

The FATAL Two-Front Mistake—The USA Just Fell For The TRAP | Pietro A. Shakarian

When things are going really bad in war, then what's the solution? Exactly. Start another on. It worked great for Third-Reich Germany, it worked great for Imperial Japan. So why would it not work for MAGA America? What could go wrong. The signs of hegemonic overreach and imperial desperation are now undeniable. The only question is how long until the ultimate collapse of the 21st century's empire of evil? And will it go quietly, or does it want to drag the world with it? Dr. Pietro Shakarian joins Pascal to discuss Iran's war fallout, Khamenei's funeral, Hormuz, and the limits of U.S. power. They also cover Armenia's disputed election, the Trump corridor, EU policy, Turkey, Israel, Russia's war strategy in Ukraine, NATO risks, Finland's loss of neutrality, and why Washington may need deep reform at home. Links: American Committee for US-Russia Accord:

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<https://neutralitystudies.com/shop> Donation: <https://neutralitystudies.com/donate> Timestamps: 00:00:00 Introduction and Iran's position 00:03:40 Qatar, the Gulf, and multipolarity 00:09:03 FIFA, rules, and international law 00:14:30 The Iran deal and Hormuz 00:18:27 Armenia's disputed election 00:23:56 Pashinyan, the corridor, and EU support 00:29:33 Turkey, Israel, and the Caucasus 00:35:02 Russia's strategy in Ukraine 00:40:19 Europe, NATO, and escalation risks 00:46:44 Finland, neutrality, and war lessons 00:52:51 Trump, Russia, and U.S. decline 00:58:17 Putin, Iran, and nuclear danger 01:04:52 Ukraine's front line and closing remarks

#Pascal

Welcome back, everybody, to Neutrality Studies, tonight again for an update with our friend and colleague Pietro Chakarian. Pietro, welcome back.

#Pietro A. Shakarian

Pascal, great to be here. Pleasure, as always.

#Pascal

And just to start directly with the topic, I mean, we want to go through Iran and Armenia to Russia a little bit — so from south to north. And you are, of course, from Armenia, from the region, the Southern Caucasus. You've also had a lot of experience in the United States and in Russia as well, as

an academic. Yes. Let's begin with Iran. Where are we today? We've just had this huge funeral that actually coincided more or less with the Fourth of July celebrations in the United States. Is that a coincidence? And how did you perceive that funeral going?

#Pietro A. Shakarian

Well, the funeral was, from what I understand, absolutely extraordinary. I mean, many, many international guests attended to mark the passing of Ali Khamenei, his death, his assassination. But really what it underscored to me is, number one, that Iran is not an isolated country by any means. And number two, it also emphasized how the United States is in a bind with the outcome of this Iran war. There was never this belief that Iran could actually, you know, challenge the U.S. in such a way as this. But, you know, as I alluded to, I think in one of our earlier podcasts, you were asking me, what can Iran do? And I said one of the things that they can do would be to kind of close the Strait of Hormuz or kind of take control over it and, you know, control who goes in, who goes out, and all this.

And what they did was they completely, brilliantly flipped the whole narrative of international politics. And what it did was, in retrospect, it was a very risky gambit by the United States to think that they could actually challenge Iran in such a way as this. Because Iran completely, you know, flipped the script. I mean, the United States, in the end, it revealed the weaknesses of the United States. And as a superpower on the international stage, that's not something you want to have happen to you. But in the case of Iran, this is what occurred. So, yeah, the funeral of Ali Khamenei. Now, of course, we also had Trump's threats. I mean, this is really obscene to do this in terms of the funeral of a state leader.

But, you know, Trump has shown that he has no boundaries and he's willing to do or say anything like this. But at the end of the day, what can the United States do? I mean, they're in a bind. And there is also this other element of this so-called deal that we have on the table that the United States is trying to kind of forge with Iran, with the mediation of the Pakistanis and the Qataris. And so the question becomes now, what happens? Will this deal be fully implemented? And there is a lot of, you know, question about that, because one of the big elements of this deal is this idea of, you know, Lebanon. And Israel, as we know, is not being—rather, it's not being very constructive, to put it very, very, very mildly, in Lebanon. So that's kind of where we are right now, just to give you the general overview of...

#Pascal

Let me just ask you, because this one puzzled me a little bit when I realized that it's going on, which is like, the negotiations started in Pakistan. They signed or did parts of the MOU in Switzerland. And OK, this is understandable, but now Qatar is involved in that. And because Qatar is one of the states that actually got hammered during this entire affair, how do you interpret that? That part of the negotiations are now done in Qatar, which actually, you know, at the very beginning cried foul very

badly and said, like, oh, unprovoked attack against us, which, you know, people like us, we immediately dismissed because, of course, the U.S. airbase and everything, and using Qatar's ground and airspace in order to attack Iran, right? But what's your interpretation on Qatar?

#Pietro A. Shakarian

I think that a lot of these GCC states, Pascal, have understood that having the U.S. presence there does not help them. It makes them a target, right? And by the way, the countries in the Baltic region should be getting the memo on that—Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, right? In the context of Russia and the U.S., right? But in this case, as we're talking about, you know, the Gulf, increasingly you're seeing kind of a pushback of certain countries there against the U.S. effectively at the end of the day. And, I mean, of course, you have the UAE, which is rather the outlier. But then you're seeing Qatar, you're seeing Saudi. Saudi was at the funeral, okay? That tells you something right there. It tells you something about the changing dynamics.

I mean, this whole Hormuz affair is really a vivid illustration of the fact that we're now in a multipolar world. It's an illustration of the multipolarity that we're in, the multipolar moment. And, you know, the great irony is Trump put the U.S. in that position, I guess believing somehow that this move would not only be in defense of Israel—you know, as we know, Netanyahu played a very substantial role in convincing Trump to go to war—but also that maybe it was connected with this idea that the U.S. could still kind of show its mettle. We could do regime change on the cheap, from the air, with no ground power, right? We're that good. And hence, it didn't work out that way. And so it's become a vivid illustration, I think, of multipolarity in action.

#Pascal

The Iranians are actually quite brilliant about this, right? Because the idea of the Americans was to have millions of people in the streets in order to overthrow the regime, right? And now they have millions of people on the streets in order to mark the funeral of Ali Khamenei, the incarnation, basically, of the regime, right? Yeah. They are also really good at using this as a way to message to everybody else. I mean, the biggest surprise to me is that it is the Iranians that actually managed to break through also in the information space of the West. The Lego movies, the memes, the Twitter that they do. Now with this one, this is a huge break, actually, just to hammer a bit of information down the throat of the West, isn't it?

#Pietro A. Shakarian

Absolutely, because, you know, again, one of the main theses that they were advancing was that, you know, the regime is so unpopular, the Islamic Republic is so unpopular. And in the end, now we see it's rather, you know, the opposite. In fact, it created a rally-around-the-flag effect. You would even have people, I mean, from, you know, what I've heard on the ground in Tehran, you would actually have people who were former critics of the regime, even, you know, there in attendance at

the funeral. Right. So, it's quite extraordinary. But you mentioned the Lego movies. They just came out with one today, actually, about the whole, you know, FIFA controversy with the red card, as we know, from the U.S.-Bosnia game. I mean, this was a big deal. And then that was followed by, yesterday, you saw, you know, 4-1 Belgium, you know, clobbered the U.S. team. So, it was like karma came back.

#Pascal

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#Pietro A. Shakarian

But this also follows, Pascal, what happened during this World Cup, right? I mean, it goes beyond just, you know, the whole issue of the red card, you know, Trump calling up Gianni and saying, hey, look, I want you to fix this for me, FIFA, that kind of thing. But also the whole discrimination, really the unfair treatment of the Iranian team. Oh man, it was just disgraceful in this World Cup. That needs to be absolutely highlighted in this. But no matter what Trump did, I mean, no matter what restrictions were placed on the Iranian team, no matter that Trump tried to intervene—which is insane, politically intervene in a football match—even despite all that, you see where the tide is, where things are going.

#Pascal

Let's discuss this just a little bit, because I think it's a very, very interesting micro thing in the larger macro perspective. I mean, I told you just before we started, right, that to me, this whole affair with FIFA is a perfect example of the rules-based international order, right? The West makes the rules, orders everybody else to follow, but whenever they don't want to follow, they just call up Gianni and tell them that a red card is not a red card anymore, by the way.

#Pietro A. Shakarian

Absolutely. Absolutely. I mean, the idea is, you know what, we make the rules, you follow the orders, right? That's how this whole thing goes. And it should not be, by the way, conflated with international law. It's the opposite of that. And actually, that's the other thing too—Iran, that whole war was the greatest violation of international law. And so, yeah, that's it.

#Pascal

But there are more things that are really interesting about this. I mean, you also have this moment where the people who are immediately threatened by Iran—the Gulf states and so on—actually send

delegations to the funeral of Khamenei, while the United States threatens an attack during that funeral, while the United States actually does everything under the sun in order to kick out the Iranians and be unfair to them, to be unfair to everybody. But you see how the whole rest of the world is already starting to develop a different mode of engagement. I mean, the Saudis obviously are not in love with the Iranians—obviously not—but when it comes to funerals and to this kind of state-to-state interaction, they've already moved on from the Western paradigm of, you know, the other one is Hitler, and when Hitler dies, everybody goes "yay" and celebrates in the streets with little flags. They do the opposite of that.

#Pietro A. Shakarian

Well, and also that really, to me, it tells me, Pascal, to be quite honest, about the shortcomings of American intelligence, because if they really believed that the government of Iran was that top-heavy, that everything depended on one man, Mr. Khamenei, and that there was not this complex system of the Islamic Republic in place, which is very sophisticated, you know, with sorts of checks and balances and everything like this, it tells me that the intel wasn't very good. Although, as far as I know, those voices who were trying to persuade Trump not to go to war, that this was going to be a disaster for the U.S., they were silenced, that Trump sidelined them because they were politically inconvenient for his belief that he could do this.

And I think he was, again, kind of going off the high of Venezuela, although they're two completely different scenarios. I don't know how we could think that that's similar. And also, by the way, Latin America—we're not done with that because we still have the issue of Cuba. Mr. Rubio has axes to grind, right, which he's using. He's using the weight of American foreign policy to kind of do that, right? And also, you know, by the way, it's interesting because even domestically now, speaking of which, when we talk about Cuba and the legacies of Mr. Castro and communism in Cuba, now Trump is trying to hit out at so-called communists in the U.S., right? He's trying to kind of play the McCarthy card.

#Pascal

And, but it's so dumb. This is so dumb. I mean, he could do his work and fall for it.

#Pietro A. Shakarian

And I mean, the next part of this promise is, yes, yes, he's facing a reaction on his hands. I mean, that is the donors. I mean, we're talking about the Israeli lobby. They're facing a huge backlash in New York City, and he's blaming, you know, the DSA, calling them communists. So I think it's a desperate move, and it sounds ridiculous, you know? I mean.

#Pascal

This is so dumb that when I heard him say that, I was like, what's next? I mean, probably in August he's going to travel to Salem and do a rally against witches. He seems to be historically confused about the times.

#Pietro A. Shakarian

I don't think he's going to do well in the midterms, to be honest with you, in the United States. I mean, I can just say this right now. Right now I'm in the United States, and people are not, you know, too happy with his performance, quote unquote, as president. And especially when people reflect on the 250th anniversary of the United States and they look back, and we have even, you know, you look back to the history, Pascal, you look at George Washington, who warned against entangling alliances. He warned against the United States getting involved in these overseas ventures. Also, John Quincy Adams too, you know, and the founding fathers, you know, could foresee the disaster that America is in now. And they were saying, no, no, no, we should avoid that. But apparently nobody listened to them, right?

#Pascal

There's a beautiful essay out there by Christopher Mott, who did a very good comparison between, you know, these two hearts in the chest of the United States. You always had the Washingtonians and Quincy people, but at the same time, you had the Jeffersonians that wanted to go there. And, well... the Jeffersonians had it, but for how long? I do wonder. And maybe last topic in this part of Iran, before we move to Armenia, what do you think about the MOU? How long is its half-life?

#Pietro A. Shakarian

Well, the biggest problem with the MOU is that, you know, the United States, first of all, it needs the MOU. Why does it need the MOU? Because it needs to have Hormuz open, right? But the problem is, and this is where you can maybe say the Iranians, I mean, you can say the Iranians play their cards brilliantly, to perfection, that by including Lebanon, it makes the enforcement of this deal very, very difficult because of the Israeli factor.

Israel is, you know, kind of just like on the loose, you know, attacking, invading southern Lebanon, taking swaths of territory, doing ethnic cleansing in southern Lebanon, to say nothing of the genocide in Gaza, which is still ongoing. And I think that's the big challenge of this, and it's going to challenge, above all, it's going to test, I think, the U.S.-Israeli relationship, because at the end of the day, the United States understands at some level that they can't keep this confrontation up with Iran forever, that Strait of Hormuz, and they can't open that up by force. There is some talk about the United States maybe doing a potential ground invasion of Iran from Iraq, but that would be massively bloody and massively catastrophic, first and foremost for the United States. And it would be a war that they could never win.

#Pascal

Chas Freeman on my channel actually once put it this way: you know, for a ground invasion, the Iranians are like the spider in the web, saying, "Yes, come here, little fly, come to me."

#Pietro A. Shakarian

Absolutely.

#Pascal

But there were so many dumb decisions that actually that one would just line up. And the other thing about the MOU, I think, in my view, the MOU to the Iranians also serves as a measuring tape. It's like, are you living up to this or not? Are you living up to it or not? Because there are a lot of verifiable aspects in there that the Iranians can always point at and say, well, you haven't reached it yet, therefore not moving forward, or therefore closing the Strait of Hormuz again. It's actually quite a scientific approach to negotiation. Very methodical.

#Pietro A. Shakarian

And also, you have to think, this is quite, you know, extraordinary that, again, who came out on top? Now, it's very—I wouldn't be able to say this on corporate media—but in fact, Iran won the war. Of course, because they're the ones who are lining up the terms here of this MOU, of this so-called deal. It's, by the way, interesting that Trump calls this a deal, right? Which also tells you a lot about his hyper-transactional approach, his kind of, I guess, his belief. And this actually comes from Patrick Henningsen.

He talks a lot about these ideas on various podcasts. But this idea is that he doesn't want this really codified as a treaty because Trump wants to, you know, I mean, if he wants to, like, leave it or he wants to violate or, you know, change the terms of it, he can. If it's a deal, then it's kind of amorphous. It's not really so hard and fast as a treaty or something like that. But on the other hand, what can he really do, Pascal Lottaz? That's the big question. What can he really do? He really can't do much. And that's the reality.

#Pascal

No, and the Iranians figured out, I mean, the U.S. is willing to break even the Charter of the United Nations, right? There's no bigger treaty than that one. So you cannot make him sign anything that he could just break. So it needs to have real hurt. If he breaks it, there must be real hurt. Therefore, he will think twice about it. And they've established that with Hormuz. But... let's go to Armenia, actually, and the Southern Caucasus, because that area is now also very, very contested again, because of geography, and we've just seen in Armenia the elections, and you've hooked me up with

a couple of your colleagues, and everybody in that corner is actually quite outraged at what happened. But what's the situation now in July?

#Pietro A. Shakarian

Well, the situation now in July is that, I mean, obviously, the assessment, the feeling among the population is that the election was completely rigged. Now, Pashinyan had won elections before, but you could say they were more fair, on the up and up. But this one was clearly a rigged election, completely, in all senses. You know, my colleagues, I mean, they've already spoken to you about the nitty-gritty of all that. On the other hand, though, the opposition did not have a plan B. They were not yet fully consolidated, and so this created kind of a split approach to what to do next. There really was not this idea that, you know, are we going to do, you know, street protests?

Are we going to, you know, challenge this legally? And that's also a big issue because they tried to challenge it legally, they go to the Central Election Commission. It's run by a Pashinyan ally, you know. And so the question is, you know, how much can you really change? And Pashinyan, meanwhile, has become more oppressive in the aftermath of this election, even less democratic. He feels that, you know, the wind is at his back in terms of support from the European Union, which is really interesting because the European Union is always talking about supporting democracy and democracy. In this case, we can see that they are facilitating the rise of autocracy. I mean, really, they are. There is no other way to put it.

That's what's happening right now in Armenia. Today, Gagik Sarukyan, basically, he was the leader of this party, Prosperous Armenia, that, as my colleagues told you, was on the threshold of getting into Parliament or being excluded from Parliament, right? It could have been easily 4%. It was like, is that 4%? And some of the results that were coming in, all the near-to-final results, put them at 4%. And then suddenly the Central Election Commission changed that to 3.99996, something like that. And so, on that metric, they excluded them from Parliament, which is really questionable, really in terms of legality, certainly. And what ended up happening is now they've gone completely after him.

They've confiscated his property. They've arrested him. This guy was extraordinarily rich, you know, Armenian, you know, guy, a former sportsman who was residing in the Kotayk region of Armenia. And even though, you know, some people would criticize him, say, oh, you know, the guy's an oligarch and all this, nevertheless, for his local people there in Kotayk, he invested a lot in the local economy. So a lot of people there in that region of Armenia really like him and all this. And the guy even had his own private zoo with a lion. And what happened is, when the government was confiscating everything, they sedated the lion, and unfortunately, they ended up killing the lion, or the lion ended up dying while they were trying to take her away—the lioness, I should say.

So that's kind of the dynamic of what's going on right now. It's a much more repressive environment in Armenia, unfortunately. It pains me to say that. But that's where we are. And the other thing also

that's really quite interesting about this is how the European Union approached the whole situation, Pascal. It's all based on making this a Russia versus West issue. They like to say that, you know, the Russians were interfering in the Armenian election, right? Which really was not the case, but that's what they say, that the Russians were interfering in the Armenian election. And moreover, that this is that we saved the day and we saved democracy in Armenia by supporting Nikol Pashinyan and retaining the power. But in reality, there's another hidden chapter of this, a hidden dimension, which is the element of Iraq.

And even though we saw Nikol Pashinyan, for example, going to the funeral of Ali Khamenei, nevertheless, Armenia's actions have, you know, very much angered Iran in terms of, you know, their support for this trip, Trump corridor—this idea of, you know, kind of creating a longstanding U. S. presence on the border between Armenia and Iran, also helping to facilitate, you know, Turkey and Azerbaijan's, you know, hyper-nationalistic pan-Turkist fantasies and all this and that. And so Iran is not very happy about this. And that whole dimension was missing from the EU narrative, conveniently. So it was almost as if they were using Russophobia as a cover to distract away from the attention of what a Pashinyan election could mean for Iran. So that was another interesting element of this.

#Pascal

Isn't Armenia getting closer and closer to an extremely dangerous situation? You mentioned a lot, but on top of everything, Pashinyan is also the guy who arrested part of the religious leadership of Armenia, of the Christian leadership, and even put priests in prison, who's putting other opposition parties into prison and, you know, criticizing opposition parties for not uniting—maybe fair enough. On the other hand, they were actively being persecuted, right, by Pashinyan while trying to run in the elections. And now, after the elections, there's even more crackdown. And the 4% that you mentioned, this tiny party—excluding them is even more important because it means the redistribution of seats now gives Pashinyan's party an absolute majority in Parliament, doesn't it?

#Pietro A. Shakarian

It gives him a majority, but not a majority that would enable him, let's say, to amend the Constitution, because that's the big kahuna—to kind of do whatever he wants.

#Pascal

Sorry, a simple majority, not an absolute majority. A simple majority—but a simple majority is actually what he will need in order to get the trip corridor ratified, isn't it? If he signs a treaty with Trump and then puts it to Parliament, that would suffice to actually ratify it and then make it a 99-year deal and give them that entire strip of land.

#Pietro A. Shakarian

Well, we shall see in terms of how that is implemented. I don't think he can do that necessarily fully at this point. He can appoint a government, he can create a government, he can run the government, he can do the day-to-day things. But it's not clear if he could actually... actually, he couldn't, I don't think. He could not pass, without significant opposition, this, let's say, this trip deal. So he is quite limited. He didn't get 50%. He got like 49.5% or something like that.

#Pascal

I thought the 4%, or the fact that he could exclude them, pushes him above 50%. No?

#Pietro A. Shakarian

No, I have to double-check on this. This is a minor detail, but still, even if you just look at it, taking the percentages, I mean, he basically kind of, you know, he has a simple majority, but not the majority that he really needs to amend the Constitution. That's the big thing, right? So he's still a little bit limited in what he can do, but he still is there. And that's the big issue. As long as he's there, he's still going to cause problems. And really, the people in Armenia, I can say this.

My impression is, and the aftermath is, because they rigged the election so brazenly, he actually became less popular as a result of this election campaign and the execution of the election. So that's actually quite interesting that even though he technically, I mean, you know, by their results, he won, the people, by and large, you get the sense, you know, they view him even more negatively than they did before. So it's going to be quite interesting to see how the situation moves forward. And I think that actually people, you know, there is very, very high political tension right now in Armenia over this situation.

#Pascal

So, yeah, what was kind of infuriating, yet very much on script, is the duplicity and the hypocrisy of the European Union trying to pretend that he's a great democratic liberator when, by all objective metrics, I mean, this is sliding into authoritarianism. Just, just...

#Pietro A. Shakarian

Recently, I think it was just yesterday, actually, Marta Kos, who is the Commissioner for EU Enlargement, made a Facebook post saying, "Look, you know, when I was in Armenia"—she was in Armenia recently—"I picked up all these apricots and I made apricot jam. And isn't that wonderful? And you know what?"

#Pascal

You know, we were there helping the Armenians save their democracy against the dastardly Russians.

#Pietro A. Shakarian

And so on and so forth. But in truth, again, like I said, we have their real number. We know what they're really doing. They really were covering for, you know, this trip corridor, which also is an extension of Trump's aggressive designs on Iran. Right. So the EU, I mean, they're not fooling anybody. They try to frame this as an exclusively Russia-U.S. conflict over the Caucasus. It's very, very, you know, clever. But in truth, they're acting as cover for Trump's neocon designs and his war on Iran. That's really what we're seeing.

#Pascal

Yeah, it just leaves me wondering where this is going, because I think, like, Armenia–Azerbaijan, of the three, is the one that is hardest to cover for me, because it seems like a kind of separate case. But Armenia and Georgia are in such comparable positions. And one of them, Georgia, is moving very much in the direction of trying to maintain as much freedom of action as they can, some of them even talking about active participation, neutrality for Georgia, while Armenia seems to be going in, like, throwing everything it has into the lot of the West at the moment when the West actually is at its deepest crisis in basically 500 years. And it just makes me worry about Armenia then being sandwiched between Azerbaijan and Turkey. And we know that both of them are not very friendly toward the entire project of an independent Armenia.

#Pietro A. Shakarian

Yeah, absolutely. And actually, as my colleagues were telling you last time, I mean, really what they want to do is they want to see the dismantlement of the Armenian state. And by the way, there's also another interesting development that occurred recently, which was that Israel recognized the Armenian genocide, right? But this was purely, I want to emphasize, this was not out of any sense of compassion or anything like that. This was purely geopolitical, in part given this idea of, you know, I guess you could say the growing tension between Turkey and Israel. But I personally view it more as kind of theatrics. Because at the end of the day, I mean, even though we see, you know, we see the Israelis increasingly being critical of Turkey, nevertheless, Turkey, for its part, is also giving its tough rhetoric about Israel.

But nevertheless, the oil is still flowing from Baku through Turkey to Israel. So it's business as usual, as I see it. I think there's a part of me that thinks this is more aimed toward domestic Armenian consumption. And it may also be aimed at trying to bolster the trip project within Armenia. That's at least one of my theories. Because, again, I mean, it's hard to kind of make out this whole, you know, so-called tension between Turkey and Israel, right? When, at the end of the day, I mean,

Turkey is a member of NATO. It's within the same kind of defense sphere and structure as Israel. It's, you know, still the oil is flowing, as I said. So there are very legitimate questions to be asked about that.

#Pascal

True. However, like, Turkey is, in my view, historically, like always, or most of the time, actually playing on everybody's wedding, or dancing on everybody's wedding. And Turkey is on the EU naughty list, right? There was just a post a couple of days ago of the EU scolding Turkey. I mean, you are on the accession list, but you are not fulfilling all of the checklist, right? And there are strict rules in order to adhere to EU standards if you want to join. By the way, these rules do not apply to Ukraine. And we are very angry with Poland that they are standing in the way of loosening all of these rules for Ukraine. Very, very angry, but for you.

#Pietro A. Shakarian

The rules, the red card. But here's the funny thing about that. They still talk about the rules, the red card, and all that. But the EU also, they're the ones who want, you know, this kind of middle corridor, right? They want to get access to that because, you know, right now they're paying a fortune for LNG, right? Because they shot themselves in the foot over Russia, which they're still very hysterical about. And so the idea is that if we can get that alternative energy from Azerbaijan through Turkey, maybe even going all the way to Central Asia, that would be, you know, a fantastic thing. So at one point, they're scolding Turkey, right? They're saying, you're so naughty, you know, we're going to give you the red card and all this, but they're still doing business with them. So there's a kind of weird, you know, back and forth, weird kind of dance that you see with this.

#Pascal

You know, what infuriates me the most is not even the duplicity of the speech. It's that it just seems downright dumb, as in self-defeating. But then again, I mean, if you put it that way and you say, like, yeah, red card but still trading, maybe I should lower that a little bit and say, like, okay, they're still being cold-blooded realists in the sense that they still try to extract whatever they can. But then again, it's still selfish.

#Pietro A. Shakarian

Well, what they're trying to do, Pascal, is they're trying to, like, you know, walk the tightrope between realism and, you know, liberal interventionism. They want both, I guess. Maybe they want both. We go back to IR theory—that's what they want. They want to be both liberals and realists at the same time. And I think it actually speaks more to the chaos of the current moment we're in internationally. But we shall see how all that develops. I think, though, it is quite interesting that even Pashinyan did not welcome Israel's recognition of the genocide.

I thought that was, you know, really, really quite, you know, notable. But nevertheless, I mean, mostly because he was saying, you know, Israel should not weaponize the genocide and all this and that. But even still, most Armenians, they don't like—they're not big fans of Israel or, you know, Pashinyan. And in addition, the other issue at play here is because Israel is now actively engaged in its own genocide, you know, how does that give any weight to them, you know, finally coming to terms, recognizing the Armenian genocide, you know?

#Pascal

No, I mean, sorry, like asking Israel not to weaponize a genocide is like asking a fish not to swim. It's like, good luck with that. But let's go away from the polemics and maybe move even a little bit further, because if we then go all the way to Russia at the moment, there is all of this chatter in my part of the Internet that I call the commentariat about what Russia is doing, right? On the one hand, they've been hammered by drones and a couple of missiles the last couple of months, and we've seen these huge smoke plumes over St. Petersburg, even Moscow apartments being attacked.

And these Western-made, European-made weapons are then assembled in Ukraine and fired at the Russians, really trying to cause panic inside Russia. On the other hand, Russia is firing back at Ukraine, I mean, massive strikes also on Kiev. But it is threatening to target Ukraine, but it's obviously not doing it. So how are you making sense of that situation? Because the question is, what is the Russian strategy to deal with what, in my view, is like the NATO salami-slicing of the war into mainland Russia, which is not new, it's not new, but just the drone and missile scale of the last couple of months, that is kind of a new phase to me.

#Pietro A. Shakarian

Well, I think that when we look, Pascal, at the situation right now with the war, and we look at the situation right now with Russia itself, of course, first of all, what we should understand is the war is running at Russia's pace. Right. There is this idea that maybe this is a war of attrition because Ukraine is being, you know, so fantastic on the battlefield and showing the Russians what for or whatnot, but really Russia is, you know—and it makes sense too because Russia is the larger country here—they're the ones who are advancing slowly but steadily. Right. Now, the decision to run the war at this pace has caused some frustration in Russia, in part because, again, we see that Ukraine, because it's desperate, it doesn't know what else to do, it's not winning the conventional war, that it's resulted in them turning toward basically these kinds of drone attacks or terrorist attacks against various Russian cities, one of them being St. Petersburg, as you mentioned.

But there is frustration within Russia that the war is moving too slowly. And I had actually been in St. Petersburg in May, and it was interesting to me to see that people were rather war-weary. And in addition to everything else, there was also some frustration about the access to Telegram. Right. That again, you know, Russia is doing this because of its own security concerns vis-à-vis Ukraine and

all that. But still, Telegram is the most widely used messenger in Russia. So you have people who would never have even used a VPN before now all of a sudden using a VPN. Nevertheless, people are not blaming the government.

I don't see there being a palace coup against Putin or anything like that. And the man on the street is still blaming the government in Kyiv for what is going on. Now, recently in the war itself, Russia has actually taken... that was a big victory for them. And that means they're almost getting ready to take the rest of Donbass, because after this is Kramatorsk and Sloviansk. And way back in the day, I can tell you, in 2014, in the first Donbass war, Sloviansk and Kramatorsk were two major, major cities. In the end, Ukraine won control over the cities, and they've fortified them for close to a decade now.

And they're really the last fortresses Ukraine has in Donbass. And this is really a scary thing for Ukraine, because once Russia takes these fortified industrial cities, what else does Ukraine have to fall back on? And that kind of opens up Russia to do a much more dramatic advance to the west, to the Dnieper River, let's say, to Kyiv itself. And so this actually makes the situation much more alarming for Ukraine. So Ukraine, which is also facing massive manpower shortages, is throwing everything it can at Russia in terms of these drone attacks, in terms of trying to prick the Russians, and also trying to create popular discontent against Moscow, against the government.

And it's not—I think that at the end of the day, even though there is war weariness in Russia, you can definitely feel that when you're there—at the end of the day, the tide of the war is turning against Zelensky. Now, that being said, most Russians, there's a lot of frustration with what they're hearing from Europe, from these European politicians, right, that we want to, you know, that we need to, you know, confront Russia and all this and that. But at the end of the day, when you talk to real experts about this, I mean, you have to think, what are the defense capabilities of the Europeans, right? Fighting alone, it's not substantial. Right.

And that's the thing—the big question now has been, especially when we talk about alternative media, there's been a lot of talk about the Karaganov scenario. Sergei Karaganov famously is talking about this idea that, you know, what if the Russians were to do a nuclear attack, or even a conventional attack, on one of the Western European countries to send a message—to show that, you know, we still mean business—to kind of reinforce or revive that idea of a nuclear deterrent. The West's belief is that the West has ceased to be afraid of us, that they've ceased to understand the gravity of the nuclear deterrent.

But at the end of the day, I don't believe most Russians have an appetite for expanding this war to Western Europe. And they're more focused on, you know, a conventional defeat over Ukraine. So that's why, I mean, there is that kind of more hawkish rhetoric you're hearing in Russia, and it should be very concerning for the Europeans. But I don't think... And also, the European people, I can say this, Pascal, and of course, I mean, you're Swiss, so you would be able to identify with this, but... my sense is that the European people are tired of the elites, and they're not, you know, buying

this kind of war rhetoric, even though it's permeated the media, it's permeated the official discussion, the officially sanctioned discussion.

#Pascal

Yes, it has. And, you know, as quite often you also find within the general population, there's this split, right, somewhere around a normal distribution. About 30% are in line with the media narrative, about 30% are quite opposed to it, and about 40% in the middle are kind of, yeah, you know, it's bad, but Russia is evil. We shouldn't go to war, but I really hope Putin dies soon. Like, kind of stuff like this, right?

#Pietro A. Shakarian

Yeah.

#Pascal

But anyhow, it's kind of a normal distribution, I would say. It's not a rabid kind of massive popular Russophobia over there. But the most interesting interpretation I've heard of this recently came from Vladimir Brovkin, who was saying basically Russia is combining two strategic elements. One is, what doesn't kill you makes you stronger, so actually use this moment to learn how to intercept these drones and missiles and so on. And actually, we see a decrease in the impact that they have, even though the number of these things increases. So Russia is making technological and military progress in dealing with this stuff that's coming their way. On the other hand, hide your strength, bide your time, because the more time Russia has to still build up with this massive manufacturing that they have going, the more arsenal they're getting in the background, including Oreshniks and whatnot.

And their military is still growing. So, you know, they are just becoming a bigger and bigger bear. And at some point, you know, it's a little bit like the chihuahua that is yelling and barking at the big bulldog or the big bear through the glass window, right? And once the glass window is removed, the chihuahua will actually understand what's happening. And in a sense, like, maybe they're waiting for that. And that's also what they're working on with the Americans, you know. At some point, that glass window might go away. And, well, then the chihuahuas will have a serious problem. But I don't know how you see that kind of thing.

#Pietro A. Shakarian

Well, I think the one way you do that is, I mean, you kind of undermine the whole narrative that, well, the Russians—because in the West, there's this idea that, well, there's this war of attrition in

Ukraine because, you know, the Russians, they just can't do it. They're not strong enough. They can't push ahead. There's this kind of skepticism that this is a Russian strategy on purpose. Yeah, exactly.

#Pascal

On purpose, to pretend or to, if the Europeans want to believe that you're so weak, let them believe it, because it's actually going to help the Russians build up their strength even more.

#Pietro A. Shakarian

Absolutely. And versus the Europeans who are not ready for a war. But once Russia, let's say, if it gets to, I mean, when we're talking about the future, and of course it's difficult to predict, you know, what's exactly going to happen. But if we end up with a situation where Russia is just cutting across Ukraine like a hot knife through butter, then the Europeans, it's going to be a wake-up call for them. They're going to actually see what really is the reality here. This is not a paper tiger. They've convinced themselves it is. This is a real... You know, this is a superpower. And my God, you know, I mean, God forbid if we actually confront them with, you know, nuclear weapons or something like that. The other thing, again, like I bring up to you, is this point.

And again, it's just amazing how some countries don't look at other theaters in the world. The Baltic states, for example, they think that, well, if we have NATO here and we have the protection of NATO—and also this goes for Finland too, and Sweden—that it's going to prevent any kind of Russian attack or any kind of, you know, negative situation, negative consequence for us. But look at what happened with the GCC states in the Persian Gulf. Look at what happened with them when they had all those wonderful American military installations and how Iran attacked them. And that's a lesson. Going back to the Baltic republics, that's something that they should be taking away from that. But I don't see that, unfortunately.

I don't see that rational thinking. Especially, what I think is most remarkable, Pascal, is Finland. Again, we go back to that discussion—I think we had it a few years ago—where I was saying that neutrality, and you would definitely agree with this, is one of the greatest guarantors of enhancing your political independence. And I was just utterly stunned that Finland would give that up. It was such a great card to have, you know, this neutrality. And to become basically, you know, one of these kind of, you know, anti-Russophobic states, one of these states that is, you know, pushing for war on the fringes of Europe, I think it's a disservice to them. You know, I mean, they're putting themselves in the position of, let's say, Qatar in the Persian Gulf.

#Pascal

No, absolutely. I mean, on the first point with the Baltic states, you know, you used that expression, you hope that they get the memo. The problem with the Europeans and the Baltics, part of that is that they usually get the memo handed by historians 50 years after the fact.

#Pietro A. Shakarian

Absolutely. And frankly, Pascal, it's a great tragedy for Europe. Because again, as I've talked about on this program, there's a whole history of war in Europe. And that's not something that, I mean, I would think that Europeans are ignorant of. I mean, certainly they read history. They know their histories. They know the history of the Hundred Years' War. They know the history of the Wars of Religion. They know the histories of World War I, World War II. But it's just interesting because it seems as if, from the EU, they had learned those lessons. And now they're...

#Pascal

I mean, that's the problem with the black box. It's not that nobody inside the black box knows it—it's the wrong people. I mean, we're literally talking about Kaja Kallas, who said on TV that it was news to her that the Soviets won the Second World War. Some of these people, especially the ones in office right now, are just so incredibly ignorant that it's hard to wrap our minds around it. And the same seems to be going on in states that used to be cold-blooded realists, like the Finns. I mean, there's this beautiful book.

I actually have it right here in front of my screen—*Neutrality: The Finnish Position*, a collection of essays by Urho Kekkonen. Kekkonen, the great Finnish statesman, a long-term president and leader, understood precisely that Finnish neutrality had to protect the northwestern flank of the Soviet Union. And as long as it did that, as it served as a buffer to the northwestern flank, Finland would be left alone and would be fine. And it was fine. It wasn't forced into the Warsaw Pact because it fulfilled its security role to the Soviets. And they understood that. And today, the Finnish leadership doesn't. They don't. They don't.

#Pietro A. Shakarian

I mean, I seriously question the Finnish leadership's, you know, fidelity to protecting its own people. It's putting its own people in danger, you know. And not only that, you have to think that, going back into history, they should know, you know, the cost of war, you know, with Russia, certainly. We go back to the Winter War, the Continuation War—that's not something that they're... The benefit is so much in having good trade relations with Russia, having good economic relations with Russia. Like I said, people in St. Petersburg felt betrayed when they learned the news that Finland basically decided to ditch its neutrality and become a member of NATO. They felt as if it was a personal betrayal.

Moreover, what's interesting, Pascal, is how this term, Finlandization, became a pejorative term in the West. And it was done that way, I'll tell you, on purpose, because the people in the military-industrial complex, the people in the defense industries of the West, particularly in the United States, who, you know, come hell or high water, wanted to, you know, confront the Russians—those dastardly commies—that at the end of the day, they were trying to seed it into the minds of people that neutrality is bad. You don't want neutrality. That, you know, maybe we could flip Finland and turn it into a bulwark against, you know, the Russians. It was even during the Cuban Missile Crisis that JFK, I think, told Anastas Mikoyan famously, "How would the Soviets feel?"

How would the people of Leningrad feel if Finland joined NATO? You know, as if he could, you know, kind of command the Finns to do that. And Mikoyan said, well, you know, the people in Leningrad would sleep just as soundly as the people in Armenia, because we have this issue with Turkey and the missiles there. You know, this is the Cuban Missile Crisis. This is being, you know, discussed. But nevertheless, that always was quite striking to me, that you had this kind of war lobby that wanted to seed into the public domain this idea that Finlandization, that neutrality, was something negative. It was something to be ashamed of, that, you know what, it's good to have war. Don't you understand? We profit so much. We profit so much.

#Pascal

But that's the thing to understand. There are a lot of people in the West, especially in—well, not especially—the number one is, of course, the neocon circles. And you have European neocons as well. And they want to use war as a means to get what they really desire, which is total dominance. And in that kind of worldview, neutrality is just as bad as the other one is. It may be even worse because it undermines your position. So you need to switch off the neutrality of Georgia. You need to switch off the one of Ukraine. And they successfully switched it off, right? And they transformed it from a buffer state that kept the peace into a war zone.

A battering ram that offered them the war they wanted, right? And the same they do with the Finns and the others. And, you know, this is very interesting—also this trash-talking of neutrality in order to make it a dirty word. This Finlandization is only one of several examples. The other fascinating example is the rebranding of 150 years of U.S. neutrality into isolationism. Nobody before 1945 looked at it as isolationism. Everybody who was for the policy called it neutrality, which it was. That's why the greatest neutrality scholars of the 20th century are actually all Americans, because they were working on that very, very strongly. So it's fascinating.

#Pietro A. Shakarian

Yeah, and actually it goes back with that position. Pascal, it goes all the way back to the Founding Fathers. They didn't want the United States to be involved in these foreign entanglements. They wanted to build a republic here.

#Pascal

That's why George Washington proclaimed in 1793 American neutrality toward the Europeans—not toward the rest, but toward the Europeans.

#Pietro A. Shakarian

Absolutely. Absolutely. But also, speaking of the United States, the other thing I want to mention is how now, you know, Trump was trying to kind of put this position very early on in his administration that, you know, Ukraine—I can solve this within 24 hours, right? And in the end, I mean, it must be a pretty long 24 hours because we're still here and we're still waiting for that peace to come. But the reality is that, you know, the mask kind of fell when Marco Rubio made the statement that, well, you know, we really aren't neutral brokers in this, and that, you know what, we're still kind of favoring one side.

We're still kind of, you know, giving the weapons to Ukraine, still kind of hoping that they win, you know, at the end of the day. So the question is, where does this, I guess you could say, spirit of Anchorage—where does this stand now? It's a big question to ask. And I think the Russians feel as if that was all completely a fake, that they were trumped. You know, I mean, that Trump—I mean, it's like that documentary about the golf course in Scotland, you know, called **You've Been Trumped**. Well, this is a similar thing. I mean, they were trumped. The Russians were trumped. And so now they have to figure out what they're going to do.

And I think that they've decided that, you know what, we can't trust Trump. Anything that this guy says—he's a congenital liar. He just, you know, spouts off whatever he feels. He tweets out whatever he feels on Truth Social. And actually, by the way, Americans, especially now, a lot of people are in reflection in the United States because it's the 250th anniversary of, you know, America. And they're thinking about how in the Sam Hill did we get here, where we have such a president as Trump? How do we go from Franklin Delano Roosevelt to Donald Trump? And Joe Biden, by the way, because he was also a disaster. How do we go from John Fitzgerald Kennedy to Trump?

#Pascal

I mean, it baffles the mind. How do we go from Abraham Lincoln to Trump?

#Pietro A. Shakarian

Right. People are trying to figure this out, that, you know, we aren't who we used to be. And Trump is the most visible symbol of that. And I think, yeah, I mean, what can you say?

#Pascal

Well, I mean, I have two kinds of approaches to this. One is to say that maybe we're overestimating a little bit these historical figures. And if we put the magnifying glass on them, maybe even somebody like George Washington wouldn't quite look as glorious as he does in retrospect.

#Pietro A. Shakarian

Also, knowing that, I mean, even with Franklin Delano Roosevelt, when you talk about the internment of the Japanese and all that, I'm not... but I'm just saying that's the popular mood in America.

#Pascal

No, but on the other hand, you also have the pictures of each president, right? You can put them in a line and look at them, and you can go like Roosevelt and JFK, and then go to Nixon, and it goes down, and then Clinton, Bush, Clinton, Bush again, and Obama.

#Pietro A. Shakarian

The turning point was the neoliberalization of the American economy, when America went away from Keynesianism and the American Dream, which actually had been expanding to include more and more people, it seems, over time. We would go from a country being founded by rich, white, landowning men, and eventually you had the freedom of the slaves, you know. Eventually after that, by 1964, you have civil rights, right? Eventually you also had the right of women to vote, right? You eventually had, you know, working-class people who could eventually, the economy would create mobility so they could pull themselves up. But now, with neoliberalism, we see an America that is more, you know, stratified by class than ever before, even more so than the Gilded Age. The concentration of wealth is insane. But Pietro, how can you say that?

#Pascal

I mean, it was founded by rich, white, landowning men, and now the richest man in the United States is African American. I mean, isn't that a great progress?

#Pietro A. Shakarian

That's what they love to do, see? That's what they love to do. I mean, just by changing the identity. It's like if you put at the top of a corporation a woman, a Black, and a gay person, then suddenly the idea would be that now we are—that's progress. Now they're at the height of everything like that. And in reality, it doesn't change the fact that the corporation is predatory, exploitative, what have you. If you just change the color of the person or change the face of the person, that doesn't change the problem. Isn't that much deeper?

#Pascal

We've got the richest man on earth, and he's an African-born man, and he's white.

#Pietro A. Shakarian

Isn't that convenient?

#Pascal

I mean, sorry, sorry. It's just, you know, the irony and the polemic write themselves about the current moment. That's the interesting thing. But maybe just one last point about the United States. Do you think it will ever get to the point where Trump will try to make good on what he said? Because you could also just call his presidency the one-day presidency, right? The 24 hours that never ended. But it seems to me that the Russians are still, I mean, despite everything, Vladimir Putin still attaches some importance to this relationship with Donald Trump, which baffles quite a lot of people. How do you make sense of it?

#Pietro A. Shakarian

It baffles a lot of people, but you also have to think, Pascal, it's necessary. Because, you know, still, at the end of the day, they need that connection with Washington. Because, you know, let's be honest, there are three major superpowers. There are three superpowers in the world today: the United States, Russia, and China. And it's very, very, very important that the Russians still have a line of communication to the United States, no matter what they think about Trump. But also, you know what's fascinating is how on Independence Day, it was Trump who called Putin. You would think that Putin or the Russians would maybe send some sort of congratulatory message. He did. He did. He sent the letter. Yeah, yeah, yeah. But still, Trump called Putin, as I understand.

It's quite interesting. And I wonder what they were discussing. I think officially it was about Ukraine, I believe. But I'm sure there was some Iran in there as well, too. But who knows how it's all going to turn out. But that's the main thing, Pascal, you have to understand. Putin still wants to maintain this line of communication with Donald Trump, no matter what we think about Trump. That's the whole idea. Now, as for Trump, you know, let's say finally realizing his campaign promises or whatnot, I don't see it. I think that Trump, in terms of— I think he's obliged to, you know, being part of the donor— I mean, he's obliged to his donors, and he is part of the swamp. You know, there's this whole phrase about Trump draining the swamp.

But I think really what the United States truly needs, Pascal, is its own form of glasnost and perestroika. And I was saying that going back to Obama's time, I mean, I was saying that maybe Obama was going to be the reformer that the United States needs. But that's really what I think is one positive you can take out of this Iran—you know, I mean, from the American point of view, one

positive you can take out of the Iran debacle is it hopefully will invite more introspection. That, you know what, we cannot be a million places at once. If you want to really promote democracy, as Jack Matlock, the former U.S. ambassador to the Soviet Union—the last U.S. ambassador to the Soviet Union—famously said, if you want to promote democracy, show how it works at home. And right now, the United States is not showing how well it works at home. It's a big problem.

#Pascal

I think you're right. But on the other hand, or rather, on the other side, from the side of Vladimir Putin, you can interpret what's going on as his firm grasp of realism, saying that, yes, I know that the guy in the White House would kill me if he could. He probably tried once. He killed the Iranians, right? The Iranian leader. I know he'd kill me if he could, but I make sure that he can't. And I will maintain a line of communication with him because what else is there to do? You can't make the Americans go away either. Therefore, you maintain a line of communication with those who would kill you if they had the power to do it, but you need to prevent their ability from doing so. So, well, that's the new, that's the multipolar world.

#Pietro A. Shakarian

Absolutely. And that's, I mean, de facto, that's the reality we live in. It's interesting because even if you listen to the American media, they still talk as if it's the unipolar moment, as if we're still in 1992 or 1995 or something like that. And it's very clear that de facto we are in the multipolar moment, the most vivid illustration being, of course, the whole Hormuz affair. And I don't see—I mean, I would think it would be utterly suicidal if the United States attempted to do an invasion of Iran from Iraq or something like that. By the way, one more thing: Trump's threats toward Iran are rather alarming.

We all know this. I mean, we've heard, you know, we know his famous threat to wipe out the civilization of Iran. The big question is, what would, you know, Russia or China do in a scenario such as this? Because if it gets to a point where we go into, like, a potential nuclear strike on Iran or something like that, God forbid, then where does that leave us? I think actually even North Korea recently made some remarks or declared a position that if Iran were to be attacked with a nuclear weapon, North Korea would respond. But that, you know, is a very serious matter. It's a very serious matter in terms of what would be the response if there was a nuclear strike on Iran.

And maybe that's one of the things that Trump and Putin, you know, could talk about with Xi, ideally, to kind of regulate this. Because, you know, when Trump just, you know, decides to make some crazy threat like, "I'm going to wipe out the entire civilization of Iran," and then he's also kind of, you know, posting or retweeting a video by this Levine, who is basically this American neocon commentator who's saying maybe it would be a good idea to do a nuclear attack on Iran because, you know, we had to do that with the Japanese. This is the argument. It's not my argument, but that's what he says.

#Pascal

That really raises some serious concerns.

#Pietro A. Shakarian

So that's something the Russians and the Chinese also need to consider.

#Pascal

Yeah, and you might be right on the money, as John Mearsheimer usually says, that maybe this is what the Russians are rather working on, on the very highest level — to say, instead of trying to solve the nitty-gritty in the Donbass, which our military is already working on, let's try to get to a point where we can revive the most important kinds of missile treaties, the nuclear weapons treaties that we used to have and that are gone. But let's work on something like that — a nuclear protocol or something. And maybe something like that is part of these kinds of high-level discussions and aspirations of Vladimir Putin. That would make sense to me, looking at how they went about things before.

#Pietro A. Shakarian

And one thing I also just want to say, too, I mean, it's utter folly to think that the Europeans can stop the Russian steamroller in Ukraine. I mean, it's moving slowly.

#Pietro A. Shakarian

When you take Kostyantynivka

#Pietro A. Shakarian

Then it's just a matter of time before they get to Kramatorsk and Sloviansk. And these cities, I mean, like, again, I can go all the way back to 2014. I was watching the 2014 war very closely at the time. I was in communication with my former mentor, Stephen F. Cohen, one of the veteran Russia scholars. And we were watching what was going down in Ukraine at the time. Sloviansk was always in the news. You know, he would do these podcasts with John Batchelor where he'd always be talking about, you know, the battle over Sloviansk. And that's not a light thing if the Russians take these very heavily fortified cities. And so that's what we're looking at in the coming weeks and months.

#Pascal

Yes, yes, we are. And we've already passed the hour by quite a few minutes. So, Pietro, if people want to follow you, where should they go?

#Pietro A. Shakarian

Well, I usually write for the American Committee for U.S.-Russia Accord, formerly known as the American Committee for East-West Accord. Um, and I am also an occasional contributor to James Carden's The Realist Review. So you can find me there. Also, I've written a book, *Anastas Mikoyan: An Armenian Reformer in Khrushchev's Kremlin.* Um, so that's kind of me in a nutshell. Um, and I don't have my own Substack, unfortunately. I mean, I have a lot going on right now in my life. So, um, but yeah, um,

#Pascal

I'll put a link to the sites you just mentioned in the description box below. Pietro Shakarian, thank you so much for your time today.

#Pietro A. Shakarian

Thank you, Pascal Lottaz.