

Iran Has Trump RUNNING Scared as Mossad IMPLODES, UAE Ships BURN | Mark Sleboda

Mark Sleboda discusses the massive upheaval in the Trump and Israeli regimes as Iran imposes its will on the outcome of the war. Mossad is imploding, and UAE ships are being struck by Iranian fire as a new Middle East takes shape. <https://boosty.to/therealpolitick> Subscribe for more in-depth geopolitical analysis! Leave your thoughts in the comments below! Support the Channel: Patreon: <https://www.patreon.com/dannyhaiphong> SUBSCRIBE ON RUMBLE: Rumble: <https://rumble.com/c/DannyHaiphong> Follow Me on Social Media: Twitter: <https://twitter.com/DannyHaiphong> Telegram: <https://t.me/DannyHaiphong> Support the channel in other ways: <https://www.buymeacoffee.com/dannyhaiphong> Substack: chroniclesofhaiphong.substack.com Cashapp: \$Dhaiphong Venmo: @dannyH2020 Paypal: <https://paypal.me/spiritofho> #iran #iranwar #trump

#Danny

Welcome back to the show, everyone. As you can see, I'm joined by Mark Sloboda, geopolitical analyst and military affairs expert, to talk about the latest developments. We have first, Donald Trump seems to be running scared from his own war of aggression on Iran, as Trump's top general is now looking for an off-ramp from this war, as U.S. options remain limited. Inside the article, it says that air power alone will not win this war and that every escalation option risks backfiring, with munitions now dangerously low.

This came as reports on the Iran-Oman technical talks coming to a deal on the Strait of Hormuz have been reported to be close. But now it seems that the United States, without any MOU process or anything like this, will lift the blockade on Iran once that deal is announced. Now, there's also a big shakeup in Israel, where Mossad has sacked two senior officials for failing to topple the Iranian government. The Times of Israel said that the two were among the architects of a written operational plan to bring down the Islamic Republic with the help of Iran's minority groups, like the Kurds, encouraging revived mass protests to oust the government.

Also happening in the Strait of Hormuz, UAE state-owned oil company ADNOC says three of its vessels this week have been directly struck with Iranian missiles and drones. Today, it appears another one was struck in the Strait of Hormuz, another UAE vessel. And in the Omani area, there are reports that Iran has boarded a vessel. No clarity on where that vessel came from exactly. But nevertheless, Mark, this appears to be all very bad news for the empire of chaos, for the U.S. hegemon. What do you make of developments around the Iran war right now as we head into, I think, a very uncertain period?

#Mark Sleboda

Yeah, I mean, it says quite clearly that Iran is in the driver's seat. I mean, it is no secret that the U.S.-Israeli goal, the real goal when they began all of this—you could even say when they began it last year in 2025, but certainly this year—was regime change. I mean, that was spoken of openly by Trump, among many other things that he at various times suggested. But we have to assume that that was the penultimate. The surprising thing is that it is being released this openly and publicly, the firing of two top Mossad officials, their head of intelligence and their head of the Iran desk, specifically for failing to achieve regime change. And what's more, they specifically talked about fostering armed insurgency in Iran. And that was one of my questions from the very beginning of this.

Before the actual war kicked off months ago, but when we all knew it was coming, I actually did a video on my channel talking about the Iranian Kurdish separatists, the Baluchi separatists, the Mujahedin-e-Khalq, which the U.S. still keeps on a leash in Albania, and, you know, the other potential separatist insurgent groups on the ground that could have been used to bring the fight to Iran on the ground within Iran without putting U.S. troops on the ground. And we never saw it. And I expressed my surprise at this. And at some point in the last month or so, we saw the Trump administration begin talking about the Kurds again and saying, all during this time, Iran has just been pummeling the Iranian Kurdish separatists who are based out of Iraqi Kurdistan, Erbil and elsewhere there.

I mean, they've just been hitting them with drones and missiles and sending forces on special forces operations, on assassination missions against Kurdish leaders this entire time, this entire conflict. And just now, in the last week, the U.S. has completed its withdrawal from Iraqi Kurdistan. They said that it packed up their last Patriot. We've had some reports that that Patriot may have been hit and damaged or destroyed by Iranian strikes. We don't know, you know, for certain whether that's true or not. But what we do know now definitely is that American air defense, not that it ever performed that well, and that the American troops are once again abandoning Kurdish proxies of the United States.

It seems that there's never—there's always another group of Kurdish proxies that become available and throw themselves, you know, as, you know, victims of the United States to use against other countries. It doesn't ever seem to be any shortage of them, but now they're being fed to the wolves. And, you know, it was obvious to me for some time now that this certainly could have been done. There's a question about ultimately its effectiveness, the numbers involved in the plans, of course, but it was never done. And it became obvious to me at some point that, for whatever reason, the CIA and Mossad had simply not done the groundwork that would have been necessary to properly train and activate those separatist groups. At least it seems to have always been a second thought for them until it was too late.

And now we find out that Mossad had people specifically in charge of that who, well, terribly failed at their job, it must be said. So there's that. I mean, we have to assume that at some point these programs are all going to be, you know, restarted, rebooted, reactivated from ground zero—protests and insurgent, you know, minority ethnic insurgent groups and so forth. I mean, ultimately, the U.S. and Israel will go back to that, having failed militarily to overthrow the Iranian government, having failed economically to strangle Iran. That's the only thing that they have, is covert means. So eventually they will go back to it. But at least in Mossad, they're going to have to start from ground zero because the people that were in charge of those programs are now getting the axe for their failures.

I guess we can only applaud that. If only U.S. intelligence held its own people responsible, at least as directly and openly as Mossad has hung them in the public square at this point, maybe there would be some accountability. But anyway, so, you know, there won't be any tears shed, you know, certainly from this audience, towards them seeing, you know, being shown the exit door. But, you know, it's nice to hear nonetheless, because we know now that it is a card permanently off the board and that there's, you know, no possibility of any unexpected surprise from that direction. We also know that Trump, once again, we had a TACO last weekend, and we had another threat early this week that Iran must come to some agreement with Oman that the U.S. is totally not involved in. Well, I mean, not officially. And the Iranians keep insisting that the U.S. not be involved.

But the U.S. has been trying, of course, to puppet Oman in all of this, but it doesn't appear to have been very successful. Trump threatened another devastating airstrike against Iran early this week—the fourth, I believe—unless Iran came to that agreement. Well, Iran never has finalized an agreement, not even for future administration of the Strait with Oman, much less reopening it now. And Trump tacoed again. So we got two servings of tacos in one week. And I mean, personally, I love tacos. I mean, depending on the type of tacos, of course. But I mean, I do like some variety in my menu generally, and that might even be a little too much tacos. With the negotiations that are going on between Iran and Oman, Iran clearly feeling in the driver's seat now, right, with the Houthis.

I mean, we've got the Houthis gone wild in the Red Sea, attacking Saudi Arabia, attacking the UAE, perhaps even as far away as Kuwait with Iranian missiles, and sinking ships in the Bab el-Mandeb Straits this last week. And now we have the U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Dan Kaine, openly saying that the U.S. is looking for an exit ramp because there's nothing they can do. They have no military options at this point. And Trump is just sounding increasingly frustrated, increasingly despondent. He's even admitted, you know, on TV that, you know, early in the week, it was, yes, we control the straits. They're partially open, sort of. And then by the end of the week, it was, yeah, Iran can hit them with missiles or sea mines or drones. And they can always do that.

There's really nothing we can do, admitting that it is not safe for passage, something blatantly obvious because Iran has kept hitting every ship that the U.S. tried to, quote-unquote, guide or push through the southern corridor of the Strait of Hormuz, hugging Oman's coast during this week. So no

luck there. The one concern that I have is that the most recent news that I've seen is that Iran is actually increasing their demands now. Maybe feeling too confident, maybe getting a little too cocky. So their new demands for opening the Strait of Hormuz are a list of nine measures that harken back to the Memorandum of Understanding, but even go a bit further. So they're demanding removal of all sanctions on Iran. They're demanding the return of all of Iran's stolen frozen funds. They're demanding \$300 billion in war reparations.

They can call it reconstruction, whatever they want. They want acceptance that they're going to control and charge service fees going forward for transit through the Strait of Hormuz. But they're also demanding an end to all insults from the United States. And I mean, let's be frank, that's not possible with Donald Trump as president. I mean, he lives and breathes, you know, childish, puerile posts on social media. So, I mean, they can't even expect that, all threats and insults. But they're also demanding a permanent end to the U.S. and Israeli war of aggression against Iran, but also Lebanon, which the Israelis have already refused. They're not going to pull out of South Lebanon. And they continue. I mean, just today, there were more bombings and artillery shells of Iranian towns and villages in South Lebanon.

That has never changed. Palestine as well. I mean, we all feel here for the Palestinian people, particularly with the state that Gaza is in, you know, the very real threat of famine, the U.S. now setting up military bases in the Gaza Strip. But I have to be honest, being a realist, Iran has a lot of leverage in this situation, but they don't have the leverage to bring peace to every problem in the Middle East, including Palestine. That might be reaching things a bit too far. And, of course, Yemen and Iraq as well. Although, you know, right now it's the Houthis who seem to be in the driver's seat against Saudi Arabia, at the least. Certainly, there's a lot more valuable infrastructure that they can destroy of Saudi Arabia's, and quite, you know, with impunity anyway, rather than the other way around.

#Danny

So.

#Mark Sleboda

It almost seems that Iran is maybe pushing things too far. And I have to think that Russia and China will quietly be urging them, you know, maybe these are maximalist demands. You know, maybe, you know, they're establishing a position of strength. You know, that's a diplomatic tactic. Certainly, the U.S. calls bluffs and maximalist demands a lot. So maybe we shouldn't make too much of that. But quite obviously, they're feeling their leverage. They're feeling their strength. It is now becoming undeniable, even to the Western mainstream media, you know, the reality of the situation, no matter what Trump, you know, and his administration of Trump propagandistic fools have been shouting for the last few months. Even the British Telegraph, you know, "How the U.S. lost the war to Iran." I mean, headline front-page news now.

And now it's just finalizing the control of the Strait of Hormuz, which is Iran's deterrent. There we go. This is proof Iran won the war. Thanks. And this is the control of the Strait of Hormuz. It's not about the surface fees, just— although the surface fees alone will increase Iran's GDP by another third, potentially. Even at five to seven percent, it will be quite significant income when you do all the math on a return to normal traffic through the Strait of Hormuz. But it is part of their deterrent and regional power. It's a bit too early to call it regional hegemony yet, but there's certainly the potential there moving forward. Now, one thing that is going to be obvious, however this finally ends, the other Gulf states that border on the Strait of Hormuz are going to be looking and actively developing every possible bypass for themselves to avoid the Strait of Hormuz, right?

You know, maybe not entirely, but, you know, provide themselves with more options. Like already exists with Saudi Arabia's east-west pipeline to Yanbu on the Red Sea. But there, of course, we see they're vulnerable to Iran's allies, the Ansar Allah movement, the Houthis in Yemen. So there's a problem with that. The UAE's port of Fujairah, which exits outside of the Strait of Hormuz, is also obviously not out of easy IRGC Navy control. As well, we're going to see more of this. Iraq is looking at resurrecting pipeline plans to take oil by pipeline through Turkey to the Med, because actually the Iraqi economy has been hurt by all of this more than anyone else, and other countries as well.

So they're all going to be looking for alternatives to the Strait of Hormuz. And that's where the second part of Iran's future deterrent and leverage comes in, and it dovetails with the physical control of the Strait of Hormuz. And that is something we've already seen. It's Iran's demonstrated long-range strike capability against these alternative infrastructure projects with missiles, drones, you know, and possibly other vectors as well. And they're both necessary. And Iran has demonstrated both of them, and they've used both of them, but they are inseparable, right? They have to be considered as a whole because the Gulf states will definitely be looking for more alternatives. But Iran obviously retains the ability to reach out and control or destroy those alternative bypasses as well.

And what's more, it has become painfully obvious to everyone, to the Gulf states, to the entirety of the world, that the U.S. and Israel both together are unable to provide air defense. They're unable to provide a security guarantee. They're unable to provide air defense against Iran's missiles and drones. And there's no foreseeable future where they will be able to do so, because even say they manage to ramp up Patriot interceptor, THAAD interceptor production within a few years down the road and rebuild their own stockpiles and start supplying allies again sometime in the next decade, we've already seen that the Patriot, the PAC-3, is obsolete. It's incapable of stopping Iranian ballistic missiles, just totally incapable of doing it.

You know, how many times have we seen seven, eight, nine? Uh, we saw the word came out that Saudi Arabia, during the period of this conflict—there it is right there—there's the number: 2,800 Patriot interceptors used just by Saudi Arabia in the last few months. To what effect? Uh, oh my God, that is just, uh, it's such a beautiful 38 days. Mark 38 days. We're just over a month. I mean,

how many are they firing a minute there? It's just like opening up, you know, like the scene with that rail gun in The Predator with Jesse Ventura, the forest with the Saudis. We saw similar things from the Bahrainis as well, firing off Patriots and all. So they're obsolete. They're simply incapable.

I mean, they still have some use in deterring aircraft, right? Because aircraft are a much easier target. If you want to waste the missiles on drones, yeah, they could. And they still have capability against older cruise missiles and the like, possibly. Uh, but I mean, obviously, against any modern ballistic missiles, they're completely ineffective. Older ones, yes, but Iran obviously has plenty of modern ballistic missiles, and obviously some hypersonics as well, which the Patriot doesn't have a chance in hell of intercepting. Uh, so facing this, facing that there's no security guarantor against Iran, they're left with two things. One, come to some type of modus vivendi, some arrangement with Iran itself, which they still seem very hesitant to do, at least publicly.

And the other one we've seen roll out just in the last 24 hours. And that is, there is a new defensive pact announced in the Middle East. And that is a defensive alliance pact between Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Turkey. And what's more, this seems to go beyond the strict definition of a strategic partnership, like, say, Russia and Iran and China and Iran and Russia and China have. But also, from everything I've seen, Now Arabia at least was reporting that it has a self-defense clause, that an attack on one shall be considered an attack on all, which, I mean, aren't there any asterisks or caveats?

Of course, we don't know the full text, but I mean, if Pakistan goes to war with India again, is Saudi Arabia obliged to attack, you know, to take action against India? I doubt it. And, you know, the same thing, you know, has to be raised with Iran. And the timing of all of this being announced was very interesting, because just hours before that, there were reports, admittedly coming from Saudi Arabia, that Saudi Arabia was expecting a joint, coordinated attack on Saudi infrastructure and military facilities over the weekend, imminently, by the Houthis, by Ansar Allah, by Iraqi Shia militias and military units. And they actually said by the IRGC as well. Now, that doesn't mean that that was really going to happen.

We don't know that. Certainly, there have been attacks on Saudi Arabia in the last week by the Houthis and likely by Shia militias out of Iraq as well, right? That has happened. Whether the IRGC would have been directly involved, of course, is another question, another story. But this announcement almost seemed like it was meant to forestall that, right? To stop that from happening. And indeed, we had Iranian officials put out statements immediately that what they called this "paper shield" of Saudi Arabia would not protect them, and that they should, rather than looking to other people for defense, for security, they should just—they didn't say the words exactly—but come to terms with Iran themselves.

They said, "Improve their behavior," and so forth, but what they meant was that Saudi Arabia needs to, you know, sit down with Iran themselves and agree on, you know, a security framework inclusively for the region, which would ultimately, of course, mean kicking the U.S. out, of course,

which is—Saudi Arabia, the other Gulf states are obviously not happy with the United States. They obviously understand that the U.S. cannot be a security guarantor like it was before. In fact, it actually seems to be inviting attack on them. But that doesn't mean that they can divorce their military relationship with the United States tomorrow, because ultimately they get the vast majority of their military equipment and supplies from the United States.

And simply, I mean, in logistics and all types of military, you can't just do that. You can't just go cold turkey and abandon everything your military has and start over again tomorrow. That would be, you know, insane and awful, and simply impossible. Now, it might be something they start working towards, you know, with China, with Russia, with European countries, possibly, you know, over time. But it's not something that can be done immediately. So this is their plan B. This is their new plan A, maybe, is regional security by other states that, you know, they have shared interests in.

#Danny

Saudi Arabia and Turkey, of course, have their differences.

#Mark Sleboda

And in many ways they are, they can be, in various situations, rivals for influence across the wider Middle East and North Africa. But Saudi Arabia and Pakistan have long had an established strategic partnership. It's kind of an open secret, quote unquote, that it was Saudi Arabia that helped fund, to a very significant degree, Pakistan's nuclear program to develop a nuclear weapon. And it is widely rumored that there is an arrangement that Pakistan has essentially nukes for Saudi's protection, held in reserve as an unofficial nuclear umbrella over Saudi Arabia. So this would be taking that to another degree, though, another degree of, well, I mean, that's a defense alliance as far as I read it.

Again, I'm sure that there are exceptions and caveats and so forth. But it is a very interesting development. And all of this—Iran's newfound strength, even cockiness with demands on reopening the Strait of Hormuz, the Saudis desperately looking to other countries for new regional security arrangements—it all speaks to a complete collapse of U.S.-Israeli hegemony in the Middle East, and even of their overall military weakness in the region. And everyone is well aware now. Trump has promised to go after the traitors who leaked this information. I don't know where Trump is coming from, because we've been talking about this for, I don't know, years now? At least a couple of years. Danny, I know we have.

And many of the other guests on your show about this U.S. Achilles' heel of their poor air defense, of their shortage of air defense interceptor production, the very slow rate of it, but also of standoff munitions, of the Tomahawks and the JASSMs, that are now, you know, scraping the bottom of as well, with low production rates. And we just found out this last week that the most recent, you know, that this war on Iran has brought U.S. inventories of ATACMS ballistic missiles and the new replacement for the ATACMS, the Precision Strike Missiles, to near-zero levels. That was the phrase

used, near-zero levels. So they've expended so much, thousands of munitions, to no effect. I mean, they've done damage, but to no strategic effect. In fact, it's quite clear.

The U.S. has been strategically defeated by Iran, with possibly some help from some local allies and possibly some intelligence help from Russia and China. But Iran has defeated the United States or Israel. You could argue both Iran has defeated the United States and Israel strategically in the Middle East. It might be better to say, in some ways, that the United States has strategically defeated itself with its absolute power idiocy in, you know, undertaking this to begin with, when we saw all of these limitations that the U.S. came up against before they began. We talked about it, and—but somehow it's just news for Trump this week, and he's venting on poor, poor war-bro Pete Hegseth, like Pete Hegseth has never told him this before. And Pete Hegseth is, "No, it wasn't me."

#Danny

It was my assistant, Hegseth, Hegseth.

#Mark Sleboda

He's Stephen Feinberg, something like that. He started blaming one of his deputies, who then got a dressing-down from Trump. So there's some shifting of blame, some Judas goats being staked out within the U.S. government, all of this. And Trump can rant and scream about traitors and treason and traitorous media advertising the U.S. weakness to the entirety of the world. Ultimately, we knew that these limitations were there, and he went right up against them in his hubris and his megalomania. And now the price, you know, is to be paid. This is the biggest U.S. geostrategic blunder and defeat ever. Bigger than, you know, in the modern era, bigger than the Iraq War. I mean, George W. Bush comes off looking good in this regard compared to Trump's mistakes.

#Danny

Yeah, most definitely. Mark, before we continue, your camera has slowed down quite a bit. I don't know if you're able to reduce the size of it to 480 or whatever. You could also reload if that helps, too.

#Mark Sleboda

Yeah, that's what I'll try.

#Danny

Okay. All right. So Mark is going to come right back to the program, and we will continue the conversation. Yes, Mark's last point there: biggest geostrategic blunder in the United States' history. I would say that we could even believe that it's bigger than Vietnam was, because at least after the

Vietnam defeat, the United States was still the hegemon, and the United States as an empire was still looking to consolidate its power. Now, after the post-1991 order, where the United States declared itself the only alternative, losing to Iran at this stage of the empire's life is a significant, significant development. Not least because this is the region, West Asia, which the United States was hoping to not move away from, in the sense of how it's advertised often, to get out of West Asia, but reduce emphasis to get to Russia and China. That doesn't look at all possible. Mark, you're back, but your camera is still a bit slow. Are you able to hear me okay?

#Mark Sleboda

Yeah, let me give me one more second, and I'll try to show something else.

#Danny

Sure. Yes. So we'll get Mark back in here in a second. So yes, the United States was still looking to expand and consolidate its power after the fall that it had in Vietnam, the defeat. Now, with the U.S. supposedly being the hegemon of all hegemonies, there being no alternative, and West Asia was supposed to be cemented, at least in the realm of chaos. There was supposed to be sufficient chaos. Israel was supposed to do a lot of the United States' dirty work, and now has become so big in its role in that regard that many believe that it's Israel pulling the strings on the United States. Getting to this level now of defeat to Iran really changes a lot of things.

And what Mark was saying about the defense pact has something to do with it as well, with Turkey, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia coming together. But Mark, all right, let's get back right into it. What do you make of Iran? You know, there were reports that the UAE and Iran had struck some kind of backdoor deal where some of its assets were released in the UAE, shipped oil out of the Strait of Hormuz undetected, with Iran not firing at them. And then suddenly, Iran can't stop firing at UAE vessels in the Strait of Hormuz. What do you make of it? I mean, this is now four, if we count today's, you know, in the last 24 hours, of these vessels being hit. Yeah. What's your thoughts on this?

#Mark Sleboda

Yeah, I've heard all sorts of contradictory statements about the UAE and their involvement in the war on Iran, and potential backdoor arrangements or negotiations with Iran. And I'm as aware as anyone else that we have to be very aware of what sources are saying what, that the Israelis, of course, have a vested interest in sowing discord and maintaining discord between Iran and the Gulf states. But we've also heard that the UAE has been the most aggressive of the Gulf states against Iran.

We have heard reports, again, you know, without any confirmation, that they were actively, actually involved, you know, back in the early days of the, you know, the 41st hot phase, that they were

actively involved in strikes on Iran. And that continued again recently. And that we also heard reports that they were the ones continually urging the U.S. on to return to direct war with Iran at various ceasefire or whatever memorandum of understanding stages. And of course, this would all come through the Western media, and a lot of it would come from Axios and Israeli media. And I really... I don't know what's true when it comes to the UAE. There's just too much conflicting information out there.

We might have to talk to a real regional specialist for the UAE specifically to unveil what is the actual truth there. However, what seems to me to be undeniable, with four UAE ships hit in the Strait of Hormuz in a very short period of time now, is that quite obviously, there is no love lost between the UAE and Iran right now, and very likely, certainly not any effective secret backdoor arrangement between the UAE and Iran. Or if there was, that it has obviously completely collapsed. Again, we probably need to talk to someone who has intimate knowledge of UAE security circles there.

#Danny

And in other news, Mark, Vladimir Putin is being said by U.S. intel to be planning in the next few years of testing NATO's unity by attacking a NATO country. Maybe you can give us an update on what the actual state of the Ukraine conflict is, given that it seems like every other week now we hear reports of Russia preparing to fire its missiles at Poland or someone else in NATO. And now we're hearing about testing NATO unity. What's actually going on here?

#Mark Sleboda

Well, are you sure that's the news? Because I thought Putin was dying of Alzheimer's and cancer and rabies and whatever else. What's more is that Russia's secret plans to finish their construction of the Death Star and to test NATO unity by destroying Alderaan. You know, that is, you know, the actual full extent of the Putin regime's terror plans for the future. You know, this, of course, is nonsense that routinely gets resurrected whenever, you know, the U.S. government or other NATO governments start getting too soft or too disinterested in maintaining the conflict in Ukraine.

We hear such nonsense coming out of the various NATO deep states. In this particular case, it's coming—again, it's not coming from the White House. It's coming from the deep state, and they obviously feel that Trump is not paying enough attention or not giving the conflict in Ukraine the proper due. So we've got to raise the specter of Russian attacks again. But, I mean, there is a bit of a self-fulfilling prophecy here. If the U.S. and NATO—and when I say the U.S., the U.S. is still very actively involved in the conflict in Ukraine. It's just now all farmed out through the CIA. And it's not a matter of question.

It has been openly bragged about by the CIA in the pages of The New York Times and The Wall Street Journal, how they're the ones directing the Kiev regime's long-range drone campaigns, striking Russian refineries and striking Russian civilian tankers in the Black Sea and the Med and

beyond. They openly admit it, right? This is New York Times talking to CIA sources, and they're saying, "Yeah, we're doing that. Yeah, that's us." It's quite obvious that there is actual escalation by the United States in the conflict in Ukraine. Again, it's just all being kept—you know, Trump basically said, you know, "Just get off my back."

You can do whatever you want against Russia in Ukraine as long as you keep it going under the covers, shall we say. And that seems to be the arrangement of the Trump administration in the conflict in Ukraine with the CIA. So now we've got this cry from the bowels of the deep state that needs to resurrect the threat of the Russian bogeyman. And this comes at a time when the NATO coalition of the willing, the driving partners in waging the proxy war against Russia in the U.S.'s presidential absence, the coalition of the willing seems to be collapsing.

And again, this isn't my words. This is The Telegraph, I believe, again, talking about the collapse of the Coalition of the Willing this week. Starmer is gone, and Yvette Cooper's in his position. I mean, he's made all the requisite noises so far, but there are doubts that he has Starmer's pro-Kiev regime zeal in quite the same way. Macron will be gone next year. You know, he's up against presidential limits, so he can't be reelected. And, you know, it's tough to say whether Le Pen will be able to take power herself, but if she is, then she obviously wants to end French support for Ukraine. And even broader than that, Merz is on a political lifeline in Germany.

His approval rating is like 13%. The AfD is now the largest, the most popular party in Germany. And they're talking again about banning it to prevent it from winning elections and ultimately changing policy on Russia and Ukraine. So the coalition of the willing appears to be collapsing as well. But if they continue escalation against Russia beyond already what they're doing now, then, yeah, they might be inviting a Russian attack at some point. At some point, all of their provocations, all of their, you know, more and more direct involvement against Russia in Ukraine, as the Kiev regime starts, you know, its more and more rapid and undeniable decline on the contact line.

It's a very recent but very real threat of economic strangulation by Russia's long-range strike blockade of Odessa and the other Black Sea ports over the last few weeks, threatening a real total economic collapse for the regime, of their agricultural industry, of their metal industry, of all of their exports. That is maybe the single most important thing that Russia has done to reduce the length of the conflict in Ukraine in the past few years, even. The Western media certainly is not addressing the significance of this blockade of Odessa port.

#Danny

Nothing is getting in. Nothing is getting out.

#Mark Sleboda

Russia is hitting every single ship going in or out of Odessa, the Kiev regime-controlled ports in Ukraine now. Odessa, Nikolaev, Chornomorsk, Yuzhny, even Izmail—it's all being hit on a daily basis, and they're day by day just picking apart all of the infrastructure of these ports going forward. And this is a direct response. For years of this conflict, there were no attacks on commercial shipping going in and out of Ukrainian ports. There was the whole grain deal, of course, that the West reneged on the terms of. But even after that, Russia did not attack Ukrainian commercial shipping and only occasionally took potshots at specific ships that were all too obvious were carrying NATO arms supplies.

But the Kiev regime, directed by their NATO allies, patrons, and almost certainly by the CIA, a little over a month ago, 40 days ago, started attacking Russian commercial shipping. First, they started attacking oil tankers, and then they went beyond that to grain cargo ships, ferries, everything on the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov. And, you know, actions have consequences. And Putin has made that quite clear. There will be reciprocal. There will be tit for tat. Only in this game, tit is much, much bigger than tat. And that has borne out again.

So the end result of the, you know, European-provided 40-day drone war to bring Russia to its knees, to the peace table, has completely failed. And what has resulted is the logistical rape by long-range strikes of Ukraine in multiple forms: attacks on railways, attacks on gas stations. You attack our warehouses, we'll wipe out every warehouse in your country. You attack our ships, you are now a landlocked country. That is the end result of all of this. Blunders like this, of course, only speed up the end of the conflict. So in that sense, blunders like this, inviting Russia to get more serious with the response, are only to be applauded.

But if... if the West cannot accept that Russia is going to not just defeat, but most likely take Kiev and occupy all of Ukraine, and they need to continue the war, they need to continue a guerrilla war, or they need to send troops into Odessa at some point as the Kiev regime's control collapses, well then, yeah, there's going to be a war. It's not going to be Russia launching an attack on NATO that starts it. But almost immediately after it does start, yeah, there's going to be Russian missiles raining down, and vice versa, of course. But as we've seen before, now Russia has a fully functional and very powerful integrated, interconnected, multilayered air defense and electronic warfare shield over their country. And the West has got jack. Yeah.

And they're scraping the bottom of the barrel of munitions for standoff strikes, for long-range strikes, and Russia's production of missiles and long-range strike drones and everything just keeps growing and growing and growing. And we can see that with multiple strikes on Kiev and across Ukraine now every week, with large numbers of ballistic missiles, of hypersonic missiles, none of which they can stop. And we're not even talking the Oreshnik yet. So, yeah, there's a threat from Russia, but only if provoked. That is the danger. But they can't stop provoking. So it would be wrong to me to say that there is no danger of a Russian attack. But as always, you know, it would be reactive. But they're doing everything, it seems, to provoke that at some point.

#Danny

Yep. Well, in the last 10 minutes or so we have here, Mark, to your point about the state of the war, Kiev's military is saying that in July they've only intercepted 15% of all ballistic missiles fired at them, which is also—many people have commented on X and Telegram that when video does get released of Russian strikes, the interception rate is much closer, if not completely zero. But meanwhile, Zelensky is complaining, it seems like, all of the time about the need for Patriot interceptors. Donald Trump said Ukraine needs missiles to win, when asked about this by the media. So, not good news for the emperor of Ukraine there. Your thoughts on this?

#Mark Sleboda

Yeah, I mean, it's the same Patriot interceptor shortage that the U.S. is running up to in the war on Iran as well. But it's also just like there, the lack of capability of the Patriot air defense system in total against ballistic missiles. Now, what they're really worried about here, they know the Patriot can't stop the Russian Iskander-M. This was reported on last year in the Western media, right? Newsweek reported on this. The Financial Times reported on this. The National Interest reported last year in 2025 that the Patriot cannot stop Russia's Iskander-M ballistic missiles, that modifications were made, you know, it's a new advanced missile, and that they can't stop it.

That was admitted, right, at one point, and then it fell into the narrative memory hole because it doesn't match the narrative. But this has long been known. So that 15% number is just nonsense, of course. But the Patriots do, again, have some utility. And what they're really afraid of here is not that they won't be able to stop the Russian ballistic missiles, because there's no chance of them doing that anyway, much less the hypersonics and everything else. But what the Patriots, again, can do is they can hit aircraft. They are the last thing that is keeping Russia from moving from air superiority over the contact line in Ukraine to total air dominance.

Where Russian Su-34 fighter-bombers and even Russian Tupolev bombers could be flying wholesale over the skies of Ukraine, you know, dropping bombs, you know, glide bombs everywhere, right? That is the only thing keeping them. There was just a number released that Russia dropped 3,800 FAB glide bombs on the Kiev regime in July, in one month. Remember, the size of these glide bombs, right, varies from the half-ton equivalent up to three tons. And Russia's missiles and drones steal a lot of the headlines, but it's actually the FAB glide bombs, especially along the contact line, the front line, that are doing a lot of the heavy lifting of the conflict on Russia's terms. They're, again, a real wonder weapon.

And if the regime can't get any interceptors, then they can't provide a threat, a deterrent threat that would keep the Russian Air Force from flying completely over their skies. That's what they're afraid of. They don't want bombers just trolling the skies above Kiev, dropping, you know, glide bombs or whatever else at will. They still want to have that threat that has kept the Russian Air Force always

cautious and at a remove. Russia had to pick apart the Kiev regime's first, far more effective Soviet legacy air defense system, and then its patchwork Western-provided one over years with long-range strikes because they didn't want to risk their air force.

Because Russia always considers that if the West can't show sanity and back down at the end of this, that this can end in a Russian-NATO conflict. And they wanted their air force in as complete form as possible as a deterrent, preferably, but, you know, if necessary, to actually go into combat against NATO's air force. And it is very true that Russia's air force is much bigger and more powerful now than it was back in 2022, because they don't have any significant losses because they've never put them at risk. And the same type of hyper-production that Russia has experienced with drones and missiles and munitions and everything has sped up the production of new aircraft that have fleshed out the ranks of Russia's air force as well.

So Russia's air force is bigger now, more powerful now than it was in 2022. And Zelensky doesn't want that flying over the skies of Kiev at will. That's why he's desperate to get even—there was actually just word out today that Zelensky did supposedly get promises of more Patriot interceptors from Trump in his most recent trip. But these will be basically a handful produced a month. He'll get, who knows, maybe 10, 15, whatever—nowhere near enough. But he will get some small amount of Patriots every month out of new production. The U.S. will continue to provide that. Again, they probably won't even use it attempting to shoot down ballistic missiles. It will be to keep the Russian Air Force at, you know, at length, at distance, not to stop Russia's long-range strikes.

#Danny

Well, Mark, this was, I think, an incredibly efficient and well-done stream, as always. I want to make sure that everybody knows to follow your work on Boosty in the video description below. They can find that. So everyone, be sure after the show to first hit the like button, because that will boost the program, and then to go to Boosty afterwards to check out Mark's work. Mark, any final thoughts for the audience before we end here?

#Mark Sleboda

Yeah, I'm going to be fascinated watching Ukraine's economy just completely collapse in the next few weeks. And we already see the tide is turning, narrative completely collapsing, and soon it will be going very much in the other direction. And already Zelensky is whining for the UN to open a sea corridor. I mean, he might as well ask Guterres to open the Strait of Hormuz while he's at it, because there's about as much likelihood of that happening. And it's just, we're living in such incredible times to see the hegemon defeated in both Ukraine and in the Persian Gulf at the same time. And as long as we can avoid some type of thermonuclear destruction coming out of all of that, well then, you know, Chinese curse: interesting times.

#Danny

Yeah, well, everybody hit the like button before you go. That helps boost the program. Check out Mark's Boosty link in the video description to support his work. All the places to support this channel are in the video description below, underneath that. And without further ado, tomorrow, 1 p.m. Eastern Time, I'm back August 9th with Mohamed Morandi. So be sure to check that out as we continue on our updates, not only on this war, but the larger world global shift that we are witnessing. All right, everybody. Thanks to all the moderators, as always. And, of course, all of you who viewed. See you next time. Bye-bye.