

Theodore Postol: Evidence of Patriot PAC-3's Near-Zero Interception Rate

MIT Professor and Pentagon advisor Ted Postol discusses the near-zero interception rate of the Patriot PAC-3. Follow Prof. Glenn Diesen: Substack: <https://glenndiesen.substack.com/> X/Twitter: https://x.com/Glenn_Diesen Patreon: <https://www.patreon.com/glenndiesen> Support the research by Prof. Glenn Diesen: PayPal: <https://www.paypal.com/paypalme/glenndiesen> Buy me a Coffee: buymeacoffee.com/gdieseng Go Fund Me: <https://gofund.me/09ea012f> Books by Prof. Glenn Diesen: <https://www.amazon.com/stores/author/B09FPQ4MDL>

#Glenn

Welcome back. We are joined today by Professor Theodor Postol, Professor of Science, Technology, and National Security at MIT. He's an expert in nuclear delivery systems, missiles, and missile defense. He has also worked as a former advisor to the Pentagon. So thank you for coming back on the program. It's great to see you again. Oh, it's my great pleasure, as always, to be here.

#Theodore Postol

Go ahead, sorry.

#Glenn

Yeah. No, I wanted to ask you today about the Patriot PAC-3 interceptors, because you have probably been the leading voice in discussing how ineffective they have been. And indeed, you can argue that the inefficiency of this has a huge cost for the United States as well. That is, it wants to sell these weapons as well, but, you know, delusion also has a high price. So I was wondering what you can say about them, because, of course, they are an important component of the U.S. alliance system. They were used now and are still used extensively in the war against Iran. And Trump himself approved now at the NATO summit for Ukraine to get licensing rights to produce Patriots. So it is quite an important topic. So yes, please feel free to unpack your argument.

#Theodore Postol

Well, let me just slightly expand on the points you were making. We hope it won't occur, but Europe is talking about war with Russia, which I think is delusional, but that's another discussion. I think it's extremely important that the European military and political leaders understand that there can be no defense from the Patriot PAC-3s against Russian ballistic missiles. This is an important finding if you believe that these systems can play a role in future wars. It's also problematic with regard to the

beginning or reopening of hostilities in the Southwest Asia war, because whether or not you have Patriots, it turns out you won't be able to defend against ballistic missiles with them either.

In addition, there are vast expenditures in the future for additional Patriots that people are now contemplating, particularly the U.S. government, and of course, governments that purchase Patriots with the support of the U.S. government. And if these systems don't provide any real defensive capability, this is an important matter for the military planning as well as the political leadership to understand. So this is not a minor issue, although it's a technical detail. It is a technical detail, but it is quite important. We've had this debate before. My joke with my friends is, for me, this is déjà vu all over again, because if I just show you a slide or two here, if we look at past experience, my colleague George Lewis and I published an article in 1993 after the Gulf War of 1991, and in that article, we laid out the technology.

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and the scientific foundation for determining whether or not Patriot in the Gulf War of 1991 actually worked. Now, the history of this has been rewritten. I discovered this when I was in Poland giving a talk, that there's a whole new history of what actually happened. The new history is that they initially thought it worked, then they realized it didn't work because of a congressional investigation. Of course, the congressional investigation occurred because of this particular article and the work of Lewis and Postol. So it didn't just happen to occur; it was because of our work. And we were attacked ferociously, to the point that, quite frankly, I thought, along with other people, that my life was under threat.

This was not a minor attack on the part of Raytheon. And, uh, they went after me through the MIT administration. This was a very unpleasant experience and taught me that all this talk about scholarly freedom, certainly at MIT, is not the case. But in any case, six years later—though it took a long time—six years later, there was a study produced and published in the same refereed journal by a panel of the American Physical Society. And what this article said, right in the abstract, was that they found an absolute contradiction between the Army's claims about the Patriots' performance in the Gulf War and all the engagements we scored in our video data.

So we found the claims initially were that President George H.W. Bush was misled. We later found out he believed that 41 out of 42 Patriot engagements had been successful. So this was like a 96% intercept rate. His Secretary of Defense at the time, Dick Cheney, also believed that this was the case. Now, this is, in some sense, a piece of history, and you might argue it has no significance. But it's kind of a replay of what we're seeing among the European leadership and other leaderships who seem to believe, without evidence, that this system has capability. And it's clear that they're relying on this, or they have been relying on this.

And in fact, the system has not been working since the Gulf War of 1991. So at some level, you could argue it doesn't matter because it's never been working. But if anyone is thinking that they can

depend on this system, or they should be spending tens of billions of dollars or more for more Patriot interceptors so they can defend themselves, this is a serious problem. This is something. Anyway, in addition, the panel stated unequivocally that the techniques that Lewis and Postol used in determining the Patriot's performance in the Gulf War of 1991 were

#Theodore Postol

were scientifically sound. And so if we use those techniques again, we should be able to understand the Patriot's performance in 2026. Now, just to give you a sense of how serious the

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Attempts to misrepresent the performance of Patriot were, and during this period, when George and I first published our analysis, here is a statement—it's just a quote from what actually happened in a congressional hearing. I was at the hearing myself, of course. I was being attacked by members of Congress who were, you know, just repeating what they had been told. And at one point, the chair of the committee, who was very skeptical, asked the program executive officer, General Drolet, "What did the Army mean by intercept?" Because I had just shown videos that demonstrated there were no intercepts. And Drolet responded, "Well, what did the President mean when he said 41 out of 42 were intercepts?" And what Drolet said, to a lot of laughter, was, "Well, what we mean by an intercept is a Patriot in the sky passing in the sky."

So that's how crazy the situation was at that time. Now, one of the things that people might actually not understand is that the Patriot, at the time we analyzed it, was the Patriot PAC-2, not the Patriot PAC-3, which is the more modernized version. The Patriot PAC-2 is a big, heavy missile. You can see my arrow. Is that right? Go ahead. Yeah, yeah, yeah. It goes. Okay. The Patriot PAC-2 is a much heavier interceptor. It works differently from the Patriot PAC-3, which is a much smaller and lighter interceptor. And two things are important. First of all, the Patriot PAC-2, even though it's a larger, heavier missile, costs about a million dollars each. But the Patriot PAC-3, which is substantially more technically sophisticated and roughly one-fourth to one-third the weight, costs \$4 million each.

So typically, the firing doctrine is that you should fire two Patriot PAC-3s at a ballistic missile in order to have a significant chance of intercepting. And the contractors, which are Lockheed Martin now, along with Raytheon, are still claiming a more than 90% intercept rate. So the argument, or the rewritten history, is we thought we had a 96% intercept rate, but we discovered, in fact, the truth was Lewis and Postol demonstrated that the intercept rate was not 96%, but was in fact zero in terms of destruction of the Scud warhead. So it was a big difference between the actual reality that was discovered and pointed out by Lewis and Postol. And now, of course, they just happened to discover this.

They don't explain, of course, though the history shows that they lied repeatedly. They were involved in attempts to intimidate the researchers. They tried to get the administration of the

university where I was a tenured full professor to intimidate me. Pressure was brought on me financially as well as administratively by the university. So this was not an easy situation. Now we're back in the same situation. We now have a situation where they're again claiming a 90% intercept rate. And it turns out the evidence, the video evidence, which the panel of the American Physical Society found, was in fact usable to determine whether or not the Patriot was actually intercepting warheads.

The video evidence shows clearly and unambiguously that the Patriot intercept rate now is maybe 2% or 3%. So this is the more advanced Patriot PAC-3, which costs \$4 million each, not \$1 million each. You fire two of them—\$8 million in an intercept engagement. And it looks like the engagement success rate is maybe 2% or 3%. So, you know, you're spending \$80 million or \$100 million to intercept a ballistic missile, given the rate of intercept, the intercept rate of this missile now. And these companies now want governments to spend more money again on this system, which is clearly not working, to be able to defend against ballistic missiles.

Well, this is simply not a good situation. So let me just quickly show you what the Patriot PAC-3 is supposed to do, which is different, again, from the Patriot PAC-2, which I won't discuss in much detail here. That can be done in future discussions if people are interested enough. The Patriot PAC-2 has a radar that's literally in the interceptor. So this system, unlike the Patriot PAC-2, which homes on reflected radio signals from a ground-based radar, the Patriot PAC-3 is cued to a target by the ground-based radar, but then as it goes toward the target, it homes on the target by using its own radar.

And with this radar, it tries to find the front end of the target, and it tries to kinetically destroy the warhead by running into the warhead and kinetically destroying the target. So this is a direct hit-to-kill warhead. The Patriot PAC-2 had an explosive warhead on it, and it tried to damage the incoming missile or detonate the warhead with fragments from the explosive warhead. That turned out to be completely incapable of doing the job. So they went to this much more advanced hit-to-kill system, which costs \$4 million each rather than \$1 million each. And it depends on being able to be accurate enough to hit the front end of the missile. If it hits the back of the missile, the warhead will simply break off, go to the ground, and explode.

#Theodore Postol

This particular company, this is Lockheed Martin, shows in a video you can find on the web. I have the YouTube URL to it. So this is Lockheed Martin's own simulation. It's a simulation they've done with their own simulation software of an intercept attempt. So this is what they find as an example of an intercept attempt. And so what you see here, this is the target. We have a rough estimate of the target's radar cross section. I won't get into the details of how we do that. I can show that in great detail. It's a very small radar cross section, which means that the distance at which the interceptor can detect the incoming target is relatively small.

It's only a few kilometers, which means that the interceptor only has a very limited maneuver time. And so, basically, the idea is that the interceptor is maneuvering to hit this target. So this is a simulation. It's showing you the thousands of seconds before the actual intercept. And we see the intercept is getting closer, closer, closer, and closer. And then this is the last video frame. It hits the target. The warhead—it misses the warhead. So we know from our simulations, from data we have from the Gulf War of 1991 and data we have from the Gulf War of 2006, that if you hit the missile body and not the warhead, the warhead is going to go onto the ground undamaged and explode.

So what they're showing in their own video is that the system will be defeated by... Their particular simulation shows that the interceptor was defeated, even in their own simulation. They didn't even understand that from the earlier analysis my colleague George Lewis and I had done from the Gulf War of 1991. Now, if I go back to share, let's just look at the video data. Remember, the video data, which I'm going to explain, is going to show you what is actually happening. So let's start looking at the video data. Here it is.

#Theodore Postol

Here we're going to see probably 50 or 100 warheads coming in, and we'll only see one intercept. I'll show you the intercept in slow motion. What you're seeing now is no evidence of any intercepts. I'll show you what an intercept looks like so you'll know exactly what to look for in future videos. So here are all these missiles coming in, and you're going to see an intercept here. This particular warhead is going to be destroyed by a Patriot. You see the whole sky light up because the explosion of the warhead is very dramatic. You're seeing this at one-tenth speed, and you'll see here the remnant of the intercept, but you see two of the three warheads go onto the ground, and when they explode on the ground, you see very bright flashes.

So in the roughly 50 or 100 missiles coming in, there was one intercept. So the real-time massed attack should look like this. There should be intercepts everywhere. If you had a 90% intercept rate, you should be seeing intercepts everywhere. I'm showing you these little circles—you don't see that. In other words, you don't see what should look like a July 4th fireworks display. You just see these missiles coming in. You don't see any evidence of successful intercepts. Now here we have another example of no intercepts, and this is in slow motion. We'll see a bright flash in the sky—that's from a bright ground explosion—and then we're going to see a submunition release.

This is, again, very slow motion. There's a second ground explosion, which lights up the sky. So that's another failed intercept. And now we see something coming in and submunitions being dispensed, and then another ground explosion. So this was a compound warhead. What we actually saw here was a warhead that was a big explosive warhead, and it also dispensed submunitions. Then we see, in five seconds—because this is slow motion—another... I'm sorry, it's still too fast. This is the warhead coming in. There are the submunitions being dispensed and falling to the ground. There was a ground explosion that you saw. No evidence of any intercepts at all here.

And what we instead see are these anti-personnel-sized submunitions falling to the ground, plus this bright flash from the warhead that dispensed the submunition. So this is a very, very complex target. Here again, we have Tel Aviv—no intercept. Here again, we're going to see an intercept in the sky where almost a Patriot dives to the ground. Then we're going to see evidence of another intercept in the sky that's very bright, but no other bright explosions. So again, what we should be seeing, if there's a 90% intercept rate, is the sky filled with bright explosions of intercepts. So again, the video evidence is showing you that the intercept rate is very low—maybe 1% or 2%.

So the video reveals unambiguously that, if you know what you're looking for, the Patriots are not successful in making intercepts at all. Here again is the same thing shown again. This is one of the Alpha Tau warheads coming in. It shows you at very high speed—no evidence of an intercept, explosion on the ground. In this case, we see a shockwave propagating out because the violence of the explosion is so high, because the Alpha Tau comes in at a speed where its equivalent weight of TNT is added to the explosive power of the warhead as well. So it's an even more intense explosion. Here we see a rapidly maneuvering warhead. We can see that the warhead is rapidly maneuvering because we see it zigzagging, and the ground should be zigzagging.

#Glenn

Okay.

#Theodore Postol

All right. We'll just go to the back end of the video here. We again see an attack coming in. It's just a line of warheads coming in, and we'll see one intercept out of these many dozens, many scores of warheads coming in. There's the intercept, but that's in real time. So I'm going to slow it down into slow motion so you know what you're looking for. Anyone who has a video who can slow it down into slow motion can identify the intercepts easily now. There's the intercept. And if you focus on the bright area, you don't see any bright object coming through relative to the object that was coming in initially. So that's a clear intercept. So, um, we can just end this now and discuss the question of, you know, what is really going on here?

And I think the answer is that we have unambiguous evidence—overwhelming, unambiguous evidence—that the Patriot PAC-3, the more advanced interceptor that costs \$4 million each, typically, according to doctrine, two of which are fired at a ballistic missile in order to intercept it. And we have a 2% or 3% intercept rate. So let's say it's 2%, one out of 50 engagements. So we have 100 interceptors fired in order to intercept a single ballistic missile. That's its effectiveness. So this is not a good situation if you're worried about being torn to pieces by ballistic missile attacks from Iran and you're Israel. And I can show—it's another long talk—that the Iron Dome has also got a near-zero intercept rate. So what we have been having is a giant deception in terms of what the public is being told about how much protection they're getting from missile defenses.

And one of the reasons for it—it's not the sole reason—one of the reasons for it is that the contractors are getting hundreds of billions of dollars by falsely claiming that these intercept systems are working. And this is a tremendous drain on the European, American, and other countries that are buying these missile defense systems in the hope of mitigating the consequences of ballistic missile attacks. So it certainly has higher-order implications for what could happen if we have a general war or general wars where these missiles are going to be used. And we now know that countries like Iran, and certainly Russia, can manufacture very large numbers of ballistic missiles with conventional warheads and do tremendous levels of damage with those missiles.

Their accuracies have gotten very high, and their warhead weights are significant. We're talking about, you know, tons—one and a half tons of munitions, of high explosives—which can do very considerable damage. So this is the situation that we're now facing. And it's extremely important that both political and military leadership understand this. And this is why we have, of course, other things going on right now. You have been, and properly, having people on to discuss the breakdown in the war in Southwest Asia, the Ukraine situation. And I don't have a lot important to say about that, except in this ancillary discussion of this technical detail, which is enormously relevant because of these other ongoing military activities. So, anyway, that's the situation at the moment.

#Glenn

But we see all this—we know that Israel has very strict limitations on what the media is allowed to cover. That is, they—I mean, it's very open now, not a very great secret—how much destruction has happened in Israel that they didn't want to reveal during the Iranian attack. We also know now from the satellite photos that the U.S. was not very open about the destruction of its bases across the Middle East. So again, the destruction was much greater than what was reported during the war. Well, what is the main importance here, though? Well, I think...

#Theodore Postol

I've been thinking about this. I'm not sure I fully understand the main importance of this. But the most profound possibility, which I think is real, is that the existence of air defenses for military purposes may turn out to no longer be possible. Keep in mind that the ballistic missiles are becoming more and more accurate, so they can potentially target Patriot radars. In addition, we already know that drones are more than capable of destroying Patriot radars. They destroyed THAAD radars very early in the Gulf War of 2026 in Southwest Asia—literally within the first day, all of the long-range ballistic missile defense radars were destroyed by Iran.

The Patriot radars are somewhat more difficult to destroy, not because they're defensible or defended, but because they're a little harder to find since they're a bit more mobile. But a little bit more mobile is what I mean—they're not easy to hide. These things are radiating very large amounts of radio signal, and the drones can be modified to home in on radio signals along with other techniques. So between satellite reconnaissance, electronic reconnaissance, and drones—

which can even be networked—you can have a swarm of drones with artificial intelligence and internet links between them. And one of the surveillance drones sees a Patriot defense unit.

They should immediately be able to locate the radar, and then the radar has to defend itself against tens or hundreds of drones. So I'm not sure that Patriot units will be survivable in the future. The S-300 is a somewhat different system than the S-400 and S-500. I haven't had a chance to study that; it may have a similarly poor future. But in the case of the S-300, S-400, and S-500, those systems do not depend on a single high-performance radar to function. They use multiple radars, so taking them out requires the destruction of multiple radars. Each of the radars that are destroyed is expensive, but they're not essentially irreplaceable like the Patriot radar units are for a Patriot unit.

You know, the radars probably cost \$200 or \$300 million. So, you know, it's not like you lose a \$10 million ancillary radar and have a backup radar that you can bring online. So the Patriot is the worst possible design relative to the S-300 to S-500 system. I think we could be looking at a future situation where the Patriot radars are no longer viable for defense. Now, this is not minor because the Patriot radars pose an absolutely overwhelming threat to aircraft. An enemy air force can essentially be kept out of the defense area of a Patriot defense unit because the Patriot interceptors have such a high intercept rate against airplanes. That's simply because the airplanes are going so much more slowly. Any damage you do to an airplane causes its destruction.

So the Patriots probably do have a 90 to near 100% intercept rate against airplanes. So if you have a Patriot defense unit defending Kiev, it's not possible for the Russian Air Force to just come into Kiev and bomb the place at will. But, of course, if the Patriot unit can be destroyed by drones and ballistic missiles, then air power becomes completely dominant and you can use it at your will. And, you know, you can use these FAB, you know, 3,000 bombs, these missiles—3,000-kilogram wire-guided bombs that have precision delivery of 5 or 10 meters. I mean, you're talking about a hellish situation for ground troops if you have an adversary who can keep their Air Force in the air relative to you. And unless you have an Air Force that can take them on directly, you won't be able to do it with ground-based defenses, it seems to me.

That's not a minor change in the military landscape. I don't know if this is true at this point, but I think this is possibly what we're facing in the future. So Patriot may—you may have to abandon Patriot for a completely different kind of distributed air defense system, where it has multiple, much less capable radars trying to do things so that you can afford to lose some of these radars and still have a viable air defense. I don't know what the solution is going to be, but it's not going to be easy. And I don't think the future is going to continue to have Patriot as a military solution in the long term—probably not even in the near term. So this is a significant military development from what I can tell.

#Glenn

Yeah, and also perceptions are important, though. That is, for the U.S. and Israel, which have been seen in the region as being all-powerful, a part of this image has, of course, been upheld by the Israeli Iron Dome—the assumption that it had complete and total efficiency, that nothing could possibly hit any target in Israel. This has been quite important for countries who take this into account when they view to what extent they could engage in a conflict with the Israelis. So again, the perceptions are important now that this is beginning to crack. It seems as if warfare will be impacted greatly in that part of the world.

#Theodore Postol

Yeah, now another problem that I haven't even begun to discuss here—and I can briefly touch on it if we have enough time—is countermeasures. What we see in the videos are warheads that are just falling. They're not evading. I showed some evading warheads, but that wasn't the warheads where we saw intercepts. The warheads we saw intercepts against were simply ballistically falling warheads. They were not warheads that had rocket motors pushing them along, like one of the warheads I showed, the Al-Fatah warhead. Those warheads are very unlikely to be interceptable by the Patriot PAC-3 because you need to have an estimate of where it's going to be possible to make an intercept, since it takes time for the interceptor to get to a location where you can then make minor adjustments to hit the target.

And with a rocket motor accelerating this incoming warhead, you don't know where that location is because the rocket motor can change its thrust. The rocket motor can actually cause the warhead to maneuver. So if we go back and just show you a few examples of countermeasures that are already demonstrated—so we're not talking about theoretical stuff at this point. I've been talking about this for years, and every time I talk about it, the critique is that, oh, you know, we haven't seen this. And, of course, my argument at the time was, well, you have no reason to see it because you already can't intercept the ballistic targets. So why would I spend any time building a countermeasure? But now the Iranians have decided that they want to build countermeasures.

So here is the rocket-propelled Al-Fatah warhead. Here's a better view of it, showing you its size. The rocket motor is back here, the warhead is up in front. That's easily a one-ton warhead, so that's going to do a lot of damage. And in the case of the Al-Fatah, the rocket motor causes the warhead to maintain a very high speed while it's reentering the atmosphere, so it hits the ground at maybe three or more kilometers per second. At three kilometers per second, if this warhead had no explosives in it at all, it would have the explosive power of its entire weight in high explosives because it hits the ground so fast that the kinetic energy released is the equivalent of its weight in TNT and other high explosives. So this has got double.

So this is like a two or two and a half or three-ton warhead hitting the ground, which is why we saw the shockwave associated with the ground explosion with the Al-Fatah, because this thing hit the ground at such a high speed that when its high explosives detonated, it was already carrying the

kinetic energy equal to the high explosives in terms of motion. So the damaging ability of this particular warhead is tremendously higher, and it's even harder to intercept. If we look at all these ballistic missiles of different kinds, notice that all the warheads have winglets on them. And if you have winglets, what you can do with the winglets is you can cause the warheads to maneuver by just maneuvering the winglets.

So here's a maneuvering warhead. There's no way a Patriot PAC-3 is going to hit that. It's just, you know, it has a 2% or 3% intercept rate against a target that's not maneuvering, that's predictable in its motion. Here's the same thing — this is the Sejil warhead. You can see it's powered; this more dense stream you see here is the second stage of the Sejil, and this is the Sejil warhead. Its plume is very broad because it's at very high altitudes, and there's no atmosphere around it to contain the plume into a narrow contrail. Here again are the submunitions. You can't intercept submunitions. You just don't have enough missiles to intercept the submunitions.

And here, for example, this is a mock-up, which is shown in an Iranian facility that's open to the public. So this is like a 150-millimeter artillery shell. And we saw those things being deployed here. On a bigger warhead than this — this is a small warhead — this is just an example of the submunitions. Here up on the left, there are small subunits. This is not a unique warhead. So you either have a big warhead that's carrying hundreds or even thousands of these smaller anti-personnel warheads, or tens or many scores of the equivalent of 150- or 155-millimeter artillery shells. So these are the countermeasures. This is an example of one of these countermeasures — basic artillery shells.

You can see in the back here, you can see evidence of a fold-out wing. And the utility of the fold-out wing is it causes the warhead to point downward aerodynamically. So when the warhead hits the ground, the fragments generated by the warhead are spread out near the surface of the ground. They're not oriented in an inefficient killing way. This is a very efficient way to cause lots of damage to people on the ground. Here's another — this is an Iskander ballistic missile, and you notice on the back here you have these vents. Well, it turns out these vents carry decoys. These are decoys that are deployed from those vents, and the decoys have electronic circuits in them, and they mimic the appearance of a warhead.

So when you have one of these Iskanders come in, first of all, the Iskander can maneuver. So it can defeat the interceptor, even if the interceptor manages to figure out where the warhead is, because the warhead has probably got a jammer on it, a radio jammer on it. But it's got all these other electronic jammers coming along with it. So you have no chance at all to defeat the system. Anyway, the situation is such that between the drones and the ballistic missiles, air defenses are going to play no role in the future. And as long as you can build very inexpensive drones and have them highly accurate and homing, and very inexpensive ballistic missiles with large warheads, you're in deep trouble.

And we know that Netanyahu told Trump that he's worried. He's more worried about the Iranian ballistic missiles than the nuclear weapons. We have him on record for that. And he should be, because Iran does not need to use nuclear weapons to defeat, to really destroy Israel's ability to fight and to support an economy. And that's what they're looking at now. If this war starts up again in a serious way and the Iranians start going at Israel again with ballistic missiles, there will be no defense. They can claim all they want, but the evidence is clear. The evidence is unambiguous that these air defense systems have no capability against ballistic missiles or drones.

#Glenn

Well, Ted, thank you so much for sharing your insights and the slides here. I think most people started realizing that the interceptor missiles, their efficiency had definitely been oversold. That is, when all the damages were essentially prohibited from being reported on. And later on, of course, this has come to light. So thank you very much.

#Theodore Postol

And remember one other point. If those ballistic missiles are nuclear-armed, God help us, because the defenses will be able to do nothing to stop them. And that's true of the strategic systems as well, which is another discussion. So anyone who thinks that these ballistic missile defenses, whether they're strategic or tactical, can play any role in defending you from the mortal consequences of either mass conventional attacks or nuclear attacks is really courting an existential disaster.

#Theodore Postol

This is really important for people to understand.