

End of NATO Hegemony: New Alliance

"Nothing Burger" Exposes Western Weakness

Turkey, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia announced the formation of a new alliance which will treat an attack against one as an attack against all. Well, that's lovely, but can we please see the actual treaty? No. We can't? Oh, that's funny, why would you keep that secret? Well.... my friends, what we are seeing here is a prime example of "Alliance Theater", where three actors — on behalf of the US overlord — are trying to posture in front of cameras while neither the military backbone nor the political resolve is ready for action. And that's not even a new thing. Let me walk you through the recent history of alliance theater and how this reveals more about the Multipolar World than about the military strength of any of the actors involved.

#Pascal

We have a new military alliance around the block, or at least that's what some people say, because a few days ago we saw how Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Turkey actually signed an agreement that is now being analyzed by a lot of people, and I would like to give you my two cents on it, because I think something is quite fishy about this one. The chatter at the moment online and on all of the news sites is whether or not this constitutes a break, actually, of the region with the United States, if this is kind of a counterbalance to NATO, whether this is meant primarily against Iran or not. And we've got really, at the moment, no clarity on what this new alliance means or if it actually indeed is an alliance.

One thing I must say is that these governments are actually quite... One thing that they tried to drive home in the media narrative is that it should be considered an alliance, right? If we go to the statements that the governments let out—here is the version from Pakistan—they all published identical statements, press releases. Then the very last paragraph actually says, "This agreement is intended to strengthen collective deterrence against any act of aggression and stipulates that any armed attack against any one of the three states shall be regarded as an attack against them all." And this is what the media is currently focusing on, that we have a very large kind of, you know, Article 5-type alliance of three countries—again, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan.

And if you look at it on a map, I mean, Iran is centered right in the middle of these three. So the supposition is very close that this is meant against Iran. And I think one of the very important observations has been made by Alexander Mercouris and Alex Christoforou on The Duran that, you know, there's no way that this would have gone ahead without the okay of the United States. And it is quite ominous, actually, that the U.S. hasn't condemned this at all, hasn't said anything negative

about it. They just let it go. So the supposition is very close that this is happening, if not with just a nod of the United States, then maybe even with an active push by them. And I judge this to be actually quite likely, that this is like one more approach at trying to create something that is meant against Iran.

Now, what is interesting about this situation is that maybe also that kind of interpretation is not the entire picture. It seems at the moment relatively difficult for international observers to make up their minds. Just this morning, we read even in Russia Today a very interesting article on this, written by an Azerbaijani analyst who, however, resides inside Russia, Murat Sadikzadeh, president of the Middle East Studies Center and a visiting lecturer at the HSE University in Moscow, Russia. So this is an international scholar in Russia. Obviously, if from Azerbaijan, then probably rather with what one might assume are leanings toward Russia, not in favor of Iran, let's put it this way. But I haven't engaged with his scholarly work, I wouldn't know.

But the interesting thing is that his relatively long article here in Russia Today kind of makes the point that this Islamic NATO, how he calls it, might be meant against both Israel and Iran. And then he's kind of making the point that Iran might not be the only target, and that also Israel is, of course, a big problem for all three states. And let's go back again. I mean, yes, we know that Turkey is, on the one hand, has a trade relationship with Israel, which is something that is also being criticized quite a bit amongst the genocide. This is something that Iran is very adamant about. On the other hand, Israel is using and has been having very belligerent rhetoric toward Turkey and has already singled out Turkey as maybe a future enemy.

At the same time, Saudi Arabia, of course, is not having a very bad relationship with Israel, but it's still refusing to join the Abraham Accords as the Americans would want it, and doesn't have normal relations with Israel. Pakistan, on the other hand, has been playing a rather constructive role during the entire last four or five months of war, ever since the 28th of February 2026, when the United States and Israel jointly attacked Iran. Pakistan has been hosting most of the talks, the only kind of really important diplomatic talks that took place, and J.D. Vance, flying to the region, flew to Islamabad in order to negotiate in Pakistan. And as a matter of fact, when the funeral of Ali Khamenei, the slain leader of Iran, happened about three weeks ago.

This very large event, this very large state funeral, with millions of people going into Tehran and other cities. What happened there is that Pakistan also sent a delegation, and Saudi Arabia sent a delegation to Tehran, Iran, to witness and pay tribute at the funeral. And during the funeral, you actually had Iran playing verses from the Quran, verses of praise, while the Pakistani delegation was paying its respects, and verses of criticism from the Quran when Saudi Arabia was paying its respects. So we know that Iran actually has, at least for the moment, a rather positive—you know, maybe not a positive relationship, because they actually did have some military interventions about two years ago. So the relationship between Pakistan and Iran is anything but just a happy one.

But at least for the current war, Iran is judging the behavior of Pakistan as rather positive. So we do not have a very clear-cut picture of enemies and friends. If anything at all, then what we can say is that the relationship between Iran and Saudi Arabia is at an all-time low, although they were making steps in the right direction two, three years ago, when the Chinese actually brokered a normalization of the relationship. It is anything but a clear-cut picture. And again, when the state funeral happened for Ayatollah Khamenei, the father, the Saudis did send a delegation. So, you know, the entire international relations between these states doesn't function the way that the European countries—what should we call it?—the tragedies in Europe do.

In Europe, the collective West always has this idea that, oh, it's either with us or against us. You're either a friend or an enemy. And if you're an enemy, then nobody would ever send a delegation to the state funeral of an enemy, right? So, and that's just not how West Asia works. West Asia has a different way of interacting, and a much more fluid one. And the argument I want to make here in this video is actually that we should probably interpret the agreement that was just struck between these three states in a similar way, a more fluid and a more nuanced affair than the way that the collective West would interpret this. Again, the collective West would love to see this as a strong alliance, while the reality might actually be something quite different and much, much more nuanced.

And also, the other argument I will make over the next couple of minutes is that we should rather take historical experiences of alliances as a guide to how to interpret this, rather than kind of fantasies about this being a West Asian NATO and just a copy-paste. Because NATO overall is a rather special organization in the history of alliances. It is definitely one of the more successful international alliances, at least when it comes to longevity and to its political impact. But historically speaking, alliances are actually built on rather shaky grounds. And the main thing that bothers me at the moment about this agreement, or what makes me kind of doubtful about its real-world impact, is the sheer fact that they didn't publish the actual text of the agreement. We don't have the text.

So the spectacle was like about, you know, MBS and Pakistan's prime minister and Erdogan meeting in Mecca, right, and signing the whole thing and saying like, yeah, one for all, all for one, that's what it is. And then they do not give us the text. And this also has precedent because actually already last year, two of these countries already signed a defense agreement, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. They have a separate agreement in which they also said that they now have a mutual defense clause. If one is attacked, then it's considered an attack against both. And now they are doing a separate one. And there was talk for a moment that maybe Turkey will just join that defense agreement. But now what we have as an outcome is a new agreement.

So the question to me is, why do you need a new agreement if you already have something in place? It means, okay, you needed to negotiate something different. And then you don't actually publish the text. And I tried to find it, very honestly, in various ways. Usually, if you look for a collective effort to find something, Wikipedia is actually not bad because this is a crowdsourced writing of articles, right? And Wikipedia, with its standards and for all of its flaws and mistakes, I

mean, they do have a need to show sources. And funny enough, Wikipedia at the moment has this external link section here where they say like, "Oh, look, full text to the agreement," and then you click on it and actually it links you to the press release, to the three press releases.

These are identical press releases among the three in English, which just report on what the agreement actually says. But it doesn't give us the actual wording of the agreement. And I find this really important because when it comes to these kinds of things, the devil is, as always, in the details, because these are legal agreements. And I don't mean to say that there's anything that could force these countries to help each other, right? International law is a very different thing and a very different animal from national law. What you write into these memorandums or in these treaties is very easily broken.

We saw that very recently with the Memorandum of Understanding, right, with the US. I mean, these things are very easily broken. So I don't mean to say that that's what matters. But how these treaties are being formulated is still important because it is what these countries are willing to put out as their will. It represents what they agree upon communicating. So the communication aspect of it matters a lot. And I tell you, you know, it takes a long time in international negotiations to come up with a treaty text where everybody is willing to put their signature under. In some of the most important agreements, let's say the Non-Proliferation Treaty, this took 10 years.

It took 10 years to hammer out an understanding and then a treaty text that everybody would put their signature under. And this one here, again, although nobody can hold these states to uphold what they are promising, what they're willing to say, like, yes, that's what we're signing, that's the question. And this thing wasn't released, which actually leads me to believe that what they signed might indeed be formulated the way that Article 5 under NATO is formulated. But the main point here is that Article 5 is, in fact, a very weak collective defense article.

It's a very weak one, and the only issue is that everybody, I mean, internationally and propagandistically, Article 5 has been so much abused that nobody takes the pain anymore of reading the thing. But Jack Matlock once made the point on one of my shows, like, go out, go out and read it. Read the goddamn article. It is not a promise to come to your military aid automatically. It is not. So Article 5 is very weak. Let's read through it just for a second. So this is the original Article 5 in the NATO Treaty, the Charter.

Article 5 says, "The parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all, and consequently they agree that if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, will assist the party or parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area." The important aspect here is that military support is one of the actions that states may take.

Not that they have to take, that they may take. And it is still up to each member state of NATO to decide, in the case of an armed attack on one of them, whether they want to do that or not. This is why Article 5 is not an automatism. It doesn't mean that the letter of the article stipulates any automatic kind of collective self-defense. It says that it is allowed to do so. The member states can do it. Now, politically, of course, NATO has attached so much value to this Article 5 and has hyped it up so much and has pretended so much that this is an automatic collective defense agreement that, for all intents and purposes, politically, it now serves as such.

And again, they've done this now for the last 70 years, this kind of hyping up this Article 5. A new treaty, if Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Turkey actually published the text of their treaty, you know, people would read this article in detail and would then deduce how automatic the collective self-defense is and how strongly this is worded. And again, that's not to say that the countries cannot break it or cannot deviate from it. It just means that what they sign is what they are willing to kind of promise and to put their signature under and then be looked at as having made that kind of commitment.

And my very, very strong intuition here regarding the fact that they didn't actually release the concrete text of this agreement means that probably it is formulated in a similar way to Article 5, in a weak way. And again, it's quite fascinating how you can do this, in what kind of manners you can do this. And we've seen attempts at formulating much more stringent forms of collective defense articles in the past. Article 5 is, in fact, one of the weaker collective defense promises that we have seen. Let me show you what a strong collective defense promise looks like that was also signed and that was in effect for a while, and that's the Covenant of the League of Nations.

League of Nations, the precursor to the United Nations, founded in 1919 after the First World War, then basically dissolved at the end of the Second World War, and the premises and so on, and the funds were directly injected into the United Nations. But the UN was then formed under a new treaty, the UN Charter. But before the UN Charter, what the Charter is for the United Nations was the Covenant, as it was called, to the League of Nations. And the Covenant had an Article 16, in fact, which stipulated what an attack on one of the members of the League of Nations would mean. And I just want to read this out to you so that you can hear the difference in formulation and how this article here, Article 16 of the League of Nations, was much stronger.

Let me just read it out for you. Article 16. Should any member of the League resort to war in disregard of its covenants under Articles 12, 13, and 15, it shall ipso facto be deemed to have committed an act of war against all other members of the League, which hereby undertake immediately to subject it to the severance of all trade or financial relations, and prohibition of all intercourse between their nationals and the nationals of the covenant-breaking state, and the prevention of all financial, commercial, or personal intercourse between the nationals of the covenant-breaking state and the nationals of any other state, whether a member of the League or not.

It shall be the duty of the Council in such cases to recommend to the several governments concerned what effective military, naval, or air force the members of the League shall severally contribute to the armed forces to be used to protect the covenants of the League. Can you hear how different that sounds? Like how the Covenant of the League of Nations actually mandated that if this happens, if an attack happens, then A, B, C, D must happen, right? First, economic, what we would call today sanctions, must be imposed mandatorily by all members. Secondly, member states must contribute military forces to an intervention force that then will be under the guidance of the Council of the League of Nations.

This is much, much stronger than what Article 5 of NATO actually says, because Article 5 of NATO still gives each member state a choice whether it wants to do this or not, and in what way, shape, or form, which is actually why I'm arguing that, for all intents and purposes, Ukraine has already been a NATO member. Each NATO member basically decided themselves what kind of weapons they want to send, how much they want to send, money they want to send. I mean, that's all actually—these are all the things that are covered under Article 5. And these are exactly the same things that another NATO member might receive from other NATO members if it was attacked.

If Latvia was attacked by Russia, then, you know, it doesn't mean that automatically Poland would have to go and send soldiers and airplanes and whatnot. They can do it, but they don't have to. It's not mandatory. And that's a very important thing about Article 5, and one of the things that actually has never been tested. So here, under the Covenant, however, they would have been obliged to help. Very importantly, and this is the argument I also want to make, is that the Covenant, of course, failed miserably. Why did it fail? Because states didn't live up to their promises. The first state that actually tested this was Japan, which invaded China—Manchuria—in 1931, under very flimsy pretext, and there was a big fuss about it, and then nothing happened.

The second state that actually tested this was Italy, which invaded Abyssinia, today's Ethiopia, and both of them members of the League of Nations, and then nothing happened. They tried to put economic sanctions on Italy, but this very, very quickly went south, and the economic sanctions then stopped working. Even the Swiss started trading again very quickly after 1936-37. And of course, nobody ever sent an intervention force. There was no military intervention taken. So overall, the League of Nations Article 16 actually broke and got destroyed more or less in realpolitik because the members actually just forgot about this article and said, like, "Ah, you know, maybe, I mean, it's all very difficult, murky, we don't know, and we don't intervene."

So whether or not such an article works depends very much on whether others believe it will work. And we see, of course, with the war in Ukraine, that Russia is taking Article 5 of NATO very, very seriously, which also is a reflection of Vladimir Putin and the way that he, as a lawyer, actually obviously evaluates the promises of other states toward each other. So the argument that can be made here is then that this new Sunni alliance of Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Turkey is, first and

foremost, meant to make a political point. And not publishing that agreement is, to me, part and parcel of the posturing, the saying like, look, we have a great alliance, but the alliance is so great that we will not actually publish the text itself.

Otherwise, it would be clear that this is not as strong a promise as we would like to make it seem. So please, everybody, believe that this is the case, but do not test it. Now, honestly, after seeing what Iran did over the last couple of months, I think this will be tested pretty soon. If the United States again should try to attack Iran and bomb Iran from Saudi territory, and the Saudis actually lend a hand to that, the Iranians will bomb back. And I do not think that this new alliance will in any way, shape, or form prevent them from doing that, because I think Iran will probably call the bluff. And once that happens, once Iranian bombs again destroy any kind of infrastructure inside Saudi Arabia, well, then that's going to be the test. That's going to be like, okay, Turkey and Pakistan, what do you do now?

From everything we've seen, especially with Pakistan and how it has been trying to navigate this affair, my best guess is that they would try again to take some political action and not military action to deal with this entire thing. Of course, this is anything but certain. This is really just a guess. But the way that this whole thing is set up tells me that it's more about the optics, more about the posturing, than it is about the actual underlying capabilities. It's also very important to know that even NATO, when it was formed, was actually a relatively weak alliance. It was much weaker in its total setup of soldiers on the ground in Europe than the Red Army, which at the time, of course, occupied half of Europe after 1945. So the political value here might be there, and in the future it might become a thing.

That is absolutely the case. I don't want to say that this alliance can never actually have a real-world impact, but the history of alliances doesn't actually lend itself very much to that conclusion. And maybe here I can also just talk very briefly about another one of these alliances that was built, that was hyped up, and then just laid to rest very quickly, and that's the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, SEATO. It was clearly formed after NATO, the Southeast Asian version of NATO. And it was formed back in the late '50s, early '60s. Its main members were actually France, Britain, the United States, which at the time all still had all of these colonial interests over there in these states. And Thailand and the Philippines became members of it.

And it was meant to kind of, you know, under this Cold War scenario, let's keep the Russians out, the Soviets, da-da-da-da, let's keep communism from spreading. But although it was considered by Allen Foster Dulles as a pillar of U.S. foreign policy towards Southeast Asia, it did outlive its purpose very, very quickly and was in the end dissolved in the 1970s, actually, as the United States was also winding down the Vietnam War. And it was very unceremoniously dissolved in the mid-'70s, I think, '76 or so, or '77. So the attack against one is considered an attack against all. I mean, this is very nice for the optics and so on and so forth. But it's mainly a political tool. It doesn't mean that automatically there will be a security umbrella and security guarantees.

Not at all. And military alliances actually have a rather weak historical record of actually providing proper security. We also have the counterexample of these alliance structures of the First World War, where different states, including the Germans and the Russians, the Brits, the French, and so on, they promised each other security, certain automatisms that if somebody goes to war with you here, then we will go to war there. And a lot of these promises were broken, some of them were kept, and in the end led actually to a chain reaction that spread a small European war basically across the globe, of course also including the entire colonial structure that the Europeans had built.

But these kinds of security agreements and promises of alliances, the point I want to make is much more about optics than it is about automatic help and whatnot. And if we look at these three states and if we also keep in mind how their military procurements and so on are built, one does obviously get the impression that, yes, they all have security agreements with the United States. Turkey is a NATO member. Saudi Arabia is a very important U.S. ally. Pakistan too. They buy military equipment from the United States. They're integrated into the military-industrial complex, but not exclusively. So Pakistan, for the longest time, has had an ambivalent relationship with the United States.

Let's not forget that Osama bin Laden, in the end, was killed in a compound in Pakistan. Yeah, not in Afghanistan. He was killed in Pakistan. So the Pakistanis were at least partially involved with the entire affair. Pakistan itself has large problems with different types of terrorism, has a very large border with Afghanistan and the Pashtun lands that are shared and whatnot. It's a very complex situation. Pakistan is also a very entrenched military dictatorship, only comparable basically with the military dictatorship in Egypt. These two states have, institutionally, the military so deeply embedded in everyday society that most of the economic structures run with and through the military.

This is very different from Saudi Arabia, which is a kingdom in which it is a police state, definitely. Saudi Arabia is a very brutal monarchy and a police state, but it is not built on the foundations of a military state, whereas the others, Egypt and Pakistan, are. Turkey, on the other hand, is a mixed bag with democratic aspects and autocratic tendencies. I mean, it doesn't really matter. I mean, Mr. Erdogan managed to recenter the state more or less around the presidency. It had a strong military, which was secular in the past, and was actually one of the guardians of the Kemal Atatürk revolution and of secularization. Erdogan changed that over the last 15, 20 years, again centered around the presidency.

These are three very different political structures. And just focusing on the fact that they're majority Sunni really misses the point that politically they have their own problems to fight with. The biggest problem Saudi Arabia has is that although it looks like, you know, Mohammed bin Salman, MBS, is firmly in the saddle and is able to dictate his will upon the nation, Saudi Arabia, the House of Al Saud, has between 2,000 to 5,000 princes. The House of Al Saud came to power in 1932, and since 1932, the family grew to a size of 15,000 people, mainly because it's a polygamous society, and all of these—the grandfather, Al Saud, had a lot of wives and many, many children, and those had

many wives and many, many children, and they're sprawling, and they're a huge family. And within that kingdom itself, the power of the king has been passed on to several of the children of grandfather Al Saud, and now to one of the grandchildren, MBS. But there's a lot of cousins.

There's a lot of discontent. And bin Salman has actually had to use quite a lot of force and violence and threats in order to consolidate power under him. And the longer this war with Iran lasts, and the more this hampers the economic development, the higher the chance that something inside that family might lead to people saying that they need a different branch of the family leading. The power structure inside Iran is entrenched because it is institutionalized and because it is largely disconnected from the individual figurehead at the helm. And we've seen that, of course, live in action as the United States killed the Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. And yes, his son now became the new Ayatollah.

We haven't seen him since. We haven't heard much of him. But what we have seen is that the different branches of the way that the state of Iran is built and is built into society are actually extremely robust. There is no guarantee that that is also the case for Saudi Arabia. The institutionalization of political power is on a completely different level. Pakistan and Egypt, I would argue, are closer to what Iran is because of the role of the military. The military takes over the role of structuring society and creating institutions and creating layers and layers of leadership and internal power struggles, which then work as checks and balances. Not the case, at least from how I understand it, for Saudi Arabia that much.

So that makes Saudi Arabia actually politically quite vulnerable. Long story, in order to just express that this treaty between the three of them, I would caution to not interpret it the way that the NATO treaty works, on the premise that the collective West, that the NATO member states, the Europeans and North Americans, actually are culturally pretty homogeneous. The only outlier is Turkey. And Turkey actually showed that it is not behaving at all like the rest of NATO, right? Turkey didn't ban—Turkey didn't sanction Russia in the same way that the rest of NATO did. Turkey, I recently flew through Istanbul. At Istanbul Airport, you can exchange any currency to Russian rubles and Russian rubles to any other currency.

Istanbul is a hub at the moment in order to fly to Russia, and one of the gateways of the West to Russia. Turkey has anything but thrown its full weight into the NATO alliance. And this is just another one of these proofs that Turkey actually is not playing along the us-against-the-other kind of mentality and is actually creating multi-vector alliance structures. This is also, funnily enough, you know, I don't know why, but international relations has this habit of reproducing certain structures from the past. This is precisely what Turkey also did in the 1930s and 1940s. It was actually playing inside the alliance structures of everybody.

It had agreements with the Germans and the Russians. When these two went to war with each other, Turkey was actually quite happy because it eliminated two problems that it had, or made the situation of Turkey more stable. And Turkey, of course, remained neutral until February 1945, until it

then, well, declared war on Germany when everything was already over, basically in order to join the United Nations. But we see again that the geographic position—probably it is geography that determines political destiny—that this geographical position of being in the middle of these powers actually then mandates that certain foreign policy actions take shape.

And so they do right now. Turkey is playing on everybody's field and not exclusively with one or the other. So if anything at all, I would interpret this new alliance as an expression of the multipolar world in which individual states, for various reasons, form clubs and discussion places and try also to politically posture with and against each other, but not in a very clear-cut us-against-them, NATO-against-the-rest, and so on format. So I do agree to a certain extent with the article that this is also an expression of actually the change of the multipolar world and that the United States is kind of losing this nimbus of being the only potential provider of security.

On the other hand, I do not believe that this entire affair here signals that these states lost all faith in the United States. Rather, on the contrary, it is probably done with the thumbs-up of the U.S. that they got together and did this political show. And I think it is a political show. Again, it would surprise me quite a lot if, in the next round of the Iran war, both Turkey and Pakistan started suddenly bombing Iran, because that seems like something very, very foolish to do, because it would create you an enemy that you don't really need. And the only ones who act in that kind of foolish way at the moment are the Europeans, because completely 100% captured.

They are captured by the U.S., and they display that. And this capture by the U.S. is something that the Europeans are currently proud of. That's why they go to Washington. That's why they look like little dogs or little schoolchildren in front of the desk of the boss, like what they did last year. But they're proud of that. They conceptualize themselves as such. I do not believe that Pakistan and Turkey and Saudi Arabia conceptualize themselves as such. They do what is in the interest of the leading elites within these countries, and they know that they cannot bank on the United States. That is pretty certain by now.

So if anything at all, then this is maybe a new political club within which you can now discuss trade and security matters. If we got the treaty text, I'm almost certain that the treaty text is focused much more on economic matters, maybe military-economic matters: who can buy what kind of weapons from whom, who will supply what kind of support, and on which levels do you do strategic support, integration, intelligence sharing, for instance, or again, like what kind of weapon transfers could be looked at. I think that is probably where the actual utility of this agreement comes in, and that then will allow agencies on lower levels to start processes of integrating—not integrating, but coordinating with each other.

Because one thing we also must understand is that especially when it comes to military matters, states tend to be very protective of their institutions, right, for obvious reasons. And then opening them up to cooperation, like military-to-military cooperation, is something that is not that easy, and you need certain political fundamentals first. So maybe this is a political fundament in order to allow

for more sharing and more exercises and joint exchange, and also economic affairs first. One more indicator that that's the case and that this hard political alliance is not as hard as it looks is, of course, that the first agreement that I just talked about earlier, the one that was struck between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia back in 2025, already had a mutual defense clause.

And in February, when the bombs started raining, in March, when the bombs started also falling on Saudi Arabia, Pakistan worked as a negotiator. It worked as a go-between. It worked basically as a neutral in the conflict between Saudi Arabia and Iran, induced by the bombings of the Americans and the Israelis, obviously, but it tried to function as a broker for negotiations and so on. It didn't try to function as a, you know, going to bomb the hell out of Tehran. And Pakistan does have nuclear weapons, it's absolutely true, but they didn't want to use them against Iran in order to support a war that they have nothing to win off.

So, again, long story short, I think what we're seeing here is more of a reassertion of the multipolar world, not necessarily against the will of the U.S., but maybe even with the tacit agreement of the U. S., but this kind of international political posturing that just shows that there's now multiple layers of meanings and multiple layers of interests that will start converging and will create different clubs. But we shouldn't interpret them the way NATO is a club, because NATO is a special club. It is a club of the colonizers. It's a club of the genociders. It's a club of the white Western world against everybody else of the last five, six hundred years of genocidal mania.

Whereas what we see here is more of this realpolitik of multi-vector foreign policy, multi-vector military policy. I might even call it a neutral policy. Maybe not neutral. Maybe this is wrong. But multi-vector kind of foreign policy, where actors try to play and dance at different weddings as long as they can get invited to them. Why not go? Why not see how far you can get? It doesn't, in my view, undermine the emergence of multipolarity. It's rather a sign of the inevitability of the multipolar and multi-vectorial future of world order. And with that, let me just thank you for listening to the entire spiel. See you next time.