

Lt. Col. Anthony Aguilar: U.S. Airstrikes Hit Southern Iran

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#Nima

Hi, everybody. Today is Saturday, June 27, 2026, and our dear friend Lt. Col. Anthony Aguilar is here with us. Welcome back, Tony.

#Guest

Thank you for having me. I appreciate it.

#Nima

Tony, again, we have a new attack on Iran happening, and you are up to date. What is happening, and how do you compare tonight's attack to last night's attack?

#Guest

So looking at last night's attacks by the United States of America on locations in Iran around Sariq Island and basically around the coastal areas of what I would say is the southern portion here. Here's the Gulf of Oman. Here's Sariq. So generally where Sariq is, here's Bandar Abbas. You know, this is the real part of the Strait right here. So this is where the U.S. was operating its distant blockade. And again, we saw a lot of those attacks going into the final attack before this deal broke and this MOU was agreed upon, where the United States focused a lot of its attacks, both naval and aerial, in those same locations. So last night's strikes were back to that. Why Sariq? Well, Sariq has command and control components, headquarters of both the IRGC Navy 2nd Maritime Division and the Iranian Navy Maritime Division. Both of those have responsibility.

They share responsibility for the Strait of Hormuz throughout it on both sides, incoming from the Persian Gulf side and incoming from the Gulf of Oman side. So, command and control. The United States struck command and control. The communications that the United States struck were not necessarily critical to military operations and communication, but they were important. I wouldn't say critical, but important for maritime commercial communication. So think about it: in the military,

military vessels and military units are operating typically on VHF or UHF or satellite communications, SATCOM. Well, in commercial vessels while navigating the strait itself, although they're still probably on SATCOM and GPS, there's direct communication through what you would consider commercial communication—direct, UHF, etc.

So it seems like the communication locations that were hit by the United States didn't really have an impact on military operations or weren't necessarily a hard hit. But the strike once again on the command and control signifies that the United States is once again attempting to shape conditions in the Strait of Hormuz specifically. And then tonight, the U.S. strikes escalated. There were more of them, and they were broader in terms of where they struck. We saw Qeshm Island being struck directly. The areas of Qeshm Island that were struck were the areas where there is command and control, or administrative control, or security control over the airfield that's there. There's an airport there.

So if you're looking at strikes on Qeshm Island, you don't want to destroy the airfield. You don't want to destroy the airport itself or its operations. But you want to set conditions to go and take it. Those strikes look like that. But then we also saw strikes in Bandar Kong, which is on the—if you look at the Strait of Hormuz, here's Qeshm Island. Bandar Kong is right here off on the coast of Iran. And why does that matter? Well, Bandar Kong is an important logistics and operational outpost for the IRGC Navy that specifically operates in that portion of the Persian Gulf.

So we have U.S. strikes that have hit IRGC Navy operations, communications, and command and control on the Gulf of Oman side of the Strait of Hormuz, and now strikes today in Bandar Lengeh and Bandar Kong and Qeshm Island, which greatly impact the IRGC Navy and the IRIN control on the Persian Gulf side. So looking at those strikes, that paints a very clear picture. That paints a picture of operational intent to what the United States strikes are doing and why. I think that we're going back to, you know, what we... It's become very clear to me that what we've been in for the last few weeks is really just the great façade of the Munich Agreement in 1938, where the British and the French negotiated a peace deal, and all the while, peace was being negotiated.

Neville Chamberlain even called it the peace of our time, that it was going to prevent World War II. And the entire time, all Nazi Germany and Hitler were doing was preparing, using that time of peace, that peace interval, to prepare, prepare, prepare, prepare, prepare, and then boom, out of nowhere, Nazi Germany attacks Czechoslovakia, takes all of it, boom. They had no intent to negotiate. So... I think what we're seeing now is, based on the pressure from Israel and from the United States on Donald Trump and the U.S. administration, that the U.S. administration looked at this at one point and said, okay, we're going to give a pretty good show.

We're going to give some really good theater about this whole MOU. Switzerland, the signing, we'll do it all. But we're fully intent on simply using this time to then go back and hit Iran and maybe change the calculus of this MOU. Because from the United States' perspective, you're looking at it and you're saying, we don't like it. How do we change the calculus? We're not worried anymore

about nuclear material, nuclear sites, the regime, the Navy, the Air Force, and all that. We're going to focus specifically on the Strait of Hormuz because we now realize that that is the blue chip, the trump card that Iran has in these negotiations.

And we want to change that calculus. So I think that's what we're seeing the United States doing now. And the pretense to that was the Iranian disabling of a Singaporean ship moving on the Omani side through the Omani channel, against the protocols that have been established by Iran. So I think that was the pretense that the United States used. Now we are back in terms of—we've had strikes, we've had responses, we've had a response, we've had a response, and we've had yet another response now by the United States on top of last night's strikes. So we're... for lack of a better term, we're back at war.

#Nima

What do they want to achieve, Tony? Look at what the United States is doing basically with this tit-for-tat, this sort of escalation. It's going to be huge if Iran decides. Let's see what Iran will do tonight. Last night, as the Associated Press reported, it was a drone attack on Bahrain. And tonight, I think they're going to attack Bahrain, Kuwait, and Jordan if they escalate. I don't know where these fighter jets are coming from. Where do they come from? And where is the location of these fighter jets? Are they coming from Jordan? Are they coming from some other areas? I don't see Kuwait and Bahrain having these fighter jets.

#Guest

So no, the fighter jets aren't necessarily gonna come out of Kuwait or Bahrain. Now, Bahrain has been hit hard. So why did they hit Bahrain again? And what you saw today, which came out in the news but was largely concealed by the United States, was that the U.S. Navy Central Command and the U.S. Navy Fifth Fleet that were headquartered in Bahrain—they're gone. They've left. They're in Israel. The United States never really made that clear. I think Iran knew that. But again, when you look at the components of national power—diplomacy, information, the military, the economy—there are always aspects of diplomacy and information in there to show that the United States lost more than they're telling the American people.

That, look, look, we struck Bahrain, and now your government has come out and said, ah, no big deal, there's nothing there anyway. So the United States Fifth Fleet, U.S. Navy Central Command, the pride of Central Command's Navy fleet, up and left Bahrain. That is a defeat. That is a defeat on the battlefield. And now we see that. So that's a win for Iran. Strikes in Kuwait, Ali Al-Salem, largely missile sites or logistics, not necessarily fighter jets, but potentially a target. So where would these fighter jets or U.S. fighter aircraft emanate from? Well, Saudi Arabia or Jordan. There are airfields in both.

There's the Salty base, Azraq, in Jordan. There's the Prince Sultan Air Base in Saudi Arabia. These are locations where the United States not only has fighter jets, but also fuelers, logistics, munitions, depots to rearm jets—the whole package—at either of these two bases, if not both. So those locations are clearly capable of supporting continued military strikes. So, you know, if Iran is looking at where, that would certainly be on the target deck. Now, the purpose of the strikes by the United States, I think, would be twofold: one, degrade where we already know there is capability to degrade in terms of Iranian capability.

But two, light up the network again. Figure out where Iran has moved things during this interval of peace, this interval of not fighting, because we, the United States, know—or at least should know, I hope the United States should know—that Iran still possesses a very robust and in-depth missile, drone, and hypersonic armament. They have that. We did not degrade it, we did not destroy it. They still have it, probably at the same level, if not more, than they did before February 28th. The question is now, how have they moved it? How have they modified it? How have they made adjustments?

Because if there's anyone that's thinking that Iran, going into this peace interval, was just, "Oh, peace, we can just, you know, take a knee, take a breather, don't have to worry about that," you'd be foolish. They certainly are planning. So I think part of this now is the United States trying to repaint that picture of, "Okay, where are things now?" But then also refining the military objective to where, you know, we were trying to do it all, to where, let's just do this. Let's do this and see if that changes the calculus and the conditions of a new MOU. Can we reshape this MOU? So I don't think the United States wants to get rid of the MOU altogether, but they certainly want to reshape the aspects of paragraph five, which is the Strait of Hormuz.

#Nima

Yeah. And paragraph one, the first clause of the MOU is basically talking about Lebanon. You see what's going on in Lebanon with the new agreement. Well, yeah.

#Guest

When it comes to Clause 1, the United States has once again chosen its mistress, Israel, and basically, we have this other negotiation going on between Marco Rubio and Israel-Lebanon, right? We have this side-quest negotiation going on that's in direct contradiction to the MOU conditions within paragraph or clause one of the MOU. They're in direct contention with one another. That's clear. So that is the great distraction. That is where the United States wants Iran to focus, to either draw Iran into a conflict, either in direct response to Israel or to other sites, other locations, all the while the United States is really focused on—I don't think the United States could care less about Lebanon. I don't.

I'm just being honest. I don't think that Donald Trump cares less about whether Israel stays or goes in Lebanon. I don't think Donald Trump cares. But it is a condition that Iran very much cares about and is not willing to step down from. What can the United States do to potentially change that leverage? Well, it's the Strait of Hormuz. And what better time than now? Well, there's this negotiation going on, this negotiation going on. And at each step of the way, you can paint Iran as the villain, right? You know, this Singapore vessel that was going through the Strait of Hormuz was using the Omani channel, outside of the very clear communication and conditions and parameters that Iran put forth.

Use this part. And some people may say, oh, well, it's international waters, their sovereign territory, they have the right to do it. Well, yes and no. If I'm on the highway, and there are very clear indicators of here's the entrance ramp, here's the exit ramp, and I consider myself, well, it's a road, it's a highway, I have a car, why don't I just go up the exit ramp? Well, you certainly could, but you would be violating laws and putting people in danger, right? So you can't just plow through the Strait of Hormuz. It would be like if somebody just went through the Panama Canal without any clearance or authorization.

Just, oh, here I go. You wouldn't make it very far because there'd be no one there to fill the locks and get you through it. So there's coordination that has to happen. So the Singapore vessel going through the channel outside of that was pre-German coordinated, and Iran gave warning, and then Iran struck with a drone. Iran didn't blow it up. Iran didn't sink it. Iran didn't kill anybody. Iran didn't make a huge explosion or destroy the ship. It disabled it by hitting the engine room. And guess what country has done exactly that at a minimum of eight times, and in doing so has also killed Indian maritime sailors? The United States.

We did it to enforce our distant blockade, which is an act of war, by the way—a blockade. So the United States has been doing that up until this MOU. And it was described by Western media and others as "The United States uses precise restraint in disabling vessel." Okay. But then Iran does it, and Western media immediately blows it up with "Iran attacks vessel, reignites hostility." No, they did exactly what is expected in terms of maintaining the conditions of the Strait of Hormuz. So it's very important that we look at both actions equally. If we're going to call one a heinous attack, well, then the other is a heinous attack.

And the United States sure did a lot worse. If we're going to call it maintaining the conditions of the Strait of Hormuz as dictated by that in power, which is Iran, well, then that's what it was. They didn't destroy it. They didn't sink it. They didn't kill anybody. They disabled it. So the pretense of that for the United States to then go strike a set series of targets—Sariq, up the coast, et cetera—and then come back another night and hit Qeshm, Bandar Kong, Bandar Lengeh, it's clear that the United States already had that planned. That was already a planned and coordinated target deck.

#Nima

No, just let me bring the map here because I want to know what your understanding is of these attacks and the way they're—yeah, here is the map, Tony, and here is Jordan. And from Jordan—let me increase the—here is Jordan. From Jordan going to Iran, let's assume they're taking off from Jordan and they have to go, and they're hitting this part of the Persian Gulf. And they have to fly over Saudi Arabia. There is no way to get there without flying over Saudi Arabia and then the UAE to get there.

#Guest

Of course.

#Nima

Is that the case? Yes.

#Guest

Yes. I mean, yes. Very similar to when Israel struck Qatar during negotiations over Gaza with the negotiating teams from Hamas. And then the United States and Saudi Arabia and others said, oh, we had no idea, we didn't know they were going to do it. And then you simply just roll out a map and you look at it, and it's like, okay, well, you couldn't have gotten from point A to point B without flying over Saudi Arabia, without flying over Jordan, if they emanated from Israel, right? You couldn't have, physically impossible. Now, if you're saying that they penetrated your airspace and you didn't know about it, well, you've got some issues, but we all know that you did know about it.

And then you look at the distance in that and you say, okay, huh, those Israeli fighters, if they flew out of Israel, wouldn't have made that. They wouldn't have been able to make that, the distance of that strike and back, without being refueled. They don't have KC-35 fuelers anywhere in Saudi Arabia. Who did it? And it's like, oh, well, the U.S. finally comes forth with, okay, well, we helped, but we didn't know what they were going to do. We didn't know what they were doing. They didn't tell us what they were going to do. They just told us they needed to be refueled. Really? Like, that's your excuse? So the same thing now, when you look at it, if you're Iran, you're looking at that and you're saying, okay, we just went through a round of this where we, Iran, punished you in complete justification of proportionality and military targeting for supporting the enemy in this war, being, from Iran's perspective, the United States.

And here you are at it again. So it's a testing of the resolve. It's a testing of Iran's willingness to hold firm to this MOU. And we see that throughout history, where agreements and treaties are tested and tested and tested. I mean, the DMZ between North and South Korea, in a war that is still technically on—we've never reached an armistice—it's always just been a ceasefire, where that DMZ is tested all the time in terms of, you know, don't cross it. It's no surprise that the MOU and Iran's conditions will be tested.

What's concerning, or I guess confusing in a way, is why the United States or Israel—in this case, the United States—would think that anybody would believe that the jets that conducted these strikes, because these were air-to-ground strikes. These weren't missiles. These weren't from Navy ships. These were air-to-ground. So is it possible that these aircraft took off from an aircraft carrier in the Indian Ocean and hit that way? Very possible. Is it also possible that these aircraft came from Saudi Arabia or Jordan? And if so, either way, if from Jordan or from Saudi Arabia, you're flying through Saudi airspace, right? So yeah, I think that Iran is not going to let that go without a response.

#Nima

Let me bring up the Indian Ocean basically here. And when you're talking about the Indian Ocean, it's going to be something like here in the Arabian Sea. The Indian Ocean is too long; it's farther away from the Iranian coast than Jordan. So they need some sort of refueling tankers on the way to get to the Iranian coast.

#Guest

Yeah, so we know that where the Strait of Hormuz is, on the southern portion, we've got the Gulf of Oman, and then you have the Arabian Sea, and then you have the Indian Ocean. And we know that those aircraft carriers, those carrier groups that were sent—we know that the Ford went back—but the Lincoln and the Bush, remember we deployed the Bush, are still there. And the Bush and the Lincoln both have the ability to deploy F-35Cs and F-18 Super Hornets. So depending on which aircraft, whether it was F-35s or F-18s—if they were F-35Bs, then they didn't come off an aircraft carrier; if they were F-35Cs or F-18 Super Hornets, then they very well did come off an aircraft carrier. But to your point, they would still need refueling in terms of that distance, if not maybe one way, but at least to make it back.

You couldn't make that full round trip. But could you have aerial refuelers loitering in between that route? Absolutely. Is it more likely that the aircraft that conducted these strikes came from either Saudi Arabia or Jordan? Most likely, which would need refueling capability. So if you came from Jordan, those refuelers would have left from Saudi. If you're in Jordan and you're flying out, well, then you're flying over Saudi airspace. If you launched from Saudi Arabia, you would, before, on your way back, need refueling. So you would probably deploy refuelers from Saudi Arabia somewhere over the peninsula to then refuel coming back in. But again, you're obviously utilizing Saudi Arabian airspace and territory and their permission.

So we're seeing that there are some Gulf nations that I think at this point are like, no, we're not doing this anymore. We're not playing anymore. We're out. We don't want to do it anymore. But then the United States is really sticking it to Saudi Arabia and Jordan vis-à-vis Israel and saying, well, you're with us or you're not. And if you're not with us, then you're not going to get any of this stuff. Simply put, Jordan and Saudi Arabia haven't learned the lesson that other Gulf nations have,

and that the United States cannot be trusted. When Israel is involved in any type of side-picking negotiation or who to go with in terms of even over U.S. interests, the United States cannot be trusted to not put Israel first. And if any of these nations in the region haven't seen that by now and it's not vividly clear, well, then they do so at their own demise.

#Nima

Isn't that amazing that we've heard nothing from the government in Jordan so far? I have heard nothing. Nothing. And that the United States is basically using Jordan as an airbase, and the government doesn't have any sort of political leverage in the region.

#Guest

The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan has become a U.S. colonial airbase. For lack of better terms, I mean, the U.S. has no respect for the Jordanian government or its sovereignty and is willing to put them right in the middle of things.

#Nima

Tony, what are the capabilities of the Jordanian government? Let's assume Israel decides to invade Jordan. Do they have the military power to stand against Israel, to resist against Israel?

#Guest

Capability, yes. Political will, no. They won't because of how ugly it would get. Now, that also depends on when you look at how Israel is spread pretty thin with operations in Lebanon, operations in Gaza, military units deployed still, and what's going on in the West Bank. Israel would have to make some operational changes if that were to happen. It would be, you know, it wouldn't be an easy win for Israel. But as we've seen in other, you know, for example, in Lebanon, it's primarily because the Lebanese Armed Forces and the Lebanese government just don't have the will or the desire to enforce their sovereignty against Israel.

So I think the same in Jordan. Are there capabilities? Yes. But a lot of that capability is hamstrung by the United States. And again, it should be a clear lesson to Jordan that all that capability they have from the United States—weapons and jets, et cetera—would require U.S. maintenance or U.S. support. Well, who do you think the United States is going to side with? Israel, every time. So if Jordan thinks anything other than that reality, they would be going into an ignorant position and likely lose if they thought they were going to do so with U.S. support. So they'd be going at it alone and likely wouldn't win.

#Nima

Here is what Donald Trump tweeted this morning: "Moments ago, United States aircraft just struck Iranian missile and drone storage locations and coastal radar sites for violating the ceasefire agreement. Again, it's very possible that they will never learn. There may come a point when we are no longer able to be reasonable and will be forced to militarily complete the job that we very successfully started. If that happens, the Islamic Republic of Iran will no longer exist." Yeah, the guy is just going, yeah.

#Guest

So, I mean, right there, he, as the President of the United States, in basically a tweet-shout statement about violating the ceasefire, just violated the ceasefire.

#Nima

Yeah, basically threatening Iran, to wipe Iran off the face of the earth. You know, basically, that's the meaning of that.

#Guest

These latest developments in what we're seeing now with these strikes and the continuation of strikes, and the United States trying to find loopholes for Israel to remain in Lebanon in direct violation of the agreement that the United States is also pursuing with Iran, it's very clear the United States cannot be trusted. The United States of America cannot be trusted in negotiations and diplomacy when Israel's interests are on the table and part of the deal. Like I said, the United States would put Israel's interests above that of its own.

It is in America's interests to pursue this MOU, to end this conflict, and pursue normalized relations with Iran and in the region. But once again, the United States is making it very clear that we choose to continue to back Israel's ambitions, even to the point of restarting a war with Iran, because the United States of America isn't willing to hold Israel accountable for withdrawing from and leaving Lebanon. So, the United States has once again shown the world and shown this region that the United States cannot be trusted when you leave its favorite drug on the table, and that's Israel.

#Nima

In reaction to the agreement, Tony, between the government in Lebanon and the Israelis, today we had a statement from the Hezbollah Secretary General, named Qasem. He said that the agreement reached in Washington is a humiliating, disgraceful, and illegitimate agreement. Instead, the provisions of the Iran-U.S. understanding regarding a ceasefire in Lebanon should be implemented. They said that they're trying to put pressure internationally and on Arab states to somehow consider the first clause of the agreement between Iran and the United States. This is their position. And what we've seen from Netanyahu today, he was just pointing out—he brought up a map which

shows the yellow line. And here you see the yellow line on the map, and you see those red lines on the map, which show that Israel is going to withdraw from those red lines.

#Guest

Yeah, so this is so critical right now. Thank you for showing this map. For everybody watching, that black line is the Lebanon-Israel border. That yellow line is where Israeli forces currently occupy within the sovereign territory of Lebanon. And those red areas are where they currently occupy further beyond the yellow line. So what the United States is brokering is a negotiation between Israel and Lebanon, that Israeli forces would move back to that yellow line. That looks like respecting the territorial integrity and the sovereignty of Lebanon. That is a lot of area.

#Nima

Basically, they're legitimizing the occupation of Lebanon because they say, disarmament of Hezbollah, then we're going to leave Lebanon. So that's not going to happen. Hezbollah is part of Lebanese society. How are you going to disarm Hezbollah?

#Guest

Well, who's going to disarm Hezbollah? The Lebanese Armed Forces? Laughable, no. Who's going to disarm Hezbollah? Hezbollah should not be disarmed. But even if this normalization of occupation is what the United States is really in support of when it comes, again, to Israel—who controls the United States—what is the mechanism to then disarm Hezbollah? Send in the Iranian, or send in the Israeli army in full? They'd get their ass kicked. Send in American forces? That's just going to get real ugly. According to Donald Trump, Jelani has just gotten comfortable in his suits. He just learned how to wear a suit and tie his own tie, and he's finally getting comfortable in a suit.

And Donald Trump wants him to throw on the old combat jersey and go back into war on behalf of the United States and Israel in Lebanon against Hezbollah, which would be a complete disaster. So every option is just a horrible option. And what that clearly is looking at is that you've got Marco Rubio doing this side quest negotiation to normalize the occupation of Lebanon by Israeli forces, while you have J.D. Vance supposedly negotiating this MOU between the United States of America and Iran, which dictates that all forces must leave Lebanon—at least in theory, at least in an agreed-upon understanding of the MOU, the understanding of the memorandum of understanding.

So both of those cannot be reality. You can't have both. You can't have a reality where the MOU is met and where this new Lebanon-Israel agreement is met. Both cannot exist together. So one will have to be enforced and take precedence over the other. And it very much looks like the United States is once again choosing Israel over even its own interests in seeing this MOU through. We're

seeing that very clearly. And furthermore, what we will see is because that clause of the 14-point MOU has not been met and can't be met, obviously, and won't be met by the United States, it's going to draw us back into kinetic conflict.

#Nima

Yeah, yeah, and Israel would be more than happy to have that back again.

#Guest

Oh, yes. They deeply desire that. War, chaos, violence, confusion is what Israel thrives upon, like an infection, like a parasite. And Lebanon is just simply their latest. And, oh, by the way, Israel has also announced that they'll be moving now to take over 100% of the Gaza Strip. So much for that ceasefire.

#Nima

I think I said that today again. We had that from the Israeli Minister of Energy saying that 100% of Gaza is going to be under occupation. And Lebanon is the same way. They're legitimizing the occupation of Lebanon by this agreement. I really believe that this government is not going to last long. The people in Lebanon are going to bring down the government. I agree. Because this is disastrous. Legitimizing an agreement accepting the occupation of your territory is unbelievable.

#Guest

The Lebanese government has shown its true face: it is simply a colonial puppet of the United States vis-à-vis Israeli influence. And Hezbollah is not going to put up with it. And the people of Lebanon should not put up with it. Because if anybody thinks that once you let Israel in the door and they stake their claim that they will ever leave, there's thousands of years of history to dictate otherwise.

#Nima

They are Mahmoud Abbas PLO 2.0 in Lebanon. And they're going to do the same if they continue with it. The people in Lebanon are going to do something about it, because if not, they're going to sell the whole Lebanese territory. They're going to lose it.

#Guest

Just think about that map that you showed. I don't think a lot of people truly understand the magnitude of how much terrain Israel occupies within Lebanon. Again, that black line is the border between Israel and Lebanon. That yellow line is where Israeli forces have pushed into the sovereign territory of Lebanon. So essentially, everything between that yellow and black line—that's Lebanon—

Israel occupies, and in those red pockets. So right now, this negotiation for withdrawal is only from those two little red pockets back down to that yellow portion. And Marco Rubio and the Lebanese government are celebrating that with a big old signing party, saying, "Oh yes, peace in our time." What? That is a betrayal to the people of Lebanon.

#Nima

And they were staying in that yellow line, under the yellow line, and nobody would attack them. This is the problem. That's right. They're basically making it theirs. Exactly. And the occupation, without any sort of attack on them—then so what else do they want? That's why Benjamin Netanyahu is celebrating that. That's why you see Israel Katz, the defense minister of Israel, celebrating what's going on.

#Guest

It is an absolute handover win to Israel. It is giving them exactly what they want. And in doing that, now that we see the second- and third-order effects of this intricately intertwined deal of deals, the signing of that agreement entirely undermined and violated the U.S.-Iran MOU. So now, with this series of strikes and the signing of that all going into this weekend, come Monday or Tuesday, what, what, do the Iranian and U.S. negotiators just come back to the table in Switzerland, you know, over coffee and a continental breakfast, and say, okay, let's start negotiations again? No, this is going to completely undermine it.

#Nima

No, there would be no third round of negotiations, because nothing has happened so far. All the clauses of the—I would say the first one and the fifth, as you've mentioned, with the case of the Strait of Hormuz—both of them, which are so important for the Iranian side, for Lebanon, they violated each and every word in those clauses. Yes, let's see what would happen. And thank you, Tony, for being with us today.

#Guest

Thank you, I appreciate you having me on during this breaking news as things are developing, and I encourage everyone to please continue to pay attention to the facts as they are on the ground. You know, that map that Nima shared shows you the clear scale of this occupation of Lebanon. This is not just Israeli forces along the border; this is Israeli forces occupying a great deal of sovereign territory. And the Lebanese government just agreed to it.

#Nima

Yeah, exactly. Exactly. That's why Hezbollah is not going to accept that. They're going to attack over and over. That's why I think they're waiting to see what the move would be on the part of the Iranians and the United States, then decide whether to attack or not to attack. Let's see what happens. The calculation on the part of Hezbollah is so important right now.

#Guest

Hezbollah would have every justification and right to attack along that entire line to push Israel out of Lebanon. Two hundred thousand people were displaced from those areas. That's right, a lot. Yeah, that's the other thing to remember— in that area between the black and yellow line, that whole area is now occupied by Israeli forces. Everybody in there has been displaced, and everything within it has been destroyed. That's like a Gaza times five. Yeah, yeah, exactly.

#Nima

Thank you, Tony.

#Guest

Thank you. Talk to you soon.