception, not only in Iran but beyond it—that this is being secured by us, this is being maintained by us, and others cannot just take it for granted. They have to move through it in coordination with littoral states, that is, Oman and Iran.

And also, if there are services to be offered, they have to pay for them. They're not talking about tolls, because tolls obviously are against international law in a strait. But, you know, services—there are precedents for them in Denmark, in Australia, in Turkey. And so they're basing their arguments there. And, you know, my international law specialist friends, two of them that I talked to, they're saying that Iran has a very strong case when it comes to its right to manage. And Oman also has that same right. They're basing their legal arguments on the need for a country with territorial waters being used by others to manage and maintain and demand payment for services offered there.

#Danny

And lastly, Dr. Hamadi, you mentioned earlier in the program this major shift that's happening worldwide toward a more multipolar world, as it's been called. Now that this war is where it is, what do you believe is Iran's role in it, now that people are talking about Iran as this fourth global power and, as you said, being in a position that is stronger than prior to the war? How does that affect the multipolar world? What kind of role now will Iran play in it? Will it be an increased role, and of what character? Yeah.

#Hassan Ahmadian

I think it will be increased because, as you see, I mean, two months after the war, the United States didn't find another way but to deal with Iran and try to get into a deal with it. That is the memorandum of understanding. And eventually, if things are to go as expected or as planned, a more comprehensive deal. The Chinese and others have seen Iran fight alone and basically win the war because they stopped the United States and Israel short of achieving any success in this war. That is being viewed globally, but more specifically, we're talking about rising powers, China on top of them.

They have seen this, and they place a great amount of value in countries that are independent, that are not to be directed by U.S. policies and strategies against China. And so if Iran is to secure a deal with the United States that is comprehensive and then have a very close connection with China, it places it in a very unique position. There are countries that are closer to the United States. There are countries that are closer to China. And Iran can play this balancing role. And I think that gives it a great amount of leverage when it comes to its relations. Now, China had concerns before this war as to what extent Iran can withstand a more comprehensive or more forceful war as opposed to the 12-day war.

After this war, their perception has changed. One other concern that they had was to what extent Iran basically can withstand an attempt for regime change. They saw now that the entirety or majority of Iran's ruling elites, including its supreme leader, were assassinated, but the system is still in place. It speaks volumes to the institutionalization of the political system within Iran. And so I think much of the concerns that parties that wanted to work with Iran but had concerns moving forward with regards to Iran itself, those concerns are no longer there. I expect Iran-China relations to grow really, you know, very, very rapidly.

And the fact that the new supreme leader in Iran appointed Mr. Qalibaf, the Speaker of the House, to be Iran's envoy to China and relations with China is also another indicator of the extent to which Iran is thinking about increasing and enhancing its ties with rising powers. Now, of course, they would welcome close ties with the West collectively, I think. That had been the policy after the JCPOA, trumped by Trump himself. But now, again, there's another opportunity. The Iranian strategic community usually pushes toward an international balancing strategy rather than moving toward this or that power.

Because, as you know, when the 1979 revolution happened, it brought down the Shah who was allied with the United States. One main slogan that is still carved on top of the Iranian Foreign Ministry was "Neither East nor West." The Islamic Republic is a country that is independent. And still, the Iranian strategic mindset is focused on that — how can we live in this world having good relations with different countries, but at the same time preserving our independence? The strategic answer to that question has, over the decades, been an international balancing act. And I think that's where the Iranians will be pushing toward. I mean, it depends on how the United States and the West act, and how China and other rising powers act.

#Danny

Yeah. I don't know if you've been to China recently. Uh, when I was there a couple of months ago, I just felt like the mood was really impressed with Iran and, uh, you know, almost like a, like a, like a brother that, uh, you know, won a big battle or won a big, uh, you know, contest or something. It was just like, there was a lot of enthusiasm for what has taken place. And so, uh, yeah, I can definitely see that too. And the Qalibaf point needs to be hit home over and over again — how big it is for someone of such stature to be appointed that job. And he has many jobs, but that job as well. Um, Dr. Khawadi, any final words before we head out of here?

#Hassan Ahmadian

Thank you. Thanks for having me on this podcast.

#Danny

Yeah, it was great. Everyone, thanks so much for tuning in today. Please do hit the like button — that helps boost the show. Thank you all who viewed today. In the video description below, you can find all the places for this channel. I'll be back on tomorrow, 2 p.m. Eastern Time, and I'll let you know who that is. I believe it will be Scott Ritter. So everybody, take care, and thank Dr. Ahmadian by giving a big thumbs up to this show so more people hear about his very wise words. All right, everybody, thank you so much.

#Hassan Ahmadian

Thank you.