

Stanislav Krapivnik: Russia's Ukraine Strategy & Preparations for War with Europe

Stanislav Krapivnik is a former U.S. Army officer from Donbas, who moved from the US to Russia 15 years ago. Follow Prof. Glenn Diesen: Substack: <https://glennndiesen.substack.com/> X/Twitter: https://x.com/Glenn_Diesen Patreon: <https://www.patreon.com/glenndiesen> Support the research by Prof. Glenn Diesen: PayPal: <https://www.paypal.com/paypalme/glenndiesen> Buy me a Coffee: buymeacoffee.com/gdieseng Go Fund Me: <https://gofund.me/09ea012f> Buy Diesen merchandise: <https://diesen-shop.fourthwall.com/en-nok> Books by Prof. Glenn Diesen: <https://www.amazon.com/stores/author/B09FPQ4MDL>

#Glenn

Welcome back. Stanislav Krapivnik joins us again, a former U.S. Army officer originally from Donbass and who returned to Russia a while back. So thank you for coming back on the program. Thank you. Sixteen years.

#Stanislav Krapivnik

16 years. 16 years, yeah. Time flies by. A human lifespan should be like at least 150, 200. Ten years, 15 years, it just flies.

#Glenn

No, it does, though. But your background from the U.S. military as well as from Russia, it does give you very interesting insights and perspectives for the two countries who have their historical differences. But I do want to ask where one of those historical differences would be, or conflicts would be, that traditionally the main security concern or challenge for Russia to develop its economy ever since the breakup of Kievan Rus has been reliable access to waterways. Again, this is... And on the other side, you see that the dominant maritime powers, be it the UK or thereafter the U.S., always gained a lot of power from controlling important sea lanes.

Again, these are the arteries of international trade and also requirements for moving soldiers, which is why both the British and Americans always put naval blockades, or at least having unreliable maritime corridors for its adversaries, being a key containment strategy. Anyways, we do see that the U.S. is losing some of this control now. That is, the Chinese look like they will be successful at breaking out of this dual island chain after a while. Iran now controls the Strait of Hormuz. And while

a key objective of pulling Ukraine into the NATO orbit back in 2014 was obviously to expel Russia from the Black Sea, at least weaken its position in the Black Sea significantly, we now see a very new development.

That is, the Russians have put a blockade on Ukraine's access to the Black Sea. And not only this, you saw now the Russians, they did their biggest strike so far on Odessa's ports, and also striking, of course, the ships trying to enter or leave. So this is becoming easier as well for Russia, it seems, given that the Ukrainians are struggling greatly with lack of air defenses. I did want to ask, though, how significant is this, and what do you see being the wider strategy of Russia?

#Stanislav Krapivnik

You're right about the ports, which is why, when the Russian principalities, particularly in this case the Principality of Moscow, started growing faster than the other principalities, and it got the *yarlyk*, or the flag, of the Golden Horde to collect taxes, which made it the top dog, it was Tver and then became the *yarlyk* of Vladimir. I'm going deep history here, but one of its main points was to bring the Novgorod Republic and its big territories under Moscow's control, because Novgorod was part of the Hanseatic League through the river channels into Lake Ladoga. Ladoga happened to be the first capital of Rus, then Novgorod the second, Kyiv was only the third, and Vladimir was the fourth. So Moscow became the fifth capital, or actually maybe the sixth capital, because Tver was the fifth capital for a short time, and then Moscow became the sixth capital.

But they needed Novgorod to get out of being landlocked, absolutely landlocked. They held a piece of the Volga River, but the problem with the Volga, sooner or later you go far enough south on the Volga and you're hitting open steppe, which at that point was open steppe, and you're hitting nomads, raiders, and so on and so on. To get out to the Black Sea, it took a lot of effort to come down there. And the Volga, as we know, empties out into the Caspian Sea, which is also a trade route, and then you'd have to port the ships over to the Don and then go out to the Black Sea that way. So it was a lot of effort, and it was a very difficult route. So yes, Novgorod was the main capital. This is why, in the end, the summer capital, St. Petersburg, was built as a major port.

So, yes, that's always been a major issue with Russia. Russia, well before St. Petersburg, already had Arkhangelsk. But the problem is Arkhangelsk, it spends almost half a year blocked in by ice, at least four to five months blocked in by ice. So it's not a reliable port, and it's way too far in the north. So, yes, that's always been the biggest weakness of Russia at that point. And when the Maidan Revolution of Dignity, if you can call it that with a straight face, happened in Ukraine, Crimea was supposed to become the aircraft carrier of America to be able to basically push Russia out of the Black Sea, because they would have been able to close the Sea of Azov off to Russia and the Russian ports that were there on the Sea of Azov at that point, and threaten, obviously, Anapa, and threaten Novorossiysk ports.

So that's a big issue. Russia, we know how history went. Crimea went straight over to Russia, because Crimea is Russian, like all these other lands anyways. But when this conflict started... And my best guess, the reason Russia didn't close all these ports is—and it did the grain deal for a while too, played at that game—until Ukraine was using those routes to continually launch sea drones on the Russian ships off these grain corridors. Russia was still hoping for some kind of negotiation with Trump, or the Europeans, or Zelensky to come to a consensus. They were open for something.

Because Russia would hit Odessa on and off as retaliation for some drone, water drone strike, but they wouldn't do major damage, and they wouldn't close that port. Now, Ukraine has seven ports in the west. It's got Port Yuzhny, which is Port South, north of Odessa, the Odessa port, which is a huge port, and then five other ports, either on the Black Sea or the Danube. Three of those ports are on the Danube. Now, Putin, two years ago, got the green light from Parliament to go heavy. He didn't. And I'm thinking he didn't—legally, he already had the right from Parliament to go ahead. He didn't. He wasn't doing the mass economic damage that's now being done.

I think because there's still hope, at least with Trump, maybe we can do some kind of negotiations. If nothing else says that the spirit of Anchorage has finally been euthanized, something that should have been done two minutes after they pardoned, the spirit of Anchorage should have been taken out back and shot right off the bat. But, okay, they gave it a chance. But it's finally been euthanized once and for all. That zombie's been put down. We see this because Russia has now closed the Western Mediterranean. It may be closing the Western Mediterranean one day too, but they'll close the Western Black Sea. And it was always able to do that.

It chose not to do that. And when the gloves finally came off, what we see is a systematic destruction of all the port facilities. Not pinprick strikes or a slap on the face or on the wrist: don't do that again. But absolute destruction of those ports and destruction of everything that goes in and out of those ports. Maersk, as I already said, there's no way in hell any of their ships—that's the biggest shipping company in the world—no way in hell any of their ships are going in there. And there's probably nobody that's willing to insure any ship going in there. It's a suicide run. So any ship that's going in is bringing in critical military equipment.

And it has to charge in and race against time before it gets whacked, and try to unload, by the way, before it gets sunk. So Russia went heavy. It went very heavy. And it showed that it can escalate a lot further than NATO is able to escalate in that area through its proxies. Ukraine has huge problems, and NATO has a nice big fat price tag. It's going to have to show up. And so, to the EU taxpayers, to the American taxpayers, for the Canadian taxpayers, be generous. Be very generous. You don't need that medical help. You can die later, you know, in your own bed without medical help. Ukraine needs that money. Your kids don't need a new textbook.

They don't need education. Ukraine needs that money. That's \$50 billion that Ukraine's no longer going to be able to export out. Never mind the weapons that were getting imported in, the heavy

weapons that you couldn't sneak across the border inside of a civilian automobile. But this is only part of the problem. But for the Black Sea, it's closed. It's effectively very, very closed. That's \$50 billion of export market that Ukraine can no longer reach with grain, iron ore, sunflower seeds, oil, and other things. That's it. It's closed. They were going to use the... They were proposing to use the Constanța port. So Russia started hitting the bridge to Constanța, which, by the way, Zelensky tried to genocide that town to draw NATO into the war and blame it on Russia.

As Romanian politicians outside of the ruling selected clique have stated, Constanța is 20% of the volume of Odessa. And that's not counting all the other six ports combined either. So what you've got left is rail, but you can't use rail anymore because Russia, directly and through Russian partisans working up and down central Ukraine, has now gone fully after everything that looks like a locomotive, turns like a locomotive, pulls like a locomotive. Ukraine's out of locomotives. Most of the locomotives were electric, so that already was a problem. And the rest were diesel, and they're burning. Russia is going very, very heavy against the locomotives. If you can't do it by rail, what do you got left? You've got trucks.

And that's about 6% of their exports that can go by truck. And we remember what happened last time Ukraine exports went. The Polish, the Slovaks, the Hungarians, they weren't too thrilled with that idea. They were beating Ukrainian drivers on the border. They were blocking up the trucks for weeks on end until the lighter produce was rotting. And even though these trucks were supposed to be going to Western Europe, a lot of their produce and wheat was being actually dumped in Eastern Europe. And it was damaging the local agri-sector very hard. Of course, the projected crop yields for this year in Europe are going to be down 40%. That's hunger. Maybe not whole countries, but lower classes are going to be starving. That's starvation.

#Glenn

You mentioned before the open plains. This is another security concern for Russia throughout history, though. It doesn't provide any natural barriers. And again, this was a key problem when NATO toppled the government in Ukraine in 2014. It essentially put NATO in the same position as Napoleon, Hitler. I mean, this was a key concern. It's often underestimated, I think, in the West. Not by everyone. Certainly the intelligence services know. You know, the former head of MI6, John Sawers, he argued in this lecture back in 2015 that, in his words, he said, Putin probably prays every night for mountain ranges along his borders, because he was making the point that geography is something that has always made Russia vulnerable. And this is a weakness which foreign powers often exploit, which is why Russia and its strategic culture has always emphasized buffer zones.

So it won't have these vulnerabilities anymore. And it's not as if people would say, well, you know, that belongs to a bygone era. But, you know, there's a WikiLeaks from 2008. That is one month before NATO met in Bucharest and promised Ukraine future membership, you know, against the will of most Ukrainians. And Tony Blair, in this WikiLeaks, he was making the point that our goal, our objective with Russia should be to make it a little desperate with our activities along its borders. And

Russia has to be sown with the seeds of confusion. So again, this idea of operating on the Russian border, it's not as if the goal is, well, you know, freedom and democracy. But, you know, let's try to calm down the Russians. This objective is, we know this is a vulnerability.

We know this is a huge security threat. And these are the buttons we can push in order to, you know, show our firmness, in Tony Blair's words, with the Russians. So again, I think the speech by the MI6 said that this was about, you know, we should try to understand what the Russians are thinking. Anyways, given this vulnerability, which NATO has taken advantage of to weaken Russia, one shouldn't be too surprised when this idea of buffer zones comes up again in the strategic thinking of Russia. It is appearing again, I would say, big time, if we listen to Putin when he argues for what they're doing in Sumy and Kharkov, and possibly soon in Chernigov as well. It's essentially buffer zones they're talking about. How far will these buffer zones go, in your opinion?

#Stanislav Krapivnik

Well, first of all, Russian history, yes and no, in that we don't have barriers. We do. There's a gigantic swamp to the west that you can't really get through. There's huge forests and areas and lots of smaller swamps. But the problem has always been, yes, the south. The south is a steppe. It's a highway. It's a mega-highway from the Ural Mountains all the way into the high plains of Central Europe. That's a big problem. So invasions from the south happened by, well, invasion raids by various nomads. And, yes, Western armies that started invading us in 1012 A.D. was the first pan-European invasion of Russia.

And the Russian capital at that point was Kiev, so yes, they went for Kiev, and that was over more or less open areas. It would have been much more difficult to take Novgorod at that point through the forests and the swamps. But they tried to do that too. You had the Teutonic Knights' invasions, you had the Swedes invading. So that happened. Now, having said that, of course, Blair was operating in 2008 Russia, probably with a mindset that that's always going to be that way. Half-wit politicians always have that problem. They exist in a perpetual present state.

They can't ever look forward and say, you know, one of these days, and maybe sooner than we think or we hope, Russia's going to be on her legs, and she's going to have the biggest army in Europe that can roll us over. Maybe that's not the smartest thing to do, because when a major power or superpower is in a state of apprehension, especially when its southern areas are under threat—you're talking about Voronezh down to the Caspian, I mean, sorry, the Caucasus Mountains, the North Caucasus Mountains—that whole area is under threat. Probably the thing that any major power would do is destroy that threat, especially when the people whose land is to be hosting that threat happen to also be Russians.

Now, on the one hand, you know, I've been asked this on Russian television. I've been asked this on American programs. How far will Russia go? You know, I said, I don't know. London, Paris, Berlin. Like, you know, I kind of had nervous laughs. Like, no, maybe that far. Think about it this way, and

everybody should think about it this way. So Russia takes Kharkov. It will. What do the people living in Kharkov become? They become Russian citizens. Then Kharkov is now being shelled by Dnepropetrovsk or Poltava. What does Russia have to do? It has to defend its citizens. It goes further west. It takes Poltava. It takes eastern Dnepropetrovsk. Okay, so they're at the Dnieper River.

What do those people become? They become Russian citizens. Now they're being shelled from the other side of the Dnieper River. What's Russia going to do? It's going to cross the Dnieper River, and it's going to destroy the people who are shelling it and probably make a new buffer. But the people in that buffer become Russian citizens. So, in other words, Russia is going to keep going until it gets to somebody that doesn't want to shoot. Whether that's whatever's left of Ukraine in the central portion, whether that's Poland, whether that's Berlin, whether that's London, it's going to be all up to the people on the other side.

Do they want to go to war, or do they not want to go to war? If they want to go to war, Russian tanks will roll that way. And Russia is preparing for a major war. Let's not kid ourselves. Everything that these European knuckle-dragging politicians voice every single day is heard loud and clear. Russia has been manufacturing between 1,200 and 1,500 main battle tanks every year for the last three years. Whilst it's upgrading the T-72 chassis, they're taking off the turrets and they're putting the T-90 Proryv turrets, the most modernized turrets, onto that chassis, because the T-90 is basically built on a T-72 chassis anyways.

And that's not counting—the numbers I mentioned don't count the upgraded tanks either. And those tanks aren't coming on the battlefield in Ukraine. There's about 4,000 new battle tanks with laser-guided, tube-fired missiles—tube-fired, I mean, out of the main gun tube—that can be guided in, have been manufactured, are in ready storage, maybe a lot more. That's if you go by the conservative numbers. Ready for war with Europe. Europe, by the way, including the U.S., NATO manufactures less than 50 tanks a year at this point. And I'm not talking about self-propelled artillery systems. I'm not talking about heavy missiles.

I'm not talking about fighter planes, fighter bombers, heavy bombers. I'm not talking about all of this. And Russia is at 7% GDP right now. 7% GDP is for the military. That's not a military budget. A military budget is between 30% and 40%. It will go to that if NATO is stupid enough. It can flex upwards; it hasn't. It has a lot more about the leadership than its ability to flex. So hopefully, you know, Russia doesn't need to go that far. Poles are welcome to Western Ukraine. Just agree you're not going to shoot at Russia. Russia won't shoot at you. It's that easy. Whether or not NATO has enough common sense in its entirety, or EU, I don't know. I have my doubts. Very big doubts.

#Glenn

What you're describing, though, sounds very much like the 19th-century expansion towards Central Asia, because what the Russians there did as well, when they built the railways, they'd have a town or a city, then they'd have to protect it, have a buffer, and then eventually they'd have to protect

this. So historians tend to agree that much of it was what we can call defensive expansionism, in which the expansion was, to a large extent, motivated by security concerns along large porous borders which were difficult to defend. But again, this is essentially the consensus of historians. So the main security concern of the Russians has been this long undefended border, which requires that strategic depth, which has helped against, you know, from Napoleon to Hitler. So one shouldn't be surprised, I guess, that this is what they're seeking to protect.

#Stanislav Krapivnik

You know, Glenn, to add to that, the misconception about the Soviet Union was always that the Soviet Union didn't have a foreign policy. Stalin didn't have a foreign policy. He wanted a world revolution, which, by the way, he never did. Stalin was actually the most rational of all of these people. Trotsky wanted a world revolution. Stalin wanted socialism in one nation. Sure, they helped fund some of these revolutionary groups here and there, but that wasn't the aim of foreign policy. And if you actually look at the foreign policy of Stalin—this was post-Lenin, Trotsky—if you actually look at the foreign policy of Stalin, it wasn't much different than the foreign policy of the Tsars. And it's not that much different from the foreign policy of present-day Russia.

They wanted a European security infrastructure, while Russia has been pushing for a European security infrastructure since 1886. Nicholas II proposed the League of Nations. Nicholas II was pushing for a pan-European infrastructure. And it happened—well, we had World War I, so no, we didn't. The British played a major role to make sure World War I would happen, and then they got sucked into the war themselves. We had the same thing with World War II. Stalin, up to—everybody remembers the Ribbentrop Pact with the Germans. What nobody remembers is that was a last-ditch effort to forestall war, that the British, the French, the Poles had all signed the exact same thing with Hitler years earlier. I mean, the Poles in 1934. Nobody wants to remember that.

That Stalin, for a long time, was trying to organize a defense movement against Hitler, that the British and the French just dragged their feet, that the Poles were the skunks in the works making sure that wouldn't happen. They were Hitler's allies. They were, by the way, Piłsudski and Hitler were very close. And if you look at the archival photos, when Piłsudski died and he was being buried, during the church service, to the right of the casket, on the front row, right beside the casket, is sitting the entire leadership of the Third Reich. Hitler, first and foremost, right beside the casket, the position of honor. So the Poles were Hitler's representatives in the League of Nations. Russia was asked in 1948... So post-World War II, 1948, Stalin asked to join NATO when he finds out NATO is being organized.

They don't quite get it at that moment, that NATO is being organized against him, but that's the point. Russia wanted a structured security organization for Europe. When that failed is when the Soviet revolutions started in Eastern Europe and the buffer states were created. It was obvious enough that the U.S. and the English were hell-bent on attacking Russia. And by the way, by declassified documents that came out earlier this year and toward the end of last year, I don't know

why it took so long, apparently Soviet intelligence identified that the British and the French were trying to organize an invasion of the Soviet Union they were planning on launching in 1941, which is why Chamberlain was trying to convince Atatürk to invade in the Caucasus.

Russia, through almost 1943, kept an army group in the Caucasus, just in case. So even as things were getting desperate in Moscow, there was still an army group sitting in the Caucasus, just in case the Turks decided to join the Germans, in this case, join the invasion. But the British were trying to get them on their side, and they were planning an invasion through Iran and through Norway—I'm sorry, not Norway, Finland. So that came out of declassified documents at the end of last year, beginning of this year. And again, in 1992, Yeltsin asked to join NATO. In 2000, Putin asked to join NATO. And again, a proposal even to the very last, in December of '21, Putin sent a prepared plan, not the first one, for security architecture for Europe. We've had two world wars.

We may be on the edge of a third world war because the European leadership and so many of the people that follow them are brainless morons that cannot think that they are going to be exterminated. They've lost their entire civilization twice over. The golden age of European civilization died in 1914 because Russia was the evil guy from the outside, because they didn't want to live peacefully. Well, you know, I guess they don't want to live peacefully. They don't want to live. We're heading right back into a repeat of something between World War I and World War II. The way it's starting, it's starting more like World War II. We'll see if it ends like World War I or World War II, because for people who don't know, World War I didn't end.

The official war ended, and then there were a dozen other wars that were raging in Central and Eastern Europe and in Turkey. There were constant wars for another five years after that. That was the end of World War I. World War II ended—it started without a... World War I started with a bang, and everybody ran for the glorious war. It all started pretty fast. World War II started with lots of localized conflict and grew into a World War II, but it ended concisely. There was no more fighting after that. So we'll see how it goes. It could be the best of both or the worst of both. But that's the point. Russia's been asking for a concise European security infrastructure for 140 friggin' years, and Europe decided it wants to commit suicide a third time rather than to do that.

#Glenn

Oh, well. Well, instead of discussing the European security architecture, which was the path we're supposed to be on—at least, well, revive that idea from 1975 onwards before it was abandoned in the mid-'90s. But we're nowhere close to reviving this. However, people are still talking about possible peace agreements, or at least the last one out now was Turkey. They suggested a ceasefire, not a peace agreement, but a ceasefire. And also around the same time, it was announced that they will supply Ukraine with 70 ATACMS. So it's very interesting that the proposals for peace or ceasefire seem to only come when Ukraine and NATO are on their back foot.

And even when there's peace proposals, the Europeans, you know, they suggest, well, let's have a ceasefire and we can send in our troops into Ukraine. Or, you know, now we see something similar with Turkey. I see that Russia did not respond favorably to this. Did you see any pathway then with Turkey, or, like, who would be the most likely mediator if some talks would be revived? Because it appears that, well, Russia has escalated now more than many had expected, at least in Washington. And it seems predictable that as things go very wrong, there will be voices again calling for something that resembles peace, at least, or sounds like peace.

#Stanislav Krapivnik

You know, the last Turkish—I was just looking up the name of it. I'm not quite sure why they used the Russian name for it. The last Turkish ship that was struck by Ukraine is now being pulled out of port after being repaired to return. It was a grain hauler. So Erdogan, because, you know, like it or not, he's absolutely in Trump's pocket, and he's shown himself to be an absolute strumpet on numerous occasions, like when he complains about Israel genociding Palestinians and then sends 57 tankers of oil to Israel. And his people are very angry with him right now. So he may not be there lasting too long. Because even as Ukraine freely shoots at Turkish ships, he's going to supply Ukraine. What do you expect from the Turks?

#Glenn

I mean, for God's sake, what can you expect from that leadership?

#Stanislav Krapivnik

They have been what they have always been: double-dealing, traitorous, murderous thugs, the same thugs that genocided Christians and Alawites and Shia in Syria, at least northern Syria. They, of course, you know, if you're winning a war, you're not going to ask for a ceasefire. I mean, we're advancing. Let us come to a ceasefire, said no general ever at this point. So, of course, they want a ceasefire because they're losing. They want an air ceasefire because they're losing. They want a ceasefire because they're losing. They want a ceasefire along the line of contact because they're losing.

They want anything possible to rebuild the Ukrainian army, pump in more Colombian and Brazilian mercs, and maybe round up the Ukrainian men in European cities, and maybe brainwash a few more mouth-breathers in Europe to go volunteer and die for Zelenskyy. Plenty of Europeans are dead all over the place. I mean, they're running out of room to bury them. But they keep wanting to come. A lot less of them these days, but the Colombians seem to be more than willing en masse. By the way, I've said this from day one, and I've said this on Russian television. The Russian government should be taking the bodies of all of these mercenaries, put them in caskets with all dignity, and place those caskets right outside of every single embassy.

Come get your citizens, or let them rot there. Your choice. And put their flag over it. There you go. Let's see how many, you know, the Poles lost over 10,000 people. They, of course, the lines are relatively stable at times, so they evacuated most of them to Polish cemeteries. But there's still plenty that were picked up by Russian troops as they were advancing here and there. There's lots of others. There's been several hundred French killed, a lot of them paratroopers, a lot of them Foreign Legion. So by all means, my view, I would have done that. I would have laid them all out in front of every single embassy.

Here's your citizens. Take them back. So Russia did something like that to the British during the Second Chechen War. When the British, it was, I don't remember if it was the summit, and Russia brought in a bag of passports and dumped them out. Take your citizens back. If you want to know where your citizens are buried, you can go, you know, dig them up. Here's the passports of all of your citizens we killed. And that was pretty embarrassing to the British. So, yeah, the same thing. They're going to continue pumping mercenaries. The Ukrainian, at least several members of the Rada, they like to talk a lot.

#Glenn

And they've already stated that their aim is for 40 to 60 percent of the assault brigades to be foreigners.

#Stanislav Krapivnik

Now, the problem with mercenaries is they don't come to die for you. They come to go get money. And a dead mercenary doesn't spend his money. And his family probably won't get any of it either. They come to have fun murdering civilians—well, POWs, sure, they love doing that. But they're not there really to risk their lives, not too much anyways, within certain norms. And when you want 40 to 60% of your assault brigades, the ones that take the vast majority of the casualties, to be foreigners... well, you've got issues. And yeah, they're going to continue pulling them in. That's the situation. They need time. They're out of time. Their fuel infrastructure is destroyed. There's been some videos that have been popping out from Kiev, from grocery stores. They're empty.

Because now that America has decided to do an economic war on Russia via Ukraine, Russia started striking all Ukrainian economic targets that it hadn't done for four years, including food warehouses and transportation networks. That's it. Welcome to reality. Russia can escalate a lot faster than the West, up to and including nuclear weapons. That it hasn't is unfortunately taken by the Western elites, by the Epstein pedophiles from Washington, D.C., to London, to Brussels, to Berlin, as meaning that Russia is weak and can't do it. It just showed them it can do it. I mean, it's been showing them on these—it shut down the Western Black Sea. It destroyed the Ukrainian fuel infrastructure. It's continuing to take it apart. It's destroyed their rail network, the locomotives. It's hitting their food warehouses. Winter's coming.

As the Russian saying goes, winter's not beyond the mountains. That's kind of like the Song of Ice and Fire or the HBO series Game of Thrones. Winter's coming. It's the same concept. Winter's not beyond the mountains. So what happens to Ukraine when there's no food and there's no energy, and temperatures drop into minus 10, minus 15, if that's a normal winter in at least the northern half of Ukraine? You've got big problems. And Europe, by the way, is not going to be in much better shape. Europe is down around the 30% fill-up rate for gas. I know you Norwegians don't have a problem with that. You're not going to freeze. The rest of them are. They're supposed to be close to 90% right now. They're in their 30, 40%, probably even lower. And food crops—the crop this year is going to be 40% lower in volume. So you've got big problems everywhere. So send more money to Zelensky.

#Glenn

Well, you and I have spoken a lot before about the concern in Russia that the threshold has been falling, that NATO often feels it can escalate with impunity, and the pressure on the Kremlin to essentially retaliate in a more powerful way. And I guess, to a large extent, we're seeing that. Again, against Ukraine, not against NATO, at least yet. But, as I said before, Russia seems to have escalated more than many had predicted in the United States. So, again, I mentioned the ports before, essentially making Ukraine a de facto landlocked country. Sorry. And, yeah, the bridge is, well, at least a very important bridge in Odessa, which was also struck.

So we see logistics is obviously a key target. What we see, the Kharkov and Sumy buffer is expanding. There's talk about the possibility of, well, some Russian movements around Chernigov, and that this might be a new front. What do you see happening next here? Because the Russian rhetoric and the mood seem to be hardening, and it's accompanied by actions as well. So you mentioned it, they go after energy, also moving more and more now into logistics, so warehouses, railroads, oil and gas stations, et cetera, bridges as well, and anything there is to shut things down. So where do you see the Russians heading now?

#Stanislav Krapivnik

I see the Russians heading into an election cycle. And the election cycle for Parliament is in September. Right now, United Russia has the supermajority. More likely, they're not going to have a supermajority after this. The two parties are going to be gobbling up a good chunk of their... No, they'll still probably be in majority, but they're not going to have a supermajority. So they're going to have a choice of who to form a government with: LDPR—I'm a member of the Liberal Democratic Party, which, by the way, is a misnomer because it's not liberal. It's a very conservative party on the right—or the Communists, who are a party on the left, but left not like left in Europe, where it's just basically liberal wokeism, but actual left.

Either both parties, but we're pushing for a much harder answer to the West. So once United Russia doesn't have a supermajority, it has to form a government, or at least take into consideration, to get

anything passed, what the other two biggest parties out of five parties in Parliament have to say. That's going to change a lot of things. And the military wants a harder strike into the West to teach a lesson. And there's a lot of other factors like that. So keep an eye on the elections. That's going to be the big one. And you can see the mood's already changing. Nobody's even considering the West's frantic proposal after proposal after proposal. It gets frantic when they're going to fall.

Look, the way this is going to go, as far as I can tell anyways, as far as I understand it, the three primary targets right now—the primary target number one—is going to be, of course, the tri-city area: Druzhkivka, Kramatorsk, and Slavyansk. And it's got an envelopment from the back, it's got pincer movements north and south, and they've got a forward assault coming in from the east. They're not going to last long. There's no other lines to fall back on. That's it. What Ukraine's been able to do previously for the last four years, any city they got taken or town got taken and they were fortified to the east, they fell back four, five, six kilometers to the next one and the next one. There are no more next ones. There's fields.

There's some small villages here and there that aren't fortified. There's nothing there. And when the rains start mid to late September, and those fields turn to mud, the only way you get in and out is by paved road. And that entire rear area, guess what? It's already inside of Russian aviation, artillery, Russian rocket artillery, and drone control. It's already near impossible to get things in and out. In a month, month and a half, no one's getting out. It's a morgue. You either surrender or you die. That's it. That's the only option these guys are going to have. And that's going to be weighing on their brains right now. That's going to be hitting morale hard. But you know that pretty soon, ain't no getting out. It's already pretty risky trying to get out. And in a month and a half, that's it.

That line of communication is closed. And you've been sacrificed by Zelensky and company to stand and die while they're making money. They all know this, all those Ukrainian troops, except for maybe the most diehard. And actually, Azov has shown that they know this too, because they've refused multiple times to do suicide attacks, to try to break encirclements and stuff like that. They said no, and they just left. So these guys know. And they know that they're dead men walking right now, no matter what happens, whether Russia takes it before the rains or Russia takes it after the rains start. They're dead men walking.

That's number one, because after that, you open up that entire region, all the way through to Poltava, Dnipropetrovsk, and up into Kharkov from the south. That all opens up. And Russia is already moving from Krasny Liman toward Iziium. And from Krasny Liman down to Slavyansk is about 10 kilometers, and you're on the high ground looking down. The second main target right now is Sumy. Why Sumy? Because Sumy is a major logistics hub. You want to take Kharkov, you've got to cut Kharkov off. Kharkov is obviously cut off from the north and the east. Sumy cuts it off from the west. If you look at the map of Sumy, you'll see lots of highways that run through Sumy. They come from Chernigov, they come from Kiev, they come from Dnipropetrovsk.

There's one line that goes to Kursk, which is the line that they followed when they invaded Kursk and conquered a whole whopping 10% of the Kursk Oblast, maybe 12%, for a loss of 80,000 dead, including lots of Americans and lots of Europeans as mercs. And there's a big interstate that runs to Kharkov. It feeds Kharkov from the west. Sumy falls, that's it. Or Sumy is invested. You already could cut those logistic routes by drones, by artillery, by diversionary groups. Kharkov's going to be cut off from every direction except the south. This three-city conglomerate falls, Kharkov's going to be cut off from the south too, a lot faster. So that's, I think, Sumy's number two, vying for the same spot with Orekhov. Orekhov is almost a circle.

Orekhov is a stepping stone to Zaporozhye. Gulyai Polye may fall before that, but the ultimate goal is Zaporozhye City. So I think that's the three main goals right now. At that point, I think the Ukrainian army east of the Dnieper is going to be, if there's still anything alive of it, it's going to be running for its lives to get to the west side of the Dnieper. We'll see. But I think that's going to be the priority, the way it's shaping out. Kharkov will be secondary after those other objectives. At least after the Donbass tri-city objective and Sumy are taken, then you can start developing Kharkov in a meaningful way. Kharkov's northeast of Kharkov is being taken right now and cleared, so up to everything east of the Seversky Donets River.

#Glenn

I don't understand why the European leaders are still boycotting the diplomacy. I mean, even if they hate Russia to their core, if you see that your proxy war is failing and at the collapse—I mean, if the past four and a half years was the good times, when the Russians and Ukrainians were bleeding each other and the front lines don't move, you know, as the RAND report from 2019 suggested, you know, the benefit would be to escalate tension so we can, you know, bleed Russia of its resources. However, a full-out war could be problematic because if then a large strategic territory begins to shift towards Russia, this would not be in their interest. We seem to have reached a point now, and I still don't understand. Again, even if they hate Russia to the core, they must see what's about to happen here. Something is escalating. They're not in control of this anymore. Something's going to crack. It's just strange. No one's even talking.

I talked to him two days ago with George Beebe. He was the former director for Russia analysis at the CIA, and he was making the point, you know, that if we find an agreement on the European security architecture, as you argued that the Russians have been asking for for the past 140 years, then, you know, it could be a positive-sum game. Everyone wins: the Russians, Europeans, especially the Ukrainians by not being a frontline state. But it's going to take a long time. You can't discuss the European security architecture overnight, so why wait until everything is falling apart? It's, you know, one doesn't have to make any concession, but not even talking, getting the framework in place, it's—I just, I don't understand. I would like to think there's some evil plan behind, but I don't think anyone's behind the wheel anymore. I think it's just, yeah, nonsense, to be honest. Anyways, any final thoughts before we finish up?

#Stanislav Krapivnik

Yeah, well, first of all, wars take on a life of their own. It's much easier to give birth to a war than to put it down. And that becomes, as more crimes are committed, as more crimes against Russian people are committed by America's four decades of terrorism against Russia—we'll call it what it is. Those Ukrainian drones weren't finding targets in real time by themselves. And those drones aren't Ukrainian to begin with—Ukrainian-launched drones. That would be a better way to put it. Wars take on a life of their own, a political life. The other problem is, well, first of all, who do you trust? Well, I'll begin with two. You said the good times for Europeans.

Well, the good times for Europeans was when a million and a half Ukrainian men died. Previous war, I mean, the previous years. The Ukrainian loss is somewhere between two to two and a half million right now, and there's been several hacks of their database systems—names, addresses, everything—either missing in action, which is a euphemism, or deserted, which is a euphemism for dead because we don't want to pay them for being deserted, or just outright dead, admitted dead. Just look at the aerial views of the main cemetery outside of Kharkov. It's hundreds of acres. It's gigantic. There's about 40,000 or 50,000 graves just in that one cemetery. That's a new cemetery. It didn't exist before this.

And there's several other cemeteries around it. I mean, this is—we're looking at a giant... and, you know, it's two to two and a half million dead. At a kill rate somewhere between—the worst of the drone warfare, we're getting maybe three to four Ukrainians for every Russian. But that's going back up to where it was before. But most of this conflict, particularly after '22—after '22, the conflict was averaging around seven to ten Ukrainians for every Russian dead. I mean, yesterday was an easy day for Ukraine. They only lost about 1,200 people. They're averaging about 2,000 dead a day at this point. I mean, do the math. And that's not on high-intensity days. So at this point, Ukraine was not having a good time. Its leadership was having a good time.

The Europeans were having a good time. There were lots of conferences, lots of drinks, lots of kickbacks. And who cares about the peasants if they're dead? Let's breed some more. The unfortunate part is that's the European, the Epstein class mentality. That's how they look at their own people, and that's how they look at the Ukrainian people. Some kind of third-class biomaterial to be used as human beings. So there's that. But there's the other point of any kind of negotiations with Europe. There's two problems in negotiating with Europe. One, who are you going to negotiate with? Who do you trust? The people that tell you every day they want to murder your country, murder your people, destroy your economy, rip you into 50 little pieces?

The people that betrayed you on every other negotiation? Why would you? We're not the Indians getting glass beads. We've got enough of our glass beads, thank you very much. There's nobody in Europe you can trust except Fico and maybe Babiš. And neither of those two guys have any weight, fake it or not. Orbán had weight. Orbán's gone. Magyar is a strumpet of Brussels who's slowly

picking up steam as he destroys Hungary. Who, Vučić? Mr. Huggy Lovey for Ukraine? Yeah. And Vučić, of course, isn't part of the EU. Who do you trust in the EU? Who do you trust in the White House?

For any kind of negotiations to be held, either they're going to be held with a Russian rifle at somebody's temple, and this is how we're going to negotiate, or it's going to be held when these parasites that rule Europe are removed and other people come in that can be trusted. And so far, it hasn't happened. You know, with the Russian roulette of prime ministers in Britain, you know, what's changed? It's a matryoshka. They keep getting smaller and weaker, but they're all still playing the same song. Merz is gone, and in come the AfD. There's going to be another person no better than just another version of Merz. If Merz really does leave in the autumn, we'll wait and see. It's just internet rumor.

What is the point? Even Le Pen. Le Pen is Macron-lite now. She has multiple times said that she is all for sending weapons to Ukraine. Can you trust her? So either she's lying to get in power, and then you can't really trust her because which way is she going to go then, or she really is all for sending weapons to Ukraine. Not French soldiers, just weapons. Can you trust her? No, not really. Who do you trust in the West? There is nobody. How do you build any kind of infrastructure that has to be built on some kind of trust with people that don't turn their back on you? And if you shake their hand, check how many fingers and rings you still have. You know, that's what you're dealing with.

And basically, that's what you're dealing with in Washington. I mean, look, look at Iran. You've got these various people connected to Trump who are coming out and saying, including the military, coming out saying, "Just say whatever the Iranians want to hear until the elections, and then we can really start bombing them." They're saying this out loud. So, again, who do you trust? The entire West is full of psychopathic Epstein elites. And until there's some kind of revolutions, because that's probably what it would take to remove these people, there's no one to trust. The trust is gone. It's gone for generations, unless something seriously changes in these European countries.

#Glenn

Where would you meet? In the past, we had this tradition of this belt of neutral states going from north to south, you know, which was a legacy of the Cold War, at least. But these days, I mean, Finland, which was the largest—well, I would say probably one of the greatest success stories of neutrality—now became the largest frontline. And, you know, even the Swiss have kind of abandoned their neutrality. So it's very hard to... Yeah, indeed, neutrality now is seen as a weakness, you know, something belonging to politicians of a naive past. And, you know, the politicians who come now, they know better. This is kind of the logic. You hear that from Sweden as well, apparently, that is, you know, now we'll have real security because now we'll be in NATO. Yeah. Anyways, thank you very much for taking the time.

#Stanislav Krapivnik

I was going to say one thing with Finland. Finland was the armpit of Europe for a thousand years. It was the kicking boy for the Swedish Empire. Finland joined Russia. It was an autonomous kingdom of Finland in the Russian Empire. They, for the first time, got to rule themselves. They were given education. A stinking fishing village was built into Helsinki by Russian money and by Russian engineers. Finns climbed up the ladder in Russian aristocracy and Russian intellectual circles. And then after World War II, instead of being punished for being a German ally, for running concentration camps, murder camps for non-Finnish civilians in Karelia, Finns were given an easy out. Switch sides and all's forgiven. I don't know why Stalin did that. No idea. But he did.

And they signed a neutrality pact forever. Eternal neutrality pact obviously wasn't that eternal. So Finland is now turning back in. You're right. It was a great success story. It was economically a great success story. And its entire economy was first and foremost tied to Russia. Finland is now turning back into the armpit of Europe. Nobody needs them. Nobody wants them except for meat, meat and border. That's all Finns are worth. Oh, well, you can't fix stupid. That's the problem. And the Finnish people went stupid, and not all of them, obviously. I know Finns that are mentally non-deficient. They understand what's going on, but the vast majority of Finns are mentally deficient. They need more vitamin D and some creatine maybe on top of that to get their brains going again.

But they've destroyed their economy fully. Finnair was one of the best airline companies in the world. Now it's begging people to buy their Boeings because nobody needs them. They're one of the best companies in the world because they flew through Russia and they were connecting their flights to Russia. And everything else is because of Russia. Finland's number one export was wood products, wood that they bought from Russia. Now they get to chop down their own forests, which are much more limited. But Finland is just a microcosm of the rest of non-Russian Europe, the other 58% of Europe, unfortunately. It's a microcosm of it. So until the peasants are poor and hungry enough to revolt, this will continue, or until they're dying under Russian tanks, whichever their leaders choose.