

Trump's Deal BLOWS UP – Iran HITS US Bases & Hormuz HARDER | Ehsan Safarnejad

Ehsan Safarnejad discusses his reactions to the news that Trump has begged Iran for a meeting in Doha currently being spun as Iranian capitulation despite repeated warnings from Iran that Strait of Hormuz and US bases are not safe so long as the MoU agreement is being violated. Subscribe to Eshan: https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCn-_UlidwJz0jTP1opyZbmw https://x.com/Safarnejad_IR?ref_src=twsrc%5Egoogle%7Ctwcamp%5Eserp%7Ctwgr%5Eauthor LIKE the video and Subscribe for more in-depth geopolitical analysis Leave your thoughts in the comments below! Support the Channel: Patreon: <https://www.patreon.com/dannyhaiphong> SUBSCRIBE ON RUMBLE: Rumble: <https://rumble.com/c/DannyHaiphong> Follow Me on Social Media: Twitter: <https://twitter.com/DannyHaiphong> Telegram: <https://t.me/DannyHaiphong> Support the channel in other ways: <https://www.buymeacoffee.com/dannyhaiphong> Substack: chroniclesofhaiphong.substack.com Cashapp: \$Dhaiphong Venmo: @dannyH2020 Paypal: <https://paypal.me/spiritho> #iran #trump #iranwar

#Danny

Welcome back to the show. As you can see, I'm joined by a new guest, Ahsan Safanijad. Before we get to the conversation, the latest news. So Donald Trump appears to be blowing up his own deal. The United States, Donald Trump has announced that there is going to be a meeting, supposedly tomorrow in Doha, that there's going to be a meeting on technical talks. Now, Iran has rejected this claim, and they do so on the basis that the United States has committed vast acts of aggression on Iran.

Tasnim News reports that they reject this claim by Axios that there's going to be technical talks tomorrow, saying there has been no agreed-upon date whatsoever for the continuation of these talks. Now, this comes as Iran had responded harshly to multiple U.S. strikes on it over the weekend and has sent a very strong warning to the United States, saying—and this is part of the news from the pro-Israeli Iran International—that U.S. bases will experience hell in the future and into the next phase of this war if the United States continues violating ceasefire arrangements. So, Ahsan, welcome to the show. How are you doing? Thanks for joining me today.

#Ehsan Safarnejad

It's great to be on your show, and thanks for inviting me to have a conversation with you.

#Danny

Of course. Well, your thoughts on the latest developments. What is going on here? Of course, we have market manipulation at play. The United States seems to, over the weekend as the markets closed, have struck Iran twice, saying they hit telecommunications, air defenses, everything along the Strait of Hormuz coastline. Now, Iran has responded and is not engaging in talks at this moment. But your reaction to these developments—Trump is saying something completely different.

#Ehsan Safarnejad

Okay, so it's not the first time that this has happened, obviously. You know, all throughout the war, we have seen the same pattern unfolding itself. But what I do lament is that the statement by the Iranian side can't be fully trusted either, unfortunately. I'm very pro-Iran. I'm pro-axis of resistance. What we have seen when, for example, the media advisor of the Iranian negotiating team would say, "No negotiation for now," and that "for now" lasts for like two hours, right? So I don't know whether this meeting is going to take place or not. I'm just like everyone else. I don't have any information sensitive to that matter to share with your audience, unfortunately. I have certain things about the military.

I'm privy to certain information about the military itself, but not with the military with regard to the negotiation itself. But when it comes to the market manipulation, just one quick thing before we get into the broader conversation is that you mentioned the market manipulation and how the time in which these strikes are taking place or carried out is very specific. After the market closes, they carry out strikes. Before the market opens, they talk about the negotiation. All this is relatively unimportant. I do not want to diminish the egregious violation of the ceasefire by the United States. But the way that I see it is that I judge how the market should react and plan for the future based on the number of vessels and the number of oil tankers that cross the Strait of Hormuz.

Based on what I know, despite the fact that I'm critical of the Iranian government for restricting the ability of the Iranian armed forces in carrying out the kind of strikes that I do know the IRGC Aerospace Force, for example, wants to carry out, or like the strikes that I myself want to see, particularly when it comes to the UAE and Qatar and how they have been sort of, in a way, exempted from the Iranian retaliations, which is so sad. But the way that I see it is that we have to look at the number of vessels that cross through the Strait of Hormuz, and I think two days ago—it's now the 29th of June, if I remember correctly, I'm sorry, we have a different calendar—so it was June 27th that, like, during the 24 hours, only 40 vessels crossed the Strait of Hormuz.

Now, about 70% of them chose the southern corridor, the southern route. You have three routes in the Strait of Hormuz: the northern route, the southern route, and the TSS route—I've forgotten what it stands for, but it's the middle route, right? The separation traffic or something it's called. So that middle route is blocked, right? No vessel can sail through that route. The northern route is controlled by Iran. The southern route is controlled by Oman. And unfortunately, 27 vessels out of the 40

vessels crossed through the southern route now. It would be okay if it was Oman doing it, but unfortunately, they crossed with the guidance of the American Navy, right? That's the issue here.

So while I do not like this dynamic at play here, I do understand that establishing control over the Strait of Hormuz during peacetime is important—infinately more difficult than doing it in the middle of a war. During a war, you just say that it's a war zone and you do whatever you have to do. During a time of peace, it takes much more nuance; it requires subtle actions and subtle measures to be taken. But 40 is still nowhere comparable to the number that we were seeing before the start of the war, which was 139, if I remember correctly. On average, every day, 139 vessels would cross the strait. And, you know, in order for the United States to replenish its strategic oil reserves, or other countries doing the same thing, this number is nowhere near enough. The control over the Strait of Hormuz is still in Iran's hands. I think that it needs to be more assertive. But yeah, so far, so good.

#Danny

Yeah, well, Abbas Araghchi made that statement today that indeed Iran is going to control the Strait of Hormuz throughout the MOU process. And that therefore there will be consequences if that is breached by the United States. Now, maybe we can get into the military part of this, Assam, because what Donald Trump is saying is the administration—shocker here—is he's saying that Iran has come to the United States and said, no, no, no, let's halt all strikes and let's talk after the United States struck. So, of course, giving the United States the upper hand.

Well, Iran has said that they've done quite extensive damage to U.S. bases in Kuwait and Bahrain over the weekend in retaliation for these strikes. What is the truth here? Do you have any knowledge about it? Because it's really hard right now to gauge what is happening when these developments occur, since the United States and the Gulf countries are not showing any, of course, information about the extent of these strikes by Iran. And I'm guessing that Iran doesn't necessarily have the capabilities to satellite those either at the moment. So what are your thoughts on this? Do you have any information?

#Ehsan Safarnejad

Okay, first of all, a quick disclaimer here. During the war, obviously, you have the famous phrase "fog of war." Carrying out a battle damage assessment is very difficult, right? But the way that I see it is that, for example, the United States attacked a radio tower in Iran. They have been attacking that radio tower time and time and time again. At this point, I'm wondering what they are exactly bombing and how that tower is still standing. Genuinely speaking, if anyone has an answer to that question, please notify me, hit me up on X. I'm very interested to know the logic and what's happening here. They have hit certain drone storage units. Production of drones for Iran is very quick and easy, right? So that's not really of too much value.

I'm referring to CENTCOM, by the way. CENTCOM has stated that they also targeted a project mine-producing or some facility that has something to do with mines, either producing them or storing them. That is also not really that important because of the rate of production in Iran. So they didn't really hit anything strategic when it comes to Iran. Obviously, I'm not trying to diminish the fact that, again, they have violated the MOU, they have violated Article 1 of the Memorandum of Understanding. So, yeah, while that is the case, they show their true colors, and they have proven for the bajillionth time that no agreement with the United States is worth the paper that it is written on. While that is the case, yeah, it's manageable.

In response, Iran has targeted the Fifth Fleet in Bahrain. Actually, the Fifth Fleet is located there, the previous headquarters of the Fifth Fleet. They are still targeting that. I'm referring to the IRGC naval force, and they have attacked a radar station at a Kuwaiti air base. I do value the radar stations of the United States more so than the Iranian drones. That's how I evaluate things. Tit for tat, I'm not particularly happy about this, despite the fact that I do acknowledge that probably the damage that Iran did was greater than that of the United States. But what I really think is a mistake, that it's a wrong tactic, is that the UAE is now excluded from the Iranian retaliatory strikes, while we know that the UAE actually bombed Iran using drones and fighter jets — whether Mirage fighter jets or F-16 fighter jets. So I do not like this dynamic.

#Danny

Well, that's an interesting point. Maybe you can talk about what you believe are the factors that have influenced this, because I've noticed this too — that Iran's target bank appears to be very much centered on Kuwait and Bahrain, while the UAE and Iran have reestablished, I believe, economic ties. I believe that now flights from Iran to the UAE are back on. I mean, of course, the UAE is a country that's just across the water and very close. But at the same time, it was, as you said, the biggest party to the war outside of Israel and was collaborating with Israel, actually, in those operations that you mentioned there. So what are the calculations here, do you believe, as to why Iran has focused its target bank away from the UAE?

#Ehsan Safarnejad

Look, there are two ways to look at this, right? One is through a very cynical lens, and the other one would be a more optimistic one. If I were in charge of decision-making, I can envision that you could leave the UAE, you know, unscathed for a time so that when you start attacking there, you would be able to hit things like the business ventures that, for example, Elon Musk has there. Right. So you do not want to actually hit these big sort of—they're called private companies, but they're actually military contractors, like Microsoft, Amazon, Elon Musk's ventures.

These are military contractors, right? So I can envision that maybe it makes sense to a certain extent for them to not do that. But what truly terrifies me is that there is a—and it's really difficult

for me to talk about this—but it's about the economy, and it's about corruption, and it's about the elites who have vested interests and ventures in the UAE. Unfortunately, I think that's the case. When the Iranian president came on TV and said, "Oh, we're really sorry that we are attacking the Arab Zionist countries in the Persian Gulf," he sort of apologized for it, albeit implicitly.

Like when he said that, which was completely untrue because Iran was attacking American bases within those countries, which are not considered to be, you know, their soil—it's American soil, right? Which is a party to the conflict. But this complaint sort of dialed down when the IRGC generals, the decision-makers, stopped carrying out more comprehensive attacks against the UAE. So it sort of makes you wonder, is it some financial ties that the donors of the president have, which would then sort of disincentivize them to carry out attacks against the UAE? That has always been the case. If you remember the riots in late December of 2025, early January of 2026.

#Ehsan Safarnejad

You know, the problem started in the Iranian bazaar, and the result was currency manipulation. Well, what people leave behind is that Iran, at that time, was relying on these trustees in the UAE to send it the dollars that they had procured by, you know, managing basically the entities, the properties that they had been entrusted with, right? And unfortunately, these people intentionally didn't do so. So that's why in Iran some people sort of use the term—they do not mean it literally, as in that the politicians have done this—but you have the big money inside Iran that has a vested interest in the UAE. And unfortunately, they did bad things. And again, it makes you wonder if this is the repetition of that episode.

#Danny

Yeah, well, these are all good questions. Now, another aspect of this I wanted to touch on is that there are more and more criticisms now coming against Iran due to its participation in the MOU process. And I wanted your thoughts about that. In particular, Israel still continues to hit southern Lebanon. They have just signed this deal with the United States and the Lebanese so-called government, essentially bringing Lebanon into absolute disarray. And of course, there are other developments happening, like with Iraq, etc. And of course, the big question, Palestine, on everyone's minds. What is your view on, you know, Iran participating in this process and the criticism it has gotten that now, because of this, it has not been doing enough for the resistance—that some have even said it's prioritizing its own self-interest above the resistance. How do you react to that?

#Ehsan Safarnejad

You know, it reminds me of a protest that I was leading when I was young. I mean, younger than now. I mean, I'm not really an adult, but I was leading this protest. And I didn't really choose to become the person who leads the movement and stuff. But at a certain point, when I was trying to

broker a deal, the problem became that other people got involved and the movement was derailed, right? And I had to backtrack and just leave the movement that I sort of started myself, right? I criticize the MOU a lot. I have a lot of points against the MOU. But unfortunately, you have these people who do not understand that thing, and they actually look at what you have written on your X.

And then you use your own words, but without understanding the weight behind them. And they sort of twist it in a way that someone like me, who is against the MOU, would find himself in an uncomfortable situation, having to go on different shows rather than advocating for his own opinion. They then say, "Look, guys, actually, it's not the way that you are saying it. It's not actually as bad as you are talking about." The first point—I wrote an assessment about the MOU, and I went through each article and the flaws that they had, right? And I did this before I knew the opinion of the Iranian leader. Later on, it turned out that the Iranian leader was also against it. So I didn't know that I actually had the same opinion as the Iranian leader.

And back at that time, it took a lot of guts because the Reformist Party was trying to portray this as something that was sanctioned by the Iranian leader. Right. So it took courage for me to write that. Right. But now you see people blowing things out of proportion. One thing that I see very clearly in the criticisms of Iran accepting the MOU is the focus on what Iran has gained and the damages that have been dealt to the United States, albeit in a very crooked, very twisted manner, and not understanding what kind of damage has been dealt to Iran. I'll give you a quick stat, for example: 7,000 megawatts of electricity have been destroyed in U.S.-Israeli attacks against Iranian power plants—not nuclear power plants. Now, like today, a piece of news was published on BBC. It said 1,300 people have been killed.

#Ehsan Safarnejad

They have died as a result of heat exhaustion because the temperature in the European countries went up, and like Germany apparently had a record high of 41 degrees Celsius. Do you know what the temperature in Iran gets up to? It gets up to 58 degrees Celsius. So for those who are living in the United States, that's like 138 Fahrenheit, right? You will die without AC in this heat. And then you have these people who do not understand what Iranians are going through, and they say, why don't you continue fighting? I mean, yeah, I mean, who cares about the fact that we had blackouts during the previous summer?

So we already had a deficit between our consumption and production. Seven thousand megawatts of electricity have been added to that deficit, right? And you have yourself in a situation where it's not really wise for Iran to continue risking, you know, basically the lives of its civilians because of heat exhaustion, right? If 1,300 people have died in Europe, how many would die in the heat of Iran? And it's not just that. They say, why don't you continue with your closure of the Strait of Hormuz? I don't know if you've checked this or not, but it's during the summer. We are currently in summer, which means that the demand for gas is not at its peak.

Why would Iran continue closing the Strait of Hormuz and using this leverage that it has? Because I wholeheartedly believe that if you use a tool too many times, it becomes dull. Right. So you have to use your levers in a smart way, in an intelligent way. Why would you do it during the heat of summer rather than doing it when it hurts the most, which is during the fall, during the winter? Obviously, you also have 25% of Iranian gas production being destroyed in U.S.-Israeli attacks. So we also have to take into consideration that Iran also needed a deal. Iran was unable to export oil because of the U.S. naval blockade.

But people brush it off and they say, well, you have shadow fleets. A person who responds to me by bringing up the shadow fleet has just shown how clueless he is about the shadow fleet, and he's just talking, he's using a term that he has heard. Because if the shadow fleets come to the Iranian ports, they're not really shadowy anymore, they're not really invisible to the United States anymore. They will be sanctioned. Do you even think before talking? But there are many people who have this very great confidence, and they say everything very definitively, which unfortunately poisons the discussion. And again, making a full circle here, I have to come here and defend a policy that I myself am critical of.

#Danny

Yeah, I think those are important points. I mean, on the one hand, of course, for Iran and for the world, making the decision to engage in talks with the United States is no small decision. And it's one that there are probably many points for why one might disagree with that. But on the other hand, the idea—and I've been trying to say this in my programs—that to also act like oil sanctions, the relief of oil sanctions, the end of the naval blockade, even the frozen assets issues, to act like that's also not a big deal for Iran would be to maybe just discount the fact that Iranians are also in this too. If you're going to be resisting U.S. and Israeli aggression and be part of the axis of resistance, then things continuously getting worse and worse and worse, and life getting harder and harder and harder, that's not something that any government that is worth its salt would be wise to dismiss. And so the situation is far more complex, I believe, than just Iran negating its principles.

#Ehsan Safarnejad

Can I just quickly interject because I forgot to address one thing that you mentioned? Look, this is a tactical retreat. This is not a strategic retreat. Iran is still pursuing the same thing. The members of the Supreme National Security Council have given the Iranian leader guarantees that they are going to achieve the same goals, the same set of goals that he has determined for them. Rather than through war, they're going to choose the route of negotiation, and it's difficult, and I don't think that it's going to go anywhere. But I do believe if you have the right mentality—I'm referring to the Iranian government officials, which I do think they don't have that kind of mentality—but if you have that kind of mentality that we need breathing room, we need to get those frozen assets, \$12 billion is no small amount of money for Iran.

The budget of Iran is actually something between 41 to 50-something billion dollars. I'm talking about the general budget. We have something that is the total budget, but 60% of it goes to certain firms. It's very complicated, but I'm talking about the budget that goes to the Iranian government directly—something around 41 to 50-something billion dollars, right? So who can come here and tell me that \$12 billion is a small amount of money, that Iran—that wouldn't make a change in the Iranian military apparatus, in the Iranian military economy, in order to sort of rebuild the infrastructure that has been damaged during the war? So if you have the right mentality that this is not something that would last, and just let's use it to rearm ourselves, to mobilize, and to prepare for the next round of war, it actually can make sense.

#Danny

Well, you said that you don't necessarily believe that the Iranian leadership is thinking in this way, but you do believe, though, that there are Iranian leaders, militarily and otherwise, that do think this way. So it sounds like there is maybe an active debate, which can be healthy for a government. It can be healthy to have active debate and to have disagreements based on varying interpretations of what's in the best interests of Iran and, you know, other big issues. But your thoughts on this, on the idea that, you know, Iran is sitting on—it seems like a precipice of its own. You know, a lot of people are making a lot of Iran's rising power and status and stature. But at the same time, it still has to deal with a lot of big issues that all exist at the same time. So do you believe that Iran has the capabilities then to steer this ship in that direction that it sounds like you would want it to go in, which is to use this to buy time rather than to maybe take ever-growing concessions?

#Ehsan Safarnejad

Look, one of the things that—again—first of all, I'd like to acknowledge something that you said. Yes, inside the Iranian political apparatus, there is a division. I mean, that division is not when it comes to the overall goals, but with regard to the tactics that we should use. And you're absolutely right. In the military decision-making apparatus, the military brass, they do firmly believe that this won't really go anywhere. And they are sort of rearming themselves at light speed, basically, right? But the Iranian diplomats are more optimistic when it comes to, you know, pursuing a deal with the United States. So let's go back to what you were talking about and Iran rising.

As you mentioned, we're in a very tricky situation. We will either make it and become the fourth superpower in the world, or Iran will be balkanized. At this point, there is no third route. It's very difficult to imagine that Israel, under Benjamin Netanyahu's leadership, will make any change. And anyone who is even a contender to become the next prime minister of Israel likes to make himself even more hawkish toward Iran than Benjamin Netanyahu. Yair Lapid, Naftali Bennett—all of them have criticized Netanyahu when it comes to Iran, not when it comes to, yeah, let's dial the crazy down—no. They actually want to crank it up to 11, right? So that's the mentality inside Israel.

And obviously, we know that, for example, the chief of staff of Colin Powell, Colonel Lawrence Wilkerson, once famously said—quoting Colin Powell—that the foreign policy of Washington is dictated and decided on in Tel Aviv, right? Those are his words as the Secretary of State of the United States. So it's very difficult for me to see any third option for Iran. But so far, the decisions that Iran has made show that it's ready to take risks. Let me mention something, and in addressing your question, also sort of debunk a sort of rumor or propaganda that is disseminated about Iran. Some people talk about the Iranian leader not being seen and how it's a ceremonial position at this point, that he has lost control. Well, the Iranian leader said that for the MOU to go through and to pass, 75% or more have to vote for it, in favor of it.

Otherwise, he will take the country back to the sort of war, right? Just imagine that. He's not happy with 50% plus. He says 75%. So he's already ready to take that step of vetoing the opinion of a big portion. Like, we're not even talking about a supermajority in the sense of the United States Congress, which is like 60-something percent. No, 75%, right? And this is a very positive sign to someone like me. It shows that the Iranian leader is sending the signal that we are in an extraordinary situation, right? And he is willing to make the necessary decisions. So, worst comes to worst, we know that the Iranian leader is ready to push back against certain visions that the reformist party has, because many people are raising the point that, oh, the reformist this, the reformist that.

And I need to also remind them that the IRGC chief, for example, General Ahmad Vahidi, who was literally the first commander of the Quds Force, which is basically the IRGC unit in charge of the axis of resistance—I mean, that's the division that is responsible for that—he also voted in favor of the MOU, right? So things are more complicated. But so far, we know that they have decided to approach the situation in the right way. The determination about the control of the strait is also another huge point. In order for Iran to throw its weight, globally speaking, on the international stage, it requires having leverage that would be important and something worthy. And the strait is that thing. The Strait of Hormuz is that thing.

And obviously, I need to just wrap this part up with this point. If Iranian military exports increase to 300% following the news of Iran supplying Russia with its drones, can you imagine the kind of purchasing requests that Iran would receive after the news of shooting down an F-35, an F-18, or an F-15? So I think that there are two things that will happen when it comes to Iran. One, Iran will play a very important role by sort of subsidizing the U.S. currency, the dollar, you know, through the enforcement of the adoption of the Iranian rial for settlement as the payment for crossing the Strait of Hormuz, the administrative fees, and the fact that Iran will earn revenue in a more considerable way by exporting its military hardware.

#Danny

On that note then, Hassan, I wanted to ask you about the Strait of Hormuz. Obviously, you just outlined not only how it's important, but also all these other factors for Iran as it navigates this particular phase of the war. But with the Strait of Hormuz, I'm curious about the situation with Oman, because there's a lot of, I think, misconceptions and perhaps misunderstandings now being spread about how this is actually going to be controlled, because it seems like the United States is trying to open up a corridor with Oman, yet Oman and Iran are negotiating for the joint management of the strait. What do you make of this? How does Iran navigate this dynamic? Is there danger that lies ahead in Iran's capacity to regulate the Strait of Hormuz and control it if Oman is cooperating with, of course, the aggressor party, which is the United States? What are your thoughts on this?

#Ehsan Safarnejad

Yeah, very good question. First of all, I need to address the elephant in the room. And every time I have to do this, it genuinely breaks my heart. Because in Iran, we genuinely consider Oman a friendly country. You know, when the late king of Oman passed away, there was a huge reaction — many people were affected by that news inside Iran, right? We consider Sultan Qaboos a very honorable man, right? So considering how we view Oman inside Iran, what I'm about to say isn't really pleasing for me, at least, right? But the fact that the IRGC carried out a drone attack against a vessel that was violating maritime navigation and trying to use the southern corridor, which hugs the Omani territorial waters, clearly shows us that this sort of Iranian-Omani collaboration and cooperation isn't working as rock solid as people want to frame it, right?

So let's address that elephant in the room. And by the way, I think people shouldn't be tough or harsh on Oman. Just imagine being a policymaker in Oman and then having to basically navigate between these two countries that are in conflict with one another, right? So give them some slack. But the decision-makers in Oman, they haven't made up their mind. This is the truth, right? And the involvement of the American aggressors, the American military, in the southern corridor is very obvious for everyone inside Iran and everyone who is watching the entire episode unfold. So in that sense, yes, there is a danger.

But I think that the Iranian diplomats — and this is something I want to give them credit for because I always criticize them, so this would be my charity to them — have actually understood the importance of bilateral negotiations with other countries apart from the United States. And I think this is something they need to pursue. Having said that, I don't want to name the politician who believed this because it's kind of tricky for me, but a very, very, very senior Iranian politician who has a lot of power inside Iran believes that the rights to managing maritime navigation in the strait should be exclusively in the hands of Iran.

And so the Omanis should understand the opportunity that Iran is handing to them. Because this person, again, considering the power that he holds, he can actually lobby and he can veto certain

other opinions. So whether the Omanis get on board with Iran or try to take America's side, we know that there will be no going back to the status quo ante. It's impossible. You know, the United States has created this mess and, you know, they have to lie in their bed or whatever the freaking expression is. They have made the bed and they have to lie in it. And this is the new reality in the Strait of Hormuz.

#Danny

Now, to the question of the other parts of what seems like, I mean, to be quite frank, in my assessment, the MOU — the only value I can see for Iran is gaining whatever it can, whether it's \$6 billion, \$12 billion in unfrozen assets, sanctions relief, all of that over time. The United States and Israel have already shown themselves incapable of carrying out even these terms to a logical conclusion. In my opinion, even just talking about a final deal — I don't even know if it will get that far. Given I'm in the United States, I know how the United States government works. I am very skeptical that it will even get that far. But to this point that some have been making that, uh, I'm sure has been infuriating you.

I know it's been making me quite, uh, angry hearing it — the idea that, uh, Iran right now is abandoning, let's say, Gaza through its limitation, its limited framework, or perceived limited framework in the MOU on the resistance front. Um, what do you make of these criticisms? Because it's not just Gaza. They'll also say the same about Lebanon, because Lebanon, of course, and Gaza are both still bearing the brunt of Israeli U.S.-backed aggression against them. Your thoughts on this point and the criticism that many people have been making. It's been going around. I'm always suspicious when points like this go around, but nonetheless, I think it's important to address it.

#Ehsan Safarnejad

No, no. You have every right to be suspicious of those points because literally there is this Israeli journalist — quote-unquote journalist — who has extensive ties to Unit 8200, Eddie Cohen. He also used the same term. He said, "Why isn't Gaza included in the deal? Isn't that haram?" You know, he said, "Oh, shame on you, the Persians," right? So he was clearly trying to sow division. And certain people, knowingly or unknowingly, are basically pushing the propaganda that Israel is trying to disseminate. So yes, you have every right to be cynical of those viewpoints.

But when it comes to what is happening here, first of all, people want to make it about sectarianism, right? Because they say, why are you Iranians so vocal, so vociferously angry about what is happening in Lebanon, but you don't show the same kind of anger when it comes to Gaza, right? They don't say it directly, but they want to make it about sectarianism. Now, the first thing that I need to say in order to address this, if you have to choose between Lebanon and Gaza, I'm sorry, Iran should choose Lebanon.

And there's a very logical reason for it. Lebanon literally got into war in defense of Iran. Can you imagine? Oh, look, yeah, we are not going to include you, we're going to ask for Gaza and not you guys, because, you know, so-and-so might feel bad, and they might feel that we are being sectarian. So out of the fear that we would look bad, we're not going to side with you guys, we're going to do the—no, it's basic decency and decorum for you to have the back of the person who had your back. It's basic decency. So that's the first thing, right? But when it comes, it's even more so than that, right? When you're trying to negotiate a deal, obviously you bargain down or you bargain up or whatever. You try to do that, right? So imagine how Israel carried out its response—maniacal, genocidal response to October 7th. They first attacked Gaza, they secured Gaza, then they moved to Syria, secured Syria.

I mean, in their viewpoint, I know that they're genocidal maniacs, but bear with me. And then they went for Lebanon, right? So Lebanon is the last piece of the puzzle. In computer science, we have something called a stack. It basically follows the rule of first in, last out, right? So you have queues that follow the logic of first in, first out, but then you have stacks that are first in, last out, right? When you wash plates and you put them in a column, when you want to pick them up, you have to remove the topmost plate first, right? So some things follow first in, last out. Some things follow the pattern of first in, first out. This is one of those situations. If the enemy has advanced into your territories, you can't just go behind their position and then start attacking them from that point.

No, you have to push them back. And in that sense, pushing them back starts with Lebanon, and then it gradually moves to Syria and to Gaza. Another thing that I need to mention is that Hamas representative Hazem Qasem actually made it very clear that Hamas was involved in the negotiation, and they were coordinating their measures with the Iranian diplomats. So unless some people want to claim that they are better partners, better informed than the Hamas representatives, or have moral high ground that supersedes that of the Hamas resistance fighters and political bureau—unless they want to argue for those things—it's very important to know what the position of Hamas itself is. And one final point: the IRGC Quds Force General, General Qa'ani, said this on national television—that he's going to rebuild Hamas, right?

So on every level that you can think of, you can see that Iran has not abandoned Gaza. But it's very lamentable that it's not really that easy for us Iranians to do what 8.3 billion people are not really interested in doing, which is to broker a ceasefire in Gaza. And by the way, I'm sorry, I said that the last point would be my last comment, but here's the thing: there is already something called the Board of Peace there, and it is backed by a United Nations Security Council resolution. We do not have enough leverage to go and say, you know what, we're going to veto the United Nations Security Council resolution, and we're just going to do our own thing. No, that's not the case. We don't have that kind of leverage.

#Danny

Yeah, and it also moves the goalposts, Asad, because if people remember, the reason why there is that UN Security Council resolution that was passed at the UNSC is not because, as some claim—and this happens not just with Iran, but also with China and with Russia—these countries that are trying to move the needle and actually move the world in a better direction for all of humanity often get the blame for why things like this occur. But people forget that, one, the United States and Israel were threatening to go back to full genocide on Gaza if it wasn't passed. And two, all of the countries in the Gulf literally consulted and counseled and said, including the Palestinian Authority—which people can criticize and condemn all you want—but it's the one body at the United Nations that has any say. And for better or for worse, a lot of times for worse, of course.

But at the same time, to expect that this resolution that was passed basically under the gun and under the support of countries and entities that, you know, probably should not have supported it, moves the goalposts away from the real problem, which is that there has not been a credible effort to restrain the United States and Israel. And to put that all on Iran or any one singular country, when it is the empire and Israel—literally Israel sitting on top of Palestinians—you know, I think moves the goalposts a lot, and it does minimize and, I think, diminish the fact that, yeah, as a nation-state around in the region, Iran is the only country that has done anything in service of Palestinian resistance, but truthfully resistance in the region at all. And this has been the case for many decades now. But your reaction?

#Ehsan Safarnejad

Look, yes, there is actually a lot of truth to that. You see people—I'm sorry, this is slightly out of my field of expertise that you've invited me for. But I see people saying, "Oh, Putin is a sellout. Putin is stupid." Sorry?

#Danny

No, I was going to say, everyone's a sellout. Putin's a sellout.

#Ehsan Safarnejad

And they say that, oh, why is it that Putin is showing weakness? Because, I mean, obviously Russia is also negotiating with the United States, right? So, like, when people criticize Iran for negotiating with the United States, it's also very important to know that Russia is negotiating with the United States as well, and Russia is a superpower. And they are not under the same restrictions and pressure that we are. China is trying to manage the escalation with the United States. I wouldn't really call it negotiation, but they wouldn't go and say, you know what, to hell with you Americans, we're just going to do our own thing.

They still, despite their big economy and despite their power and might, manage the escalation. But every one of these actors is now being called a sellout, right? Twice in a week, if I remember

correctly, a Moscow refinery was targeted by Ukrainian drones, right? There was another attack on a military-industrial facility in Russia, right? And Russia actually doesn't really have a viable, concrete solution to Ukraine, right? Can you imagine the amount of resources they had to dump into Ukraine in order to capture these areas? What, are they supposed to just march to Kiev? Do you think that's easy? You think that Putin has that option but chooses to just ignore it? Do you understand that Ukrainian drone production?

Facilities have been moved to Germany, Italy, different countries, so that they wouldn't be susceptible to a Russian attack. I'm sorry, it's very weird for me to talk about Russia when I was talking about Iran, and that's the topic that I'm being invited to talk about. But that actually feeds into the question and the sort of environment that you set by asking that question, right? What do you think about all these actors making these decisions that people haven't had the easiest time basically understanding? What I do have to say is that please, please understand that there is a limit to how informed you can become about the events of a certain country using the automatic translate feature of X, or like using the translate button of Telegram. You have to study a country for more than ten days.

You have to study a country for like one decade, two decades, to become an expert on that country. It's not easy. When you say a person like President Putin is a sellout or he's making stupid decisions, the decisions that the IRGC generals have taken, you have to put yourself in their shoes and wonder if you could do what they did. Do you truly think that if you were in charge of the IRGC, and with the modest budget that you have, you had to fight the United States military? Just a quick thing — ISIS's budget is bigger than that of the entire Iranian armed forces. ISIS's budget, wow. You think that you could fight the United States military that has a budget larger than the next ten countries combined? You think that you would be able to do that? So you don't think about the contradiction, the innate contradiction within your statement, that you say, "Oh, if you guys had just fought for a longer period of time, you could achieve victory."

But at the same time, you're comfortably ignoring the fact of who accomplished that kind of victory that you're making seem so easy to achieve, right? You're making it seem so easy to achieve. That victory was achieved by the IRGC generals. But you, at the same time that you say they were potent enough to gain a total victory—which isn't true, by the way, completely—we suffered a lot, and we were able to control ourselves, to hold ourselves, and defend ourselves against the United States. If tomorrow I lose a race to Usain Bolt, as a person who is like 220 pounds and has never tried exercising in racing or sprinting, that doesn't—by a couple of seconds, right?—that doesn't make what I call...

#Danny

We might have lost you for a second. I hope you come back in. You were saying it doesn't make it.

#Ehsan Safarnejad

I understand that. What happened here?

#Danny

We lost you for a couple of seconds. You were saying it doesn't make—I think you were going to say it doesn't make what Iran accomplished continue. Sorry, we missed that last part.

#Ehsan Safarnejad

It's okay. Look, you don't have to exaggerate. It's okay to say that Iran was able to defend itself. You don't have to go into exaggeration mode and say, "Oh, Iran did something, Iran eviscerated the United States." It's okay. It's significant enough that Iran was able to defend itself, right? And if you do not exaggerate, you will understand the limitations that all these decision-makers are under, whether in Iran, China, Russia—all these different countries. The United States is still a very powerful country. And this point is, I think that, you know, all the talks about the decline of the US dollar, which I unfortunately was engaged in, right? I think that we sort of created a monster that we can't really... Yeah, I'm sorry, we did that. We went on different shows and we talked about the US decline and multipolarity, and we created a monster that we can't contain and confine now that it is going on a rampage there. So, sorry, I know that the last bit of my commentary sort of was here and there. No, no, no, I think it's good.

#Danny

I like to have these bigger conversations as we get into the latter half. You know, in the last minute or two that we have, though, I'll just say this and then I'll get your final word. You know, it's so funny because I am—you know, this channel is a big steward and champion of the multipolar world. It really does like to highlight what it has been able to accomplish, what countries like Iran, China, Russia, even smaller countries are able to accomplish. However, I do think that there is a tendency to view the shifting world order as zero-sum—as if China or Russia are going to polarize the United States, that the United States is going to go away because of what they are doing or what Iran is doing.

The truth of the matter is that the peculiarity of how the U.S. empire behaves—its entire structure, not just the dollar financial system, but everything about it, the political system, the military, all of it—is built not necessarily to thrive and to expand and to last forever. I think it is built to collapse, but it's not going to be destroyed by some kind of global war. Its own internal contradictions will be what ultimately have to destroy it, and that means that people who actually live in this country, who live in the West, they're going to have to be the ones that, similar to how the Iranian people have had to do it—so many people all around the world have had to do it—they've had to say, "OK, this is what we want. We want a better system."

We want a better world. We have to build this. Not China and Russia are going to obliterate this. China, Russia, and Iran—they all have to develop themselves. They have to take care of themselves, what they need, what they desire. You can't fight a total war against a nuclear power. First of all, it doesn't exist. You don't fight total wars with nuclear weapons. The nuclear age has gotten rid of any possibility that Russia versus the USA, China versus the USA, is ever going to happen beyond nuclear catastrophe. So with that said, China, Russia, Iran—any country—would be foolish to engage in that kind of war and would be far better equipped and, you know, just far better positioned to focus on building something better.

And so I urge audiences in the West, and in the United States, of course, to focus on the changes that they need to make so this all stops, because that is ultimately what will stop genocide in Gaza, the genocide against the Lebanese people, that war on Iran—all of that. That's what stops it. Iran, China, Russia, the Axis of Resistance, all these forces that are trying to fight for something better, they'll fight back. But ultimately, if the empire has just carte blanche to do what it wants with consent of its own, or at least tacit consent, or people not paying attention, or whatever it may be, then that's where the big dangers, I think, lie. But that's how I see it, Ahsan. Your final word as we close out here.

#Ehsan Safarnejad

It's very funny that you actually mentioned that, because I actually talked about this as well, right? People have the weirdest perception of this thing. They think that if Iran wins and we somehow succeed in liberating Palestine, then it will solve the problem of Zionism in the United States and how Congress doesn't put the basic needs of Americans first, and it's always an Israel-first policy. No, it actually becomes worse. Where do you think all these Zionists will relocate to once there is no ethno-supremacist state that they would have complete freedom over? They will actually become more aggressive in the United States. So, like, in a weird, twisted way, if you want to be selfish, pray against Iran's victory, because it will become harsher for you guys.

I'm dead serious about this one. And there are many things that people need to learn that they need to do for themselves. The fact that, look, I've been hearing since 2016 about and from Bernie Sanders, who later on turned out to be a fraud—I mean, for an outsider like me, "Are you ready for a revolution?" with his very peculiar voice and posture and everything. And this revolution has never manifested itself, right? I've been hearing people talking about how there's a shift in American society, how people are changing their minds. But then I see something like this: Marjorie Taylor Greene introduced an amendment to impose a full arms embargo against Israel. Six people voted for it.

Three of the six people are now out of U.S. Congress: Marjorie Taylor Greene, Al Green, and Thomas Massie. You couldn't even keep Thomas Massie in your Congress. I'm sorry, I don't mean to be disrespectful or smug, but to think that somehow Iran's victory is going to change that—it's not

going to do so. You have to understand that the flaws that exist in the U.S. political structure aren't going to be fixed by some outsider help. It will never happen. I think that a more realistic point of view, a more realistic understanding of the kind of dynamic that exists, would be very positive. And by the way, this is not to take away from the people that actually pay attention to foreign policy.

Because I was listening to, I think, Stephen Kinzer, the author of the book **All the Shah's Men**. And he was saying that foreign policy isn't even in the top ten list of the demands or the things that an average American voter pays attention to when they want to cast their vote. So it's admirable that they have decided to pay attention to foreign policy. They have to understand that while foreign policy is important, while the wars 12,000 kilometers away from their shores would impact their life, while this understanding is very admirable, they have to understand that other countries can't fix their problem. And yeah, the reform comes from within, basically.

#Danny

Yeah. Yeah. And ultimately, if people in the United States, people who watch this program, Westerners, if they view genocide in Gaza, genocide against Lebanese in Lebanon, war on Iran, Yemen, et cetera, as their problem as well, then, you know, you've got to take that to the perpetrators of that problem. And they sit in Washington, and they sit in Tel Aviv. All right, Ahsan, it was great to be with you today. I want to make sure everyone hits the like button. I want to thank Peace Lover Forever for your super chat. Sorry we couldn't address that deeper, but I think we did in the conversation. Ahsan, is there any place that people can find you so I can put that in the video description right now, just before, so people can head there afterwards?

#Ehsan Safarnejad

I have my own YouTube channel, which, I mean, I don't really put that many videos out there. It's a way for me to basically have my interviews be accessible in one place under the collaboration section, right? So for the people who want to see my interviews, that's a very easy way to see them. It's called Political Aficionado. I have the same channel on Telegram, and, I mean, the place that I'm most active is X, under the handle Safa_Nejad_IR. That's S-A-F-A N-E-J-A-D underscore I-R. They can go there and read what I think about geopolitical developments in the region.

#Danny

Great. Yeah, I put both of those now in the video description below. Everyone, hit the like button before you go. That helps boost the show after we're done. Tomorrow I'll be back on to end June—June 30th, 2 p.m. Eastern Time—with Professor Richard Wolff to do an economic analysis of what's going on. All right, everybody, see you then, June 30th, 2 p.m. Eastern Time. Be sure to hit that like button before you go. Check out Ahsan's work in the video description afterward. And until next time, see you then. Bye-bye.

